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Abstract 
 
The year 2000 witnessed a significant convergence of global policy positions. These positions range 
from the neoliberal regime which gained traction in the mid-1990s, participatory development models 
of the 1980s, and the technocratic approach to development of the late 1990s. Despite their ideological 
differences, these policy positions found co-existence in the (MDGs) and have framed how poverty is 
globally understood and how it should be addressed, including the use of communication especially the 
media to promote or fast track poverty reduction projects. 
 
This thesis is a critical analysis of the extent to which the United Nations (UN) Communication for 
Development strategy of 2007 has been used in Kamaila Village in Zambia and Mwandama Village in 
Malawi to implement MDG-related projects. The two villages were chosen because they have been 
exposed to different models of poverty reduction activities. The Mwandama Village project is part of 
the Millennium Village Project where a holistic approach is applied to address poverty, while the 
Kamaila Village is a beneficiary of a water project which is considered to be important to kick-start 
village-driven poverty reduction activities.  
 
Even though the two villages have been used as units of analysis, the main goal of this study was to 
examine the two policy documents as texts – the MDG and the UN Communication for strategy – how 
the discourse and narratives that inform them and their relationship with power, shape social practices 
and behaviour at national and village level. The study also sought to establish how language operates 
within the context of power relations by applying theories of global governance, knowledge and power, 
hegemony, participatory and media communication. The methodology used to gather data consists of a 
critical discourse analysis on the policy documents and qualitative interviews with different respondents 
from the villagers, the UN system, NGOs, media and governments. Through a combination of these 
theoretical frameworks and methodologies, this study has shown that the narratives and discourses that 
inform the MDGs are influenced by western actors who use the power of money to pursue their 
neoliberal interests under the guise of reducing poverty. The link between political power, the poverty 
reduction ideas and interests of elite actors saturates and remotely controls available policy spaces for 
participation with external knowledge and rules, starting from the UN system down to the villages 
thereby enabling neoliberal ideas to control the flow of knowledge and the construction of discourses.  
 
Despite attempts to harness local modes of social communication to transmit the neoliberal notions of 
poverty in the villages, individual villagers have discursively devised ways of maintaining their own 
‘traditional’ ways of life. This highlights that poverty reduction discussions must not be too obsessed 
with controlling or changing people’s minds and behaviour but seek to understand the grassroots’ 
lifestyles as a baseline for informed intervention. Ignoring this baseline knowledge is one of the many 
reasons development has failed dismally since the 1950s because it is driven by capital interests from 
the top to bottom with less or no intentions to address poverty.  
 
In addition, the ability of media messages to influence practices and behaviour remains a contested 
arena. But as this study established, the strength of messages to alter social practices has its limitations 
because behaviour is a manifestation of several factors such as environment, context, biology, genealogy 
and culture, some of which are not linked to communication. However, communication within the 
context of the villagers is part of their way of exchanging or transmitting ideas and knowledge in 
producing and reproducing their culture and not to eliminate it. This thesis makes scholarly contribution 
through the use of a critical approach to international policy formulation, and participation within a 
globalised world. While several studies have analysed the link between communication and poverty 
reduction privileging the neoliberal construction of these themes, this study has demonstrated that the 
grassroots are not unthinking; they have a well-being, cultural context and communication ecology 
which needs to be understood first and respected. These findings expose the tensions between the 
neoliberal interests-driven elite view of poverty and the local way of viewing well-being.  
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SECTION I: INTRODUCTION AND CONTEXT 
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Chapter One: Introduction and organisation of the study 
 
1.1 Background 
In September 2000, 189 countries unanimously adopted the Millennium Development Goals 
(MDGs) and pledged to reach a number of targets that would improve people’s lives by 2015; 
a declaration that has been praised as the world’s biggest poverty0F1 reduction project. The MDGs 
project has enjoyed the backing of development professionals and major finance institutions 
such as the World Bank, IMF and other bilateral aid agencies1F2 (Easterly, 2007; 2008). Critics 
such as Amin (2006), Escobar (1995) and others have raised concern over global policies such 
as the MDGs, for their prescriptive and top-down nature and their inability to take on board the 
views of ordinary people in their formulation, despite the promise to embrace and strengthen 
participation.   
 
This study aims to critically analyse the discourses and narratives that frame both the poverty 
reduction and participation approaches in the two United Nations system texts: the UN 
Communication for development strategy and the MDGs, with a specific interest in examining 
the function of the former as an enabler of the latter.  It is a study of policies as texts, messages 
and ideas and their relationship with social power and practices through examining how words 
shape worldviews (Freire and Macedo, 1987). The study also examines participatory 
opportunities and moments for different actors, mainly focusing on Malawi and Zambia 
governments and villagers, and their role in the policy formulation and implementation of 
MDG-related projects, including identifying which actors have access to or participated in 
which policy spaces across the cross-section of policy hierarchy of the global system, and with 
what level of influence.  
 
The interest to undertake this study derives from the UN Secretary General’s (UNSG) report of 
2010 which recommended that to achieve the MDG targets requires strengthening 
communication for development in order to expedite their localisation. Localisation of the 
                                                 
1 The researcher is aware of the ideological baggage associated with the word poverty. When used outside the 
conventional discourse, it refers to lack of what is needed to achieve a desired well-being by individuals and 
communities.  
2 The United States, the European Union, Canada, Norway and others made promises of substantial aid increases 
at Monterrey in 2002, a result doubtlessly influenced by the MDG negotiations two years earlier (Clemence, Kenny 
and Moss (2004). 
2 
 
MDGs suggests an interesting and important policy shift which is the baseline of this inquiry, 
especially to establish whose ideas shape the discourses at global, national and local level. 
Various studies led by Chambers (1983;1997) and Edwards and Gaventa (2001), that have 
attempted to analyse the relationship between international development policies in relation to 
participation have looked at this link as a given, without paying particular attention to how 
interests embedded in such policies have implications on the mode of participation at different 
policy levels. This study assumes that actors hold positions, opinions and interests and also 
belong to constituencies. These positions and interests shape policies, ideas and therefore 
exercise agency (power). This assumption makes this study one of communication messages, 
ideas and social relations. The field of sociology has extensively offered important insights into 
the relations between power and social communication (cf. Gerber and Linda, 2010) but it is 
critical theorists such as Cox (1987) who offer provocative insights into the link between ideas, 
interests and global policies. The latter insights have stimulated interest in pursuing this study, 
especially to examine how communication is used to translate the ideas in the MDGs. The 
recommendation by the UNSG report places communication at the heart of achieving the 
MDGs. In a way, this revives the long standing debates on media-reception theories and the 
cause-effect relations between ideas, communication and hegemony. Therefore, my interests in 
this study transcended debates on media effects as raised in Gerbner (1983), Levy and 
Gurevitch (1993) and others. This study thus brings to the fore Cox’s (1987) argument that 
global frameworks such as the MDGs are outcomes of ideas which are neither neutral nor 
candid to the poverty reduction cause since they are designed to pursue specific interests.  
 
In undertaking this research, I have also taken into account that the link between 
communication, participation and their integration into global policies has not been adequately 
explored in the field of communication and media studies. This study attempts to bring these 
concepts together and to examine the effect of communication on behaviour, without taking 
development ideas as given.  Within the field of media studies, the relation between knowledge 
and behaviours resonates with media-effects theories which have oscillated between three 
narratives, namely the alternative, significant and minimal media effects theories (Katz, 1980, 
1987; Schramm & Roberts, 1971). Despite their variations, these three have their origins in 
Lasswell (1930, 1935) who popularised the magic bullet theory, which assumed a significant 
effect of the media messages on the target audience. Shannon and Weaver (1949) developed 
the agenda-setting theory, drawing from Lasswell’s magic bullet theory which emphasised the 
power of media messages to transform society. The rise of modernisation meant that mass 
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media were enlisted as a key socialising agent to the modernisation cultural orientation (Katz, 
1960), as did other less assuming theories in the 1950s and 1960s. The UNSG’s 
recommendation to apply communication to expedite the implementation of the MDGs 
resonates with the first category of theories where messages are assumed to have the power to 
alter behaviour (cf. Katz, 2001; Neuman and Guggenheim, 2011).  
 
Focus on media effects alone is not sufficient to respond to the discussion on the cause-effect 
relationship between media effects and behaviour change, because limiting the analysis to 
media has always assumed media and communication to be neutral, thus free from interests. To 
secure a solid theoretical grounding for analysing the link between the UN Communication for 
Development strategy and the MDGs, this study draws from several critical theorists  such as 
Cox (1987), Foucault (2003),  and Escobar (1995), who have extensively brought to the fore 
the link between discourse and power. This study relies on Foucault’s (2003) and Lukes’ (1974; 
2015) definitions of power as a multi-dimensional social factor. All three dimensions of power 
postulated by Lukes (1974) are applied in this study. The first dimension noted by Lukes (1974) is 
that power is a behavioural characteristic which gives one social group or individual the power to 
influence decision-making and choices against the wishes or interests of the other in a context 
considered participatory. The second dimension refers to the extent to which the power group or 
individual consciously or unconsciously prescribes participatory parameters. The third dimension 
refers to how the powerful set the agenda to transform the powerless in such a way that the 
powerless are forced to behave like the powerful.  
 
Unlike Lukes, who has understood power as the capacity of an individual or group to impose 
their will on those seen as powerless, Foucault (1980) has conceived power as not being owned 
but as something that manifest itself in a particular way, more as strategy than a permanent 
possession.  In Foucault’s understanding, power is recursive, fluid and dynamic which makes 
it employable and exercisable through different social networks. He places the individual at the 
center of power and as vehicle of power and not an object of its application (Foucault,1980).  
Foucault’s view of power present two dimensions that are relevant to the analysis of the MDGs, 
participation and the role of communication in poverty reduction.  The first dimension is that 
power is everywhere and it operates through a social network of relations of the entire society 
than between the developed and the developing societies. The second dimension is that 
individuals are therefore not powerless or objects of its exercise or application but are the agents 
of power who act and exercise it.   
4 
 
 
Once communication is connected to power, or is in the service of a dominant discourse, several 
authors (Cox, 1987; Foucault, 2003; Escobar, 1995), have cautioned, this convergence 
advances the interests of hegemonic forces, with communication functioning to sustain a 
cultural environment that perpetuates the dominant social order. Drawing on empirical insights, 
an interpretive analysis is used to assess the impact of discourse on participation in MDGs 
projects in selected villages of Malawi and Zambia. Through this approach, this study unpacks 
the encapsulated assumptions that when fostered through an appropriate communication 
strategy, community participation and empowerment have the effect of fast-tracking poverty 
reduction in the selected villages of the two countries.    
 
In order to effectively examine the proposed role of the UN Communication for development 
strategy in expediting the MDGs, this study situates analysis within theories of global 
governance, largely paying attention to the UN system as an arena of discourse production, 
where interests manifest into ideas and form narratives which are disseminated through textual 
devices. The study draws on global governance theorists such as Rosenau (1999), Foucault 
(2003) on discourse production, Cox (1997) on his critical analysis of the link between actors 
(including institutions), ideas and materials interests. It also draws from insights on media 
effects theorists such as Hall (1982), Gerbner (1983), and Levy and Gurevitch (1993). The 
convergence of these theories is almost adequate to provide a credible context to analyse the 
discourse and narratives that frame the MDGs and the UN communication for development 
strategy. This study relies on Cox (1997), mainly for his critical theory, and also draws from 
Freire’s (1994) ideas to unpack how the villagers defined their lifestyles. The researcher is 
aware of the recent contributions made by several scholars in the field of communication for 
development such as Hemer and Tufte (2005), Malikhao (2004), Servaes and Malikhao (2004), 
Obregon and Waisbord (2012), Morris (2001),  Mefalopulos (2009), Adams (1999, 2015) and 
many others who have paid particular attention to specialized areas. This study also takes into 
account that available literature on communication for development from some of these authors 
hardly challenge or explore ideas outside conventional development; or analyse communication 
for development in a broader global framework such as the MDGs. They have invested much 
of their time and resources in narrow or specialised areas such as public health, emergencies 
and cultural practices (cf. Singhal and Rogers, 2004, 1999; Tufte, 2001; Bauman, 1999). 
 
5 
 
The concept of participation, in its different variations, and as a global value in poverty 
reduction, has acquired dominant currency in conventional development. An extensive range 
of research has paid attention to the different levels of participation and their implications for 
intended outcomes (cf. Lazarsfeld, Berelson & Gaudet, 1944). There is however, little research 
on the link between communication and the different variations of participation, with existing 
research ranging from communication for community integration (Salmon & Neff, 1989), 
participation for integration (Vedlitz & Veblen, 1980), and the use of media for participation 
(Smith, 1986). These are only differentiated by purpose, not by model, as they each resonate 
with the democratic participatory model (Friedland & McLeod, 1998). Community integration 
into government structures provides spaces for participation, but media and interpersonal 
communication have been used to provide the knowledge or incentives to access participatory 
opportunities provided by the structure. 
 
The nexus between the UN communication for development and the MDGs is yet to be studied 
in greater detail. Extant literature consists of specialized studies mainly in the areas of health, 
agriculture and human rights but does not link to a broader framework as proposed in the 
UNSG’s recommendation. Thus, available literature has numerous loose ends, specifically 
regarding whether lack of development can be directly attributed to lack of participation, 
knowledge or communication. These co-relations are betrayed by how poverty is defined in 
economic terms and not from epistemological or participatory perspectives. In addition, the 
context in which the UNSG makes his recommendations raises key theoretical concerns 
regarding the integration of a horizontal model to facilitate a vertical global policy framework, 
given the historical tensions where the latter is seen as dragging the former to advance the 
interests of the global elites.  Although the scenario is not in favour of the former, the argument 
put across in this study is that Malawi, Zambia and other developing countries can escape both 
poverty and domination if they retain their local understanding of well-being to which 
communication is inherently part of. 
 
While the use of communication to advance development ideas might have a much longer 
history, this study traces this relationship from the post Second World War era, where 
development gained prominence as part of the very old catch-up models purportedly to bring 
forward those left behind by modernisation (Escobar, 1995; Rogers, 1962). Existing literature 
Rogers, 1999; Servaes and Malikhao, 2006; Mefalopulos, 2003; 2006; 2008; Waisbord, 2000; 
Hemer and Tufte, 2005) and many others,  has focused on the role of communication in poverty 
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reduction, but a lot more needs to done on the effects of ideas on communication at the 
grassroots. Most of the extant literature tends to focus more on the effects of institutionally-
driven poverty reduction ideas instead of attempting to understand how local ideas on the same 
interact with local communication practices. Although not deliberate, such academic 
negligence is partially responsible for the unquestioned marriage between communication and 
modernisation development models, which have paved an unquestioned role of communication 
at the service of conventional development. Such literature has mainly focused on improving 
the effectiveness of communication in transmitting ideas, as opposed to analysing the ideas 
behind the poverty discourse. Most of such research has drawn from the post- Second World 
War era, where development theories were characterized by policy shifts, while communication 
for development remained static, making it a supporting act to the top-down modernization 
theory in the 1960s. Development theories have transitioned from the dependency theory in the 
1970s, the alternative models in the 1980s and the Structural Adjustment Programmes in the 
1990s, to the MDGs (Servaes, 2010).  With this dynamism occurring in the field of development 
studies, communication for development has remained a tool for transmitting knowledge, a 
practice that is drawn from Quebral (1970) who equates poverty with ignorance, and 
consequently justifying a vertical transfer of ideas to those considered poor (cf. Quebral, 1973; 
Singhal and Rogers, 1999). Quebral’s early conceptualisation resembles Lasswell’s (1930) 
magic bullet theory, which prioritizes the efficiency and power of the message to change minds 
and worldviews. Shannon and Weaver’s (1949) agenda-setting theory also built on Lasswell’s 
(1930).  
 
The United States and other western donors embraced the Information and Communication 
(ICT) for Development agenda in the 1990s, largely informed by the assumptions contained in 
these theories (Amoah, 2104). This was part of the bigger picture aimed at enhancing 
participatory spaces, liberalisation and shifting economic growth activities from government to 
the private sector through the ICT agenda. However, as with most communication models, the 
ICT agenda fell victim to the interests of global elites raising the question of the strength of 
ideas over channels (ibid). In Foucault (2003) and Cox (1981, 1987), the message is an 
embodiment of ideas and interests, while in Giddens (1984) communication is a socialising 
agent which can maintain or change existing values in society. These concoctions of theories 
and models in the field of communication for development, remain stagnantly grounded on 
Rogers’ (1960) vertical diffusion of innovation model and somewhat reference Freire’s (1994) 
dialogic pedagogy ideas (cf. Tufte and Mefalopulos, 2009) despite several theoretical advances 
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in other fields of study such as behaviour sciences and social marketing (Kotler and Lee, 2008). 
It is also worth highlighting that the notion of diffusion has also evolved from Rogers’ 1960 
model to represent attempts to spread ideas with the aim of influencing actions within a social 
group. According to Rogers (1995), diffusion refers to three processes: repetition of ideas from 
the sender and the receiver; opposition where ideas are interpreted polysemically by the receiver 
according to their different context, and adaptation, where receivers reconcile the ideas 
according to their context. In Gustav Le Bon (1897), diffusion is an outcome of social collective 
behaviour with little room for difference. The theorization of diffusion model is necessary to 
explain the tensions between the UN Communication for development strategy’s desire to bring 
the poor on board and the poor people’s ability to either adopt, adapt or reject the proposed 
ideas, all of which must be viewed as both logical and natural.  
 
A critical discourse analysis of the MDGs and how they set the development agenda, imposing 
a worldview, and the way actors are allocated roles, helps to explain these tensions. A narrative 
and interpretive analysis compliments the critical discourse analysis by assessing the 
differences in meanings of words and concepts when used within the global policy frameworks 
and at village level, including how the two worlds are forced to converge into a single discourse. 
The forced convergence of these two worlds lays the foundation for concluding that the current 
poverty, as understood by the UN system, is an outcome of power but is also a basis for creating 
a new discourse, through the reformulation of identity and repositioning of communication for 
development. The manifestation of interests into global policies is summarized in Cox (1987), 
Hemer and Tufte (2005) and others as an unholy alliance that sustains neoliberalism2F3. The main 
source of concern arising from these authors is that communication ends up being fashioned 
along the old magic bullet model of Lasswel (1930), of who says what to whom, with what 
effect/intentions, especially when those considered poor are at the receiving end of an interest-
laden international development policy such as the MDG, without raising fears of co-option of 
the poor into the global mainstream (cf. Foucault, 1979; Cox, 1987; Cohen, 1994; Freire, 1994).    
 
Providing further nuance to the varying views on the impact of communication on behaviour, 
especially where participatory approaches are linked to globalised frameworks such as the 
                                                 
3 Neoliberalism is based on several reforms which include governance reforms, community-ownership of projects, 
open and competitive environment, results and goal-oriented planning, people-driven initiatives, market enterprise 
and decentralisation among others. 
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MDGs, this study contends that the transmission of ideas and messages has to be analysed 
within a context of power given that such ideas can potentially create identities.  In the 
mainstream literature, the impact of communication is defined in two ways;  the instrumental 
and intrinsic. On the one hand, the instrumental view focuses on delivering an improved well-
being, empowerment and participation within the economic growth model through 
communication structures and processes (Panos, 2007). On the other hand, the intrinsic view 
considers information and knowledge as central enablers to achieving the above indicators as 
people are assumed to be empowered to take advantage of available resources to improve their 
lives (FAO, 2010). It is for these reasons that conventional development deploys 
communication to reduce marginalisation as a means to empower citizens to participate in 
public debates (UNDP, 2009). However, the view promoted in this study is that the impact of 
communication must be seen as resulting in people transitioning from poor to a better state of 
life, according to their choices and aspirations using locally available or externally acquired 
resources. This is central to this study considering that poverty reduction models, including the 
people-oriented approach (Pieterse, 2009), have historically been understood through the 
discourse of the economic growth model, a discourse which has hindered Sen’s (1989) proposal 
for alternative ideas on poverty in his capabilities theory. Sen’s proposal can be linked to 
communication as it prioritises communities through their own participation outside the 
economic growth model. His views find support in Koinyan (1991) and Mefalopulos (2008) 
who propose that well-being must mean the progression of individuals and the unfolding 
realisation of their capabilities, enabling them to improve their conditions of living by utilising 
locally available resources  (Koinyan, 1991). Mefalopulos has always insisted that development 
should focus on participation as a two-way communication process which “constitutes the 
necessary elements if we are to avoid the mistakes of the past” (2008, p. xii). In Mefalopulos’ 
view, communication and participation are connected to Sen’s (1989) human capabilities 
approach. In both Mefalopulos and Sen’s perspectives, participation does not only empower 
individuals to identify, define, analyse and proffer solutions to their own problems in a context 
where they have control over their environment, but it also gives them the power to decide. The 
process of defining well-being is left in the hands of individuals (Freedman, 1985) and not 
development institutions.  
 
1.2 Aim of the study 
This study examines the use of the UN Communication for Development strategy which the 
UN Secretary General (SG) has considered key to achieving MDGs. The UN communication 
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for Development strategy is a policy document adopted in 2007 following recommendations 
from the 10th UN Inter-Agency Round Table on Communication for Development report 
entitled “Achieving the Millennium Development Goals” (2007). The adoption and integration 
of the strategy was necessitated by the observation that the slow progress in achieving the 
MDGs was due to lack of localisation of the goals, especially at grassroots levels. The strategy 
is framed on the premise that achieving the eight MDGs requires “communication systems and 
processes that enable dialogue and allow communities to speak out, express their aspirations 
and concerns, and participate in the decisions that relate to their development” (2007, p.8). 
Therefore, to achieve these would require that Communication for Development principles and 
methodologies be included at all stages of the development process and to allocate resources 
for that purpose. This inquiry is couched within a critical analysis of the discourses and 
narratives that frame the MDGs, including the implications these have on both policies and 
practice in Kamaila Village in Zambia and Mwandama Village in Malawi.    
 
To achieve this aim, this study undertakes a critical discourse analysis of the MDGs Resolution, 
and the national plans of Malawi and Zambia. It complements the critical discourse analysis 
with a narrative analysis of the Mwandama Millennium village project and the Kamaila 
Villages in Malawi and Zambia respectively to unpack the discourses and narratives that inform 
the implementation of the UN’s Communication for Development strategy. As a product of the 
UN system – a global governance institution, the MDG framework encapsulates certain 
assumptions about development and these have implications for the communication tools used 
in implementing them, especially in the villages under study.  
 
Another set of units of analysis are the villages in Malawi (Mwandama) and Zambia (Kamaila). 
The Millennium Villages Project (MVP) is a ten-year experimental project which was 
conceptualized by the Earth Institute at Columbia University but implemented by the 
Millennium Promise Project in collaboration with the United Nations Development Programme 
(UNDP) with the goal of eradicating poverty to meet the MDGs. The MVP was tested in Kenya 
and Ethiopia in 2005, before it was launched in 2006 to reach nearly 500, 000 people across ten 
countries, including Malawi (The Earth Institute and the Millennium Promise, 2010). The 
central focus of the MVP is to demonstrate and promote an integrated approach to community-
level poverty reduction in translating the MDGs into grassroots deliverables. The MVP concept 
suggests that when communities have “access to clean water and sanitation as well as other 
essential infrastructure such as education, food production, basic health care, and by focusing 
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on environmental sustainability”3F4, their living conditions will be enhanced in a sustainable 
manner. A detailed discussion on the MVP is provided in Chapter 2. It suffices to say here, that 
it is proposed as locally-led by the villagers and the host governments and supported by the 
Earth Institute at Columbia University, Millennium Promise, and the United Nations 
Development Program (UNDP), including several other partners (ibid). It is premised on the 
assumption that using different communication tools can lead to participation and 
empowerment. This study used the two villages as units of analysis because they have been part 
of the MDGs project activities, including communication for participation. Mwandama Village 
in Malawi is one of the 14 village sites across ten countries4F5 in Africa under the MDG Village 
initiative, whereas Kamaila Village in Zambia is not part of the Millennium Villages but has 
been exposed to a number of MDGs-related projects, (MDG report, 2010) and communication 
for development activities (Bwalya et al., 2004).  
 
The researcher’s objective in grounding analysis in these villages was to examine the link 
between the discourses that frame the MDGs as a policy document5F6 and its implications on 
practices in the villages. It also sought to draw attention to the relationship between policy 
positions and the villagers’ understanding of both poverty and participation and how these are 
mediated at village level. Document analysis focuses on Malawi and Zambia national plans 
covering the period 2011 to 2015 when the UN system adopted and recommended integration 
of the Communication for Development strategy in the implementation of the MDG framework 
(XI UN Inter-Agency Round Table on Communication for Development, 2009: p. 5). In 
adapting the two pronged methodological approach, the study established a theoretical 
foundation for providing a re-read or reformulation of the role of communication in fostering 
well-being for marginalised individuals and communities in Malawi and Zambia.  
 
1.3 Research problem 
‘Participation’ has become a buzzword in the field of development (Cornwall and Brock, 2005). 
Arnstein (1969) in the paper, “Ladder of Citizen Participation”, identifies and analyses eight 
types of participation which include citizen control, delegated power, partnership, placation, 
                                                 
4 http://www.millennium-project.org/millennium/overview.html (accessed on 30 June 2012) 
5 Koraro, Ethiopia; Bonsaaso, Ghana; Dertu and Sauri, Kenya; Gumulira and Mwandama, Malawi; Tiby and Toya, Mali; 
Ikaram and Pampaida, Nigeria; Mayange, Rwanda; Potou, Senegal; Mbola, Tanzania; Ruhiira, Uganda.  
6 The MDGs resolution, Poverty Reduction Strategic Papers, Millennium Villages, Malawi and Zambia national MDGs’ plans 
from 2011 to 2015 for Malawi (Malawi Millennium Development plan for 2011 to 2015) and Zambia (Sixth National 
Development 2011 to 2015). 
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consultation, informing, therapy and manipulation. She does her critical analysis within the 
topological ladder of power.  These types of participation invoke a myriad of questions about 
how participation itself is operationalised within UN poverty reduction frameworks such as the 
MDGs when considering issues of power or lack thereof especially in the context painted by 
Arnstein (ibid) of the poor and the rich. Notwithstanding variations, the common goal of the 
different types of participation is for those who represent power to drag those considered poor 
closer to institutions or programmes purportedly designed to reduce poverty.  
 
Such a context where dominant power dictates on the poor, questions the possibility of poverty 
reduction being an outcome of empowerment in a context where local power is neither 
acknowledged nor supported but seen as a barrier to inclusion.  The main argument advanced 
by various scholars for the link between participation, democracy and development, tends to 
seek the legitimizing government’s choice of policies and actions than addressing the needs of 
the poor through participation. Perhaps it is for this reason that recent studies (Penderis, 2012; 
Cleaver, 2001; Cornwall, 2002; Mohan and Hickey, 2004) have advanced the view that 
participation in its current conceptualization is ambiguous, vulnerable to power and interests 
and therefore not adequate to achieve the empowerment needed to improve well-being. In 
making this claim, these authors concur that participation marginalizes individuals from their 
contextual grounding and their identities as it operates from an externally driven and pre-
conceived policy position. This pre-conceived position is space where the discourse of people-
centred approaches is located. The discourse creates an assumption that that when people are at 
that centre, they become capable of assuming the freedom to manage themselves, author their 
own future and improve their lives (Sen, 1999). Based on these assumptions, the general idea 
and practice has been that to participate is to be at the centre where individuals can influence 
policy formulation and development initiatives. 
 
The dichotomisation between the rich and the poor is a characterisation of power through texts, 
language and policies. If texts can make so much difference, then whose language guides action 
and participation, and defines what participation means, asked Chambers (2004). The 
controversial debates on naming, othering and labelling theories are well known (cf. Gordon, 
1990; Mountz, 2016; Adam, 1978), including how these are deeply embedded in social and 
political power and their resultant social differentiation and stratification (cf. Pock, 1996). 
While the push for participation dominates development thinking today, it is problematic as it 
draws from loose assumptions that those outside programmes and projects are poor and the 
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closer they are to these the faster they are developed. It is the same stand point assumed by the 
UNSG’s recommendation that when the grassroots move to the centre, the movement does not 
only give voice to the voiceless but also allows the policy-makers a better insight into the 
grassroots conditions and facilitates the transformation needed to address poverty. This became 
the mainstream approach in the 1980s where “tapping into local knowledge and enabling 
beneficiaries of development efforts to participate in all stages of the (development) process” 
became the mantra (Penderis, 2012, p.2). Participation became known as a tool for addressing 
inequality, social transformation and a new way of addressing poverty (Chambers, 1977). Thus, 
the failure to acknowledge the existence of local realities is part of the problem.  
 
The UNSG’s recommendation focuses on the people-centered development approach which 
gained momentum in the 1980s. This approach is not only pre-occupied with placing 
individuals at the center but also re-allocates them the identity of citizenship whose roles are 
limited to holding governments accountable as a benchmark for empowered participation. 
Ultimately, the net effects of this social relocation of individuals is not their empowerment. 
Rather, they become exposed to the dominant transformation agenda which is part of the pre-
existing economic, social and political structures (Hoff and Stiglitz, 2001). Among the 
mainstream scholars, Penderis (1996) highlights that the major problem lies in that the dominant 
participatory approaches consider participation as a means to achieve development goals as 
opposed to viewing participation as an outcome of voluntary consciousness to one’s aspirations 
and a response to realities. Despite parochial emphasis on participatory development, between 
the 1980s and first decade of the 21st century, poverty continued to increase and the gap 
between the rich and the poor continued to widen (see Heller and Evans, 2010). Rahnema 
(1992) has added his voice to the growing concerns that in its current format, participation is 
nothing but a coercive and manipulative tool to achieve the objectives of the dominant power 
than empowering the poor. He describes it as co-option of the South, through governmental 
forces into the dominant socio-cultural structures of power and control disguised as democracy, 
poverty reduction and empowerment.  
 
The concept of participation as presented in the MDGs presents two major challenges. The first 
is that development cannot be an outcome of internal dynamics. Further it fails to take into 
account that the configuration of a local individual as a reflexive subject also includes local 
practice, knowledge and voluntary interaction. Viewed from the eyes of those internally 
involved in the making of that individual, these practices are both constituted and constitute the 
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productive individual expression of the self and community. The individuals targeted by 
development projects and other social inclusion activities by development institutions, is seen 
in this approach as occupying the position of constituting themselves by reproducing and 
adjusting their identities. The second problem is that in the eyes of those imposing development 
on others, development is seen as non-existent unless it conforms to the norms, practices and 
social reality of those imposing development (Mbembe, 2001). 
 
Notwithstanding these challenges, the three key themes: poverty reduction – communication 
for development, and participation – embody the notion of change or an improved well-being. 
These themes grew in prominence from the post- Second World War period, mainly influenced 
by what seems to be the desire to improve the lives of those seen as poor or lagging behind and 
to help them improve their standard of living. In spite of the huge financial and technical 
investments into poverty reduction projects, two key factors continue to predominate poverty 
reduction thinking. First, is that poverty in its current conceptualisation in conventional 
development continues to deepen and secondly, in spite of various global policy shifts on 
poverty reduction, it continues to be defined by economic factors, including in the MDGs, 
which gives no room for alternative views. The multi-dimensional nature of well-being or 
poverty has been largely neglected, with poverty defined and understood from the West or 
centre of power than from local realities. Consequently, criticism of the economic income as a 
measure of poverty has also grown exponentially, largely from post-development scholarship 
which has continuously challenged the way in which conventional development has 
commodified human life. In addition, efforts to empower poor people, which have tended to be 
associated with increasing their income, are yet to achieve tangible results in terms of the 
promised sustainable development. This study sought to establish the relevance of these 
conventional development ideas to the local context of the villages, largely considering that 
Malawi and Zambia have been recipients of development aid for over five decades, and yet they 
have remained poor (Dossani, 2012; Africa Development Bank, 2013). In spite of these 
investments and several policy shifts, possibilities of leading a successful participatory 
approach unimpeded by neoliberal interests has remained elusive.  
 
Currently, international global governance institutions continue to advocate for participatory 
development, with communication playing the role of a catalyst. Community and individual 
participation remain relevant for all their merits, mainly allowing space for individuals and 
communities to define their well-being within their own contexts. However, the possibilities of 
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communities defining their development, as this study will reveal, continue to be constrained 
by interests of the elites who drive and sponsor ideas in the governance structures. This raises 
a question regarding how UN Communication for development configures participation as a 
means to achieving the goals of a global policy such as the MDGs in Malawi and Zambia. It 
also raises an interesting question, when considering the political complexities in the UN 
system, of how a horizontal approach can co-exist with a vertical model. In addition to how 
discourses use words and language to mediate and reconcile these tensions, the study also 
sought to examine how dominant narratives and discourses define poverty and prescribe courses 
of action. The goal is to reveal whose power and interests define and decide these courses of 
action, and with what intentions and consequences (cf. Foucault, 1979; Cox, 1981; 1983; 1987; 
Mills, 2011; Raz, 1986). 
  
This study considers the concerns raised by Cooke and Kothari (2001), Servaes (2010), and 
Pieterse (2000), that the link between capital interests and global policies raises pertinent 
questions on the possibilities of achieving an autonomous participatory model (Hendriks, 
2008).  The notion of localisation of MDGs proposed by the UNSG encapsulates a lack of 
awareness of either the villagers’ development needs or the knowledge required to effectively 
implement the MDGs (cf. Pagliani, 2007; Vinding, 2006). Such a theorisation of poverty has 
historically been used as justification for a persuasive diffusion model by transmitting 
knowledge to the unknowing and under-developed communities. Two assumptions are made in 
the way communication for development is conceptualised. First is that poverty is seen as lack 
of knowledge. The second assumption is that the people of Kamaila and Mwandama Villages 
are poor because they lack a certain type of knowledge. These assumptions raise two critical 
questions or concerns. First, is the way the global community, backed by international donors, 
views other societies’ poverty outside the western block. Second, premised on this ideological 
view of the ‘other’, to what extent is the UN system willing to recognise that societies and 
communities are different and must be treated likewise?  
 
Findings in chapters six, seven and eight shed more light on the importance of taking into 
account local knowledge as a local means of assessing well-being. Findings in these chapters 
challenge the UN assessment of poverty especially that by the year 2010, over 300 million 
people in Sub-Saharan Africa had doubled the level of poverty compared to two decades before 
the MDGs were adopted. Such an assessment is based on economic income than local factors. 
The need for challenging these statements arises from the realisation that by poverty, the UN 
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system is making reference to economic income and not to the grassroots’ assessment of their 
well-being. The UN system also notes that due to lack of participation, over 70% and 90% of 
the population in Zambia and in Malawi respectively, were living on less than one dollar a day 
in 2010 (World Bank, 2010). Despite the fact that it is antiquated, the UN system continues to 
use the dollar-a-day as an indicator of poverty. As later discussions will reveal, the dollar-a-day 
started being used following labour relations issues during the industrialisation period, and it is 
therefore irrelevant to both the current global context in general, and to the two villages in 
particular. According to Rowntree (1901), a labour economist scholar who developed Booth’s 
(1887) ideas, the dollar-a-day made sense in western economies where labour wages were 
calculated on the basis of measurable production earnings and general cost of living, variables 
which do not apply in the villages in Malawi and Zambia. In addition, the value of a dollar 
differs within each country and context, and hence cannot be used as a generalised measure. 
This study also seeks to establish that contentment and gratification are not only limited to 
financial income, but to other factors as well. Based on this flawed theoretical base of 
understanding well-being, the UN system continues to link participation to economic activities 
and production, on the assumption that improved participation will trigger increased production 
which will in turn lead to increased income. The extent to which the UN system is willing to 
invest in its firm belief in participation without succumbing to neoliberalism remains a key 
question.  
 
What is apparent already is that using economic statistics to justify an external mode of 
participation is structurally flawed, especially if there is no emphasis on understanding different 
local realities. The subtexts of these statistics ring alarm bells on increasingly growing poverty 
where communication is needed to rescue the situation. Participatory model within such a 
discourse of economic statistics becomes questionable and impossible. However, on their part, 
governments in Malawi and Zambia have complied with the MDGs planning processes and 
have developed their national plans in line with the UN system’s requirements, without 
questioning the validity and relevance of imposed norms of planning. Malawi developed the 
Poverty Reduction Strategy (MPRS) between 2001 and 2005, which paved the way for the 
Malawi Growth and Development Strategy (MGDS) of 2006 -2011. During the course of this 
study, Malawi was implementing its 2011 to 2015 strategy. Similarly, Zambia was also in its 
Sixth National Development Plan (SNDP) 2011–2015,  a successor to the Fifth National 
Development Plan (FNDP), which “aims to actualise the aspirations of the Vision 2030 of 
becoming a prosperous middle-income nation by 2030” (The Sixth National Development Plan, 
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2011, p. 1). The power of the neoliberal hegemony is evidenced by how Malawi and Zambia 
have placed more emphasis on economic growth in the national plans, even when their 
situational analysis shows little or no relationship between growth and poverty reduction. 
Participation is reduced to benefitting from trickle down aspects of economic growth.   
 
The UN system’s proposal to promote participation, in reality undermines local knowledge as 
it seeks individual, community and state involvement in pursuing a type of well-being that is 
foreign to the targeted audience. However, a detailed analysis of these two worlds helps to shed 
light on the challenges in co-opting local discourses into a dominant one. By suggesting that 
participation and communication have to be part of the global discourses, the UN system is 
setting a context that not only impedes alternative policy spaces but takes away individuals and 
villages’ decision-making with regards to well-being. What is supposed to be inclusion 
becomes exclusion as processes shift from a locally-based discourse of well-being to eventually 
manifesting in a form of marginalisation which has historically replicated itself in the structures 
of economic and political power (Hulme, 2009).  
 
Recent policy documents, have yet to indicate a departure from their marriage to conventional 
development projects despite advocacy by several scholars who have built on Freire (1994) and 
Rodney’s (1981) ideas that escaping the trap of neoliberalism depends on local discourses in 
which social communication plays a part. In proposing this route, these authors were concerned 
that the flow of knowledge from the centre of power to the periphery, especially when aligned 
to economic interests, would be skewed in favour of the centre and at the expense of the 
periphery. Although undertaking an assessment of individual and community participation is 
one of the main focuses of this study, assessment of the extent to which views of ordinary 
people are included in international development policy is given particular attention. Existing 
policy documents on communication for development and participation largely have the 
objective of co-opting those seen as poor into structures of power by promising to amplify their 
views but within the same decision-making structures. Among these is the Bellagio Statement 
on the role of Communication in meeting the MDGs (2004), Paris Declaration on Aid 
Effectiveness (2005), the Rome Consensus (2006), and several other initiatives. Both the 
Bellagio and the Paris Declarations are concerned with processes and structural integration of 
communication for development, and the Rome Consensus (2006) provides the knowledge 
frames and the working definition.   
 
17 
 
Literature on Communication for development abounds with examples of seemingly successful 
initiatives, but instead of enhancing freedom, emancipatory participation and autonomy, 
communication activities’ link to institutional project goals has tended to defy the promise of 
communication as “a social process based on dialogue using a broad range of tools and 
methods... and about seeking change at different levels including listening, building trust, 
sharing knowledge and skills, building policies, debating and learning for sustained and 
meaningful change” (The Rome Consensus, 2006). Initiatives such as the Rome Consensus 
come on the heels of the people-centred development models of the 1980s which failed to gain 
ground because of similar reasons. The 10th UN Inter-Agency Round Table on Communication 
for Development Monitoring Report (2007) however, takes a sideswipe by blaming insufficient 
platforms and mechanisms for communication for development as part of the reasons why 
developing societies cannot escape poverty (ibid, p.4).  
 
Due to its lack of academic independence or freedom from control/influence of development 
organisations, communication has remained locked within top-down models purportedly to 
facilitate horizontal dialogue. The establishment of radio programmes under the World Bank 
funding in both Malawi and Zambia as part of Declaration on Aid Effectiveness (2005) and the 
Rome Consensus (2006) are examples of the inclusionary use of communication to transfer 
knowledge (cf. Rogers, 1986). It is noted that the UNSG is proposing a model where knowledge 
is transmitted from institutions to the grassroots, another scenario which contradicts the view 
that dialogic communication is a priority. Historically, the UN system has demonstrated a lack 
of suitable structures for listening to the grassroots. Critiques of the UN system as a global 
governance institution have argued that the endogenous character of global development 
solutions is a veiled replica of Westernisation, by imposing western culture and systems on 
developing countries (Serves, 1995; Alexander and Kessler 2003; Bullard 2003). Nonetheless, 
scholars of participatory development are hopeful that the concept can be salvaged from the 
trenches of neoliberalism, by firstly understanding local culture as a basis for formulating 
relevant response (Cooke and Kothari, 2001).  
 
1.4 Research question  
The central research question of this study is: To what extent does communication for 
development facilitate poverty reduction within the framework of the MDGs in Malawi and 
Zambia? In order to address this broad question and unpack other intricate issues around the 
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use of communication for development in implementing the MDGs at country and village level, 
the following sub-questions are explored:  
1. What is the global governance context in which the MDGs are formulated, adopted and 
implemented?  
2. How were the MDG and the UN Communication for Development strategy 
conceptualised?  
3. What narratives and discourses frame the MDG and the UN Communication for 
Development Strategy? 
4. What are the implications of the Communication for Development strategy on 
participatory approaches to Malawi and Zambia’s poverty reduction strategies and 
practices in the villages? 
 
Question 1 takes into account that the MDG as a global policy becomes the source of ideas 
being transmitted through the UN Communication for development strategy. It also considers 
global, national and local policy spaces and opportunities for participation. 
 
1.5 Rationale 
This study contributes to and revitalises the stagnating body of critical scholarship in the field 
of communication for development in general. Despite a proliferation of university training 
courses and demand for experts in the field of communication for development, mainstream 
literature, especially recent scholarly publications, is yet to adequately approach 
communication for development from a critical perspectives. This is largely because most of 
the available studies are either donor-driven or commissioned by organisations with pre-set 
programme goals. That focus has diverted attention on the importance of understanding the role 
of communication for development at local level and has reduced it to a tool for poverty 
reduction by development institutions. Crucial to this inquiry and existing literature in this field 
of study is the assumption that communication for development can only exist to advance and 
expedite institutional policies towards broader global and national goals. The UNSG’s 
recommendation to integrate communication for development into MDG projects suggests that 
the transmission of messages to targeted audience has the direct effect of transforming 
behaviour. The primary objective in the UNSG’s recommendation is not to acknowledge the 
relevance of local knowledge to addressing local problems. The notion in this assumption 
resonates with the two-step flow sub-theories which have attempted, though not adequately, to 
shed more light on the importance of local context as a basis for reasoning and reading of 
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messages. Lack of interest in understanding grassroots context has perpetually rendered 
communities goalless, thoughtless and passive receivers of knowledge and aid, despite the 
concept of the UN communication for development strategy acknowledging that the power of 
locals to address poverty lies in their culture.  
 
An assumption being conveyed by the UNSG’s recommendation is that integration of 
communication and participation into the MDGs projects is paramount, with communication 
positioned as a necessary condition needed to reduce poverty. The link between the MDGs and 
bringing individuals in Malawi and Zambia into its projects is a function of and is mediated by 
communication. The assumption established by this narrative is that individuals are unaware of 
their poverty hence the need to acquire such knowledge through the media and other forms of 
communication before they can solve it through participatory approaches. Applying 
communication for development to improve message delivery of institutional goals continues 
to constrain research in this area, as most of the recent studies focus more on the efficiency of 
message delivery (cf. Mefalopulos, 2003, 2006, 2008; Serves & Malakai, 2006; Hemmer & 
Tufted, 2005).  For most of these authors, addressing poverty assumes different forms of 
configurations, one of which is social mobilisation, through different forms of media calling on 
citizens to participate in projects. Development projects are seen as the only available and 
acceptable infrastructure for participation and integration, and anything outside that is either 
void or poverty. These interpretations have inevitably foregrounded and justified the persuasion 
and diffusion models. As this study seeks to achieve, there is need to provide a re-read of 
communication for development theories in Africa. By bringing to the fore the role of 
communication for development detached from global and national institutional policies and 
structures but linked to and defined by local aspirations to improve wellbeing, the study 
attempts to provide new thinking on communication for development theory. 
 
This study takes off from the UNSG’s concern that a few years before the 2015 deadline, the 
MDGs would not be achieved “as improvements in the lives of the poor have been unacceptably 
slow” (MDG Report 2010, p. 1). This realisation suggests the need for new ideas on 
understanding poverty reduction from a different dimension, the role of communication within 
local context and how the two combine in participation. Save for the few available grey 
publications (cf. Hulme, 2009; Scott 2010; Easterly 2005; UN Round Table reports), there is 
very little or no academic literature on the MDG framework or on how global policies connect 
with the concept of communication for development at that higher level of policy discussion. 
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Due to the dearth of research challenging the global governance regime and the accompanying 
critical analysis on the MDG framework, conventional development ideas have thrived 
unchallenged, and have come to represent the truth and accepted as common sense despite them 
being part of the global poverty problem (cf. Smith, 2007; Moyo, 2009; Easterly, 2005; 
Escobar, 1995; Esteva, 1987; 1992; Rahnema, 1991). By the time of finalising this study, the 
UN system had called for another UN General Assembly in September 2015, to adopt a new 
15-year global poverty reduction agenda called the Sustainable Development Goals (SDG) – a 
follow up to the MDGs. The process of deciding the SDGs, somewhat mirrors that of the MDGs. 
The only main difference is that this time, the UNSG put together a panel of heads of states 
representative of all continents (Sachs, 2012). The content and language of the SDGs mirror 
that of the MDGs with the overarching key message being to eradicate “poverty in all its forms 
and dimensions, including extreme poverty, is the greatest global challenge and an 
indispensable requirement for sustainable development.”6F7 The ‘We’ discourse which conveys 
a sense of global collectivity and participatory approaches is emphasised in, “all countries and 
all stakeholders, acting in collaborative partnership, will implement this plan. We resolve to 
free the human race from the tyranny of poverty and want and to heal and secure our planet. 
We are determined to take the bold and transformative steps which are urgently needed to shift 
the world onto a sustainable and resilient path.”7F8 
 
Analysing how the UN system frames poverty and its manifestation into a message can advance 
the notion that though it is difficult to apply communication independent of ideas and interests, 
communication can also be used to reshape, reproduce and re-disseminate local discourses. 
Africa’s historical relationship with the West, particularly related to the latter’s economic 
interests in Africa, is enough foundation to raise questions on the narratives and discourses that 
frame both poverty reduction and participatory practice. The ultimate objective is to explore 
possibilities for reformulating and rethinking communication for development approaches 
which are appropriate to facilitate participation within the framework of local realities.   
 
1.6 Theoretical frameworks  
This study seeks to contribute to the body of knowledge on theories of how communication 
facilitates participation for improved well-being of marginalised groups. To achieve this, the 
                                                 
7 https://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/post2015/transformingourworld (accessed on 12 September 2015) 
8 https://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/post2015/transformingourworld (accessed on 26 August 2015) 
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study applies theories of global governance, hegemony and critical participatory and 
communication theories. This theoretical analysis is foregrounded on Cox’s (1981, 1983, 1987) 
critical thinking to enable examination of ideas on well-being from outside the problem-solving 
approach which remains dominant in the practices of communication for development. Critical 
thinking enables the exploration of issues from outside the parameters of political and social 
structures. This approach takes into account that the long standing problem-solving approach 
is part of the problem because it has historically been promoted as the ideal and ahistorical 
because it is methodical in the way it addresses problems.   
 
Cox’s ideas are relevant in examining how societies respond to external power, especially in 
the analysis of how participation is theorised within international development policy against 
the villagers’ own culture. To examine how power deploys communication, this study is 
interested in the global policy architecture with the objective of identifying opportunities and 
moments available for participation, by which actor and with what effect. Two objectives 
underlie this theoretical approach. First, that the UN system is a public global space – a public 
sphere for member states, including Malawi and Zambia. Each member state is assumed to be 
equal – in the same view as the UN system assumes equal authority over each of them. The 
relationship and policy discussions between the UN system and member states occur in a 
context presumed to be neutral and untainted by interests. As this study shall demonstrate, 
policy discussions in the UN system are influenced by ideas which advance interests of the 
dominant actors. Second, such policies consist of words that shape worldviews. In this study, 
the MDG framework is a global policy and a product of global governance institutions, 
therefore representing and communicating the interests of the elite (Cox, 1996; Overbeek, 
2004). Discourse and messages arising from the UN system’s global policy spaces, are most 
likely a manifestation of dominant interests or a “coalition of interests representing dominant 
class interests, supported by a broader social hegemony incorporating subordinate classes and 
social forces” (Cox, 1996, p. 5).These are communicated through a “common framework of 
thought and guidelines for policies that are disseminated through the process of 
internationalization [of a standard way of looking at life]” (Cox 1996, p. 111).   
 
MDGs become relevant to examining whose ideas frame global policies, especially in relation 
to how the poverty problem and its solutions are defined. The theory of hegemony popularised 
by Cox (1981, 1983, and 1987) is essential, when one considers that the MDGs promote a 
universal approach to addressing poverty in all countries including Malawi and Zambia. This 
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study proceeds to examine how power and knowledge converge in selecting issues that are 
packaged into policies and how these reconcile actors’ material interests in transforming ideas 
into practice. Theories of hegemony are applied to explain how knowledge and power 
rationalise and establish a generalised worldview on poverty and how that worldview secures 
consensus, domination and submission (Cox, 1996). Central to Cox’s approach, (1963) is the 
interplay between ideas, material capabilities and how these play out in global governance 
arenas. For Cox, hegemony is not limited to the citizen-state relationship but is “an order within 
a world economy with a dominant mode of production which penetrates into all countries and 
links into other subordinate modes of production” (1963, p. 62). Policy actors therefore become 
a hegemonic social class which holds “its own ideology, strategy and institutions of collective 
action” (Cox 1981, p. 111) and is responsible for agenda setting (cf. Fiske, 1987; Shannon 
&Weaver, 1949).   
 
This theoretical undertaking aims to provide a basis for re-theorising the extent to which 
communication can facilitate participation towards heterogeneous well-being. Although a 
critical analysis of the extent to which communities participate to improve their well-being in 
whatever context is equally important, how communication is used within and outside global 
policies is also vital. By referring to Rogers’ diffusion model, Freire’s dialogical and pedagogy 
ideas, as well as behaviour studies and social marketing (Kotler and Lee, 2008), the study seeks 
to establish the effect of communication on behaviour and participation and how this can either 
be used to improve well-being or diverted by hegemonic interests. Participatory development’s 
popularity in the 1980s (cf. Cooke and Kothari 2001) compels us to search beyond its concepts, 
definitions and its cosmetic application. Cooke and Kothari have dismissed the benefits of 
participation as null and void in the context of neoliberal global policies although they have not 
discounted the importance of communication in social transformation. 
 
1.7 Context and scope of the study  
The study analyses the extent to which the UN’s Communication for Development strategy is 
used to implement the MDGs in Mwandama Village in Malawi and Kamaila Village in Zambia. 
The Millennium Villages were established to demonstrate how the eight MDGs can be met 
through community-led participatory development approach. The villages are believed to 
demonstrate how communities can lift themselves out of poverty and achieve the goals if they 
have access to proven and powerful technologies that can enhance their farming productivity, 
health, education, and access to markets, while operating within the budget constraints 
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established by international agreements for official development assistance (Millennium 
Project, 2006)8F9.  
 
Villages were selected on the basis of having been part of the MDGs projects, including 
communication for development processes. Mwandama Village in Malawi is part of the UN 
MDG Village initiative, whereas Kamaila Village in Zambia is not, but has been exposed to a 
number of MDGs projects (MDG report, 2010). While there are many villages in Africa and 
other developing countries that can fit the required criteria to address the objectives of this 
thesis, I took into account that studying many villages is burdensome and not easy to manage 
within the given time frame. Through these two villages, it was possible to undertake a thorough 
and critical analysis of the issues in question. Patton (1990) advises that in qualitative studies 
such as this one, it is not the size of the sample that matters but the relevance of the unity of 
analysis if selected purposefully. The strength of the data collected and the findings lie in the 
power of purposefulness of the unit of analysis in providing the needed in-depth information 
from which to draw knowledge about issues of importance to the goal of the thesis. For instance, 
the purpose of this thesis as outlined earlier in this chapter was to critically examine the use of 
the UN Communication for Development in implementing MDGs, which makes this study an 
analysis of policies as texts, messages and ideas and their relationship with power and social 
practices (Freire and Macedo, 1987). I use these villages as instruments to understand the extent 
to which the MDGs projects and the UN Communication for Development strategy influenced 
social dynamics of the villages, hence making the findings of this study easily generalizable. 
The selection of these two villages yielded more than adequate information to illuminate the 
questions under study. In the next section, I explain the selection of the Mwandama and 
Kamaila Villages as cases in this study.  
 
1.7.1 Mwandama Village - Malawi 
The Mwandama Village in Malawi is one of the 80 Millennium Villages clustered into 14 
different sites in ten countries. Each cluster site is located in a distinct agro-ecological zone 
which, together, represents the agro-farming systems used by 90% of the agricultural population 
and 93% of the agricultural land area of sub-Saharan Africa (Millennium Village Project, 2006).  
Mwandama Village, with a population of over 35,000 is located in the southern region of 
Malawi’s Zomba district, considered to be among the poorest places in Malawi, “intensively 
                                                 
9 http://www.unmillenniumproject.org/mv/mv_faq.htm 
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cultivated both by smallholders growing maize, pigeon peas, cassava and groundnuts, and by 
the commercial estate owners growing tobacco and maize”9F10 (Millennium Village Project, 
2006). Livestock management is practiced at a small scale and includes chickens and goats. 
According to the Millennium Village Project (2006), there were only three cows in Mwandama 
before the project, and nearly 90% of the people in the Mwandama Millennium Village cluster 
live in extreme poverty (ibid.). This is significantly high in comparison to the 65% of the 
population who live below the poverty line in Malawi, when economic income is used to 
measure poverty.  The Millennium Village project uses this to justify its relevance by stating 
that: 
 
The core idea of the Millennium Villages Project is to demonstrate that working with 
communities to implement integrated, practical interventions – such as improved seed 
and fertilizers to raise farm productivity and support school meals, or long lasting 
insecticide treated bed nets to reduce malaria, clinics to dispense effective treatment 
and care, and safe drinking water – can be transformative (Millennium Village Project, 
2006). 
The Mwandama Village in Malawi fits within the scope of this thesis as it is one of the 14 
village sites across ten countries in Africa under the MDG Village initiative established in 2010 
with the sole purpose of implementing a poverty reduction project in a laboratory-like model. 
The ideology by Sachs (2005) - the author of the idea which underpins the Millennium Village 
concept, makes the idea relevant to the objectives of this thesis, especially its view of 
communication, participation, and external material and financial support as the means to 
poverty reduction.  
 
While the goal of using the two villages in this study is not for comparative purposes, the 
Mwandama Village project embodies a dependent variable as it represents the ‘ideal 
experimental model’ of conventional development, in which a global idea is implemented with 
the full backing of external actors’ knowledge, resources and technical expertise to address 
poverty of villagers. It is somewhat ironic, therefore, to call such a project community-led. 
Through its reinforcement of the superiority of western ideas on poverty and how it perpetually 
undermines the importance of reading poverty from the villagers’ inside perspective, the 
                                                 
10 http://www.unmillenniumproject.org/mv/mv_faq.htm 
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Mwandama Village project represents the prototype of how the UN system has always viewed 
poverty and how it should be addressed.  
 
It is this ideological context which makes the Mwandama Village project relevant for analysis 
of communication for development, as well as its link with the MDG poverty reduction agenda. 
The history of the UN system and conventional development is offered in detail in later 
chapters. It is worth highlighting at this juncture though, that in principle both were established 
to fight for the cause of the marginalized and weak societies against the powerful elites.  Practice 
strongly suggests that the contrary has been achieved.  Since its establishment, the UN system 
has remained under the control of a few powerful member states who sit in the Security Council,  
the UN system’s principal body charged with peacekeeping, sanctioning and acceptance of 
member states in the UN system (cf. Scott and Hulme, 2007; Yoo, 2003; Charles, 2007). Given 
the above scenario, the UN system as a global government through the MDGs is most heavily 
skewed towards serving the interests of the powerful member states. That being the case, it 
becomes necessary to interrogate some of its projects such as the Mwandama Village project, 
particularly how communication for development strategy principles drive the UN notions of 
participation, community-led development and ownership. 
 
1.7.2 Kamaila Village - Zambia 
Kamaila Village in Zambia is situated 50 kilometres from Lusaka City and is 11 kilometres into 
the bush from the main road. It was established in 1963 by charcoal burners. The population is 
estimated to be over ten thousand people residing in six villages, spread over a wide area. Most 
of the villagers live in traditional houses made of mud bricks, with grass roofs. Like many in 
Zambia, according to Water for Kids, an NGO operating in Kamaila Village and one of the 
units of analysis for this study, the village is believed to be facing the biggest challenge of 
poverty as Zambian official statistics indicate that almost 64% of Zambia’s over 15 million 
people are living on one-dollar per day or even less (Zambia Weekly, Volume 2, Issue 42, Oct 
2011). But in Kamaila, the government estimates that more than 80% of the people live below 
a dollar a day. With no health facilities, the nearest clinic is 18 kilometres away and the people 
in this area survive through rain-fed subsistence farming. In bad seasons, the communities rely 
on selling labour to the nearby commercial farms. With the absence of good social amenities 
such as schools, clinics and other facilities, the standard of living in Kamaila is, according to a 
Sharing Life report (2009), below the normal survival level.  As indicated earlier, Kamaila does 
not officially fall under the Millennium Village Project but is a beneficiary of MDGs projects. 
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The Zambia Association for Research and Development (ZARD) trained the villagers on the 
MDGs as part of localisation of the MDGs, and in order to raise awareness of people’s rights 
to know about and participate in development as a fundamental human right (UN General 
Assembly A/RES/41/128, 1986).    
 
The Kamaila Village in Zambia is selected for several reasons. Firstly, unlike the Mwandama 
Village, it is not part of the Millennium Villages project and therefore does not enjoy the same 
resources and financial attention from the UN system and donors. One of the reason Kamaila 
Village was chosen for this study is that activities implemented in the village are aligned to the 
MDG targets. On that ground, the Kamaila Village is an independent variable in the sense that, 
while it receives spasmodic support from the Water for Kids organisation, the lifestyle and 
activities in the village are locally driven. Kamaila Village is largely free from external 
influences regarding how poverty or development are framed. While contestable, it may be said 
that the Kamaila Villagers have more power to decide how they want to define their lifestyles, 
meaning that their activities are individually or community-driven in response to the needs 
arising from the local realities and not externally constructed. The link between communication 
and participation is intrinsically inherent within their ways of life. Kamaila Village is used in 
this study as a template for a village that is, to some extent, not directly ‘tainted’ by external 
influence. Since the commercial farms in the surrounding areas scaled or shut down, 
individuals, families, communities have been able to define how they want to pursue their 
aspirations. These factors above and others, make the Kamaila Village worthy of selection for 
data collection to meet the objectives of this study. The flow of ideas is recursive and sometimes 
moderated by their local leadership and family gatekeepers than external consultants or 
development workers as happens in Mwandama Village.  In addition, people’s identities are 
defined by what they choose to do than how they are viewed through external lenses.  
 
1.8 Organisation of the Study 
This study is divided into ten chapters, linked together by the flow of the research style and 
presentation. The first five chapters present the aims of the study, the background of the MDGs 
and UN Communication for Development strategy, literature review, theoretical frameworks 
and the methodology of the study.  
 
The first chapter introduces the study; the second provides a historical background of the 
MDGs, the Poverty Reduction Strategic Paper, and the UN communication for development 
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strategy in addition to other accompanying approaches such as the Millennium Village Project. 
Chapter three reviews literature on development, poverty reduction, global governance and 
communication for development. The methodology used in this study is presented and 
discussed in chapter five. The chapter discusses document analysis, qualitative interviews and 
focus group discussions, and the various ways in which data is generated and interpreted. An 
instrumental case study method of research is used to focus specifically on the two villages in 
Malawi and Zambia. The instrumental case study enabled the researcher to investigate “a 
contemporary phenomenon within its real-life context” (Yin, 1984, p. 23).  
 
Because this study combines critical discourse analysis on policy documents and practical 
analysis of how communication for development is used in the MDGs in Malawi and Zambia, 
for proper critical analytical purposes, findings are split into chapters six, seven and eight. 
Chapter six presents findings of the critical discourse analysis on policy documents, mainly 
examining how the poverty problem and the solutions are framed while establishing the 
discourse and narratives that underlie policy documents. Chapter seven provides a critical 
analysis of how participation is operationalised in formulating and implementing policies 
within available spaces from the villages to the national level in Malawi and Zambia. Chapter 
eight provides findings of the extent to which the UN Communication for development was 
implemented in MDGs-related projects. The objectives of these three chapters is to examine 
how the framing of ideas and concepts influence the use of words such as participation and 
poverty; how their meanings shape practice in the selected villages  and also how villagers view 
these issues from their own perspectives.  
 
Chapter nine offers reflection and discussion on the findings from chapter six, seven and eight. 
This chapter argues that communication remains vital but needs to be repositioned within the 
right knowledge framework if it is to help achieve empowerment and an independent well-
being. It also argues that although the global elite actors seek to dominate and establish 
hegemony, there are possibilities of delinking and re-theorising communication for 
development and re-linking it with local discourses. Whereas this study pursues the media 
studies route, it also notes that for individuals to claim their power and define their destiny, 
requires a broader cultural re-orientation, which involves enlisting other fields of study such as 
education, behaviour studies, and social marketing. Chapter ten provides a concluding 
discussion of the study. The next chapter provides a historical account of the MDGs, 
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Communication for Development, Poverty Reduction Strategic Paper and the Millennium 
Village project.  
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Chapter Two: Contextualising the MDGs 
 
2.1 Introduction 
This chapter gives a historical background of the MDGs. It also critically discusses the 
formulation of the MDGs, as well as the Poverty Reduction Strategic Paper and the Millennium 
Village project, among some of the approaches to meet the MDGs targets.  The adoption of the 
MDGs was followed by resounding emphasis on the need for participation and empowerment 
to reduce poverty. The central belief is that when communication is used to change behaviour 
and cultural practices, poverty can be easily reduced. With this confluence of positions, the 
MDGs have been hailed as a new way of addressing poverty. The chapter references authors 
such as Cornwall and Brock (2005) to argue that the ideas in the MDGs framework are not new, 
but rather a rehashing of old development ideas couched in seductive buzzwords to regenerate 
a new consensus on poverty reduction.  
 
This chapter has three objectives. The first is to provide an analytical and historical account of 
the context in which both the UN Communication for Development Strategy and the MDGs 
were formulated. The second is to argue that within that context, while poverty reduction is a 
central theme of the MDGs, historical factors preceding and influencing their formulation have 
little or nothing to do with addressing the problem of poverty. The third aim is to zoom into the 
Poverty Reduction Strategic Paper and the Millennium Village project. In both approaches, 
communication for development is viewed as essential to improving participation for meeting 
the MDG targets by 2015 in Malawi, Zambia and other developing countries. It concludes by 
critiquing the function of communication for development strategy in interest-laden discourses 
of participation and poverty reduction. 
 
2.2 The MDGs: the birth of another development myth  
In September 2000, Malawi and Zambia were among the 189 countries that adopted the 
Millennium Declaration, making a commitment to reach eight development goals by 2015. The 
adoption was done through “consensus” implying engagement, participation, or that the goals 
were in tune with local realities in developing countries. Between 2000 and 2015, the MDGs 
were the world’s biggest poverty reduction policy which sought to halve poverty by year 2015. 
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The MDG project is backed by  major finance institutions such as the World Bank, IMF and 
other bilateral aid agencies,  to meet its targets10F11 (Easterly, 2007; 2008).  
 
The origins of the MDGs can be traced to two unrelated scenarios which later converged in 
pursuit of goals unrelated to poverty reduction. The first phase of the birth of the MDGs was 
led by a group of ministers from Western countries as explained later in this paragraph, while 
the second was led by a UN technocratic system. The following discussions provide an 
analytical and historical account of these phases. A detailed account of the first phase is found 
in Hulme and Scott (2010) and to a lesser extent, Amin (2006). Initial discussions can be traced 
back to the time when the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) 
inherited the International Development Goals (IDG) in the late 1990s, a process that was led 
by the Utstein Group11F 2 in the mid-1990s. When formulating a new global development agenda, 
the Utstein group claimed to have been motivated by the desire  to “correct the political 
conditions influencing the flow of aid during those years” (DAC, 1996) and to reinvigorate the 
depleting development funding at a time when donors were fatigued by financing ineffective 
poverty reduction projects. While the privileging of the narrative of correcting mistakes of the 
past and conditions that influence aid gained prominence among the Utstein group and other 
donors over the years, I argue in this chapter and in Chapter Six that these have served to mask 
the continuation of the economistic focus of poverty reduction. The eight MDGs can be 
subdivided into three key categories. Goal 1 combines the broad economic definition of poverty 
as lack of a dollar per day. The other goals which include Goals 2 universal primary education, 
3 gender equality, 4 child mortality, 5 maternal health, 6 HIV/AIDS, malaria, and other diseases 
and 7 environmental sustainability, are all indicators whose baseline is the dollar a day and 
whose targets can be achieved by increasing economic growth. Their reduction in the context 
of the MDG framework is conveniently dependent on Goal 8 which calls for a global 
partnership for development. As shall be discussed in Chapter Six, this goal requires developing 
countries to “develop an open, rule-based, predictable, non-discriminatory trading and financial 
system” – a scenario which favours the rich nations than developing nations. The plausibility 
                                                 
11 The United States, the European Union, Canada, Norway and others made promises of substantial aid increases at Monterrey 
in 2002, a result doubtlessly influenced by the MDG negotiations two years earlier (Clemence,Kenny and Moss, (2004). 
12 The Utstein group formed in the 1990s is a loose association of six donor governments which include Canada, Germany, 
Netherlands, Norway, Sweden and the United Kingdom, with a commitment to promoting increased coherence, coalition-
building, coordination and cooperation among on various international organizations, donors and development partners on 
areas such as poverty reduction.  
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of what seems to be the reversal of a traditional approach to development becomes seriously 
compromised by the fact that the MDGs place the dollar a day, a consumption measure, as the 
means to an end.  
 
Despite these paradoxes, the Utstein group, largely made up of ministers of international 
development in Europe, saw the increasing gap between the rich and poor and the waning 
confidence in the aid industry among donors as a threat to their relevance and their global 
economic and political influence in the arena of international development policy. A response 
was therefore essential to redeem their fading significance, concurrent with regaining 
confidence in a development industry facing organizational down-sizing due to dwindling 
funding.  
  
Notwithstanding that none of the objectives mentioned above resonate with the poverty 
reduction agenda for countries in southern countries such as Malawi or Zambia, the Utstein 
group’s ideas culminated in the first attempt at the MDGs in a document titled Shaping the 21st 
Century: The Contribution of Development Cooperation report (1996). This was the first 
document to outline the seven goals. These ideas were then transferred from the Utstein group 
to the OECD where they were further refined with support and guidance from the IMF and the 
World Bank, leading to their adoption (Easterly, 2007; Reddy and Heuty, 2004; Hulme, 2007). 
While the interests of the Utstein group and these financial institutions were not the same, 
exhibiting major contrasts, they were in fact complementary in securing a global consensus on 
the “new narrative”, which both were desperate to achieve. For example, the World Bank and 
the IMF were worried about the growing uneasiness among developing countries who had 
endured the negative effects of the Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP) policies resulting 
in the “development disaster decade” of the 1990s (Stiglitz, 2006). A former World Bank head 
admits that there were growing fears that deepening poverty caused by their policies would 
trigger dissent among developing countries, resulting in loss of markets (cf. Wade, 2002; Easter, 
2007).  
 
From the view of these financial institutions, it was imperative to join forces in seeking a new 
global consensus on what seemed to be a new development idea, whose actual objective was to 
tie developing countries to some form of global commitment as a means to forestall dissent. 
The fundamental objective was not necessarily to address poverty. Discourses such as these 
echoed those of the 1970s, when consensus and participation were applied to domesticate 
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dissension through colonial community development (Presley 1988), imposing a false sense of 
independence through indirect rule. 
 
The second phase of the MDG formulation is discussed in Wilks and Lefrancois (2002) and 
Hulme and Scott (2010). As the Utstein group-initiated process was underway, the UN system, 
through a group of technocrats, launched its own internal process in the basement of the UN 
offices in New York. Just like the Utstein group and international finance institutions, the UN 
system was under immense pressure to launch a major project to coincide with the turn of the 
new millennium. This was against the backdrop of the UN’s 50th Anniversary Summit which 
had failed to deliver a credible global development agenda. A team of UN technocrats was 
established to glean ideas from previous global conferences and commitments on a wide range 
of development initiatives from 1945, when the UN transformed from the League of Nations. 
The process culminated in the report We the Peoples: The Role of the United Nations in the 21st 
Century, a near replica of the OECD’s Shaping the 21st Century launched in April 2000, albeit, 
with slight variations from the IDGs. Again, the aim of the UN process was not to address 
poverty, but to create a public relations campaign or performance appraisal exercise to justify 
the UN system’s relevance in the new millennium.  
 
Despite developing countries such as Malawi and Zambia being the main targets of these two 
processes of international development policy-making, they remained marginalised in the 
formulation process, perhaps under the usual assumption that their intimate local knowledge 
was insignificant to shaping a global agenda.  Notwithstanding that the actors and processes in 
both projects showed little or no intention to address the poverty problem, the two documents 
merged into one in what seemed to be a contest of power and interest, involving negotiations 
and compromises. The process reveals a strong pre-occupation with elite interests and financial 
power, and less with the desire for inclusivity and participation. These dynamics contributed 
substantially to the framing of what would be perceived as a ‘new solution’ to the poverty 
problem. For example, the UN system secured consensus from member states for its ‘We the 
Peoples’ policy document which led to the Millennium Declaration in 2000 as a normative 
framework, buoyed by a moral imperative, caveated on the need for countries to re-align the 
targets to their local contexts. The Millennium Declaration outlined the eight goals as discussed 
earlier.  The following chapters, especially Chapter 6, offer a critical discourse analysis of the 
MDG targets in keeping with the objective of this study, which is not to give an analysis of the 
technical contents but to critically analyse the MDG policy positions as they relate to power.  
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The OECD, supported by the IMF and the World Bank, backed their view by arguing that their 
IDGs were simpler, results-based (by use of logical framework) and in line with donor interests. 
A narrative shift ensued, from a moral imperative where the states could decide priorities, to a 
model that was global, prescriptive and methodical, backed and supervised by the same donors 
but through the UN system. With the economic growth model occupying centre-stage under the 
stewardship of the UN system on behalf of the Utstein group, OECD, IMF and World Bank, 
came the imperative to integrate the logical framework as part of national plans. It must be 
noted that this was not the first time such a tool of control had been used. The World Bank had 
led the promotion of the Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSP) launched in 1999, with the 
goal of enhancing performance and accountability (Scott and Hulme, 2007).  
 
Consequently in 2001, the UN General Assembly approved the revised MDGs in the UNSG’s 
report A Road Map Towards the Implementation of the United Nations Millennium Declaration 
(United Nations, 2001), largely succumbing to donor pressure, with a plan of action developed 
by the OECD, World Bank, IMF and other unnamed key stakeholders. With the logical 
framework and PRSP becoming part of the MDG framework, also came funding commitments 
from Western donors. The UN’s Monterrey Consensus summit held in 2002 noted that “a 
substantial increase in ODA and other resources will be required if developing countries are to 
achieve the internationally agreed development goals” (UN 2002). This was followed by a 
renewed funding commitment from Western donors, curiously coinciding with the introduction 
of Goal 8. Having not been part of the initial discussions, Goal 8 saw countries from the North 
promising to allow greater trade access, reduced debts and increased aid as sought by the Utstein 
group (Clemence, Kenny and Moss, 2004).  
 
With the confluence of these tools, once again, the poverty reduction agenda had regressed to 
become policy and tool-kit-driven and problem-oriented with money as a determinant and 
solution to poverty reduction. Capitalism had yet again assumed the driving seat, but in this 
case as neoliberalism and re-created a scenario similar to that which had led to failed 
development approaches of the 1960s and 1970s (Escobar 1995; Esteva and Prakash 1998; 
Rahnema, 1995). Armed with the tools of control and money, capital interests represented by 
donors had secured a controlling stake and their actors occupied a strategic position which 
allowed them to dictate how development would occur. In short, the Utstein group redeemed 
themselves by regaining donor support in exchange for allowing economic interests to control 
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and supervise global and national poverty reduction policies in developing countries and this 
scenario has implications on how communication and participation are operationalised.  
Against this background, Amin (2006) and Ziai (2011) have concluded that the MDG 
framework is culpable for promoting standardised lifestyles, creating demand for external 
knowledge and suppressing non-monetary local concepts of development in southern countries. 
This chapter concludes that the MDGs framework is not as new but a recycled product of the 
same old idea repackaged with new themes (see Clemens, 2004; Amin, 2005; Hulme and Scott, 
2010).  
 
Today, implementing the MDGs is configured around several policy approaches. This study 
focuses on two main policy projects, namely the Poverty Reduction Strategic Paper (PRSP) and 
the Millennium Village Project (MVP). The PRSP and the MVP place communication as a 
central pillar for the participation and empowerment prerequisite for poverty reduction. 
Defining the term “participation” outside these two approaches may not be an easy task because 
it is situated within a specific discourse of poverty analysis. According to Fairclough, (2003), 
Sorel (1941), and Wodak and Meyer (2009), words derive their meanings from context. For 
later discussions, the study is informed by Fairclough’s (2003: 24) proposition that “words as 
independent constructs are limited to defining certain potentials and possibilities but once 
placed in a particular context, can exclude others”. Sorel (1941) in Brock and Cornwall (2005: 
p.9) cautions that “comparing statements of intent with what actually happens in practice is to 
misunderstand their purpose”, especially when looking at language as a social practice (Wodak 
and Meyer 2009). The next section discusses the Poverty Reduction Strategic Paper (PRSP) 
model and its link with the MDGs. The PRSP forms part of the policy documents where 
participation is considered the corner stone to achieving poverty reduction in the MDGs.  
 
2.3 The Poverty Reduction Strategic Paper: The autocracy of participation  
The MDGs implementation at a national level is framed along the Poverty Reduction Strategic 
Paper (PRSP). This is a template developed by a task force comprised of the UN, OECD, World 
Bank, IMF, including bilateral and multilateral donors to operationalise the implementation of 
the MDGs (Hulme, 2004). While the PSRP and the MDGs are outcomes of two different 
processes and intentions, they show similarities, especially in their theoretical positioning of 
the concepts of participation at the centre of poverty reduction projects. The World Bank and 
IMF launched the PRSP in September 1999. The PRSP is a template planning tool designed for 
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developing countries to help them access concessional assistance from global finance 
institutions. An analysis of the participatory approaches proposed by the PRSP is relevant to 
Malawi and Zambia for a number of reasons. They are among the countries to submit for HIPC 
(Highly indebted poor countries facility), with Zambia successfully receiving debt relief in 
December 2000 (IMF and World Bank, 2004). In addition, when the PRSPs were to be 
integrated with the MDGs, Malawi was among the few countries hailed as having effectively 
complied with the PRSP requirements (IMF, 2012).  
 
Just like the MDGs, the PRSP is not a new concept, and was also a response to growing anxiety 
resulting from failed SAPs. Lewis et al. (1997) trace the origins of the idea to the 1950s and 
1960s when economic growth occupied a central position in international development policy 
discussions. The same ideas were central in the World Bank and IMF’s SAPs and the 
Washington Consensus, both of which sought to configure national fiscal and monetary 
policies, altering regulatory frameworks along global norms in clear disregard of varying 
economic and social contexts (Maxwell, 2005). Agitation by developing countries who fell 
victim to the SAPs, led to numerous initiatives including the Copenhagen Summit in 1995, the 
Programme of Action on Poverty Eradication, the HIPC Initiative in 1996, the PRSP in 1999 
and the MDGs in 2000.  
 
In a context where the IMF and the World Bank were concerned about losing control of 
dissenting countries, following the failure of SAPs, the PRSP was again promoted as a new way 
to purportedly rectify the situation by improving national planning, implementation and 
monitoring of the poverty reduction project. Developing countries argued that SAPs made them 
poorer and multinational investors had reneged on their promise to invest profits in developing 
countries in exchange for favourable investment conditions. But the international financial 
institutions saw things differently as they argued that the SAPs failed because of poor planning 
on the part of developing countries (Hulme and Scott, 2009). The debate was not won by the 
global institutions on merit but the promise of more funding which developing countries needed 
to address their increasing poverty problems with the PRSP presented as a second chance, a 
way of improving what did not work in the SAPs. The UN system gave in to pressure to merge 
the PRSP and the MDG plans. Malloch Brown, a senior UN staff stated that “just as the Bank 
and Fund have clear strengths in driving the PRSP process, I think the UN system can build on 
the real momentum of the Millennium summit and Declaration and play an invaluable role in 
helping develop a new campaign at global, national and even community level to monitor and 
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benchmark outcomes” (Brown, 2001, p. 3). His statement endorsed the marriage between the 
PRSP and the MDGs by forcing all developing countries to adhere to the World Bank and IMF 
norms.  
 
A close analysis of the four principles that underpin the PRSP model reveals congruency with 
neoliberalism and a deceitful regression to failed top-down models and a coexistence of policy 
paradoxes couched as global consensus (cf. Dijkstra, 2005; Stewart and Wang, 2004). For 
instance, the PRSP foregrounds the long-held view that since the World Bank and IMF’s 
establishment, they always have used concessional lending to coerce states to abide by their 
policy narratives and templates. Such an observation remains relevant to the analysis of the 
discourse on participation and poverty reduction against a context in which the scope of 
national-ownership of development projects is compromised and sacrificed at the expense of 
compliance to global prescriptions (cf. Levinsohn, 2003). 
 
Firstly, the PRSP places ahead of other principles, the narrative that countries are assumed to 
take the lead in developing their national plans, but using a World Bank and IMF template 
(Brown, 2003). The notion of taking the lead is explained in later chapters but it is worth 
highlighting that taking the lead refers to filling the PRSP planning form and not necessarily in 
making substantial decisions. There is a reason for predicating this narrative because according 
to the PRSP, those countries wishing to access HIPC relief and all those under the IMF’s 
Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility are required to develop a PRSP to demonstrate  
commitment to reducing poverty, complying with the norms of the Bank and the Fund. 
Addressing poverty is tied to conditions which require countries to comply with the World Bank 
and IMF who make the final decision on the allocation of resources. This situation also 
questions the assumed consensus on the concepts of participation, empowerment and ownership 
promoted within both the MDG and PRSP (Levinsohn, 2003). Levinsohn (2003) views this as 
a way for the Bank and Fund to use the newly secured consensus to revive some of the models 
which they earlier failed to launch such as the Comprehensive Development Framework due to 
the similarities of the two projects.  
 
The second principle of the PRSP is that such national plans must be based on a logical frame 
approach, a tool thought to be results-oriented (OECD, 2006). Earlier discussions revealed how 
the logical framework is a tool deployed by the World Bank and IMF, the main drivers of the 
neoliberal agenda, to control and supervise the management of national economies of 
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developing countries. As the PRSP became a central planning tool for MDGs national planning, 
the World Bank and IMF won over the control and supervision of national economies of 
developing countries. As discussed earlier, for the UN system, and as observed by Cornwall 
and Brock (2005), the MDGs were adopted as normative framework with a moral imperative 
based on loose commitment and did not seek to impose terms on member states. The integration 
of the PRSP made it imperative for countries, developing countries in particular, to adhere to 
its conditions using debt reduction and cancellation to impose compliance with the Bank’s 
principles. Rückert (2007, p.101) notes that the World Bank and IMF “continue to push for only 
slightly modified inclusive-neoliberal macroeconomic and structural policies” in their role as  
“gatekeepers,” in deciding which countries qualify for financial assistance and debt relief, when 
they will receive it, and under what conditions. The Reality of Aid (2002, p.8) has described 
this as "retooling the aid regime under rubric of ownership and effectiveness”. 
 
The third principle of the PRSP exhibits a policy paradox, an attempt to portray the PRSP as a 
locally-driven project, while obscuring the inherent economic growth model (Rückert, 2007). 
Suggesting that national plans must reflect local realities and acknowledge the many 
dimensions of poverty is surely incongruent with the policy dictates of the PRSP. Placing 
narratives of ownership, participation and empowerment at the centre of the PRSP is 
inconsistent with the demands made by the World Bank and the IMF for uncompromised 
conformity and compliance to global norms.  For example, the PRSP Sourcebook alludes that 
the PSRP’s “shift to country ownership will allow more leeway in terms of policy design and 
choice, acceptance by the Bank and the IMF boards will depend on the current international 
understanding of what is effective in lowering poverty” (Klugman, 2006, p.4).  
 
Configurations of the poverty reduction narratives appear to be similar in the MDGs and the 
PRSP as they follow the same logic that participation plus empowerment equals poverty 
reduction. There are, however, contradictions in how participation is conceived, how the 
marginalised are supposed to be involved in decision-making and how global policies are 
formulated. A curious divergence can be noted in the fourth principle of the PRSP, where the 
process of developing national plans is supposed to be open for participation and inclusive of 
all players as described in the PRSP Sourcebook (2001) as “development partners”. 
Inclusiveness in this regard, is by no means in reference to the ordinary citizens, but civil 
society, non-governmental organisations (NGOs), the private sector and donors to put available 
resources together towards one national poverty reduction plan. This is in contrast to the 
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language of participation endorsed by the UN system in 1975, when member states were 
advised to embrace broad and active citizen participation in processes of national development 
planning and implementation (Cohen and Uphoff, 1980). Once the UN system seeks to draw 
on this premise to localise development projects, with participation occupying a central role in 
empowering people to address poverty, the PRSP subordinates citizen participation to 
institutions of development and civil society organisations to pre-determined poverty reduction 
projects.  
 
These contradictions and similarities foreground how discourses are framed and how they 
manifest into policies and practices in Malawi and Zambia. Citizen participation is subsumed 
within civil society participation in the PRSP processes, which is viewed as necessary in 
creating a broad-based consensus around development priorities. This, however, dislocates 
communities from engaging with their realities, simultaneously undermining local traditional 
and government structures. Participation in this context is supposed to be a means of 
maintaining relations with the government and institutions of development. This is problematic 
when considering that in most African countries, civil society organisations, institutions of 
development and their funders are controlled in the North, and that the UN system and 
developing countries also depend on these for funding.  
 
2.4 The Millennium village project: A foreign village in a local village 
In 2005, Jeffrey D. Sachs, the director of the Earth Institute at Columbia University and Special 
Advisor to the UN Secretary-General on the MDGs, argued that locally-driven national plans 
through PRSP were not enough to stimulate participation at village level12F13. He cited some of 
the reasons why the PRSP was institution-driven and remote from the communities as the 
projects usurped the ability of communities to take appropriate decisions and actions when 
responding to their local problems (Millennium Project, 2006). Perhaps Sachs’s ideas were 
influenced by Chambers’ (1997) participatory methodologies from his Participatory Rural 
Appraisal (PRA) model which prioritises the importance of infrastructure such as roads to 
improve access to medical facilities, markets, schools and capacity building for staff to provide 
services in these facilities. While Chambers (2004) praises the PRA by highlighting areas where 
it was successful, he however admits that these participatory methodologies are not panaceas 
                                                 
13 http://www.unmillenniumproject.org/ (accessed on 28 August 2015) 
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to poverty reduction but merely offer opportunities whose success depends on local realities 
than the efficiency of projects.  
 
Sachs drew attention to the dominant democratic participation model premised on the civil 
society activism model, arguing that active participation should go beyond influencing 
decisions, to also promoting local production at local level. Sachs derives from the normative 
approaches, that participation and people are central to addressing the poverty problem (ibid). 
The only problem is that his approach as well assumes that those at grassroots are unthinking 
and lack capacity and thus require external western supply of knowledge and resources.  
 
As a model, Sachs’ idea is plausible, demonstrating a shift from institution-driven to 
community-driven approaches. Much as his model had much promise for the reasons given 
above, it remained theoretically grounded in the same old ideas of understanding poverty and 
development and never allowed space to listen to the villagers.  Conventional development has 
been historically blamed for undermining local knowledge and capacities. For instance, 
according to Sachs, the success of community participation is seen as complementary to 
external interventions and not with building local empowerment. The establishment of the 
Millennium Villages concept is based on this parlance, creating an assumption that the village 
concept is new, has never existed, and that people need to belong to a village for development 
to be facilitated. Without making an attempt to understand how different  communities perceive 
and define their poverty within their context, the project presumes that villagers, seen as poor, 
are incapable of making “meaningful investments in human capital and infrastructure required 
to achieve self-sustaining economic growth, unless there is a community-led development, 
largely designed around their local needs, but based on foreign knowledge” (ibid). In fact, as 
later chapters will demonstrate, Sachs never cared to establish if what he saw as poverty was 
really poverty from the villagers’ perspective. 
 
As a result, the Millennium Village project from the onset fails to acknowledge the importance 
of the prevailing local social orders in the villages in Malawi; instead, it seeks to re-organise 
the targeted communities to enable development. Such an attitude is evident in Sachs’ emphasis 
on small areas to promote an “integrated approach to rural development through community-
led development by providing access to basic services and facilities as well as technologies to 
enhance productivity” (ibid). In addition, the MVP’s failure to acknowledge that community 
collective projects have been part of the African village practice for many centuries should have 
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flagged the need to investigate how uninformed external development interventions have been 
part of the poverty problem. Rather than paying attention to ways of seeking to understand the 
local context and listening to those concerned on how to support local efforts and thereby build 
on existing structures, the project derives from the interventionist approach which prioritises 
development ideas from Northern countries. 
 
Despite these conceptual shortcomings, based on Sachs’ idea of participation, more than 80 
Millennium Villages have been established in 14 different sites across ten countries 13F14 in Africa. 
Investing in a single mode of production such as farming (as proposed by Sachs) obscures the 
local and multi-dimensional nature of the productive capacities of individuals within 
communities. That a community is located within an agro-zone does not always make every 
member of that community a farmer. Such universalised prescriptions occupied centre stage in 
the criticisms of poverty reduction models in the 1970s with post-development scholars 
advocating for more diversified approaches that draw on individual capabilities (Abrahamsen, 
2000; Escobar, 1995; Sen, 1999). The MVP model, however, serves to demonstrate the 
deflections of meanings discussed earlier, often bending over backwards to the whims of 
political power and so-called expert knowledge.  
 
It is evidently and overwhelmingly clear that the MVP concept is influenced by the economic 
growth model largely premised on the logic that intervention at the local level should aim to 
increase production and that increased production would equal development. Such economic 
thinking influences the choice of MVP project sites, with most of the villages located in Sub-
Saharan Africa where roughly 300 million are perceived to be living on less than $1 a day. For 
Sachs, that is how the problem of poverty is defined and should be solved through a single 
approach of increasing production. “The continent's environmental, epidemiological and 
geographical challenges – including low-productivity agriculture, a high disease burden, and 
high transport costs render African countries most vulnerable to persistent extreme poverty,” 
argues Sachs (Millennium Village Project, 2006).  
 
This statement summarises a view that justifies his model, one that privileges providing high-
yield seeds, fertilizers, medicines, and materials to build school rooms and clinics including 
                                                 
14 Koraro, Ethiopia; Bonsaaso, Ghana; Dertu and Sauri, Kenya; Gumulira and Mwandama, Malawi; Tiby and Toya, Mali; 
Ikaram and Pampaida, Nigeria; Mayange, Rwanda; Potou, Senegal; Mbola, Tanzania; Ruhiira, Uganda  
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technology and science, all considered to be an effective way of combating poverty and 
launching communities into a new age of health and opportunities (Millennium Village project, 
2006). Where local context is acknowledged, it is viewed through universal lenses to justify its 
amalgamation and dilution with global narratives, often backed by scientific knowledge which 
overlooks local knowledge and culture. In fact, the concept is characterised by a reluctance to 
listen and learn before conclusions are drawn, as illustrated by the urgency to refract the 
knowledge domains of conventional development. 
 
Sach’s model of participation in the MVP is premised on the assumption that people in a certain 
area are in locations of their productive capacities, an assumption that disregards heterogeneity 
as the basis of setting individual priorities. Such an assumption retains and maintains the 
dominant structures of power with both knowledge and capital needed to implement projects 
outsourced from the West. In addition to re-creating a cycle of long-term dependence for 
resources and markets, outputs of such projects are measured only in terms of monetary value 
(Cooke and Kothari, 2001). By imposing external knowledge on local contexts, knowledge of 
experts like Sachs dis-empowers local communities. Approaches such as these resonate with 
criticisms of modernisation and dependency models that are often blamed for disempowering 
people by dispossessing their knowledge.  
 
When ordinary people increasingly depend on foreign technical knowledge and financial 
resources to sustain their lives, it creates a cycle of dependence which is not easy to break 
(Moss, Pettersson, van de Walle, 2006). Imposition of knowledge and resources, on account of 
discursively ascribed poverty, implies a backward and hopeless community whose human 
capital is only necessary because of the invocation of external intervention. A stereotype which 
development intervention has historically subscribed to, in this context, is being recycled, 
refreshed and sustained through what seems at first glance to be new ideas. Participation is not 
about simply providing information and knowledge or answering questions, neither is it about 
being part of a social group nor being involved in whatever form of project (Arnstein, 1971).  
It is rather about action to increase control over resources, self-determination and one’s 
wellbeing (Stiefel and Wolfe, 1994). 
 
Empowerment and sustainability in Sachs’s proposals are not assessed on how much the 
villagers are recognised as social actors who possess the ability to lead the process of their own 
development unaided. Rather, economic growth is believed to be the means to ending poverty. 
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The application of the concept of empowerment in the MVP echoes that of the World Bank 
which entrenches a wide range of meanings deriving from various actor networks to conform 
to certain policy requirements on which aid depends. While empowerment maintains a central 
role in the MVPs, it is often part of the policy narratives in a contaminated form, weakening the 
actual emphasis on building people’s power to enable them to fight for the autonomy needed to 
reclaim the control of their lives. Sachs derives this view in part from the 1960s, when 
sustainability was linked to “the need to empower the entire community, especially the most 
vulnerable by building their local technical, administrative, and entrepreneurial capacities”14F15. 
Similar views are echoed in Rostow (1960) where he advocated for increased production as the 
only way of poverty alleviation. While acknowledging the important role of villagers in 
addressing their problems, Sachs places the success of such problem-solving initiatives in the 
hands of donors, especially those from the West. As noted in earlier discussions, most of the 
donors pursue the neoliberal interests of their constituencies. For similar reasons, the MVP 
project operates on a “results-based approach, a mechanical process that does not take into 
account other dimensions of development”15F16. Even though village committees are established 
to include local chiefs and the local government to spearhead the process of implementing and 
evaluating project possibilities with the support of a scientific team and local partners, there is 
reluctance to draw from local knowledge.  
 
2.5 Communication for development and the MDGs: delivery of the minds  
Since the adoption of the MDGs, UN member states, the private sector and donors have 
continued to reiterate their commitment to achieving the targets at every five year UN summit, 
including the five year planning and reporting periods. In Clemence et al’s (2004) assessment, 
of the 47 African countries, 42 were considered “off track” on half of the targets and 12 were 
“off track” on all MDG targets and 86 of the 155 countries at risk of not achieving the goals, 
most of them sub-Saharan countries (UN, 2014). Signs were already clear in the UN system’s 
assessment in 2010 that the MDGs would not be met. However, the UN opted to reinforce the 
paternalism that has always characterised development by stating that “goals are achievable 
when nationally owned development strategies, policies and programmes are supported by 
international development partners” (UN MDG report, 2010, p.3).   
 
                                                 
15http://www.unileverusa.com/Images/mc_Millennium%20Villages-FAQ-Oct-2012_tcm23-315708.pdf 
(accessed on 12 September 2015) 
16 http://www.millennium-project.org/ 
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While the UN system and other development agencies have historically applied different forms 
of communication strategies and tools in their projects, recommendation in the UN report 
(2010) resulted in the need to strengthen communication for development. The report justifies 
localisation of the MDGs on the grounds that there was a lack of awareness of the goals at 
grassroots level. The report creates an assumption that without local participation at the 
community level, the MDGs would not be achieved. It is worth noting that communication for 
development has a longer history in the UN system but the practice itself has always been part 
of the African cultural reproduction systems (Eyoh, 1987; Chifunyise and Kerr, 1982). Within 
the UN system, it started gaining a sense of organisation in the 1970s with the establishment of 
a United Nations unit called development support communication services led by Elsine 
Childers who initiated the process of round tables (Gumucio-Dagron and Tufte, 2006).  
Academic debates on the concept of conventional development communication can be traced 
as far back as the 1950s when they were linked to a systems model of communication – a 
strategic way of producing effective messages to change behaviour and transform societies (cf. 
Soola, 2000; Neufeldt, 1998). Such debates have been largely led by global institutions of 
development often using social change as corollary to development theory and politics, 
characterised by varying interpretations of the concept of communication for development from 
top-down diffusion models to empowering participation and through to what has been described 
by Servaes (1999;p.52) as “the multiplicity paradigm”.  
 
Today, the concept is characterised by different variations, ranging from empowerment, 
democratic participation, holding government accountable and collective ownership of plans in 
addressing poverty problems (see Chambers, 1997; Pieterse, 2009; Fischer, 2003). 
Notwithstanding the variations, central to the concept of communication for development is 
that it leads to participation, facilitates listening, trust, and reduces the social distance between 
development actors and the beneficiaries as well as increasing the uptake of transmitted ideas. 
Examples such as “disease prevention, protection of ecosystems [...] improved agricultural 
practices” (UN Inter-Agency Round Table on Communication for Development 2007, p.4) 
have been used to justify the use of communication in addressing social problems. Such 
narratives ignore the fact that these are not achieved through the use of communication only, 
but through a situation where people have power and control to respond to their problems.  
 
Perhaps the UN system was informed by this theoretical and historical foundation in proposing 
the integration of communication for development strategy to fast-track the implementation of 
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the MDGs? The process was preceded by several efforts to strengthen communication in 
projects.  For example, the World Bank and IMF published Development Communication 
Sourcebook: Broadening the Boundaries of Communication (1998) which acknowledged that 
local ownership and strengthening communication were of strategic importance to enhancing 
participation (Wade, 2010).  The sourcebook emphasised a two-way process which would 
enable development specialists to influence the targeted communities: 
  
[T]wo-way communication, when used from the onset of a development initiative, is not 
only a useful but also a necessary ingredient to enhance development initiatives and 
avoid the failures of the past, and a two-way communication should be applied 
professionally by specialists familiar with the rich body of knowledge and the diverse 
range of methods, techniques, and tools of development communication (Mefalopulos, 
2008, p. xiii).  
 
The dominant narrative, derived from the paradigms of modernisation theories, viewed 
communities as vulnerable, lacking knowledge and history, and essentially passive receivers of 
aid in need of development knowledge from professional specialists (Hartung, 2011).  
 
The UN communication for Development strategy was adopted in 2007 following 
recommendations from the 10th UN Inter-Agency Round Table on Communication for 
Development report entitled Achieving the Millennium Development Goals (2007).  The final 
strategy is an amalgam of various initiatives dating back to the 1980s. Emphasis was on the 
importance of communication in meeting project goals. Among some of the major global 
instruments on communication for development are: the Bellagio Statement on the role of 
Communication in meeting the MDGs (2004), Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness (2005), 
the Rome Consensus (2006), and several others. Both the Bellagio and Paris Declarations 
focused on integrating communication within institutional structures, while the Rome 
Consensus (2006) focused on “social process based on dialogue using a broad range of tools 
and methods... and about seeking change at different levels including listening, building trust, 
sharing knowledge and skills, building policies, debating and learning for sustained and 
meaningful change” (Mefalopulos, 2008. p.1).   
 
The UN Communication for Development strategy largely draws from these instruments in 
recommending integration of the concept into the UN system – strategies and plans to allow 
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marginalised people to participate in development projects to address their poverty. According 
to this recommendation, the only available option for people to take the lead in addressing their 
poverty is when they are part of institutionalised projects. Ownership of projects, which are 
already and literally owned by NGOs, is achieved through listening to project officers and being 
actively involved in their projects. Anyone outside development projects is portrayed as 
marginalised and therefore poor. The type of ownership conceptualised in the PRSP inheres in 
this approach as well, neglecting the importance of the role of power and how it strips 
communities of their capabilities to imagine alternative approaches to poverty reduction.  
 
The UN Communication for development strategy as an approach reinforces the diffusion 
model, further widening the gap between expert institutions and the communities. The effects 
of the diffusion model go beyond that as it creates another gap between communities and their 
knowledge. This defeats the moral essence of participation, empowerment and ownership in 
the process. Nonetheless, to effectively implement this recommendation, the UN report (2010) 
proceeds to suggest that strengthening of communication systems is important in order to 
promote participation of the grassroots. The assumption in the UNSG’s recommendation is that 
people-centred and “information and communication focused interventions are central in 
bringing about such participation” (UNDP-BDP, 2006, p. 6). Thus communication for 
development needs to be integrated in every effort aimed at achieving the Millennium 
Development Goals and improving aid and development effectiveness (UNESCO, 2009, p.1).  
 
The processes of formulating a global strategy which promotes participation would obviously 
require participation and consensus by all states including Malawi and Zambia to foreground 
and determine a shared understanding of the concept in both policy and practice. The process 
that formed the UN Communication for Development is at odds with the narratives of broader 
ownership through participation which it seeks to promote. The first UN Inter-Agency Round 
Table on Communication for Development was made up of “UN agencies, western NGOs, 
academia, western donors, and communication practitioners from western countries, who 
gathered in 1986 to devise a coordinated and organised mechanism for UN system collaboration 
and information exchange”16F17. In 1994, the Joint Inspection Unit of the UN Round Table on 
Communication for Development urged improving communication strategies for projects 
(UNESCO et al., 2009, p. 5). These were followed by Inter-Agency Communication for 
                                                 
17 http://www.c4d.undg.org/articles/un-agencies-gathered-discuss-communication-development (accessed on 16 
June 2012) 
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Development meetings from 1995 to 2009 when a strategy was finally adopted. Both the 
structure and process deny access to spaces for engagement to developing countries such as 
Malawi and Zambia, even when Malawi is hosting the UN Communication for Development 
office under FAO’s management. Perhaps it is the limited scope by participants and the reliance 
on experts from the North, which culminated in the narrowing of the conceptualization of 
participation, often subordinating participants to the dictates of the funders. 
 
2.6 Conclusion 
The chapter discussed the history of the MDGs framework, the PRSP and MVP from a critical 
perspective, questioning their suitability in local contexts. It also discussed the history of the 
UN Communication for Development strategy. The chapter was able to create a platform to 
discuss development practice and the concept of participation proposed in the MDGs. Cooke 
and Kothari (2001, p.12) offer a refreshing view by asserting that when participation focuses 
on individuals and the local communities as sites of empowerment and knowledge, 
participatory approaches can reduce the relevance of the “other” sites where power and 
knowledge are located such as the North. The more people are capable of increasing their ability 
to make “independent choices” the better chances they have of obtaining self-determination 
(Foucault, 1982).  
 
The next chapter is a literature review on the concept of development and how certain historical 
epochs have shaped it. The chapter critically interrogates the concept of development from 
different historical paradigms. This chapter has also laid the foundation for critiquing the 
conceptual and practical perspective on both development and communication within the 
realms of participatory approaches, paying particular attention to how powerful actors and 
interests play out in framing them. An attempt is made to establish how communication for 
development has been used since its conception in the early 1950s, and whose interest it served. 
It also investigates how it can be applied for emancipatory participation and for empowerment.  
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Chapter Three: Literature Review 
 
3.1 Introduction 
Poverty reduction is among the most topical aspects in contemporary society. It dominates 
global discussions and has become a key determinant of human well-being, central to the global 
order. As stated earlier, the MDG framework was the latest milestone in the global development 
agenda before the Sustainable Development Goals of 2015, yet another contribution after a long 
series of failed models that were launched over the past seven decades. 
 
This chapter has three main aims. Before outlining these, it is important at this stage to clarify 
that poverty reduction or development is viewed in this study as a discourse which influences 
the functioning or use of communication in society. The first aim is to define and analyse 
poverty reduction, with particular reference to the articulation of its implementation and the 
implications of power relations and stakes with communication. This critique is mainly 
diffracted through different scholars such as Escobar (1995), Esteva (1987, 1992), Rahnema 
(1991) and several others. I argue that the dominant ideas on global poverty reduction agenda, 
particularly their coinciding with major political events such as the achievement of 
independence in Africa, served neoliberal interests, thereby acting as a tool to control, manage 
and dominate the former African colonies. The second aim builds on this premise by discussing 
landmark global development policies launched after World War II. Key to this discussion is 
to establish how African poverty became a global concern only post-second world war and 
post-independence. The third and last objective is to examine, through literature, how the 
poverty reduction discourse relates to communication for development. I argue that as a project 
embedded in development practice and because of a lack of its own theoretical baseline, the 
field has become a tool used to maintain longstanding power relations. As an alternative, I 
propose that even though they have been co-opted into the corridors of power, communication 
for development and media remain useful in the retention of authority by populations in need 
of development. It is also contended that there are real prospects for achieving the right kind of 
development in African countries. 
 
3.2 Perspectives on the concept of development 
Central to this study is a critique of the extent to which the UN communication for development 
strategy has been used to implement the MDG framework in Malawi and Zambia. Debates in 
49 
 
the field of social sciences and economics on the meaning of development are characterised, 
since the 1980s, by a growing body of criticism. Escobar (1995) alongside several authors such 
as Esteva (1987, 1992), Rahnema (1991) and others have spearheaded a scholarly campaign 
challenging the conventional conceptualisation and definition of development. Central to their 
argument is the position that development means different things to different people in different 
contexts. These post-development scholars have noted, with increasing urgency, that 
development in its current format has many faults, lacks accountability to those classified in 
terms of dominant views as poor, and is quick to prescribe a solution without understanding the 
localised meanings of poverty.   
 
Among the models that have been severely criticised by post-development theorists are 
Rostow’s stages of growth, which have continuously been the underlying principle of different 
variations of development theories since the 1960s.  Rostow (1960) equated development with 
increased per capita income, which must culminate from change of an economic system, and 
not necessarily the development process per se. Abrahamsen (2000), a post-development 
scholar, avers that Rostow’s model imposes structures, policy-making and implementation 
processes which are impervious to genuine consultative, deliberative and participatory 
processes. A central consideration for Abrahamsen is that by placing economic growth at the 
centre of development, it implicitly allocates the responsibility for development to economic 
growth actors who are thus able to dictate the meaning of development, a meaning that 
inherently determines ways of life as well as centralising and controlling of wealth. An 
implication of this viewpoint is the closure of spaces for alternative views and local forms of 
development and opportunities for participation.  
 
While Abrahamsen’s (2000) work took issue with a lack of participatory opportunities and 
exclusion of local ideas in the implementation of the economic growth model, the notion of 
participation had earlier gained momentum through the work of scholars such as Everett Rogers 
(1962). He postulated that in order for modernisation to yield the intended result of reducing 
poverty, people should be integrated into the modernisation culture. Rogers’ theory of diffusion 
of innovation rose at the same time as the modernisation model in the 1960s, where different 
communication strategies were used to foster social transformation by changing culture and 
behaviour. By maintaining that development evolved through innovations introduced by social 
agents, Rogers (1962) endorsed Rostow’s (1960) ideas, which epitomised modernisation 
theories and their variations. The difference between these two models, however, is that Rogers’ 
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ideas, for all their merit, are embedded within structures of power that suppress alternative 
views of development, while Abrahamsen (2000) proposes the liberation of alternative views 
from the constraints imposed by universalised and centralised power structures.  
 
Like most post-development authors, however, Abrahamsen’s (2000) very positive argument 
has not gained much ground for lack of a different perception of poverty that can serve as an 
acceptable alternative to income (i.e. the monetary value of an acceptable basic standard of 
living of workers in an industry). The dollar per day perception of well-being has remained 
unchallenged since it was pioneered by Booth (1887) and refined by Rowntre in 1901 - 1918, 
giving rise to the adage of a-dollar- a- day. This perception was clearly related to labour 
relations, rather than development, during the period of industrialisation. Porter (2001) and 
Alvares (1992 trace the history of development to two different historical epochs. They trace 
Rostow’s (1960) economic growth model to the Enlightenment period in the 18th century, when 
the Industrial Revolution triggered demand for raw materials leading to the colonisation of 
Africa and the partitioning of the oil-rich Middle East (Porter, 2001). At the time, development 
meant wealth accumulation by the elite groups as a means to economic growth sustained by the 
expropriation of raw materials from colonies not considered worthy of note at the time. 
However, as noted in Porter (2001) and Pieterse (2009), those left behind by the fast-growing 
capitalist system born out of industrialisation, began to be seen as a security threat to the status 
quo which necessitated and marked the beginning of organised philanthropy in the form of a 
social welfare system and poverty reduction programmes (see also Steeves, 2001). Within that 
framework of thought, development meant different things to at least two different groups 
(Porter, 2001; Escobar, 1995). From a capitalist point of view, development still maintained its 
meaning of economic growth – a process of centralised wealth accumulation. This was while, 
from a philanthropic perspective, it meant providing for the poor (note though that the 
philanthropic view was merely a function of the capitalist stance – a critical consideration with 
far-reaching consequences since it simply meant that philanthropy would inevitably serve as 
the handmaiden to capitalism). These two worlds (philanthropy and capitalism) converged into 
one global programme, which manifested in the MDGs and their predecessors and became the 
central theme for criticism generated by later post-development scholars (see Rahnema, 1991; 
Escobar, 1995; Crush, 1995).  
 
Recent post-development scholarship emanated from conditions prevailing in the aftermath of 
World War II. The premise was that if economic growth is equated with wealth accumulation 
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by the elite , then development, charity, social welfare and poverty reduction are not acts of 
goodwill but tools used to control and forestall revolt by those either left behind or deprived of 
opportunities to develop, thus echoing the situation occurring during the enlightenment period 
(Escobar, 1995; Rahnema, 1991). This argument will receive further attention later in this 
chapter. Similarly, Pieterse (2009) postulates that historically, development interventions were 
designed as a catch-up prescription which spread across Central and East-European countries 
considered to be latecomers to industrialisation (Melkote and Steeves, 2001). The questioning 
of modernisation ideas commenced in the 1950s. In examining the collusion between and 
convergence of the economic growth agenda with that of poverty reduction, Kutznets  (1955) 
wonders whether such complicity would not result in a repetition of the negative effects of post-
industrialisation “in the sense that in the early phases of [modernisation] in developing countries 
income inequalities  tend to widen” (p.28).  Rodney (1982), Webster (1984), Escobar (1995; 
1999), Cowen and Shenton (1996) and Davids et al. (2009) have used these arguments to 
express their concern with western industrialisation for the underdevelopment of non-western 
territories by transmogrifying Africa, Asia and South America into suppliers of raw materials. 
Since the period of western industrialisation and World War II, a lot has changed and so did 
poverty reduction in the global arena. Rawls’ (1958) work on theories of human capability 
offers the notable assertion that happiness and fulfilment are the key indicators of development. 
While economists argue that Rawls’ ideas cannot be maintained to any reasonable level of 
sophistication without a sound economy, it is probably erroneous as well, to equate economic 
growth with general social accumulation of wealth as wealth carries varied meanings. It also 
runs the risk of the generalised assumption that those outside the capitalist arena of economic 
growth do not possess other forms or sources of wealth.  
 
The capabilities model and the economic approach to understanding poverty are not necessarily 
reconcilable, particularly if economic elitism is predominant. Individuals have the capacity to 
define their own development even in the absence of externally driven development projects 
and expertise. For Rawls (1958), individuals are not passive beings; they are born with 
potentials, aspirations and the ability to initiate action to satisfy their needs. Rawls (1958) 
opines that “Each person participating in a practice, or affected by it, has an equal right to the 
most extensive liberty compatible with a like liberty for all”, and that “inequalities are arbitrary 
unless it is reasonable to expect that they will work out to everyone’s advantage”. Sen’s (1999, 
p.188) idea of development complements Rawls’ proposition by linking freedom of choice 
“within the context of available opportunities”. His hypothesis that a society is naturally in 
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charge of its development agenda – which is neither driven by economic growth nor externally 
driven but derives its meaning from within – remains relevant but neglected. Sen’s ideas were 
instrumental in creating a platform for a plethora of participatory, empowerment and 
community development models in the 1980s. In the absence of new conceptual ideas on 
development, his ideas were diverted by Chambers (1997) and many other scholars whose work 
on participatory approaches concentrated on co-opting people into institutionalised 
modernisation development projects, such as those proposed by his social choice theory. 
 
There is no academic consensus on what development should consist of and how it should be 
achieved, and there is material evidence that in practice, the “dollar-a-day” adage encapsulates 
the dominant perception of what is meant by development. The world is therefore divided into 
the developed and the developing; the rich and the poor; the modern and the traditional 
(Giddens, 1991). The wide array of views on what constitutes development demonstrates the 
endemic confusion in which efforts at development are elusive today.  Numerous studies have 
been carried out since the period of Industrialisation and through to the post-Second World War 
era and recently, with the pertinent question, following Ziai (2011), being: to what extent do 
the MDGs represent such an evolution? It is beyond question that they represent a concoction 
of ideas including economic growth, (Rostow, 1960), transformation (Rogers, 1962), social 
choice theory (Sen, 1999) and participatory development (Chambers (1997).  Although post-
development scholarship is yet to gain traction, it can already be stated with conviction that the 
overall project of poverty reduction has failed comprehensively and irretrievably, as will be 
shown by analysis of relevant literature.  
 
3.3 Critique of the agenda for development and poverty reduction 
The idea of development stands like a ruin in the intellectual landscape. Delusion, 
disappointment, failures and crimes have been steady companions of development and 
they tell a common story: it didn’t work (Sachs, 1992, p.1). 
 
While Sachs is not a post-development scholar, his remarks in the epigraph above summarise a 
common trait among several development  eras and ideas ranging from modernisation theories, 
dependency, alternative models, structural adjustment programmes and plans for good 
governance reforms (Smith, 2007). The MDG framework was adopted at a critical juncture, a 
time of paradoxes and policy dilemmas, in the aftermath of conventional development being 
subjected to severe critical pressure from post-development scholarship, especially by Escobar 
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(1995), Crush (1995), Abrahamsen (2003), Rahnema (1995) and others who have committed 
to deconstructing the concept of development and its processes. Yet, it is also came at a time 
when the number of people living in poverty in developing countries such as Malawi and 
Zambia was increasing, a situation that perhaps requires new ideas, rather than refreshed 
modernisation under the guise of the MDGs. I must point out that the Global Monitoring 
report17F18 released by the World Bank in July 2015 attempted to contradict the above notion by 
projecting “decline of those living in global poverty, which is reclassified as living on $1.90 or 
less a day, to a forecast 9.6 percent of the world’s population in 2015.” This argument however, 
does not hold as it only relates to economic boom in China and India, scenarios which are 
insignificant to the countries under study. It is for the same reasons that the above authors blame 
this sad reality on the development project as a whole, justifying their calls for abandoning that 
project on grounds that they consider it not only obsolete but also bankrupt and harmful rather 
than beneficial (Matthews, 2004). It seems inevitable that a policy dilemma might well ensue 
in that abandoning conventional development in favour of new ideas could mean nothing in 
practice. Through reference to recent literature, this section will seek to address the central 
question that occupies post-development scholarship, namely, why development failed and why 
its intention is not to address poverty despite its supposed commitment to do so.  
 
Rahmena (1991), Escobar (1995) and Crush (1995) are among a group of authors who emerged 
in the early 1980s and challenged conventional development and pronounced it a failure. I am 
also aware that Mohan (in Cooke and Kothari, 2001) is critical of post-development scholarship 
for deconstructing conventional development without offering alternative ideas. In Africa, the 
Ujamaa by the late Julius Nyerere, the first President of politically independent Tanzania, 
represented a socialist and non-capitalist model of development. His policies included 
localization of means of production through collectivisation of communities, creating 
individual and community self-reliance and nationalisation (Keshomshahara, 2008). Nyerere’s 
ideas suffered the same challenges as other alternative models of development because they 
were conceived to counter the economic growth models than to create a new way of viewing 
well-being which is detached from economic growth. For instance, Nyerere’s Ujamaa wilted 
with the oil crisis in the 1970s and the collapse of global markets for Tanzania’s products. One 
of the factors that has sustained conventional  development to establish an overwhelming 
impression that achieving MDG targets is a necessary cause, which is the “most urgent 
                                                 
18 http://pubdocs.worldbank.org/pubdocs/publicdoc/2015/10/503001444058224597/Global-Monitoring-Report-
2015.pdf 
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challenge humanity faces today” (Ziai, 2011, p. 27) is linking their ideas with human suffering. 
That urgency has spawned a sudden and overwhelming consensus which threatens to close all 
doors for criticising the MDGs, since views that contradict a solution to human suffering can 
easily be misconstrued as heretical while allowing the suppression of alternative ideas. In his 
paper, “The Millennium Development Goals: Back to the future?”, Ziai (2011) acknowledges 
a shift in discourse from the development thinking that was current in the 1960s and 1970s to 
that of the 21st century in terms of topics and priorities. He notes however, that power is retained 
in favour of “neoliberal, market-oriented measures to counter global poverty” (2011, p. 40). 
Ziai concludes by drawing parallels between MDG and modernisation theories of the 1960s 
and 1970s against a backdrop of literature which asserts a shift in development discourse since 
the 1980s. The inability of post-development scholarship to extricate itself from the trappings 
of conventional development and post-development’s continued use of economic income as a 
frame of reference in its research could be one reason that has hindered the generation of new 
ideas, hence we are still confronted with the same old ideas repackaged in new words in the 
form of MDGs (Easterly, 2007; Moyo, 2010, 2011). However, Mohan admits that post-
development scholarship remains a vital foundation for contextualising the intricacies and 
paradoxes that beset conventional development today, and that perhaps the framework 
constitutes a launch pad for new ideas. 
 
A close analysis of Ziai’s work (2011) suggests that essentially there is no dearth of new ideas; 
rather, the situation is bedevilled by powerful interests that refuse to allow breathing space for 
the generation of new ideas. A similar view is advanced by Brocks et al. (2004, p. 27) who note 
that development policy is “embedded and embroiled in politics, the theatre of power, in fact 
firmly located in the realm of the social and the political science”. This dispels popular claims 
by Chambers (2007) and several others that development is technical and apolitical. Scholars 
such as Escobar (1995), Crush (1995), Rahmena (1991) and others have been vocal concerning 
the operation of power in political and other guises in development discourse, with the result 
that these scholars are naturally seen as a threat to the status quo and have therefore been 
relegated to the periphery of global development. The intention here is not to rehash their work 
but to apply their seminal ideas in mapping how power has historically disguised itself as 
development in three key historical epochs – the industrialisation/enlightenment period, the 
post-second world war and the 21st century MDGs. These examples are used to argue and 
illustrate that development has historically never been intended to address poverty but to keep 
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the poor and subordinates under control. Poverty reduction is a social construct that draws a 
(transparent) veil over the power agenda inherent in development discourse.  
 
Like other discursive constructs, the term “poverty reduction” can be understood only within 
the context of the imbalance of power, which gave rise to it. Later chapters will discuss this 
imbalance of power by analysing various meanings of poverty reduction. The discussion of 
power overshadowing the development issue will revolve around the historical account of 
development given by Porter (2001), Rodney (1981) and Pieterse (2009). These authors trace 
the origins of conventional development to the Enlightenment period also known as the Western 
Industrialisation Revolution or Age of Reason in the 17th century from which they locate two 
forms of development namely, the welfare systems for citizens left out of the economic boom 
and the catch-up model for Eastern European countries which were economically lagging 
behind. Rostow’s (1960) stages of economic growth are largely influenced by this model. The 
underlying view is that the welfare system was established to control dissent among those who 
were either left behind by economic growth or those who lost their jobs when European 
economies began to slump. Capitalism was the biggest beneficiary of industrial revolution and 
it sustained itself from the lessons drawn from the period of adversity. Given this reality, a quest 
was mounted to establish a welfare system to ensure that poor people’s basic needs would be 
taken care of and simultaneously exact compliance with the rules of capitalist governance. 
While variations exist between welfare and poverty reduction, Porter (2001) and Pieterse (2001) 
emphasise the need to limit the damage that can be caused by revolt against capitalist dominance 
and centralisation of power and wealth as the ultimate goal of poverty reduction agendas. Here 
capitalism is not a governance system in itself, but it influences people’s thinking and the ways 
government functions, for example by sheltering behind taxes. The paradoxical capitalistic 
exploitation and control of the citizenry mark the dilemma of the state, which has to balance 
democratic participation, the responsibility to protect citizens from exploitation by capital 
interests and at the same time ensure economic growth to service the welfare bill incurred by 
protecting its subjects from exploitation.  
 
A similar scenario has supervened in post-colonial Africa, described in Escobar (1995: p. 239) 
as “post Second World War coincidences” which gave rise to modern development practice in 
the 1940s to 1960s with similar objectives of protecting Western capital interests. Before 
proceeding, it is worth noting that whether by natural coincidence, default or design, the people-
driven struggle for freedom and independence in Africa is punctuated by international policies 
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seeking to reduce poverty and to provide welfare programmes that are in fact funded or at least 
instigated and motivated by capitalism. Such coincidences and convergences have been a major 
concern for Escobar (1995) who postulates that poverty is either socially and historically 
constructed or deliberately produced. Escobar (in Sachs, 1992) does not deny the existence of 
social problems, especially in African countries, but the point is made emphatically that much 
needed transformation has to be conceived at a local level and fit for local purposes: 
While social change has … been part of the human experience, it was only within the 
European modernity that 'society', i.e. the whole way of life of a people, was open to 
empirical analysis and made the subject of planned change. And while communities in 
other [regions] may find that there is a need for … change—in part to reverse the 
damage done by [imposed poverty] —this undoubtedly will not take the form of 
'designing life' or social engineering”18F19. 
  
The long-term effect is that when people adjust to an imposed way of life, the meanings of their 
lives have to be redefined. Here Escobar is referring to “coincidences” and “similarities” that 
characterise, especially the simultaneous emergence and convergence of events in the 1940s. 
In particular, he highlights the sudden “discovery of poverty” in the 1940s when it assumed a 
new urgency on the global agenda that coincided with African independence.  
  
A dominant discourse that arose between independence and development in African countries 
indicated that the newly liberated countries would be free from colonial rule and able to work 
out their own destinies (Escobar, 1995). The so-called discovery of poverty at such a time 
betokens the false cheer offered by the poverty agenda overall, under the aegis of global 
governance. This is especially so given that poverty reduction had not been part of the colonial 
agenda for more than half a century while the colonial powers were pursuing their main aim of 
extracting wealth from their colonies (see Adas, 1989). They salved their consciences by taking 
refuge in the belief that the “natives” would be uplifted by the colonisers, and “not much could 
be done about their poverty because their economic development was pointless as they lacked 
the technological capacity” (Escobar, 1995, p. 22). While the idea of development had started 
as far back as the 17th century in Europe (Porter, 2001; Pieterse, 2009), in Africa it only became 
part of the global agenda after World War II. 
  
                                                 
19 http://www.swaraj.org/shikshantar/escobararturo.html 
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Whereas most post-development scholars have focused on deconstructing development as a 
concept, the real issue is the unstable marriage between post-independent developing countries 
and the capital interests that drive institutions of governance. This is what lies at the root of the 
failure to cope with poverty in consonance with declarations of intent to eliminate poverty. The 
next section discusses the third historical epoch of the development disaster decade leading to 
the 21st Century launch of the MDGs. The following section will also reveal the psychological 
effects of the poverty reduction discourse on developing nations through the operation of power 
embedded in global structures.  
 
3.4 Shifting colonial power into global governance 
The establishment of the UN system, while portrayed as being fashionably part of the global 
village, also meant that newly independent states had to cede their autonomy to the UN system 
and its agencies. The freedoms attained and desires for a better life that drove the struggles for 
independence were immediately re-appropriated and integrated into the global structures of the 
UN system controlled and funded by the same Western countries that were formerly colonial 
administrators of pre-independent African countries. Moreover, by being members of the UN 
system, developing countries found themselves compelled to obey global rules of conduct by 
virtue of their membership to the “global village”.  This issue is never pursued to a satisfactory 
conclusion, but it will suffice to say here that global governance has grown to include a myriad 
of actors and interests and has attracted its fair share of criticism since the 1980s (Dingwerth 
and Pattberg, 2006).  
 
The United Nations Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) has adopted Weiss and Thakur’s 
(2010) definition of global governance as “a complex web of institutions, mechanisms, 
relationships, and processes between and among states, markets, citizens and organizations, 
both inter- and nongovernmental, through which collective interests on the global plane are 
articulated, rights and obligations are established, and differences are mediated” (ECOSOC, 
2006, p.4). Studies linking global governance with international relations are broadly divisible 
into three strands according to Keohane (1984). These include global transformation across 
national borders, transnational relations (cf. Nelson & Wright, 1995) and globalisation with its 
connection to the UN system. In this study, the focus is on the third strand, and how it has 
become central in social, political and economic global reforms through global policy 
frameworks and cooperative and multilateral solutions to a range of global problems such as 
poverty reduction and development (cf. Karl Deutsch, 1953; Ernst Haas, 1958, 1961; Giddens, 
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1991). Despite these divergent approaches to global governance, Kreutzmann (1998) contends 
that in all these, the UN system acts as a centralised command post for a system of wealth 
accumulation built on an “unequivocal belief in solving problems of underdevelopment by 
applying [foreign] economic-growth oriented strategies” (1998, p. 256) such as the 
modernisation, dependence, alternative models, structural adjustment programmes and the Big 
Push theory (Easterly, 2006). Recent insights into levels of control extend beyond the physical 
to encompass psychological effects that have profoundly influenced developing countries’ 
political, economic and cultural well-being (Escobar 1995), the net effect being the replacement 
of colonialism with a global system of governance.   
 
Before addressing Kreutsmann’s (1998) psychological effects of the discourse of conventional 
development on developing societies, it is worth noting that Escobar took issue with the position 
that global governance and development are driven by the desire to reduce poverty. Kreutzmann 
(1998) notes that since the time of the League of Nations in 1919, its role in brokering peace 
among warring nations after WWI shifted to a global mandate to mediate global politics, 
manage the global economy and coordinate the common interests of Western states (Rosenau, 
1990).  Despite proclamations of the League of Nations’ intent to promote self-determination 
among African states, it continued to preside over the trusteeship of African colonies.  
 
When the League of Nations transformed into the United Nations in 1945, its mandate 
significantly changed, focusing on the establishment of international mechanisms for the 
economic advancement of all people and the promotion of “higher standards of living and full 
employment, conditions of economic and social progress and development” (UN, Article 45).  
This is the promise the UN system makes in the preamble of its Charter, which forms the basis 
for the proliferation of specialised United Nations agencies, which lead in the implementation 
of development policies largely formulated by the International Monetary Fund19F20 (IMF), the 
World Bank (1946), and the World Trade Organisation (WTO). These institutions collectively 
control global monetary, economic development and trade policies. Since the 1990s, the UN 
system, painfully embraced neoliberalism. Among the reasons for hesitantly adopting that 
approach was the threat of funding imposed by the donor community who had started 
                                                 
20 The World Bank is not a bank in any ordinary sense but is a development institution that provides loans to 
encourage development in developing countries, while the IMF caters for all countries (see Hoy 1998 76-79 for 
further discussion). 
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advocating for “economism and marketism, as achieved by means of privatization, 
liberalization and deregulation” (Scholte, 2005, p. 7).   
 
Scholte further highlights that as the UN system moved to embrace neoliberalism in late 1980s 
for its survival, most national, regional and bilateral agreements were tailored towards 
supporting a common global market by embracing liberal market practices and principles such 
as regulating labour, trade, finance and industry. The World Bank, IMF, OECD eclipsed 
International Labour Organization (ILO) and the United Nations Educational, Scientific and 
Cultural Organisation (UNESCO) who were at the time, at the forefront radically resisting what 
they felt was recolonization of smaller nations (Scholte, 2005). UNESCO, for instance, had 
launched a debate on the New World Information and Communication Order (NWICO) in early 
1970s to 1980s challenging the skewed media coverage against smaller nations, unbalanced 
flows of media influence and unfair control of military and commercial uses. NWICO 
challenged global power imbalances. The process led to the McBride Commission report 
entitled, Many Voices One World by UNESCO, articulating the same issues and laying out the 
way forward for addressing them. During the same time, the ILO was critical of the IMF and 
the World Bank’s structural adjustment strategies, the standardisation of policy mechanism 
known as the “Washington Consensus” (Fraile, 2009) and dismantling of protective labour 
regulations (Standing, 2008).  
 
In 2000, to coincide with the MDGs, the UNSG Kofi Annan launched the Global Compact 
initiative redefining transnational corporation relationship with the UN system, which became 
the world’s leading corporate responsibility on several issues including poverty reduction. 
While it is legitimised by several resolutions, it is a business-led (private sector-led) initiative 
which has exposed the UN system to business interests (cf. Rasche, 2012). One of the reasons 
the ILO was critical of new policies was that they led to job losses and disempowered labour, 
while giving more power to the private sector (Fraile, 2009). The proliferation of non-state 
actors such as NGOs 20F21, the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development21F22 
                                                 
21 The role of NGOs, mainly from the North, in global development has grown since the early 1980s, and these entities have 
taken their place in global governance. However, their impact was first felt in 1945 during the drafting of the UN Charter, 
emphasising the UN’s role on human rights, economic and social questions, and equality for women (Willetts, 2011). Their 
input has become critical in shaping the global development agenda.  
22 The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), formerly the Organisation for European Economic 
Cooperation (OEEC) established in 1947, is not a UN member but has become a key player in international development. 
OECD has expanded to include other members outside Europe and USA such as Canada and Japan. Since 1961, the OECD has 
been a policy advisor to European countries, including the United Nations system.  In 1996, a Development Assistance 
Committee (DAC) report, Shaping the 21st Century, sets out a number of development objectives, including prospectively 
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(OECD, 1961), the Development Assistance Committee (DAC), and several other specialised 
networks cannot be ignored. 
 
In the 1980s, a line of research emerged built on Heclo’s (1978) seminal conceptualisation of 
civil societies and issues networks, purportedly to promote participation in policy formulation 
processes. Subsumed in these efforts were attempts to challenge power dynamics and promote 
democracy within policy arenas. This as an agenda culminated in the proliferation of another 
set of global players called civil society actors who have added a new dimension to global 
governance in pursuit of democratic participatory approaches, local ownership and 
empowerment (Fischer, 2003). What was evidently meant to counter capitalist hegemony is 
today reduced to a watchdog role for development policy and implementation and has not 
altered the power dynamics and the discourses that feed on it. This is because their economic 
survival is dependent on funding from the same institutions they wish to challenge. 
Consequently, capitalist hegemony has remained intact. Against a plethora of studies 
challenging western domination, the World Bank and IMF, the main authors of global policies 
have remained under direct control of the USA and Europe respectively since the 1940s (see 
Woods, 2006).  In a recent study, Jackson (2010) addresses the question of corporate interests 
in poverty reduction. He observes an increased inflow of Western private sector funds into the 
UN, World Bank and IMF, outstripping states’ contribution, which he attributed to energy that 
drove the SAP policies in the early 1990s. Hulme and Scott (2009) note that during the UN 
Millennium Summit, developing countries were forced to withdraw their push for locally driven 
development plans due to pressure from Western countries, who promised through Goal 8 “to 
create a global partnership for development with targets for aid, trade and debt relief”.  
Heywood (2007) and Stiglitz (2006) present a grim picture of how, through global governance 
policies, economic interests have preyed on and weakened developing countries. These 
countries are obliged to relinquish their decision-making powers to the UN, World Bank, IMF 
and behind-the-scenes actors (Heywood, 2007) “who control the rules of the game that prevent 
the redistribution of benefits” (Davids et al., 2009, p. 169).  Stiglitz (2006), a former World 
Bank head, questions the commitment of the IMF and the World Bank “to help developing 
countries onto paths of stable, sustainable and equitable growth” (World Bank, 2004, p. 1). 
Looking closely at the adoption of the Millennium Declaration preceding what has been 
described as a decade of development disaster (1990s), we can see similarities with issues 
                                                 
halving poverty by 2015. These would later form the major part of the current set of Millennium Development Goals (Hulme, 
2009). Other initiatives followed, including the Sahel and West Africa Club Secretariat.   
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highlighted earlier in this chapter, thereby sustaining the argument that development is an 
obstacle to social progress (see Gill, 1997; Rosenau, 1990, 2003).  
 
The central argument in the post-development literature is that societies can transform if they 
are liberated from the restrictions imposed by capitalist rules disguised as global governance 
(Biermann and Bauer 2005; Rosenau 1997b).  Power in these structures is pervasive in the 
discourse of development. For Escobar (1995), institutionalised poverty – especially when it is 
defined extraneously – tends to distort reality in favour of those who control the discourse. 
These critical reflections by Escobar reveal underlying intentions of putative developmental 
intervention. Ziai (2011) and Stiglitz (2006) link the adoption of the MDGs to the time of the 
above-mentioned development disaster. Hence, the goal of the MDGs is to mask the damage 
caused by SAPs in the 1980s and 1990s, again demonstrating how economic growth driven 
global governance favours the developed northern hemisphere at the expense of developing 
countries. While the MDGs will not actively address the poverty problem as in Stiglitz's view, 
the framework is deployed, like social welfare during the enlightenment period and poverty 
reduction after World War II, to quell dissent among developing countries that have once again 
fallen victim to the treachery of neoliberal development policies.  
 
3.5 Unpacking the power in poverty reduction discourse 
Some scholars such as Rahmena (1991) go beyond the structural oppression imposed by 
development. Rahmena (1991) takes a psychological view on this broad argument as to why 
economic growth driven poverty reduction interventions always emerge immediately after 
people-led struggle or imminent revolt for freedom. Beyond the purported aim of alleviating 
human suffering, poverty reduction is little more than an idle promise to psychologically disarm 
dissatisfaction with a view to cushioning, protecting and preserving capital interests. Rahmena 
(1991) and Escobar (1995) have extended this argument to suggest that poverty reduction is an 
autocratic agenda deployed to ensure continued psychological control of former colonies 
without stopping the inevitable political independence. This intricate relationship is also 
revealed in Ferguson (1995) and his investment theory of politics which demonstrates the 
connection between capital interests, power and control and the management of the poor. 
Therefore, development for Ferguson is an arm of capital’s interests, which establishes a system 
of governance that thrives on consensus and the creation of a false sense of collectivity and 
inclusion in the fight against social problems such as poverty, while profits from economic 
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growth are privatised. Presenting poverty in such a manner conceals underlying power 
structures (Cowen and Shenton, 1996). Through such a discourse, power is camouflaged and 
rationalised through systems such as Rostow’s (1960) stages of economic growth while blaming 
poverty on backwardness and the inability of the poor to effectively catch-up with the developed 
world. Rather than letting them define their own way of life through catch-up models, a course 
of action is imposed on developing societies.  
 
Escobar (1995) refers to the widely quoted United States President Harry Truman’s inaugural 
speech in 1949 in which the former set the tone for power relations between the North and the 
South. The speech characterised Africa and other non-Western countries as desperately in 
urgent need of western intervention. Development became more than a catch-up model. It also 
became a humanitarian emergency that required urgent western intervention to save human 
lives from poverty in developing countries. This statement of urgency diverts attention from 
the operation of power and economic interests of the West, preferring to prioritise the discourse 
of saving lives and subsequently opening up unquestioned space for western development 
intervention, which is embedded in neoliberalism. Countries that had fought long and hard 
battles for liberation found themselves succumbing to the narratives of development without 
critically analysing inherent ideas and intentions. Hence, for seven decades the concept of 
development has become sacred, representing the only way to solve poverty problems, thereby 
creating an impression that challenging it would endanger humanity. In so doing, local ideas 
suffered, further leading to annihilation of cultural diversities and differences, and 
homogenisation of all non-western countries as experiencing one significant problem – poverty. 
Developing countries are constructed as objects that need to be transformed, rather than as 
existing societies who have their own lifestyle and with their own power to utilise their 
capabilities and resources to transform their world and react to changing circumstances. 
Truman’s speech has been used by post-development scholars not only to demonstrate how the 
identity of poverty is discursively constructed, but also to emphasise that this stage offers both 
a point departure and opportunity to deconstruct the poverty identity and reconstruct a new one. 
This can be achieved through either democratising the policy formulation process or extricating 
participatory approaches from the binds of systems which privilege certain identities in the 
allocation of resources and consequently benefit from economic opportunities at the expense of 
others.  
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To illustrate the effects of discourse on identities and poverty, it is instructive to take a cursory 
look at how Africa is discursively constructed against how it is in reality. While ethnicity and 
cultural diversity as the fabrics of the structural dynamics of African societies are acknowledged 
in many fields of study such as literature, history, art and cultural studies, in the field of 
development, developing societies are all seen as one homogeneous block experiencing similar 
problems needing one solution. This, coupled with the forced acceptance of a socially 
constructed poverty, have contributed to developing countries’ parochial allegiance to the rules 
of western hegemony that demand unquestioned adherence and compliance to universalised 
global development solutions making them easy to govern (Escobar, 1995). Ziai (2011) 
reiterates points made by Escobar (1995) and Rahmena (1991) about how development is linked 
to new global shift from decentralisation towards regression to the old centralised global 
governance system. While the issue of centralisation of power is at the centre of the post-
development argument, it is worth noting that there is little or no evidence demonstrating that 
global and universalised policies worked for developing countries, nor were they behind the 
success of Western countries. The effects of the power of discourse on African societies go 
beyond subservience to orienting and socialising people to see their world as filled with human 
suffering, emptiness and nothingness, denoting the absence of something of any meaningful 
economic value unless there is Western intervention (Escobar, 1995; Said, 1979). In fact, the 
mind-set is affected, altered and disarmed. According to Rodney (1981), this is part of the 
psychological scheme that promotes the notion of nothingness, adding to the reconstruction of 
the African mind. Rodney’s propositions, though considered controversial by some scholars, 
remain relevant and insightful in demonstrating how discourse establishes domination of North 
over South especially when read alongside Foucault’s (2003) insights on the irrevocable nexus 
between power and knowledge. 
 
Despite the acknowledgement that Africa is endowed with abundant raw materials, for instance, 
most African societies ceased to see the value in what they possess, subsequently allowing their 
identity to be shaped by imagined inadequacies. The rapid shift from fighting for freedom to 
accepting the prevalence of poverty and nothingness and subsequent submission to the same 
western narratives that oppressed them, is instructive. Today, most African national 
development policies and plans prioritise attracting foreign investment as a solution to unlock 
their potential, by so doing exposing themselves to “techniques designed to structure an organic 
social order which, whatever the concrete localisation of the human subjects it deals with, has 
hitherto remained formless” (Proccacci, 1991, p. 164). The role of locals in transforming their 
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lives is taken away or not acknowledged as they are considered poor and incapable of improving 
their conditions. This is not only malicious and misdirected but is behind the obliteration of the 
diverse African cultures; their history 22F23, local civilisation23F24; knowledge and industrial 
revolution that occurred in Africa prior colonisation (see Walter Rodney, 1982; Hooker, 1996; 
Venter and Neuland, 2005). Development literature exhibits a gap which literature of African 
history employs to demonstrate that interesting advancements occurred centuries prior to the 
Western invasion.  
 
Development literature thus deliberately erased African advancements, selectively failing to 
acknowledge the vibrant industrialised economies in the form of farming, mining, smelting of 
copper, iron and gold, spinning of cotton, glass and ceramic manufacturing that existed in 
Africa. Studies by Venter and Neuland (2005) and Hooker (1996), provide practical examples 
of how Africa might have been if it were not for colonisation. Rodney’s arguments go beyond 
Rahnema’s (1991) argument on how power controls dissent by offering aid to those left out of 
economic growth and considered poor. This observation is pertinent when we consider that 
African civilisation and industrialisation could have potentially equalled, overtaken or 
threatened western dominance. Regions such as the Mapungubwe Empire24F25, the Great 
Zimbabwe, the Zulu Kingdom in South Africa, Timbuktu in Mali and Songhay in West Africa, 
Mossi to the East of Mali and the kingdom of Dahomey in the central part of Africa were among 
the emerging economic centres in the continent prior to colonialism.  Europe, at the time, was 
not the only dominant region: the Mesopotamia (in West Asia), Egypt in North Africa, Indus 
in India and China were comparably dominant in their regions.  
 
Based on the above, Rahnema (1991) concluded that conventional development is not only 
irrelevant, but an active barrier to progress. Other authors such as Smith (2007), Escobar (1991) 
and Matthews (2004) concurred but disagreed on the way forward. The proposition by Said 
(1979) and Escobar (1995), that poverty is a social construct, could be a key to challenge power 
                                                 
23 Hooker (1996) in Venter and Neuland (2005) provides historical synopses rich in African industrialisation and civilisation 
in the southern part of Africa. The region was occupied by the Mwenemutapa Empire (Munhumutapa or Monomutapa or “The 
Conqueror”) who had migrated from Central Africa. The Mwenemutapas introduced iron smelting and agriculture in the rich 
goldfields of the Great Zimbabwe kingdom. This vast wealth and proximity to the Sofala coast (Mozambique) enabled trade 
with the Chinese, Indians and Persians. Their industry grew to include iron-smelting, textiles, gold and copper along with 
agriculture. 
24These include the period renaissance or high points of civilisation; the Ancient Egyptian period between (3100-343 BC); 
ancient Carthage (814 BC-697 AD);  the trans-Saharan trade and development of African empires (800-1100 AD);  ancient 
Ghana (ca 1000 AD), ancient Mali (ca 1230-1325 AD); the Shongai period (ca 1464-1600 AD); the Mossi kingdoms (11th - 
15th cent.); the Haussa states (ca 10th cent. AD - present);  Iron Age culture south of the Sahara from about 1400 BC, and 
Great Zimbabwe and Mapungubwe around 1000 AD (cf. Venter & Neuland, 2005. p. 40). 
25 The Mapungubwe ruins are situated at the Zimbabwean border with South Africa and Botswana. 
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relations or devise ways of improving people’s lives without recourse to interventions falling 
under the rubric of development. Rahnema (1991) acknowledges that developing societies 
whose lives have been made difficult by development intervention do need change, but does 
not provide a practical plan of action beyond the vague suggestion that regenerative ideas 
should be pursued with a view to eliminating development intervention. By regenerative he 
means the adoption of an enterprise that aims to reclaim power, freedom, autonomy and cultural 
diversity, and that generally shuns the paths and toils of institutionalised power. This must be 
achieved by promoting locally driven approaches based on local culture, knowledge and 
capacities. This intends to displace and dismantle conventional development, which, for 
Rahnema (1991), is part of the neo-colonialist agenda (cf. Foucault, 1986; Escobar, 1995).  
 
Although there is a growing realisation that African countries must spearhead their own 
development, the innovative effort required to that end is thwarted by the absence of state 
autonomy (i.e. not captive to neo-colonialist agendas) (cf. Presley, 1988). The Asian and Latin 
American experiences of how cultural heterogeneity combined with state sovereignty have 
steered them to better living standards are insightful. Heterogeneity in these countries takes two 
forms. First, cultural diversity is allowed to flourish by means of social and collective 
mobilisation resulting in new micro-forms of development.  In Asia, heterogeneity was 
cultivated nationwide as attested to by Jinyong et al. (2008) in tracing the rise of the Asian 
Tigers of Hong Kong, Singapore, South Korea and Taiwan between the 1960s and the 1990s. 
The mentioned sources demonstrate how the Asian Tigers gained autonomy to shape their own 
destiny by parting company with western narratives. To this end, though, they had to ensure 
state autonomy so that they could develop a state-driven national identity, which would become 
a fertile breeding ground for improving people’s living standards. Second, autonomy gave the 
state the power to formulate and enforce national policies that owed no deference to global 
governance. This led to the creation of prosperity attached to national and local identity. While 
these two models seem to be different, they offer the common insight that heterogeneity must 
be allowed to set the pace as a driver of human progress. We also learn from these regions of 
the importance of transnationalism, which is considered a critical factor contributing to the rise 
of Asian economies between the 1960s and the 1970s, and more recently to the unprecedented 
growth of the Chinese economy (Moyo, 2011). Both citizens and states were engaged in 
cultivating a needs-based supra-/transnational entity with regulatory systems to control and 
manage interaction. Transnationalism in this case is based on a pluralist theory that accords 
equal autonomy and equal membership to each state (Risse, 2002) in matters of supra-
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/transnational governance. Note that autonomy does not preclude interdependence and 
collaboration, but instead proposes a process that caters in due measure for each member’s 
interests (see Keohane, 1984; Mansbach and Rafferty, 2008). Supranational institutions in this 
category include the African Union, Southern Africa Development Community (SADC), and 
the New Economic Partnership for African Development (NEPAD). The recent emergence of 
Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa (BRICS)  demonstrates the strength of 
transnationalism in establishing new power structures that are threatening traditional 
institutions such as the World Bank and the IMF by reshuffling global economic, social and 
power dynamics to make way for political reforms that are amenable to global governance 
(O’Neill, 2011).  
 
National autonomy is indispensable for operation in the transnational arena (cf. Foucault, 2003; 
Burchill et al., 2009).  The main sources for this discussion are Rawls (1996) and Foucault 
(2003) who emphasise that quality of life is vitally dependent on individuals’ specific capacities 
and characteristics, including their ability to be innovative and contribute positively to society 
regardless of their situation. These traits are critically dependent on the prior existence of 
national autonomy of the country concerned to cushion the individual and community to 
manoeuvre independent of global governance narratives. Cultural reorientation seems 
imperative in light of the damage caused by the discourse relating to conventional development 
interventions (cf. Escobar, 1995; Rodney, 1982; Said, 1979; and Foucault, 2003). Among the 
recent studies is Mutunhu’s (2011) in which he proposes renaissance theory, which encourages 
citizens to be active, innovative and to take the lead in shaping their development destiny and 
promoting micro-level development, local solutions based on the plurality of development ideas 
and reliance on local resources and capacity. The historical and main theoretical approaches to 
communication as aid to development, particularly referring to Malawi and Zambia, among 
other developing countries, are covered in the next two sections. Aspects considered will 
include the role of communication in institutionalised development, the implementation of 
development policies such as the MDG, and its impact on participation, empowerment and 
sustainable development in Malawi and Zambia (Cornwall and Brock, 2005). 
 
3.6 Communication for development 
The discussion above offered a critical analysis of the concept of development. Further 
discussion is necessary, however, of the closely related idea of communication for 
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development, which has been acknowledged as a necessary adjunct to development projects 
since the 1940s. According to FAO (2006), 
…the best way to reduce poverty is to provide people with opportunities to earn income 
through participation in the production process. Therefore, any strategy aimed at 
defeating ... poverty in the long run will have to be rooted in sustainable, broad-based 
economic growth and development.   
The literature review will present a critical analysis of the narratives and discourses that underlie 
the UN’s Communication for Development strategy. First, the differences between 
development and communication for development are discussed for the sake of clarity.  
 
The coinage ‘development communication’ is attributed to Nora Quebral (1970) who taught in 
a professorial capacity in the Philippines during the 1970s. The specific context was 
communication of new ideas in rural development with a view to fulfilling human potential and 
achieving dynamic economic growth where poverty normally prevails (Quebral, 2006; Currin, 
2002).  Quebral (1970) equates poverty with ignorance, which has to be overcome with the aid 
of communication strategies. However, in her conceptualisation of poverty, she does not 
provide a contextual definition of ignorance; whether it is lack of knowledge on modern ways 
of life or a complete lack of knowledge on anything related to well-being.   
 
However, despite this porous conceptualisation of communication in her earlier definition, the 
practice of applying it to effect change is traced to her and various other theories relating to 
communication and media studies, development studies, behaviour studies and social 
marketing – all of which emerged during the 1950s and 1960s (see Quebral, 1972; Mefalopulos, 
2008; Singhal and Rogers, 1999). Harrold Lasswell’s (1930) magic bullet theory asserted that 
mass media messages had the power to control people’s minds and alter their worldview. Later 
studies by Shannon and Weaver (1949) argued in their agenda-setting theory that mass media 
was not as powerful as earlier believed, but was capable of setting the agenda. Similar views 
are expressed in later studies by Hornik (1988), Wilkins (1999), Servaes (1989), Jacobson and 
Servaes (1999), and Fair and Shah (1997), reaffirming that mass media has limited impact on 
behaviour. Even comprehensive reviews of mass media related studies from 1958 to 1996 
concluded that the impact of mass media on social or behaviour change was insignificant but 
such reviews acknowledged that the mass media remained a marketplace for new knowledge 
and ideas. This conclusion contradicts the gist of studies in behaviour sciences and social 
marketing theories. For example, Lerner and Schramm (1967), Pye (1963), and Rogers (1962) 
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consider that poor communities need to adapt new or rather western ideas and increase 
production at all levels in order to develop. While Kotler and Lee (2008, p. 8) argue that 
communication as social marketing strategy can actually “sell behaviour”, they  do not explain 
whether selling behaviour implies willingness to partake in the new behaviour with regard to 
the targeted audience. Their pre-occupation was limited to injecting a message into the 
audience. There is no consensus on the extent to which communication can influence behaviour 
even though communication for development has remained central in promoting change, which 
tends to assume the same meaning as development. Historically, communication for 
development’s attachment to modernisation meant that local culture was the target to be 
replaced by western ideas, with participation measured by the level of adoption of the preferred 
ideas (see Escobar, 1995; Crush, 1995; Servaes, 1999) in order to achieve a preferred form of 
development. Said (1979) and Foucault (1972) provide extensive literature on the use of 
knowledge to exercise power, including how communication is used to impose universal ideas 
which become the source of disempowerment (see also Sachs, 1992); Escobar, 1995); 
Rahnema, 1997); Crush, 1995); and Rodney, 1982).  
 
The assertion that media messages have limited impact needs to be reconsidered (Said, 1979 
and Foucault, 1972).  A glimpse of such analyses is offered by several scholars who extract a 
message from mass media channels and examine the power of the message not as a standalone 
unit of analysis but in relation to social power. For example, Blummer and Katz (1974), Fiske 
(1987), and McQuail (1983) concur that messages influence public discussion, public opinion, 
persuade or educate people in the context of planned development and political campaigns and 
cultivate the audience’s perception. According to Katz and Lazarsfeld’s (1955) two-step theory 
model, participatory communication leads the field when it comes to changing attitudes and 
behaviour with the aid of locally designed media strategies and tools. Suggesting that messages 
have limited impact contradicts the sociological view that transmission and exchange of 
knowledge, whether vertical or horizontal, is inherent in a cultural socialisation through which 
human beings acquire their identities (Giddens, 1984). This realisation has spawned a 
proliferation of studies in the use of indigenous communication strategies, rooted in cultural 
socialisation. Indigenous media are a powerful means of engaging and involving people in the 
process of message creation, presentation and awareness, which is believed to lead to action.  
Foucault does not question the power of the message itself, but the power and intentions that 
drive the message. He registers his concern about the ability of power to alter the mind, 
especially concerning the “delimitation of a field of objects, the definition of a legitimate 
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perspective for the agent of knowledge, and the fixing of norms for the elaboration of concepts 
and theories” (Foucault, 1972, p. 199). By not questioning the power of the message, perhaps 
Foucault is endorsing Giddens’ sociological view that communication is an important part of 
culture. This, however, places communication for development in a classical dilemma. The 
transfer of knowledge is used in the service of agenda-driven development projects such as the 
MDG (Rogers 1962, 1983; Chambers, 1987) or alternatively in the service of an autonomous 
people’s culture - where people are not passive receivers of new knowledge (Hall, 1980; 
Alvarado, 1987; Halloran, 1970; Blumer and Katz, 1974). These alternative views have led to 
various rationales concerning the most suitable type of communication, namely how it was 
achieved with the aid of communication for development, instead of the other way round. 
 
A close analysis of existing global instruments and declarations on communication for 
development points to a centralised message of development. The UN, for instance, stresses 
“the need to support two-way communication systems that enable dialogue and that allow 
communities to speak out, express their aspirations and concerns and participate in the decisions 
that relate to their development” (UNDP, 2009). Participation is seen from the perspective of 
integrating people into national and global systems and confining it to communicative practice 
without considering that people can also lead a better life outside development projects based 
on their potential and capabilities (Sen, 1990; Rawls, 1958).  On that account, we can conclude 
that the social transformation agenda of the 1940s still endures in the UN Communication for 
Development thinking. The Bellagio Statement (2004) emphasises “helping people change the 
[way] they live”, while The Rome Consensus (2006) promotes “...dialogue... [and]  ...seeking 
change...”.  UNICEF25F26 and FAO 26F27 are also pro-transformation. For Cornwall and Brock (2005), 
this reasoning not only distorts and limits participation, but also promotes neoliberalism. Instead 
of promoting autonomy and empowering people to initiate and drive their own development 
agenda, participation focuses on engaging “intended beneficiaries” in development projects by 
changing their behaviour and culture (see Chambers, 1997). Renn et al. (1995) and Habermas 
                                                 
26 UNICEF: Communication for Development: a systematic, planned and evidence-based strategic process to promote positive 
and measurable individual behaviour and social change that is an integral part of development programmes, policy advocacy 
and humanitarian work. UNICEF understands C4D as a field that uses dialogue and consultation with, and participation of 
children, their families and communities. It privileges local contexts and relies on a mix of communication tools, channels and 
approaches. 
27 Communication for Development (ComDev) is a social process based on dialogue using a broad range of tools and methods. 
ComDev is about seeking change at different levels including listening, establishing trust, sharing knowledge and skills, 
building policies, debating and learning for sustained and meaningful change.  The ComDev process goes beyond information 
dissemination to facilitate active participation and stakeholder dialogue. It highlights the importance of raising awareness, the 
cultural dimensions of development, local knowledge, experiential learning, information sharing and the active participation 
of rural people and other stakeholders in decision-making. 
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(1989) go further to propose participation as institutionalisation of “communication between 
government, citizens, stakeholders and interest groups, and business regarding a specific 
decision or problem” (Renn et al., 1995, p. 2).  Among these numerous attempts to construct an 
appropriate model of communication which promotes locally driven participation, this study 
sticks with Quebral’s later version of communication for development which she defines as 
“the art and science of human communication linked to a society's planned transformation from 
a state of poverty to one of dynamic socio-economic growth that makes for greater equity and 
the larger unfolding of individual potential” (2001). 
 
3.7 Communication for development in Malawi and Zambia 
The use of communication for development in Malawi and Zambia has been and remains a 
matter of dealing with theoretical tensions between horizontal and vertical models. Poverty 
reduction and communication have been indissolubly linked and are effectively no longer 
separate entities. This is not aided by the theoretical crisis that characterised the evolution of 
communication for development and how it has not been able to bifurcate to become its own 
discipline. This study, however, takes a closer but by no means exhaustive look at literature on 
how communication has been used for development in Malawi and Zambia from both 
developmental and traditional perspectives. The goal is to bring these two dimensions into 
dialogue in analysing how each interacts with development as a sub-section of cultural 
socialisation.    
 
The use of communication for development in poverty reduction has dominated development 
practice in Malawi and Zambia since the early 1980s, about the same time as the 
democratisation processes in both countries. The belief in the people-centred approaches, which 
dominated the 1980s, gave rise to large numbers of participatory communication initiatives in 
Malawi and Zambia, chiefly spurred by the ideas of Chambers (2007). Malawi and Zambia are 
signatories to the African Charter for Popular Participation in Development and 
Transformation (1990) which was adopted after leaders of many African countries realised that 
lack of "full appreciation of the role of popular participation in the process of recovery and 
development" was partly to blame for social and economic regression in the continent. The 
Lome IV Convention (1985) set the tone, compelling mostly African countries to strengthen 
the use of communication in order to improve participatory development (FAO, 2007).  The 
UN established an office in Harare, Zimbabwe in 1996 through the FAO to promote the use of 
communication for development within the member states of the Southern Africa Development 
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Community (SADC). The office, which later relocated to Malawi, offers in-house training for 
national teams to apply communication for development in rural development projects.  
 
Although anecdotal, available literature on how communication for development has been used 
in Malawi and Zambia reveals affinities with globalised top-down models (see Servaes & 
Malikhao, 2006; Mefalopulos, 2003; 2006; 2008; Waisbord, 2000; Hemer and Tufte, 2005).  
Consequently, the faith placed in participatory approaches is not backed by willingness to 
abandon old ways of development and to make way for heterogeneity and endogenously driven 
development. Mefalopulos (2008) and Pretty (1995) identify seven forms of vague and 
incoherent application of participatory approaches at different stages of community projects. 
Driven by these global policy imperatives, the relative opening of democratic space aided by 
improvements in telecommunications and recent proliferation of community radio stations in 
both Malawi and Zambia have allowed governments and NGOs to use different forms of 
communication to serve development aims.  The rise of community radio in Zambia was 
intended to address the information needs of communities by fostering community development 
through programme content (Musanshi, 2000). In Malawi, community radio stations are 
considered centrepieces of participatory communication (Dagron and Tufte, 2006). However, 
the tools, strategies and messages used still resemble Rogers’s diffusion model and an over-
reliance on western modes of thought in which promoting dialogue on development ideas is 
considered an effective process of promoting adoption. In Malawi, Zambia and most developing 
countries, FAO (2007) observes a gap in that the practice of communication for development 
follows the western model, still funded and driven by western donors and NGOs, perhaps 
confirming why it exhibits an issue-based and top-down knowledge transfer model that 
anticipates a change in behaviour, attitude and cultural practices as an ultimate result.  
 
For instance, Kotler and Zaltman’s (1971) pro-persuasion social marketing approaches have 
been adapted for small groups and mass media, because they are seen as an effective way of 
promoting social transformation in both countries. Their use though, tends to address 
information needs based on specific issues such as engagement with local and national 
authorities, HIV/AIDS, combating diseases, and information on civic matters in the community 
(e.g. civic responsibility, child abuse, human rights and entrepreneurship) (Banda and Fourie, 
2004; Kalindekafe cited in Bessette, 2006; Yoder, Robert and Chirwa, 1996; Hornik, 1997). 
Communication is not used to inspire citizens to take part in economic growth but in addressing 
their social problems. The same is true of participatory communication, which is based on the 
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premise that grassroots should be able to influence policies (Brawley and Martinez-Brawley, 
1999). In many cases, this is interpreted by a reinforced focus on promoting the voices of those 
perceived to be voiceless through access to the national and community media and by 
promoting cultural diversity. Most studies in both Malawi and Zambia base the use of 
communication for development on the community approach and the grassroots-awareness 
raising model linked to modernisation thinking.  A critique of the social marketing theory is 
offered by Fourie and Froneman (2009) who argue that it privileges a top-down communication 
model than two-way dialogical communication strategies suggested by the participatory 
development approach to communication. Besides being issue-based and non-humanistic, 
Fourie and Froneman (2009) question its relevance to complex and involved social factors such 
as development in developing countries. 
 
Among the few African studies to add their voice and step out of the modernisation enclosure 
are those found in Makumbe (1996) and Chisinga (2003) which discuss the concept of 
participatory development as a means to alleviate poverty in Malawi. Makumbe, for instance,  
argues that institutionalised participatory communication is largely to blame for perpetuating 
poverty in Malawi and notes that attempts to change people’s culture merely takes them away 
from their own ways of development. Therefore, the participatory communication in Malawi, 
Zambia and other African societies has not been representative of a multi-cultural world of 
development. Makumbe (1996) considers this not as a gap or deficiency in academic 
knowledge, but as a main cause of poverty. Manyozo (2014) is among the new few African 
voices to emerge in the field of development communication. Manyozo has added a different 
dimension, which detours from binary discourses, especially notions of development 
communication and homogeneity and the North-South relations, a complete departure from 
scholars such as Melkote & Steeves (2001), Srampickal (1994) and others who have invested 
much of their time focusing on the message-oriented diffusion approaches.  Manda (2015) has 
also added his views on how radio and technology can be integrated into national policy 
framework to improve production. Kalipeni and Kamlongela, (1996) have also placed 
community participation in Malawi at the centre of addressing social problems such as health 
care to the extent of arguing that communication for development reduces deaths. This, 
however is a common claim among most scholars of communication for development. This 
claim rarely examines the sustainability of external knowledge and resources used to raise 
awareness of health issues. Penina Mlama (1975; 1987; 1990) another African author, has 
shifted her attention to the use of folklore for educational purposes. While her writing has used 
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folklore to examine its instructional value, she acknowledges that folklore actually comprises 
an enormous array of cultural facets such as beliefs, ideas, symbols, assumptions, attitudes, 
texts, and sentiments of peoples. She places its role beyond just didactic media and identifies it 
as central to cultural reproduction. Similar views are echoed by Mtonga (1980) in his focus on 
theatre and dance as tools of cultural reproduction.   
 
Even with a meticulous proposal, the above authors remain lone voices for several reasons. 
Literature shows that certain aspects of communication for development in Malawi, Zambia 
and Africa in general, are scattered across disciplines such as literature, arts, religion, and 
African history. Additionally, these aspects of communication are not effectively analysed and 
linked to the technocracy of poverty reduction. Consequently, most of the African and non-
western literature on participatory communication presumes that indigenous Malawian and 
Zambian cultural media are an effective means of instilling a preferred form of development 
ideas through cultural transformation without acknowledging that such media is part of the local 
culture. Such an approach has perpetuated the view that communities targeted for development 
are a blank slate on which anything can be written at will. It accords with the recommendation 
by Ericsson (2001) and the UN (2010) that by restricting communication for development to 
processes between governments, NGOs and donors, it can be used to localise MDG and enable 
people to take charge of their own development. Stepping out of this literary enclosure requires 
exploring how communication was traditionally and historically practiced in Malawi and 
Zambia. The villagers in Malawi and Zambia have been in existence before conventional 
development projects.  
 
That said, there is an irresistible temptation to connect the response to the question of how 
Malawians and Zambians have traditionally used communication for development with Freire’s 
ideas on the pedagogy of the oppressed before zooming in on the traditional methods.  Boal 
(1979), together with Chambers (1997) are blamed for integrating Freire’s ideas in institutions 
of conventional development, an approach which facilitates integration of indigenous 
knowledge, as a form of participation, into institutions of power. Interpersonal media and local 
mass media are used as agents of development and socialisation to instigate conventional 
development by project officers (Bessette, 2004). “The concept of interactivity, with traditional 
media as its operational instrument, makes possible the endogenous acquisition of knowledge 
and skills within the framework of a search for solutions and the communication process” 
(Scrampickal, 2006, p. 7). Theatre in Malawi and Zambia, for instance, proved highly 
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significant because of its traditional religious and ritualistic application. “In the pre-colonial 
period, a combination of activities including poetry, myths, songs, dance, acting, wrestling and 
even serving various dishes took place over a period of time, sometimes days or even weeks, in 
one all-encompassing performance” (Article 19, 2003) 27F28. 
 
However, Freire’s initial ideas remain crucial and relevant to this study. Within the paradigm 
of endogenous development, the need for change is driven by internal dynamics and cannot be 
induced externally. Freire’s ideas combine nationalism, individual and community progress and 
empowerment (Freire, 1970; 1978). He argues that if people can analyse their own reality, then 
they can identify solutions to their problems. He grounds his ideas in the anthropological view 
that people must be authors of their own culture and development (Freire, 1978).  This refers to 
an endogenous process, intended as a set of interrelated tools that sustain the existence of a 
society and its cultural progression, in spaces characterised by a local power and knowledge 
base. A survey of studies on African art and literature reveals that Malawi and Zambia have a 
rich history in the use of indigenous media drawn from their cultural background (Mda, 1993). 
Theatre, for instance, remains a rich form of cultural communication, especially in the rural 
areas where the majority of the country’s population still reside. It remains a unifying factor, 
with people watching or participating in performances that entertain, educate and inform 
(Scrampickal, 2006). Like most African societies, theatre, dance, song, music, story-telling and 
poetry were common tools used in Malawi and Zambia to promote development by sharing 
information, exchanging ideas, raising awareness and stimulating society to react to certain 
themes and causes, including the transmission of knowledge from one generation to another.  
Similar views are found in Mda (1993) who observes that in Malawi and Zambia theatre was 
pivotal in mobilising and stimulating action towards addressing developmental causes. He notes 
that between 1965 and 1975 this practice, with the aid of a few educated Malawian and Zambian 
authors, led to the creation of a new genre of plays aimed at fostering the spirit of liberation 
struggle for independence. 
 
3.8 Conclusion 
After defining and offering a critique of the concept of development and analysing it from a 
global governance perspective, this chapter identified some critical observations that are vital 
in considering how communication for development is used in Malawi and Zambia. Firstly, 
                                                 
28http://www.abstract.lib-ebook.com/a1-history/1544020-1-article-the-global-campaign-for-free-expression-
february-2003-arti.php (accessed on 28 September 2015) 
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based on emerging literature, development embraces a variety of meanings that tend to preclude 
the formulation of a universally acceptable and accepted definition. However, the fact that the 
organisation of the world today is predicated on global and national economies suggests that 
development has become the central organising concept and therefore has a definitive meaning. 
Studies by Escobar (1995), Crush (1995) and Rahnema (1991) are instrumental in exposing the 
underlying meaning of development and its significance as an intrinsically embedded element 
in global governance structures. The work of Said (1979), Proccacci (1991) and Rodney (1982) 
on the effect of development as an agent to alter mind-sets, opened an insightful discussion on 
communication for development and its cause-effect relationships with development. The 
marriage between these two concepts remains an unholy one which undermines fundamental 
principles of participatory approaches. The MDG as a global governance policy is propagating 
a particular point of view of development that can be potentially enslaving and undermining of 
human interests and potential and a regression to the past. Earlier discussions have shown how 
development, which now dominates culture, is not only limiting, oppressive and dominating. 
The convergence of top-down models of thought into horizontal processes is in discord with 
the principles of true participatory theories (see Sachs, 1992; Escobar, 1995; Rahnema, 1997). 
This is not helped by the confusion that characterises the origins of development. Emerging out 
of many different theoretical disciplines has denied it the chance to evolve away from the 
trammels of past theories. For instance, recent literature on communication for development 
remains committed to diffusion of innovation models of the 1930s as a service to modernisation 
ideas. Servaes and Malikhao (2006) observe that communication for development is still pro-
media, pro-innovation and pro-persuasion, drawing on old ideas of Lerner (1958) and Schramm 
(1964) and diffusion models (see Servaes and Malikhao, 2006; Everett Rogers, 1962, 1983).  
Media theories have evolved to embrace freedom of thought, citizen empowerment and 
participation in democracy (McQuail, 1983; Fiske, 1987). Similarly, participatory approaches 
have become preeminent in addressing poverty issues (see Jennings, 2000; Cooke and Kothari, 
2001). Lack of funding has inhibited independent academic studies on communication to the 
extent that most are commissioned by donors or NGOs to improve project efficiency and largely 
to integrate diffusion models and influence social and behaviour change (see Mefalopulos, 
2003, 2006, 2008; Servaes and Malikhao, 2006; Waisbord (2000); Hemer and Tufte, 2005).   
 
This theoretical gap is not without consequences. While there are many views on participatory 
involvement, it is clear that participation is about autonomy, power and the ability of 
communities to define their lives independently without extraneous reference to the West 
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(Jacobson, 2003; Snyder, 2002).  To that end, communication for development first has to 
loosen its ties with the past (e.g. influence of MDG) by establishing its own theoretical 
grounding. By advancing this proposal, this study rejects the patronising idea of social 
conscientisation proposed by Melkote (2002), and Barranquero (2005) as the main goal of 
participation. Such an assumption can be risky as it presupposes that communities are unaware 
of their problems and therefore justifies intervention from outside.  By not denying shortages 
or the need for external ideas, this is intended to empower communities to gain external 
knowledge and resources without compromising their power and autonomy (cf. Said, 1979; 
Habermas, 1989).  
 
Jacobson (2003) and Freire’s (1970) ideas are useful in suggesting that true participation is not 
about the object-subject relationship but a way of life that is driven by internal dialogue within 
particular contexts. Therefore, people are already aware of their problems and needs, including 
how they should address them. Freire’s (1986) later work is inspirational, especially in 
postulating that no matter how difficult life can be, human beings are capable of looking at the 
world in a critical manner and thus having a dialogic encounter with the social environment. In 
Freire’s engagement with knowledge theory, everyone is at the same knowledge level, therefore 
communication for development is more than just a one-way, top-down, exclusive process. It 
is, rather, a dynamic, recursive, transactional and an experience process. Ultimately, unless 
people themselves are leading their own development, no amount of investment in ideas, 
technology and inputs will bring about any lasting improvements in their lives.  The next 
chapter reflects on theories of global governance, ideology, knowledge and power, hegemony, 
communication for development, and participatory approaches. 
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Chapter Four: Theoretical Frameworks 
4.1 Introduction  
This chapter presents the theoretical frameworks used to analyse the application of the UN 
Communication for Development strategy in implementing the MDGs in Malawi and Zambia. 
The chapter begins by discussing state and society participation in the context of global 
governance theories, in an attempt to identify opportunities and limitations for Malawi and 
Zambia to participate in policy formulation and implementation.  
 
The first objective of this chapter is to present theories that have helped to address the aims of 
this study and the role of actors in policy spaces and how they influence ideas in the UN system, 
including the implications of such ideas on how member states interpret participation and 
practices pertaining to poverty reduction. The second objective of this chapter is to discuss how 
ideas, material interests and global governance structures metamorphose through theories of 
hegemony, and how they are mirrored through policies (MDGs and UN Communication for 
Development strategy) as sites where ‘words’ impose a ‘worldview’ on developing countries. 
The relationship between states (Malawi and Zambia in this instance), global policies and the 
UN system, are not considered neutral, but rather, a complex set of social relations, and in 
complicity with power that seeks to condition and configure local behaviour in its favour. As 
part of the third objective, this chapter discusses communication for development and 
participatory theories, taking into account the role of the UN system and hegemony as central 
sources of policy narratives which, in this case, are sources of the communication messages to 
effect behavioural change.  
 
The study is situated in Cox’s (1981, 1983, 1987) critical view to allow analysis to step outside 
the problem-solving theories which have dominated governance, communication for 
development and participatory debate. The strength of applying critical thinking lies in its 
ability to explore issues outside the parameters of political and social structures. By taking such 
an approach, this study attempts to explore alternative positions on poverty, which derive from 
local realities that stand apart from the prevailing ones. The use of Cox’s critical theory is also 
necessitated by its attention to the different state forms in response to power, production and 
world orders, and his argument that social order influences production modes. 
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4.2 Global governance: a definition and mainstream approaches 
As mentioned earlier, in 2000, Malawi and Zambia were among the member states that adopted 
the Millennium Resolution, setting out eight development goals to be achieved by 2015. With 
the UN system acting as the major global governance institution, the adoption of the 
Millennium Resolution was conducted through a process described as ‘consensus’.  The UN 
Communication for Development strategy was similarly conceptualised by a UN technical 
team, with an objective to expedite the implementation of the MDGs (cf. Chapter Two). The 
study views these texts through the lens of the international development policy, as they are 
products of the UN system – a system of global governance (Rosenau, 1999). On that account, 
the study applies theories of global governance to critically analyse these texts within the 
framework of participation, both in terms of formulation and implementation of the MDGs by 
Malawi and Zambia.   
 
The analysis of the MDGs and the UN Communication for Development strategy is predicated 
on earlier academic discussions on global governance theories in the 1950s by Deutsch (1953), 
Haas (1958; 1961) and later by Giddens (1984), which foregrounded debate on global 
convergence and globalisation respectively. Deutsch (1953) for instance, hypothesised that the 
convergence of transnational exchange, communication and transactions would lead to social 
integration, while Haas (1958; 1961) proposed the creation of global institutions to manage the 
process of integration. Giddens (1984) summarised these in his theorisation of globalisation. 
The main purpose of drawing from these theoretical discussions is to establish a theoretical 
premise to interrogate the interface between member states (Malawi and Zambia) and the UN 
system as a global government in the process of unpacking the ideas that underpin international 
development policies. This is at the centre of this study’s goal – to examine the 
operationalisation of participation deriving from both the MDGs and the UN Communication 
for Development strategy. In addition, the study seeks to ascertain claims by Thakur and Weiss 
(2006) and Rosenau (1999) that a global single rule system tends to manifest into a single world 
order because policies tend to define social positions where communication operates as a social 
agent in defining a worldview. 
 
Despite global governance occupying a central position in the field of international relations, 
the concept faces definitional crisis. As a result, there are more than a dozen interpretations of 
global governance theories, perhaps an indication of the confusion that characterises the 
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concept (Pattberg, 2006). Thakur and Weiss (2006) offer a loose and yet general definition 
wherein they describe global governance as a:  
“...complex of formal and informal institutions, mechanisms, relationships and 
processes between and among states, markets, citizens and organisations, both inter- 
and non-governmental, through which collective interests on the global plane are 
articulated, rights and obligations are established, and differences are mediated” (p.3).  
It is not the aim of this study to pursue the conceptual confusion that characterises global 
governance, but to reflect on relevant interpretations as they converge into a single mode of 
global governance in the UN system.     
 
Global governance theories are interpreted in a variety of ways which range from the role of 
civil society in global decision-making processes to supra-national organisations, specialised 
networks, technical bodies and transnational corporations in global politics. The study considers 
these as amongst the actors who feed into the global policy architecture. Dingwerth and Pattberg 
(2006) categorise mainstream global governance approaches into a single global socio-political 
order, the transnational relations and globalisation. This study, however, foregrounds its 
analysis on the third category – the UN system. This is not to render the two approaches 
irrelevant as there is interplay between the three, but the purpose is to understand them within 
the structures of governance which the UN system approach proffers. An analysis of the 
formulation and implementation of the MDGs and UN Communication for Development 
strategy through the UN system approach is vital for the purposes of locating the role of member 
states and their communities who are supposed to take the lead in addressing their poverty 
(Pieterse in Hemer and Tufte, 2006; UN, 2010). That the UN system now occupies a central 
position in establishing cooperative mechanisms to global problem-solving approaches such as 
poverty (see Risse, 2002; Cox, 1996; Soederberg, 2006), provides a context for discussing how 
communities and governments in Malawi and Zambia influence the poverty reduction agenda 
in the MDGs and the participatory approaches proposed in the UN communication for 
Development strategy. 
 
4.2.1 Global policy formulation and the developing state 
Responding to the question of ‘how’ communities and governments of Malawi and Zambia 
participated in the policy formulation and implementation processes alone is inadequate to 
address the goals of this study, without addressing the question of ‘where’,  ‘when’ and ‘what’. 
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International development policy studies have often glorified global governance theories as a 
prerequisite for social transformation; sustaining the problem-solving approach to poverty 
reduction. The concept of global governance in poverty reduction assumes that global 
cooperation is paramount to addressing global poverty, than lived experiences by the 
communities. The predominant problem-solving approach masks the presence of ideas and 
interests which control global relations. For the purposes of this study, the main focus is to 
understand the network of global governance, including its formal and informal interactions 
between actors at different levels which feed into the MDG formulation. The problem-solving 
approach is a main concern for Cox’s (1981, 1983, 1987) critical theory which questions 
possibilities of diversity of conceptualisation of life as an outcome of participation within global 
policies. He contests the notion of applying a one-size-fits-all universal solution to problems in 
different contexts. The theoretical contradictions between external solution and local problems 
are where individuals’ ability to determine ‘their modes of perceiving the world, and of their 
potential” is undermined (Cox, 1987, p. 403). 
 
Cox discusses global governance in relation to social order and dominance, largely anchoring 
his view in structures of power, ideas and material interest. Before addressing ideas and material 
interests, the study sought to gauge the extent to which the global policy structure permits 
Malawi and Zambia and their communities to participate in the formulation of the MDGs. The 
objective was to identify and establish moments and opportunities where Malawi and Zambia, 
with their people, could possibly interact with policy-making and implementation processes. 
To achieve this, the study examined the global policy infrastructure which according to Heclo 
(1978) and Grindle and Thomas (1991) is predominantly made up of three key categories of 
policy arenas. The first category of close policy spaces draws on influential work of the 1980s 
largely from Heclo’s (1978) seminal conceptualisation of issues network, which focuses on 
policy subsystems, often made up of actors of the same interests and inaccessible to non-
members. These policy subsystems are important for policy formation in the policy cycle. 
Unlike the agenda setting theory and the legislative spaces where representatives of the public 
or states are more directly involved, participation in policy formation is much more restricted 
to the members of a policy subsystem. The second category is the legislative spaces, a replica 
of Habermas’s public sphere theory (Garnham, 1992), where decisions are made, adopted and 
endorsed through the process of consensus by elected or representative actors, often 
representing the public or citizens. The third category is described in Brock et al. (2004) as the 
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autonomous spaces, largely occupied by coalitions, civil society actors and interest groups who 
claim not to be aligned with governments or corporate interests.  
 
A thorough examination of these policy spaces goes beyond understanding the participation of 
Malawi and Zambia within the policy architecture of the UN system. This should also shed 
more light on the functions of each space in terms of setting the agenda (cf. Shannon and 
Weaver, 1949), the framing of issues and knowledge contribution in relation to actors’ material 
interests. Cox has consistently argued that policies are not neutral, as they are burdened by actor 
interests, most specifically international capital in its aspiration for hegemony through 
neutralizing and marginalization by universalization as a way to curtail revolt (cf. Cox, 1981). 
A similar view is echoed by Soederberg (2007) who postulates that policies are outcomes of 
“compromises, negotiations or imposed by the interplay of popular pressures and the response 
of different actors” (p.500), which makes public policy unbalanced in favour of powerful actors. 
The scenario laid down by Soederberg (2007) provokes pertinent questions about who 
participates, where and with what interests, with implications for whose ideas govern in both 
the UN system and the dominant poverty reduction narrative. Analysis in this context takes into 
account that the UN system is a network of systems and actors. These include the UN Security 
Council charged with peacekeeping, sanctioning and acceptance of member states in the UN 
system. Implicitly, the five permanent member states28F29 out of the fifteen have powers over other 
states and they exercise agency. The ability of member states to use force enables them to pursue 
their interests, either national or global (cf. Yoo, 2003). Yoo cites the use of the Security 
Council to declare war on Iraq in 1990 (UNSC Resolution 660, 1990)29F30 and Resolution 1441, 
(2002) which led to the downfall of Saddam Hussein under the guise of destroying weapon of 
mass destruction which were later discovered to be non-existent. Charles (2007) has contested 
that the veto power is now being used by member states to pursue national interests instead of 
global peace.  Soederberg’s (2007) analysis also  helps to address the question of whether the 
MDGs are a prescription designed to create an unquestioned demand for global governance in 
the affairs of Malawi and Zambia, rather than addressing local challenges, and whether or not 
they conceal certain interests. 
 
                                                 
29 The permanent member states of the Security Council include Russia, United Kingdom, France, China and 
United States of America. Other non-permanent member states include Angola, Egypt, Japan, Malaysia, New 
Zealand, Senegal, Spain, Ukraine, Uruguay and Venezuela. 
30 http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/660(1990) 
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The application of global governance theories to how MDGs are implemented in Malawi and 
Zambia through the UN Communication for Development strategy, seeks to interrogate the 
notion of the extent of equality of member states enshrined in the UN Charter, that “The 
Organisation is based on the principle of the sovereign equality of all its Members” (Chapter 
one, Article two). The charter considers Malawi and Zambia as equal members entitled to enjoy 
autonomy in making their own decisions as sovereign states. This study carefully examines how 
the UN system, according to Soederberg (2007), is dominated by multiple and non-state 
interest-driven actors. According to Soederberg, these interests contaminate the UN system, 
originally thought to be the sanctuary for the plurality of views free from inequality, 
exploitation and class struggle (cf. Rosenau, 1992). Habermas’ (1990) disputed public sphere 
theory perhaps appropriately characterises Soederberg’s (2007) thinking on participation in the 
UN system, especially where he theorised equal participation within spaces of the public sphere.  
 
A further concern over global governance raised by Soederberg (2006), which is conversely a 
major weakness in Habermas’ (1989) disputed public sphere theory, is that given the 
centralisation of powers on the UN Security Council and Western corporations, public policy 
spaces such as the UN system weaken participation and autonomy when Malawi and Zambia 
(as member states) interact with the UN system as an authority. Soederberg’s (2006) arguments 
also raise the question of how such a western based participatory model is applicable to the 
African context given that the governance structures are very different from those in the West. 
In a context where such dominant actor interests dominate policy spaces and narratives, both 
the neutrality of the UN system (as a global government), and the autonomy of Malawi and 
Zambia as member states, are compromised by the interests of dominant actors. Weiss and 
Gordenker (1996) concur that the assumption that all member states are equal in an arena where 
they are ranked according to their economic size is merely masking the exercise of power. This 
is particularly relevant in light of Weiss and Gordenker’s (1996) postulation that the UN system 
is an authority which places itself in a position of governmental power over states, and its ideas 
are accompanied by authoritative power over member states yet it is controlled by few member 
states. The notion of diversity and plurality of ideas in such public policy arenas has been the 
central theme in Cox’s (1981) account of power imbalances. Cox drew his argument from the 
basis that material conditions required to configure equality of all member states in public 
policy spaces are inadequate. This is due to imbalances rooted in materialism that gave rise to 
the UN system at its formation.  
  
83 
 
In his discussion of the nation-state relationship, Cox’s (1980) postulation implies that global 
governance can instead undermine developing states such as Malawi and Zambia by depriving 
them of their sovereignty and ability to exercise autonomy – a scenario that runs contrary to the 
principle of participation. In his arguments, Cox (1980) contends that ideas and discourses 
arising from policy spaces such as institutions of global governance, tend to favour those that 
sustain the interests of the dominant actors. This is part of what this study seek to establish, 
whether the MDGs are promoting the ideas of the elite as global solutions to poverty and 
therefore a mode of social transformation. Central to this study is the desire to identify 
opportunities to balance between a centralised global governance policy (like MDGs) premised 
on a participatory model, and examining possibilities of incorporating local ideas and interests 
into the global policies without compromising each other’s interests. This is necessary because 
the concept of transformation proposed in the UN Communication for Development strategy 
prefers epistemological diffusion as an equivalent of social change or poverty reduction, while 
equality equates to a plurality of voices to disguise biased political and social relations between 
the North and the South (Gordenker and Weiss, 1996). To analyse the convergence of the two 
approaches requires interrogating the above theoretical arguments against the concept of state 
autonomy, which is the fulcrum of the participation agenda.  
 
Gordenker and Weiss (1996) and Rosenau (1997a) also discuss globalisation in terms of how 
global policies, through the lenses of transnational relations, erase  national state borders, 
shrinking the national-global interface and threatening state autonomy for Malawi and Zambia. 
Strange (1988b) discusses how state autonomy is diminished by the universalisation of 
production and consumption and how changes in production also alter social and political 
power. The authority of global governance institutions transcends state capacity in terms of 
seeking consensus for the global agenda. Gramsci (1971) too has argued that the regulatory 
function and the act of setting rules (by the UN system), is an exercise of power which 
introduces and reinforces a preferred social order, secured through consent (as member states), 
or by force (by ensuring compliance to global policies). Once consent has been secured, power 
determines priorities and knowledge parameters within its hierarchical structures, thus 
neglecting local realities (cf. Dingwerth and Pattberg, 2006; Weiss and Gordenker, 2002). This 
theoretical construction of global governance and its function is important in assessing the 
capabilities of governments of Malawi and Zambia to decide their priorities and the extent to 
which they can use their power to empower their people. Such analysis is carried out in relation 
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to the extent to which the UN system exercises its authority over member states, especially 
developing nations.  
 
In pursuing this approach, the objective is to understand the ability of Malawi and Zambia to 
independently formulate locally relevant policies suitable to address local problems without 
creating tensions with or succumbing to global policy pressures.  Attention is given to how 
poverty reduction is framed and its relevance to the realities of countries under study. The 
primary purpose is to respond to Cox’s (1953) concern that global governance theories overlook 
the link between power and social relations in pursuit of the globalization agenda. International 
development policy has often failed to address and conceptualise power, knowledge dynamics 
and epistemic supervision by international institutions and their consequences on the mind-set 
of people from the South. This especially takes place when an international Communication for 
Development strategy is involved in the promotion of such knowledge.   
 
4.3 Hegemony: global governance, the state and social order 
The effect of global governance power, as discussed in Gramsci (1971), Cox (1980) and other 
authors, is not only limited to how the UN system enforces compliance of member states such 
as Malawi and Zambia regarding the MDGs, but also questions the role of the UN system in 
promoting certain ideas and how they condition policies, knowledge and individual behaviour, 
rendering these as a given. Gramsci conceives this as hegemony, a form of social domination 
by the elite social groups operating through states, governmental and epistemic institutions. I 
am aware that in Gramsci, hegemony does not imply the direct actions of specific individuals, 
but  refers instead, to a situation where the dominant ideas, and frames in which such ideas are 
produced, are aligned with the interests of a particular set of elite. The main insight in Gramsci’s 
concept is that the hegemonic power of elite ideas makes them seem like common-sense, given 
or the only possibility. In other words, a development worker does not consciously or 
deliberately represent the interests of global elites at the expense of those considered to be poor, 
but because of the centrality of the economic growth ideas, he/she unconsciously reproduces 
economistic ideas and policy responses to the problem of poverty.  
 
This study draws from the neo-Gramscian scholarship of Cox (1981, 1983, 1987), Robinson 
(2005) and others who have deepened Gramsci’s nation-state relationship analysis to another 
theoretical dimension which provides a comprehensive framework of social change, which can 
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be linked to the social change thrust in the UN Communication for Development strategy. In 
his framework, Cox argues that it is not only the relationship between the nation and the social 
power that matters, but also the actors, ideas and the material worlds, which are connected, 
manifesting as a social transformation agenda in establishing a particular social order (Leysens, 
2008).  From the onset, the study considers the MDGs as a set of ideas proposing a certain mode 
of practice, which provides the ground upon which to examine how such ideas are a form of 
hegemony exercised through structures of power, practices and systems. The study is further 
informed by Cox’s idea (1987) that hegemony is not only limited to domination but is also a 
reflection of the dominant power in a given society where interests are implicitly linked to ideas 
and knowledge frames (Leysens, 2008). Acceptance of such ideas is acquired through 
rationalisation and social stability, leading to and in this instance, implying consensus with the 
dominant power.  
 
Of particular interest to this study is Cox’s neo-Gramsci thinking that global ideas, such as the 
MDGs framework, are linked to material capabilities, ideas and institutions.  Also essential, is 
his analysis of how they manifest in ‘transnational social forces’ or a ‘global civil society’ (Cox, 
1981, p. 105; Cox, 1983, p. 136). The symbiotic relationship between these factors defines a 
world order under the auspices of elite social groups. The need to investigate the role of actors 
in knowledge formation has already been discussed earlier in this chapter. Applying the theory 
of hegemony from a global governance perspective enables the analysis of local realities in 
Malawi and Zambia against what is proposed in the MDGs framework. In doing so, I consider 
Cox’s postulation that global hegemony subsists through powerful states that canvass their 
interests of capital and the powerful class as they establish their ideas worldwide through global 
policies. While the role of the state institutions is not negligible, even though bypassed, 
hegemony, as explained in Cox (1983) involves transnational social forces, thriving on ideas 
and materialism to perpetuate a global mode of production.  
 
By transnational social forces, Cox, (1983) refers to how domination is exercised by social elite 
groups with technical networks, epistemic communities and by earning control over knowledge 
to promote a certain form of production. He cites scientific knowledge and the way it is used to 
justify rules, norms, practices and standards in order to condition behaviour. By putting across 
this theoretical argument, Cox invites us to critically analyse how hegemony resides in both 
structures of power (global and state) and in the ‘social science lexicon’ of policy narrative and 
discourse such as those that underlie the MDGs (Robinson, 2005, p. 1). This makes it pertinent 
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to examine the discourse and narratives that constitute the MDG framework by interrogating 
theories of global governance, both in terms of the structure and epistemological foundation. 
Such an analysis reveals how the MDGs construct social order through both consent and 
coercion.   
 
Analyses of both the discourses and narratives that frame poverty reduction in the MDGs 
constitute an integral component of this study. This is largely because a Communication for 
Development strategy that speaks of social transformation and is attached to a global idea such 
as the MDGs framework raises concerns over altering subaltern culture in terms of production, 
practices and consumption patterns. The use of communication to link the global and the local 
has always been suspicious given that the flow of knowledge is skewed against the local, 
especially when considering Cox’s (1983) argument about how hegemony is maintained 
through both state and social forces to transform society into a world order. For Cox (1980), 
when ideas laden with actors’ and material interests are linked to social transformation agents, 
they lead to the universalisation of the societies and production (Leysens, 2008). Central to his 
theoretical argument is that hegemony seeks, through policies, to co-opt both the state and 
individuals into a certain world order, leaving little or no room for difference. Policies and ideas 
are produced in a context where they not only cease to be neutral, but are also contaminated by 
actors’ interests in pursuit of a particular worldview. The power of ideas in such a scenario 
transcends the state’s ability to protect its people from subscribing to the dominant ideology 
and hence the state may not be the only vehicle through which hegemony is transmitted and 
maintained. This, however, raises curious concerns where the success of the MDGs in reducing 
poverty is predicated on community participation (UN, 2010).   
 
In highlighting the link between ideas and material interests, Cox (1981) is concerned about the 
increasing role of finance in knowledge production, especially in poverty reduction. Cox (1981, 
p. 110) states that ‘international finance [is] the preeminent agency of conformity to world 
hegemonic order and the principal regulator of the political and productive organisation of a 
hegemonic world economy.’ His main worry is that finance institutions now drive the processes 
to internationalise global production, which underpins the world order (Cox, 1992). This raises 
questions about the power exerted by finance institutions such as the World Bank and IMF, 
disguised as neutral technical entities, while imposing themselves on developing states such as 
Malawi and Zambia who must comply with macroeconomic policies. The role of finance in 
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such a context is seen by Cox (1983) as a form of power, especially where it occupies a central 
role in defining the well-being of a society.  
 
Earlier in this chapter, it was noted that policies are produced by an intricate web of actors and 
groups (Cox, 1983; Leysens, 2008; Robinson, 2005). In a context where global policies are 
constructed and maintained through a policy coordination system, elite actors represented by 
different networks, together form the machinery that delivers a world order, raising the question 
of the role of states and communities in defining their well-being (Leysens, 2008). This 
becomes relevant when Robinson’s (2005) observation that a ‘transnational hegemony [is] 
emerging in which a transnational capitalist class predominates, leading [to] transnational 
capital’ (p.4) is taken into consideration.  Such capitalist groups constitute a managerial class, 
which often does not include states but rather social groups with capitalist interests and who 
depend on state institutions for propagating their ideology. Their interests tend to influence state 
and cultural policies. Among these social groups are multinational and transnational 
corporations historically known for pursuing self-interests and imposing a particular material 
culture on states, with the objective of maximising capital accumulation (Leysens, 2008), with 
little or no desire to benefit local economies and uplift the well-being of local communities.  
 
Of particular interest to this study is to ascertain the pressure on the governments of Malawi 
and Zambia and the villages to align their policies with the MDGs and for individual villagers 
to adjust their behaviour in line with development projects. In the context where a global 
governance policy presides over these adjustments, internationalisation of both the state and 
production at local level occurs (Cox, 1981), which ultimately leads to the centralisation of 
knowledge production and dependence on foreign epistemic frames. Once the control of 
knowledge has been secured, power is also centralised in the hands of the elite groups. While 
the conceptualisation of production may vary, this would not stop the elite group from claiming 
the right to knowledge production (Cox, 1987).   
 
In Cox (1987) the cause-effect relationship between finance and production is central, 
especially in terms of how finance joins forces with ideas to alter means of production. In this 
study, Cox’s (1987) theorisation is used to analyse the MDGs’ goal of halving poverty, based 
on the income of a dollar-a-day benchmark. This study does not limit itself to this symbiotic 
relationship, as doing so endorses the parlance that all types of well-being are determined by 
material and finance. Instead, I take a detour at Cox’s (1983) advice that the finance-production 
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nexus is responsible for delinking society from its ‘eco-system’ which effectively reduces 
societies’ productive capacity, leading to material and epistemological dependency on the 
transnational managerial classes for policy guidance. In so doing, I am not completely 
discounting the importance of material input in achieving well-being but stating that the 
conceptualisation of life cannot be universalised and centralised.  Viewed from the perspective 
where social transformation is an outcome of both power and socialisation, with communication 
as a socialising agent, the effect can only be the subordination of weaker groups, with hegemony 
as an ultimate outcome, hinged on the ruling ideology subsisting under unquestioned consensus 
(Leysens, 2008).  In the next section, the study explores the role of power and knowledge in 
conditioning state and individual behaviour. 
 
4.3.1 Alignment, detachment and local realities 
The role placed on communication in the implementation of the MDGs demands further 
analysis, especially in line with the link between ideas, interests and knowledge in shaping 
behaviour and practices (Stoddart, 2008).  The UN report (2010) notes that the failure to meet 
the MDGs is largely attributed to the lack of appropriate communication of the development 
strategy to localise the MDGs and stimulate participation among those considered poor. By 
localisation, the report implies that communities at a lower level needed to adopt a certain form 
of knowledge congruent with the MDGs. This is not necessarily intended to improve their well-
being. Earlier discussions highlighted the UN system as a global government that sets rules and 
ensures compliance. In a context where Malawi, Zambia and other developing countries are 
coerced to align their plans to global narratives, it would be interesting to establish if 
participation is anything more than pacification to maintain existing inequalities. Power 
becomes a repository of capital interests, a driver of transformation or social change towards a 
preferred order, which undermines state autonomy. This is explored following Cox’s (1987) 
argument that aligning individual behaviour or national plans to global policies links to capital 
interests, which in turn affects the framing of participation. The goal is to understand how the 
proposed alignment of behaviour, practices and national plans to the MDGs frame both the 
conceptual and contextual meaning of participation, while simultaneously unravelling the 
discourses and narratives that frame both the poverty reduction agenda and participatory 
approaches. In the analysis of hegemony, alignment of development plans has the effect of 
altering or replacing social realities with socially constructed lifestyles. Cox’s (1987) typology 
of modes of social relations and economic production is relevant in understanding how power 
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seeks to reinforce or impose certain production patterns, including how it erodes autonomy. 
Within the context of these theoretical tensions, the study questions the viability of the 
participatory project in the absence of state or society autonomy.  
 
Examining the concept of alignment in the context of autonomy is central to investigating if the 
Malawian and Zambian national plans are informed by local realities or aligned to global 
policies, which tend to make national plans more outward-oriented. Outward-oriented plans 
tend to lead to epistemological dependence through the outsourcing of knowledge in order to 
comply with global norms. Externally imposed knowledge often distances societies from their 
reality and makes them epistemologically dependent, as it drags them out of their cultural 
repository. Cox (1987:267) observes that ‘international finance is the preeminent agency of 
conformity to world hegemonic order and the principal regulator of the political and productive 
organisation of a hegemonic world economy’. He aptly notes that global governance 
internationalises the state in a space where dominant discourses triumph at the expense of the 
less dominant and sees global governance as processes in which ‘the nation state becomes part 
of a larger and more complex political structure that is the counterpart to international 
production’ (Cox, 1987, p. 253). Thus these processes, argues Cox, subsist in consensus 
formation, hierarchy formation and the transformation of global policies into national policies 
and practices. It is on that basis that Garnham (1992) calls for the acknowledgement of the 
importance of other public spheres outside formal structures, as alternative modes of 
participation. Garnham’s (1992) proposition for all its merit, has not gained sufficient ground.  
 
In Rosenau’s (2002) research, autonomous modes of participation are not treated with the same 
importance as in the formalised structures, which suggests that anything outside or that counters 
the global governance discourse is either of no significance or is viewed as anarchy. In 
neglecting or suppressing differences and the autonomy of societies, it is necessary to 
investigate how global policies are antagonistic towards participation, maintains Calhoun 
(1992). This is in line with Fraser’s (1992, p.116) view that the ‘exclusionary bourgeois public’ 
suppresses the ‘sub-spaces’ and marginalises the ‘subaltern counter publics’ to ensure control.  
 
4.3.2 Power, knowledge and actions 
Theoretical debates on how knowledge and power frame practices are of relevance to this study. 
As noted in Overbeek (2004, p.10), ‘monetarism holds that by making money scarce … 
economic reasoning can be forced upon states and society as a whole’. This is a foundation for 
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understanding how the power of money conspires with knowledge to become an oppressive 
force in societies. The importance of such an analysis is derived from what seems to be the 
dominant notion that in the absence of finance there can be no poverty reduction – a scenario 
that discounts grassroots and developing countries from taking the lead (cf. Cox, 1991).   The 
primary strength of investigating the MDGs through the lens of knowledge and power is its 
capacity to provide insight into what has been highlighted by Ruggie (1998) and Soederberg 
(2007) that dominant ideas are purveyed through the impunity enjoyed by global governance 
institutions such as the UN system in order to facilitate the positioning of neoliberal hegemony 
(cf. Fischer, 2001).  This is analysed in the context of both Coxian and Marxist positions, which 
suggest that ideas are not neutral. As such, the MDGs framework is a set of ideas which 
represents powerful interests.  
 
In Marx, for example, ‘ideas are nothing more than the ideal expression of dominant material 
relations’ (Marx and Engels, 1975, p.59), while Weber (1948, p.80) states that ‘not ideas but 
material and ideal interest, directly govern men’s conduct’, to which Burchill et al. (2009) add 
that global policies reproduce, extend and perpetuate the global capitalist system. Cox (1983) 
extensively explains the link between actors, ideas and material interests by stating that global 
policies tend to be framed by discourses that preserve capital interests, structures of power and 
social relations, while facilitating a smooth cultivation of neoliberal values (cf. Keohane, 1984). 
On these grounds, the assertion by Cox (1983), that global arenas, such as the UN system 
function to legitimise the ideology of neoliberalism into a world order and the superiority of 
market rationality as justification to intervene in developing countries through public spheres, 
requires further analyses.  
 
Given the central role of texts in framing the poverty reduction pedagogy in the MDGs, it is 
instructive to analyse how these ideas manifest into knowledge in light of Cox’s (1983) 
observation that global governance is congested by actors and material interests all of which 
define relations. He cites how the IMF and the World Bank have become powerful stakeholders 
in designing development policies within specific historical circumstances suitable only for 
certain ideas and material interests and thus compromising the UN’s neutrality. The interest, in 
this case, is to investigate the claims that actors acquire power, seek to transform society 
through ideas and to uncover how the same ideas, when linked to power, often distort or replace 
social realities by altering social forms of production.  
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Leysens (2008) lays the foundation for analysing the link between knowledge and power, which 
has been pursued in detail by Haas (1992).  Haas’s (1992) analyses of the global policy 
coordination process and the role of global institutions in configuring the social order are 
relevant to the objectives of this study, especially in relation to how individual or national 
behaviour is conditioned. Haas’s line of inquiry provides a basis for evaluating the extent to 
which global policy-making processes can accommodate national interests of developing 
countries. It is also useful for evaluating the degree to which countries such as Malawi and 
Zambia can formulate policies independent of global policy pressures in pursuit of their 
people’s well-being (material and nonmaterial value). Haas (1992), however, sees opportunities 
for state action, but only if states are capable of identifying issue areas of policy-making and 
priority setting, rather than depending on global policy processes. His advocacy for these issues 
arises from several concerns. The first concern is that while human agency occupies the space 
between global policy conditions, knowledge, national actions and individual actions, the role 
of epistemic communities is crucial in supplying knowledge. The second concern is that such 
knowledge becomes central in ‘framing the cause-and-effect relationships of problems and 
which frame issues for collective debate, proposing specific policies, and identifying salient 
points for negotiation’ (Haas, 1992).  
 
Epistemic communities, according to Haas (1992, p.2), are ‘networks of professionals with 
recognised expertise and competence in a particular domain and an authoritative claim to 
policy-relevant knowledge within that domain or issue-area’. While epistemic communities 
may be comprised of experts and professionals from a variety of disciplines and backgrounds, 
they operate under political conditions and their views are vulnerable to political interests and 
power. Because their knowledge is unquestionably believed and assumed neutral, scientific 
rationality is applied to suppress alternative views in decision-making and promote a situation 
favourable to elites. Haas (1992) further highlights that powerful actors tend to use knowledge 
from epistemic communities to advance their interests and condition behaviour of both the 
states and individuals. This is particularly important to this study to establish if the practice of 
poverty reduction in the MDGs framework relies on epistemic communities for guidance in 
defining and solving the poverty problem. These intricate linkages become pertinent in light of 
Haas’s (1992) reflection that control over knowledge and information is an important dimension 
of power, and therefore the use of communication for development strategies premised on the 
diffusion of ideas and information can potentially be used to reconfigure new behavioural 
patterns in favour of a preferred social order. It is clear in Haas (1992, p.5) that ‘the policy role 
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of the knowledge elite’ feeds into the narrative that policymakers and political leaders use 
knowledge to retain control. A similar argument is offered by Ruggie (1976) on how ideas 
shape social reality and how social organisations such as the UN system, and practices they 
establish in society, lead to a social order.  
 
The study thus investigates the nexus between such knowledge and the mind-sets of those 
exposed to it. For instance, the mental schema through which Malawi and Zambia societies 
conceptualise how to address their poverty problem is of particular importance. Furthermore, 
to locate this connection within the realms of how a different well-being is imposed on them 
before analysing the parameters that guide the narratives is paramount.  Foucault’s (1977) 
contribution to the debate on the relationship between knowledge and power is critical in 
establishing if the MDGs have imposed a socially constructed poverty discourse in Malawi and 
Zambia – one that is remote from their local realities. Knowledge influences people’s 
psychological schematic structures in constructing meanings (Chomsky, 2002; 1988). Chomsky 
describes schematic structures as frames of thought (representation) within which concepts are 
understood and put into practice. He highlights how knowledge can operate as an instrument of 
power. Foucault (2002) also describes the restricted public policy domain, such as the UN 
system, dominant ideology, institutional pressure and actors’ interests as influential because of 
the forms of knowledge that they construct.  
 
Chomsky (2002) discusses the notion of knowledge in detail and demonstrates how it manifests 
as mental frames of reference, which guide judgement, decision-making and behaviour, which 
are often the base for transformation. The role of power in the imposition of knowledge is to 
impose meanings on particular concepts (cf. Fairclough, 1989). This is described in Luke (1974) 
as representation of relative dominance, that is to say, where one party dictates to another. This 
makes it relevant to probe if knowledge on poverty is an imposition of power on Malawi and 
Zambia (cf. Escobar, 1995; Abrahamson, 2004). This study attempts to establish if the lifestyles 
of Malawians and Zambians have been socialised into foreign lifestyles as that may have 
resulted in an identity linked to poverty. Where lifestyles are altered, often through 
rationalisation, Stoddart (2008) concludes that knowledge becomes the oppressive force that 
intimidates alternative views, thereby distorting reality. The discrepancy between real and 
constructed poverty identities forms the basis from which conclusions are drawn on how 
poverty is defined in Malawi and Zambia. 
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4.3.3 Rules, power and subordination 
It was noted in earlier discussions that hegemony also secures its positioning through rules, 
consent and epistemology in favour of those actors who originate ideas. Global governance 
theories have been criticised for giving a voice to the ‘universal norms’ that are part of the 
‘common-sense ideology of a hegemonic world order’, because they function ‘to uphold the 
rules that underpin the idea of a liberal world economy’ (Cox, 1983, pp. 137-8). This is vital to 
the analysis of narratives and discourses that frame the MDGs’ poverty reduction agenda, which 
is part of the transformation process in a given country. Both Cox (1983) and Overbeek (2004) 
have led discussions on how global governance is a discursive attempt to conceal the neo-liberal 
agenda by disguising it as a poverty reduction strategy. Historical materialism holds that 
hegemony maintains its dominant position through consensus under the guise of cooperatively 
managing global affairs while subtly imposing itself on subordinate states (Overbeek, 2004). 
Lefebvre (2005) summarises this process as the ostensible neutrality of poverty to disguise how 
it is advanced, while paying lip service to issues of inclusion and participation.  
 
This study therefore takes interest in the connection between economic interests, social power 
and epistemology, often a source of debate, particularly the alignment of national poverty 
reduction plans for Malawi and Zambia to global policies. This is an important basis to question 
whether the alignment of national plans with the MDGs deprives Malawi and Zambia 
opportunities to draw from their own knowledge and their local realities. Hegemony effectively 
secures its positioning when the dominant knowledge presents its definition of reality and 
worldview in a way accepted by others as given, or as common-sense, and as the only sensible 
way. Alternative views are side-lined through knowledge supremacy and moral leadership 
(Gramsci, 1971). For hegemony to create and sustain a new society, it needs to maintain a new 
consciousness. This new consciousness either is ingrained in local culture or replaces the 
current culture, both aesthetically and anthropologically. 
  
Most theories of development studies have largely placed culture at the heart of development 
policy, but this study contradicts this view and argues that development defines aspects of 
culture, while culture is broader than development. The differences between the two concepts 
have become blurred. In general, development denotes the well-being of a society, while culture 
is a whole way of life of a society. Both are determined by systems of production and 
consumption styles. Production is the source of material capabilities from which power is 
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derived and a new culture is formulated and imposed. The struggle with hegemony lies in its 
control over production and consumption and the power resulting from it.  
 
4.4 Participation and communication for development: a critical perspective 
As earlier stated, one of the main goals of this study is to analyse how the UN Communication 
for Development strategy applies participation of those affected when implementing the MDGs 
in Mwandama Millennium Village in Malawi and Kamaila Village in Zambia. The role of 
communication in framing practice is central in the field of sociology and development studies 
especially in relation to behaviour stimulation, behavioural change and social transformation 
geared at improving the well-being of a society (Nair and White, 1993). In sociology, for 
instance, the ‘word’ occupies a central role in shaping ‘worldview’. Chapters 1 and 2 have 
discussed the conceptual overviews of the role of communication in establishing participatory 
models within the framework of the Millennium Village. By applying a critical participatory 
theoretical analysis, the study engages with theories of communication for development, but 
within the context of theories discussed earlier in this chapter. This is not to rehash theories of 
global governance and hegemony, but to pave way for unravelling how their convergence 
delivers the proposed behaviour and social change at village level in Malawi and Zambia.  
 
The application of the critical approach to participation and communication stems from the 
recommendation by the UN to add Communication for Development (cf. Waisbord, 2000) as a 
means to expedite participation (UN, 2010). This proposal by the UN report places 
communication in a position where it acts as ‘a science to produce effective messages’ 
(Waisbord in Hemer and Tufte, 2005, p. 77). Given the centrality of communication (both social 
and institutional) as a key theme of this inquiry, the study seeks to analyse its relationship with 
policy frameworks as ‘words’ that shape worldviews and frame practice.  
 
Despite a mixture of approaches and practices, this study relies on two main yet opposing 
theoretical standpoints: the diffusion of innovation conceptualised by Rogers (1983) and the 
dialogical pedagogy of Freire (1970). These are employed in order to assess the participatory 
approaches applied in the villages under study. These two theoretical approaches can be linked 
to Daniel Lerner’s study of communication and development (1958) and Wilbur Schramm’s 
study on the role of media for national development (1964) wherein the media are central in 
mediating between the targeted audience and drivers of development projects. Despite huge 
investment in the communication for development project to influence behavioural change, 
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there is no consensus on the extent to which media messages influence social behaviour, and it 
is safe to say that the media can offer choices and options from which people can choose to 
alter their behaviour. However, the study builds from behaviour theorists such as Darnton 
(2008) and Jackson (2005) who have offered authoritative views of how theories of behaviour 
have been integrated with those in media studies and adapted in the field of policy 
implementation to catalyse behavioural change. These authors refer to two key theories of 
behaviour where communication is used to effect social change towards certain policy positions 
–  the theory of interpersonal behaviour (Triandis, 1977) and the theory of planned behaviour 
(Ajzen, 1991). While these theories differ in their approach, they give credence to the premise 
that the media remain a vital agent of socialisation and a catalyst for participation. When applied 
to the field of media studies, the focus has been on the analysis of ideas and how the messages 
that carry them reflect and affect social and cultural change, as well as practices (Hansen et al., 
1998). Lasswell’s (1930) famous communication model of ‘Who says What through Which 
channel to Whom with What effect’ summarises what seems to be the main source of concern 
for the diffusion model, especially where participation is concerned.  
 
4.4.1 Communication, participation and social change 
This study applies the diffusion of innovation theory popularised by Rogers (1983), which 
conceives of development as driven from the centre of power (sender) to the targeted 
beneficiaries (audience) with the intention of effecting behavioural change. Improvement of the 
well-being is conceived as an outcome of an interventionist linear process where individuals 
accept imposed ideas into their lifestyles. Communication, in such a scenario, facilitates 
transformation by spreading new ideas. While media scholarship broadly concurs on the 
limitation of media in altering behaviour, there is also consensus that the media can offer 
choices and options from which people choose to alter their behaviour. Applying this theory 
does not imply endorsement, but rather examines the mode of participation preferred in the 
villages to implement the MDGs in a context where knowledge diffusion is a function of power.  
 
Within this approach, the role of the media is to alter behaviour by targeting attitudes, social 
norms and habits with the ultimate result of ensuring the adoption of a particular behaviour. 
This is often facilitated by measures and incentives to undertake the desired action leading to 
social transformation. The study takes into account that new perspectives on the diffusion model 
have incorporated cultural and inter-personal communications methods to improve the process 
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of social behavioural change (Servaes and Malikhao in Hemer, 2005).  Existing ideas which 
are a target for replacement, are seen as either irrelevant or barriers to a preferred mode of 
development. Social change in this theory is the ultimate goal of communication for 
development (Servaes, Jacobson and White, 1996; Wilkins, 2000). The study considers the 
concept of change or social transformation in the villages in terms of either reinforcing the 
preferred or eliminating the unwanted ideas.  
 
In applying the diffusion of innovation theory to the analysis of how communication for 
development is used in Malawi and Zambia, the study seeks to address several questions. 
Firstly, it assesses how the UN Communication for Development strategy interprets the MDGs 
at village level and how that translates into behaviour that facilitates poverty reduction. 
Secondly, it examines how modes of communication for development have been applied in the 
villages. Thirdly, it assesses the poverty reduction ideas that subsisted in the villages under 
study prior to the MDGs idea, with the study establishing how the two worlds of ideas reconcile 
with each other. The fourth objective is to investigate the extent to which local ideas are 
considered relevant to the poverty reduction agenda and the form of participation prescribed in 
the implementation.  
 
Rogers’ (1962) emphasis on adoption, largely derived from the sociological research on 
socialisation, is premised on the proposition that diffusion of new ideas through well-designed 
communication strategy tools leads to the adoption of cultural innovation, and is the main 
source of concern in this study. While transformation is the diffusion theory’s ultimate goal, it 
is not the central question of this study as transformation can be an outcome of both internal 
and external cultural dynamics. Rogers (1962) insists on the use of communication, as a social 
agent, to enforce the adoption of new ideas while giving little or no merit to local ideas (cf. 
Cox, 1983). He discounts the value of local ideas by conceptualising that poverty reduction is 
an outcome of the adoption of external and diffused ideas. Participation, in his theory, is only 
demonstrated by the enactment of these ideas. On this account, the study seeks to establish the 
capabilities of this model when applied to the two villages.  
 
The purpose of such a critical analysis is to establish if the concept of participation is predicated 
on the assumption that individuals can only develop from the social orders from which they are 
nurtured. The diffusion theory is the centre of the construction of the order of things, which 
becomes the ontology (Cox, 1981). Consequently, the individuals should adjust to that social 
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order in the form of behaviour and societal change, including global transformation, thereby 
surrendering the definition of individual and societal well-being to the hands of institutions. 
Such adjustment as Leysens (2008) observes, is co-option where power mediates between a 
top-down diffusion model and a dialogic model. The second purpose is to establish how the UN 
Communication for Development strategy frame is implemented. According to Gitlin (1980), 
communication is always linked to the way concepts are framed into a source of practices and 
cultural pedagogy. For instance, Rogers’s ideas on communication are closely linked to the 
World Bank’s framing of participation, which it describes as a process by ‘which stakeholders 
influence and share control over priority setting, policy making, resource allocation and project 
implementation’ (World Bank PRSP sourcebook, 1996, p.237). In the field of communication, 
the concept of framing is concerned with how main themes dominate texts and thereby shape 
practices. An examination of how the UN Communication for Development frames 
participation is therefore vital in its contribution to the debate on poverty reduction in the 
villages in Malawi and Zambia, taking into account that both countries are obliged to integrate 
participatory approaches in their national MDG plans as  a prerequisite watchword for donor 
funding (cf. Waisbord, 2000).  
 
Waisbord’s (2000) proposition provides a platform to interrogate Chambers’ (1997) 
participatory rural appraisal tools dominating the World Bank’s model of participation. The 
same participatory rural appraisal tools were criticized by Cleaver in Cooke and Kothari (2001) 
as elusive and as merely an act of faith, as their efficiency is overrated. These authors questioned 
whether participatory development, as proposed in Chambers (1997), leads to empowerment. 
Given that the research investigates the link between communication, participation and 
empowerment, the critical theoretical approach to the study makes it necessary to examine the 
implied mode of empowerment in the MDGs in the villages, taking into account that Chambers’ 
(1997) concept of empowerment focuses on people assumed to be excluded (relegated to the 
outskirts of society) from development project goals. They are, from Chambers’ (1997) 
perspective, intended to be brought into the fold, and empowered to take control of development 
projects. A countervailing theory to this approach is found in Freire (1986) and it seeks to 
facilitate the escape of social groups from what he terms trappings of domination. The former 
holds that Chambers fails to acknowledge people’s capabilities outside development goals. 
Lack of ‘self-critical epistemological awareness’ is evidenced by Chambers (1997) in his 
pursuit of enhancing participation without questioning the knowledge claims embedded in the 
development practice.  
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For a critical analysis of Rogers’s diffusion theory, and Chambers’ toolkit approach, the study 
relies on Cooke and Kothari’s (2001) critical analysis. It pays particular attention to their 
argument that while the ideas may be relevant to the poverty reduction cause, the approach does 
not allow flexibility – which is a key characteristic of human vicissitude, premised on the belief 
that human life cannot be tied and limited to project goals. These project goals emphasise cost-
effectiveness and yet are at variance with the empowerment agenda which is based on the 
assumption that communities are powerless, deeply ignorant in all areas, and incapable of any 
sort of initiative. Attention is also given to the notion that participation is only recognised when 
applied within project activities, without taking into account people’s capabilities outside 
projects. Notwithstanding the World Bank noting at its conference in 1998 that participatory 
development must shift from preoccupation with project effectiveness, Francis in Cooke and 
Kothari (2001) observes that this narrative still endures in global development policies.  
 
Given the importance of participation in the MDGs agenda, it is important to explore 
opportunities of self-awareness. Cohen (1994, p.65) argues that by ignoring these ‘we 
inevitably perpetrate fictions in our descriptions of other people’ – instead of enabling an 
individual to be ‘someone who can reflect on her or his experience of and position in society of 
being oneself’. Building on Cohen’s argument, it cannot be denied that communication for 
development is an interlocutor for participatory development, which Chambers (1997) uses 
interchangeably to mean engagement, involvement and inclusion of local populations in 
development projects. Cohen attempted to contest the assumption that institutionalised 
development knowledge is the only credible one, whereas this study indicates that local 
knowledge is equally valid.  
 
Cohen’s (1994) analysis is particularly important to this study, considering that both Rogers 
(1962) and Chambers’ (1997) approaches were blamed for homogenising and imposing the 
poverty problem definition. That Chambers neglects the power embedded in institutionalised 
poverty reduction begs debate on whether this is due to an oversight of the tensions of merging 
a top-down participatory model with a horizontal model (cf. Cox, 1981) or a strong belief in 
power being an author of change. The role of power shaping the social order is central in Cox’s 
(1981) criticism of centralised problem-solving models, which he blames for inherently 
undermining participatory principles. Although Chambers (1997) acknowledges the importance 
of local knowledge, he does so to integrate it into conventional development frames and not as 
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a stand-alone epistemology. This effectively neglects the underlying autocracy of development 
epistemology which disadvantages knowledge outside the conventional development.  
 
Applying critical participatory approaches to explore how power mediates between a horizontal 
model and top-down MDGs framework is intended to gain insights into participatory 
development practices in Malawi and Zambia. Cooke and Kothari (2001) for example, are 
critical of the top-down goal-oriented approach advocated by Chambers (1997), stating that it 
imposes institutional barriers over communities and thereby inhibits other processes that 
promote empowerment and freedom. Chambers (1997), however, insists that his participatory 
rural appraisal (PRA) tool can challenge the institutionally produced ignorance in the upper 
echelons of development professionals, which not only denies the realities of the lower echelons 
but also imposes its own uniform, simplified realities on them.  Cooke and Kothari’s (2001) 
objection to top-down approaches and these author’s contention that any attempt to infuse local 
knowledge into development projects obscures local knowledge in complex technocratic 
planning processes which are themselves  conditioned by the norms of development 
organisations, is problematic. This prompts further analysis to establish if the use of local 
Malawian and Zambian knowledge is an inversion of power hierarchies given the suggestion 
that development experts are not neutral agents. The latter represent institutions, which are not 
neutral either, as they are accountable to interest-oriented stakeholders (Jennings, 2000).  
 
Since this study’s primary objective is to examine the power of policy texts and how they 
transform individual and cultural practice, it seeks to analyse how experts and institutions create 
forms of social relationships in Malawian and Zambian villages, where people are obliged to 
adhere to the rules of engagement (Giddens, 1984). The theoretical tension between Cooke and 
Kothari (2001) and Chambers (1997) is of fundamental importance in drawing conclusions on 
relevant participatory paradigms based on the local realities in Malawi and Zambia. At the core 
of Cooke and Kothari’s (2001) proposal is the assumption that people’s ability to be innovative 
beyond the parameters imposed by institutional norms is constrained in the battle between the 
individual and institution. This limits their ability to organise their lives according to local 
realities and ‘difference’ (Cooke and Uma, 2001). These authors draw from Cohen (1994), who 
argues that the importance of the individual’s thoughts, is often glossed over in generalisations 
derived from collective social orders and categories. His main objective is to underline that 
individuals are endowed with capacity, and attention should focus on how they think rather than 
how they belong.  
100 
 
 
On the contrary, Chambers (1997) places emphasis on the notion of belonging to social 
categories, which is premised on the assumption that social inclusion in development projects 
reduces marginalisation and improves sustainability, ‘mostly fundamentally, the participatory 
and communicative structures, including new forms of social partnership through … a shared 
sense of public good’ (Cleaver in Cooke and Uma, 2001, p.38). Such a scenario is described by 
Cleaver in Cooke and Kothari (2001) as a tyranny that regulates the individual’s relationship 
with power, with the result that the person’s capacities and individual characteristics are merged 
into a universal identity.  
 
Criticism of the diffusion model transcends the institutionalisation of development, but is used 
by experts to promote certain forms of development, including cultural change. The relationship 
between communication and culture wherein experts are the drivers of development is one of 
the main concerns. Where culture is supposed to be the repository of knowledge and practices, 
the role of experts in the diffusion model is to eliminate and denigrate local cultures and replace 
them with what is perceived to be relevant. This conceptualisation occupies a central role in 
problem-solving theories (cf. Devetak, 1995) where social change is used as a measure of 
development even when the welfare has not changed. The importance of further pursuing the 
criticism of the diffusion model arises from the way the village projects are treated by 
institutionalised development vis-à-vis the villagers’ own view of their capabilities and their 
wellbeing. For example, Cleaver in Cooke and Kothari (2001) contests that in institutionalised 
development, the responsibility of reducing poverty and changing attitudes is no longer with 
individuals but with experts. These experts are paid staff pre-occupied with achieving 
organisation goals with scientific methods and in pursuit of a single efficient solution that feeds 
into the dominant social order, rather than paying attention to the diversity of context and ideas.  
 
This study follows a similar theoretical path, especially the dichotomisation of society through 
cultural change which is at issue, wherein terms such as local people, local knowledge, local 
solutions and many others draw the distinction between ‘us’ and ‘them’ – meaning the 
unconverted that still require social change, a reasoning that converts people into passive 
beneficiaries of development projects. Applying the diffusion of innovation in the analysis of 
how the MDGs are implemented in the villages in Malawi and Zambia, assists in examining 
how these MDGs and the village projects enhance or constrain opportunities for participation. 
This takes into account that local culture forms the groundwork for participatory development 
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(Cooke and Kothari, 2001) as people are likely to be better off when they have the autonomy 
to decide and work for themselves. This proposition is central among critical participation 
theorists who charge that effective participatory development is a combination of the power of 
local decisions and the capacities to steer development in line with  individual needs (see 
Jenning, 2000).  
 
4.4.2 Autonomy, dialogue and social wellbeing 
The second theoretical framework applicable to the implementation of the MDGs in the villages 
is the dialogical pedagogy popularised by Freire (1970; 1973; 1983; 1994) who opines that 
participation is a right of all people to individually and collectively communicate dialogically 
and in an unhindered manner. Unlike Rogers (1962), Freire does not identify participation as 
the result of communication. Instead, his model considers the two as having a dialogic and 
symbiotic relationship. The main idea in applying Freire’s theoretical ideas is to establish how 
the concept of poverty is understood and conceptualised at village level vis-à-vis Sachs’s (2005) 
Millennium Village model. An investigation into the collision of the two worlds (village 
knowledge versus Sachs) enables analyses on who decides, whose ideas prevail and what form 
of power exists. The Freirian proposition is derived from two theoretical standpoints. Firstly, 
imposed ideas tend to subjugate people who, if participation is to be achieved, must be viewed 
as equal human beings in any development process. By this, Freire is not discounting the need 
for external ideas in improving the welfare of society, but is proposing a dialogical process of 
communication – a situation where knowledge is autonomously acquired by one society rather 
than imposed by another. It is on that account that the study draws from Freire’s theoretical 
argument that communication and ideas are not privileges of a few individuals, and therefore 
the definition of concepts (in this case poverty) cannot be a function of a few, as that amounts 
to robbing others of their knowledge and communicative abilities.  
 
In addition, Freire (1994) has drawn from Marx’s (1844) vocabulary that human welfare cannot 
be measured only in terms of material needs. This proposition is further advanced by Baker 
(1996) in Brocks (2001), who borrows from Freire. Baker (1996) indicates that that the concept 
of policy at the individual level needs to be read within context, where individuals adjust 
according to their local realities and therefore ‘policy [at individual level] is never made once 
and for all’ (Baker, 1996, p.27). A key aspect of Freire’s proposition relevant to this study is 
his argument that individuals are naturally ascribed with relevant capabilities to manoeuvre 
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local realities and are capable of identifying solutions to their problems outside development 
institutions. An analysis of such conceptualisation contributes to the debate about the relevance 
and impact of the institutionalised poverty reduction framework. Cooke and Kothari (2001) 
further caution that the more people interact with project activities (cf. Rogers, 1983; MD, 2000; 
Sachs, 2005) the more their needs are shaped by institutional practices, thus creating an 
externally influenced lifestyle which often is not locally sustainable. This proposition by Baker 
(1996) points to the need to understand the relevance of locking poverty reduction within time 
frames and measurable material outcomes (e.g. halving poverty by 2015).  
 
To study the dynamics that constitute the constraints and opportunities of participation, as 
proposed in Freire’s (1994) theory, the study draws inspiration from the sociological position 
held by Giddens (1984) who indicates that actions performed by human agents are a process 
rather than a totality of externally driven goals, reasons, intentions and activities.  The point of 
departure for such an analysis is that individuals are in the villages at the level where the 
problems of living conditions are both lived and defined. As Waisbord in Hemer and Tufte 
(2005) observes, the important form of participation is ‘self-management’ – a concept that 
implies the right to freedom to determine self. These authors concur that empowerment 
associated with project participation serves to justify the activity of outside agencies, ignoring 
the function of autonomous individual and self-empowerment (Stirrat, 1997). Attention is 
therefore given to the extent that every day activities are not limited to or outcomes of contact 
with development projects, but a manifestation of several factors. Humans are organically 
multifaceted and duly characterised by several identities such as age, class, gender, race, 
religion and others imposed by a variety of local factors and thereby dispute the western model 
of democratic participation popularised by Habermas (1990).  
  
4.5 Conclusion 
As discussed in this chapter, the selection of the theoretical frameworks of global governance, 
hegemony and critical participatory approaches and other related concepts was based on the 
premise that there are essential components in the way reality is constructed. The central 
argument is that development ideas are social constructs scripted by actors who use global 
governance platforms to pursue their interests. Through the application of the theories herein, 
the study seeks to understand how ideas shape discourse and the narratives that dominate the 
implementation of MDGs in Malawi and Zambia. The decision to use these theoretical 
frameworks stems from the realisation that issues of words, language and internal development 
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policy (McQuail, 1994) have a strong influence on behavioural patterns of a society 
(participation) and are therefore susceptible to the whims of power. For lack of its own 
disciplinary grounding, communication for development, in its current conventional format has 
historically been associated with ideas similar to those in today’s neoliberal agenda, often 
associated with globalisation (Pieterse, 2001). Where communication is applied for social 
orientation, especially for development, a crosscutting cultural aspect raises key concerns 
regarding the use of knowledge in the exercise of power and the reinforcement of hegemonic 
values in society (McQuail, 1994).  
 
In a context where policy arenas are congested with material interests and powerful actors use 
ideas to govern, the chapter attempted to identify opportunities for participation outside 
structures of power. Scholars such as Foucault (2003), Derrida in Newman (2005), Marx and 
Engels (1989), Freire (1986) and others have offered useful insights with a view to 
reformulating apposite communication theory without reference to conventional development. 
Ashley (1981) offers means to securing freedom from institutional constraints imposed by 
conventional development, with Communication for Development applied to rescue the ‘self’ 
out of fixed identities often linked to materialism. This reasoning is derived from Freire’s 
(1986) emancipatory communication theory on the idea that self-ownership is achieved through 
individual freedom and autonomy. Unlike a number of prestigious sources (Abrahamsen, 2006; 
Escobar, 1991; Cleaver in Cooke and Uma, 2001) who argue that external knowledge is part of 
the problem, the line pursued in this study is that it is not knowledge in itself, but the way power 
imposes itself onto communities. Power acquired by way of locally driven initiatives has an 
empowering effect along Freire’s (1986) liberation and emancipatory ideas. In addition, such 
power can be deployed to acquire external knowledge to compensate for what is missing. This 
chapter has presented the theoretical frameworks and how they relate to the study. The next 
chapter discusses methodological approaches applied in the study. A combination of methods, 
including discourse, narrative and interpretive analysis were also used. Their justification is 
also offered in the next chapter.  
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Chapter Five: Methodology 
5.1 Introduction 
This is a study of policies as texts, messages and ideas and their relationship to social practices. 
It analyses how language operates within the realm of power relations. It is a study about words 
and the world (Freire and Macedo, 1987) and how the UN communication for Development 
strategy – as a behaviour and social change tool – connects with ideas in the MDGs. This study 
applies qualitative methods of analysis and this chapter introduces, explains and justifies the 
use of document analysis, qualitative interviews, including methods of data analysis.  
 
This study applies a policy space analysis by Brock et al. (2004) to investigate the participatory 
opportunities and moments for different actors but mainly focusing on the governments and the 
villagers in policy formulation and implementation of MDG-related projects. To achieve this, 
this study relies largely on Brock et al.’s (2004) policy space analysis, to identify which actors 
have access to or participated in which policy spaces and with what level of influence in the 
cross section of policy hierarchy. It considers as actors, those who take part in policy 
formulation and implementation of MDGs-related plans and projects at all levels.  
 
The goal in applying the policy-space analysis is to establish whose ideas shape the discourses 
in national and local spaces, from NGOs to government spaces before tracking the implications 
of such ideas on national planning processes and local behaviour. This is taking into account 
that actors hold positions and interests, belong to constituencies and therefore their discursive 
contribution to policies exercises agency (power) reflects interests of their networks. The 
relationship between ideas, communication and behaviour is well documented in the field of 
sociology (cf. Gerber and Linda; 2010). Critical theorists such as Cox (1987) have added their 
voice on the connection between ideas, political and economic interests.   
 
As a point of departure, this study takes off from the common assumption that to participate in 
policy spaces is to influence (cf. Chambers, 1997; cf. Brock, 2004) but does not limit the 
understanding of participation to those spaces as human activity also occurs outside structures 
of power. In that regard, this study refers to policy spaces as any platform, arena, opportunity 
or moment where “poverty discourses and policy actors interact” (Brock et al., 2004, p.17) 
across power relations, governed by rules of practice which determine who participates with 
what effects on policy. The study tracks through the hierarchy of spaces from the individual 
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villager, communities, local and national government platforms, including the same structures 
for NGOs on how the UN Communication for Development strategies facilitate the 
implementation of the MDG-related planning and projects (cf. Soederberg, 2007; Brock et al, 
2004). In doing so, the goal is to assess available participatory opportunities at global level and 
in the localisation of the MDGs from the villages to national level in Malawi and Zambia as 
member states of the UN system. Fischer (2001) and Grindle and Thomas’s (1991) 
categorisation of policy spaces into three relevant spheres – the closed, open and legislative (cf. 
Heclo, 1978), is useful in identifying the different policy streams and the views they feed into 
the mainstream policy spaces. Policy spaces, according to these authors are moments in which 
interventions provide opportunities to reconfigure the relationship between actors and policies. 
Used in this context, policy space analysis method provides the lenses through which to analyse 
the policy infra-structure as it makes it easier to break down the policy process into easily 
observable elements (Brock et al., 2004).   
 
With the policy structure and analysis of ideas handy, this study proceeds to apply a critical 
discourse analysis on the policy documents, including the MDG resolution, the UN 
Communication for Development strategy, PRSP and Malawi and Zambia national poverty 
reduction plans between 2011 and 2015. The goal is to establish how the concepts of 
participation and poverty reduction are conceptualised and framed with whose interests and 
with what effects on the national governments and the villagers. Special attention is given to 
how power influences meanings of words and concepts and how this imposes a certain 
worldview on poverty and the practice of participation. Finally, qualitative interviews with the 
Zambia National Broadcasting Corporation (ZNBC) radio and Malawi Broadcasting 
Corporation (the Development Broadcasting unit30F31), the Ministries of planning, UNDP resident 
coordination, Water for Kids (Zambia), Millennium Promise Alliance (Malawi) and focus 
group discussion with Kamaila and Mwandama Villagers in Zambia and Malawi respectively, 
are used with the goal of examining how policy narratives are translated into practice.   
                                                 
31 The Development Broadcasting unit generates and provides content to the Malawi Broadcasting Corporation radio one and 
other community radio stations across the country. Development Broadcasting Unit (DBU) has also set up a network of Radio 
Listening Clubs to generate content for radio development radio programmes such as Village Voice which presents through 
drama, music, poetry and prose, a priority problem the members have identified after community consultations: the village 
voice is an invitation to a service provider to fill the gap; this is played to the appropriate service provider who is then invited 
to visit the community. It also includes Dialogue - which connects the service provider and the community, and Action Update 
- recorded by the Radio Listening Club on progress update. These programmes are edited for a national and community 
audience.  
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5.2 Qualitative research method 
This study investigates policies as texts and as carriers of messages and ideas, especially how 
they link with behaviours and social practices. It is an analysis of how language operates within 
the realms of power relations and for that reason, this study relies on predominantly qualitative 
methods of inquiry and analysis. The strength of applying qualitative methods is their ability to 
intellectually engage with theory and to explore intricate literary textures and how they connect 
with human behaviour and practices (Creswell, 2003; Miles and Huberman, 1994). This  
approach was useful where there was a persistent requirement to examine the policy documents 
in question, relating to their discursive positions and their interaction with behaviour and 
cultures in Malawi and Zambia (Huberman and Miles, 1994). Qualitative methods were 
relevant in exploring the diversity of social and policy issues about well-being and the MDGs. 
This is because the method is grounded on the reasons and ways of how policy decisions are 
arrived at before they are transmitted to inform behaviour at grassroots (Huberman and Miles, 
1994; Creswell, 2003). As the concern is to understand the link between policy and practice, 
qualitative methods of data collection were relevant in providing ways of systematically 
comparing policy positions, meanings and practices (Shank, 2002), including how villagers in 
Malawi and Zambia make sense of their lived experience (Michael, 2008; Denzin and Lincoln 
(2000).  
 
5.2.1 Explaining the case study element of the research 
While this study broadly applies the qualitative research method, there are two cases – the two 
villages in Malawi and Zambia – which are used as the unit of analysis. Nevertheless, these two 
villages are not the main object of inquiry. As mentioned earlier, this study is about policies as 
texts, messages and ideas and their relationship with power and social practices (Freire and 
Macedo, 1987). It is an analysis of how language operates in the MDGs and the UN 
Communication for Development within the realm of power relations. In using the two villages 
as units of analysis to undertake this study, I take advice from Robert Stake (1995) to explain 
how the policy documents under study interact with the villagers within the domain of poverty 
reduction. Stake (1995) categorises case studies into three types – intrinsic, instrumental, and 
collective. The intrinsic case has the objective of exploring a phenomenon with less or no 
interest in building, extending or explaining theory, while in the instrumental case, the case 
itself or the unit of analysis is secondary to understanding the phenomenon under study. The 
collective case study, with similarities of the instrumental case, can also be extended to other 
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cases.  This study is an example of an instrumental case study because of its focus on policies 
and how they interact with the villagers in poverty reduction. While it is important to establish 
the social dynamics of the villages, it is not the ultimate aim. It is part of the means to understand 
the extent to which the MDGs projects and the UN Communication for Development strategy 
influence social dynamics of the villages, hence making the findings of this study easily 
generalizable. 
 
5.2.2. Document analysis 
To achieve the objectives of this study, an analysis of how participation and poverty reduction 
are formulated and framed in the MDG resolution, Malawi and Zambia national poverty 
reduction plans and the UN Communication for Development strategy is central. Qualitative 
analysis enabled an in-depth analysis of both visible and hidden meanings of thematic concepts 
such as poverty, participation and the role of communication for development. Data on these 
themes was collected and analysed to understand how ideas frame operational meanings of 
words.  
  
Although this study also drew from other policy documents for historical perspective, such as 
the International Development Strategy of the 1970s to deepen analysis, its primary units of 
analysis are the UN MDG resolution, the UN Communication for Development strategy, PRSP 
and Malawian and Zambian national MDGs plans for the period 2011 to 2015 (Corbin and 
Straus, 2008). In focusing on these policy documents, this study assumes that since the UN 
system only adopted the Communication for Development strategy for the MDG framework in 
2007, it could only have been incorporated and applied between 2011 and 2015 in Malawi and 
Zambia. Drawing from Bowen (2009), these documents as policy position encapsulate certain 
assumptions about development, which have implications on how communication is used in 
implementing the MDGs and the practices it imposes on those seen as poor.  Such meanings 
are explained in the context of power. It is with this understanding that this study considered 
policies to be outcomes of Cox’s (1987) critical thinking and the Foucauldian views on the 
relationship between ideas, knowledge and power. Fairclough (1992) has also added his voice 
is highlighting the causal relationship between discourse and societal behaviour because in his 
view, discourse shapes social structures of power relations and is the basis for sustaining 
hegemony or for instigating social change. This makes it imperative to examine the proposed 
link between the MDGs and the UN Communication for Development strategy.  
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The historical discourse analysis was used as an important component of critical discourse 
analysis to examine how the MDGs framework, especially the texts that define poverty derive 
their meanings from other texts such as the field of labour relations and economics linked 
together through intertextuality (Fairclough, 1992). Read on its own, the MDGs framework 
conveys development and poverty reduction as an independent policy position, but as this study 
reveals, it is only when it is read through the lenses of intertextuality that the hidden 
connections, meanings and causes drawn from other fields of study are revealed. Historical 
discourse analysis, as a method, is premised on a poststructuralist approach to critically examine 
texts, words and facts that form discourses. In rejecting the notion of historical knowledge as 
being neutral and objective, it makes it imperative to track the historical meanings of facts, 
statistics and interpretation of phenomenon. This study applies to question the dollar-a-day 
conceptualization of poverty which seems to have been taken for granted over many decades 
(Wodak and Meyer, 2009). By delving into the depth of meaning formation, this study’s desire 
is to get to the bottom of how key themes are historically defined. Therefore the temptation to 
reflect on the history of concepts that underlie the poverty narratives and how they have 
positioned themselves in the UN system is irresistible. For example, the dollar-a-day as a 
measure of poverty, as noted in Chapter three, relates to consumption in the field of labour 
relations studies and production in economic studies with both being subfields of economics. 
The interpretation of these narratives facilitated the correlation between the contextual and real 
meanings.  
 
Analysing discourses that frame the MDGs framework within the domain of power enabled the 
examination of relationships between discursive events such as the formulation of the MDGs 
and other processes foregrounding their adoption. This was necessary to examine how texts and 
narratives are organized to support the interests of different actors from various policy streams. 
Adopting this approach made it possible to demonstrate the multi-function of language in 
conveying interest-laden ideas, constructing new understanding of poverty, which omits or 
erases the realities in Malawi and Zambia while facilitating the translation of the dominant ideas 
into practices in the villages. Analysis proceeded by exploring the construction of storylines 
and sequencing of concepts. Within that discursive context, actors and participants whose roles 
are highlighted are revealed. This study was able to navigate, through the convergence between 
Fairclough’s (2003) critical discourse analysis and Cox’s (1987) Critical theory how a social 
discourse becomes an arena for ideological production and reproduction and how the discourse 
of development serves political interests (Bryan, 2004). To complement the strengths of the 
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document and discourse analysis method, qualitative interviews and focus groups discussions 
were also used. 
 
5.2.3 Qualitative interviews 
To collect data relevant to addressing the objectives of this study, interviews were conducted 
with respondents from the UN system in Malawi and Zambia. The UN system represents the 
global governments, and its country offices are charged with monitoring the implementation of 
the MDGs and in some cases it takes the lead in national planning processes. Interviews were 
also conducted with Government Ministries of Planning, who are both national policy-makers 
and implementers. In focusing on these respondents, the goal was to establish an understanding 
of the planning spaces and processes, assess the source of the dominant poverty knowledge, 
identify opportunities for grassroots participation and unravel factors that influence the entire 
process.   
 
During the initial planning of the interviews with media organisations (those who are 
knowledge interlocutors between the villages and the development institutions), this study 
considered national radio stations to be key sources of information, as they interpret government 
policies through a wide range of programmes in local languages. However, during interviews 
in Malawi, it was noted that the villagers were much closer to a Chanco radio station, a local 
community radio station, attached to the Chancellor University in Zomba, Malawi, which 
collects stories from the villagers and the Millennium Village Project and broadcasts them back 
to the communities. However, in Zambia, villagers in Kamaila, due to their proximity to Lusaka 
the capital, indicated that they listened to Zambia National Broadcasting Corporation Radio 
One which broadcasts in local languages, for development information. Interviews were also 
conducted with representatives of the NGOs operating in the villages to get their views on a 
wide range of topics from planning, participation, use of media and their assessment of 
progress.  
 
In the process of collecting data from these respondents, the study applied both face-to-face and 
electronic mail interviews for different groups of respondents depending on the context and 
their choices (Maykut and Morehouse, 1994; Fontana and Frey, 2000). For example, there were 
challenges in fixing face-to-face interviews with government ministries and some UN officials 
and interview questions had to be emailed to the respective respondents, including follow-up 
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questions. In some cases, some respondents requested written questions so that they could also 
keep a written record of their response.   
 
In all these deliberations, qualitative interviews were useful tools to solicit views on how 
policies and decisions are made in different layers of policy spaces and how the village decision-
making processes interface with institutional processes. Part of the goal of these interviews was 
to gain an insight into available policy spaces including the degree of participation by different 
actors in each of the different policy space levels, including their accessibility by and influence 
of the villagers. Data collected from these interviews enabled the researcher to draw inferences 
on who participated where and with what influence, including drawing the conclusion that 
although the individual and the villagers were neglected as policy spaces, they retained their 
power and knowledge against the run of the conventional development discourse.  
 
Unstructured closed and open-ended interview questions were vital in engaging with the 
respondents and they enabled the researcher to analyse the respondents' emotional reactions 
about their thoughts as they narrated their experiences (Patton, 1987). Semi-structured one-on-
one interviews were important in soliciting respondents’ ideas and thoughts, and especially the 
villagers’ perceptions on well-being and their fears and concerns in their own words rather than 
in the words of policies (cf. Ezzy, 2002). Responses from the interviews were analysed 
alongside the policy documents under study, which served the important function of 
triangulation. To manage the flow of the discussions, this study followed Lincoln and Guba’s 
(1985) advice to use interview guides which framed the discussion within key themes and 
concepts before starting the inquiry. This minimised bias and separated the views of the 
researcher from those of the respondents as suggested in Pickering (2008, p.106).  
 
5.3 Focus group interviews 
To complement data from institutional and individual interviews and the document analysis, 
this study applied the focus group discussion method with villagers in Mwandama and Kamaila 
in Malawi and Zambia respectively for purposes of triangulation. For focus groups, different 
authors recommend between 6 and 12 participants per group (Krueger, 2000; Langford, 
Schoenfeld, and Izzo, 2002; Morgan, 1997; Johnson and Christensen, 2004; Bernard, 1995). 
Convenience sampling was partly used to bring together villagers, in consultation with the NGO 
and the village leadership. I took advice from Lecch and Onwuegbuzie (2007, p.116) that 
“sample sizes in qualitative research should not be too small to achieve data saturation, 
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theoretical saturation, or informational redundancy and not too large to undertake a deep, case-
oriented analysis”. Statistical inference was not the main objective, but the results according to 
Maxwell (1992) are adequate for generalisation. Interviews with villagers were conducted in 
both Chewa and English where any of these languages applied. The researcher possesses a fair 
understanding of the Chewa language.  
 
In the Mwandama Millennium Village project in Malawi, the group was split in two based on 
their areas of focus. The first group comprised six members of four men and two women, 
including the village leadership who together formed the village project management team. The 
second group comprised seven respondents (four women and three men) who were mainly 
involved in the business section31F32 of the project.  While the splitting of the group was not part 
of the initial plan, it helped to have focused discussions on different issues which are part of the 
MV project. The scenario was different in Kamaila, Zambia where interview discussions with 
the villagers happened in one group made up of seven men and one woman ranging from 
community leadership to ordinary members of the village. The proportion of men to women in 
the groups also represented the gender dynamics in the villages where men tended to get more 
involved in decision-making than women. In both villages, the focus group interview method 
used semi‐structured questions, largely to spark discussions based on the list of key themes 
drawn up by the researcher in the form of an interview guide (Kumar, 1987).  
 
The focus group interviews in both villages yielded information on the villagers’ general 
perceptions on issues related to how they define their well-being and their aspirations, including 
the role of social communication in their cultural ecosystem under study. In the case of Malawi, 
issues of participation and the role of traditional leadership in moderating village conversations 
were evident (Punch1998, p. 177).  While there were challenges in Malawi, where women still 
shy away from contributing to discussions in the presence of men, the research ensured that 
women were given opportunities to contribute. Focus group discussions in both villages drew 
a lot from the interactions among the group members than with the researcher. One-on-one 
interviews with a few selected villagers helped to get detailed insights into issues that would 
have been left unaddressed in group discussions. Direct conservations with the villagers were 
instrumental to gathering data on their perspectives on poverty, well-being and different aspects 
around these concepts. This study was able to gather knowledge from the villagers' point of 
                                                 
32 The MVP projects run a warehouse, retail shop, maize grinding mill, a purchase for progress initiative the UN World Food 
Programme and other small scale ventures. 
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view, to unfold the meaning of their experiences, uncover their previous lived world before they 
were co-opted into project activities by the NGOs and their governments (Kvale, 1997; 
McNamara, 1999). These views formed part of the basis to establish an understanding of the 
role of communication in influencing the villagers’ behaviour, views and attitudes, as well as 
how these interact with NGOs and government policies.  This was relevant in locating the 
function of communicating from both institutionally-driven development and internal dynamics 
of the villagers’ understanding of well-being.  
 
Most importantly, villagers listened to each other’s contributions, and that was a source of new 
insights as they developed their ideas (Kitzinger, 1994; Maykut and Morehouse, 1994) thereby 
enabling more data to be produced through participants’ interaction with each other as well as 
the researcher (Pickering, 2008). Group discussion brought to the surface several aspects of 
their ways of life which were not always easy to extract if the focus had been limited to the 
MDGs only. Data emerged from discussions which, in many ways, offered new reflections of 
social perceptions of their well-being and ways of life. Group dynamics and reactions to 
questions allowed the researcher to observe feelings, expressions, perceptions, beliefs and 
traditions of the people. 
 
5.4 Data interpretation methods 
The relationship between global governance institutions, the state and the villager, which is 
analysed through investigating participatory approaches in global policy frameworks, including 
framing of concepts, is examined from the broader context of social relations. A detailed critical 
analysis of institutions and development theory, and factors that influenced institutions and 
theories are discussed in Chapter 3 and 4. Part of the goal of this chapter is to draw critical 
attention to the rudimentary frameworks of the global policy formulation structure and 
processes and to identify the possibilities and constraints impeding participation for 
governments and the villagers in Malawi and Zambia.  
 
The MDGs framework is a response to what was perceived as deepening poverty in developing 
countries during the late 1990s, a period thought to be characterized by a widening gap between 
rich and developing countries. Post-development literature has blamed the deepening poverty 
on the World Bank and IMF policies. Zambia is among the countries that had adopted SAPs in 
the 1990s, which left more than 70 per cent of its people living below the poverty line. On the 
other hand, Malawians were believed to be poor due to economic stagnation. Together, the 
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people of Malawi and Zambia were among the roughly 300 million thought to be living in 
poverty in Sub-Saharan Africa.  Addressing these problems would, as this study argues, require 
individual effort, but then according to the UN system, a global solution was necessary to 
address all global poverty related problems.  
 
A collective approach would apply at all levels; taking into account that deepening poverty 
during that time was believed to be prevalent in three continents 32F33, which justified a global 
approach in the form of MDGs. This is the basis on which global policies derive their consensus 
and secure a universalized poverty reduction, participation and empowerment discourse that 
inheres in the UN system. In order to zoom into these issues the study uses critical policy space 
analysis, critical discourse analysis and narrative analysis as data interpretation methods. In this 
section, theoretical background, purpose and justification of meeting the objectives of this study 
are presented.  An attempt is made to briefly explain the distinct stages and activities that take 
place when employing each method and how interpretive acts shape the analysis.  
 
5.4.1 Critical policy space analysis 
The study applied a policy space analysis to determine which actors accessed and contributed 
to which spaces with what capabilities to participate (cf. Heclo, 1978; Grindle and Thomas 
(1991) in Brock et al., 2004). In analysing participation, this study considered policy spaces to 
be sites of discourse production with communicative impact on defining policy directions and 
how policy is implemented in practice (Cox, 1987). Assessment of participation, in this context, 
was grounded on the assumption of equality of all member states enshrined in the UN Charter, 
described in Habermas’s contested but ground-breaking communication action theory, as a 
public sphere, an arena for equal and democratic participation for member states. Analysis of 
documents that provided a detailed account of the history of the formulation of the policy 
document under study was instrumental in facilitating data collection. As discussed earlier, the 
strength of document analysis lies in its ability to systematically examine institutional policy 
spaces from which policies are formulated and texts derive their meanings.   
 
This study approached data analysis from the international development policy perspective, 
particularly policy space analysis in order to identify moments or opportunities or lack thereof 
available to villagers in Malawi and Zambia to participate and effectively influence decisions 
                                                 
33 In Africa, Asia and South America 
114 
 
that affect them.  Analysis is foregrounded on the Foucauldian discourse analysis of public 
policy, specifically to explain the structures of global governance. The study relies on 
Foucault’s ideas to unravel how Malawi and Zambia and other actors engaged and interacted 
and elaborates who did what in which spaces, before exploring the impact of each actor on 
policy formulation and implementation (Foucault, 1982). That is essential in revealing 
contradictions and dissonance in the narratives of participation and poverty reduction within 
the MDGs discourse.  
 
That approach was relevant to the goals of this study because policies are often considered as 
manifestations of interests through texts, language and messages (Fairclough, 1989), and also 
decreed through government institutions (Gramsci, 1992) and transferred through 
communication for development. The combination of these three (interests, power and 
communication) have the effect of either maintaining or altering social order (Freire, 1983; 
Chambers, 1997). Therefore for purposes of this study, I consider the MDGs framework to be 
composed of messages which must be understood within a context of interests (Cox, 1981; 
Smith, 1995), thereby laying the foundation for questioning whose interests are being served 
by the MDGs (Cox, 1953). The ability to map the policy space infrastructure helped to critique 
and interrogate the notion of ‘consensus’ in both the adoption and ownership of the MDGs and 
their implementation within the confluence of contradicting positions on participation and 
poverty reduction. The concept of consensus is used as a baseline for critiquing participation 
from various dimensions – including equality, involvement, inclusion and consultation.  
 
5.5 Critical Discourse Analysis 
Linked to the above, analysis of how concepts are framed in the selected policy documents 
constitutes a fundamental element of this study. To do this, I applied critical discourse analysis 
to investigate the UN Communication for Development and MDGs, for an in-depth 
investigation of the relationship between texts, language, ideas and social practices (Fairclough, 
1995).  The use of critical discourse analysis as a method must not be confused with textual 
analysis as the latter is concerned with gathering information on how members of various 
cultures make sense of their world through text. In textual analysis, texts such as the documents 
are interpreted to understand how culture or people make sense of the world around them. In 
this study, I use critical discourse analysis to establish how social orders, dominance, and 
inequality are produced or reproduced, enacted through text in the context of global poverty 
reduction policy (van Dijk, 1985). In applying this methodology, I take advice from other 
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critical theorists who have used it in media and language studies, sociology, psychology, 
development studies and many other such as Rasmussen, (1996), Fowler et al. (1979), Wodak 
(1996), Singh (1996) and several others. Central for these scholars’ work is that language or 
text is a form of social practice and therefore means by which social relations are produced or 
reproduced and different interests are served.  In addition, the primary strength of critical 
discourse analysis, which was broadly qualitative, was its ability to critically analyse and break 
down how the poverty problem is defined in the MDGs and the PRSP.  Analysis of how poverty 
is defined or framed helped to shed light on the discursive poverty construction and to create a 
foundation for theorising the role of power in deciding meanings of words, phrases and concepts 
in relation to participation and empowerment. Starting analysis from the poverty problem 
definition was necessary for two reasons. Firstly, it enabled to build an understanding of how 
the concept is constructed and secondly, to explain how power makes use of such construction 
for social ordering based on a variety of ‘scientific’ facts, beliefs, and moral values.  
 
As a point of departure, this study took the general view that policymaking is a process through 
which individuals and communities define meanings of their self-worth based on their context. 
In addition, Cobb and Ross (1997) remind us that policy formulation process is not neutral. The 
same view is advanced by Foucault (2002) who argues that policy is not an outcome of 
rationality because its evidence is created within structures of power which tend to assume the 
value of the truth. Through critical discourse analysis, it was possible to expose the disparities 
between what was known by the villagers and what is proposed by the institutions. This was 
made necessary by breaking down the poverty problem into easily observable elements, 
narratives and storylines which sustain the main themes in the MDGs and the UN 
Communication for development strategy. The main themes under study were examined, 
analysing how words were put together in statements of the MDGs and PRSP, focusing on how 
their meanings were aligned to a particular ideological position. The MDG Resolution carries 
with it many statements of intent with performative effects, semantic qualities and 
reinforcement, which together mobilize rhetorical constructions toward consensus and setting 
a certain reading of social texts on poverty reduction. The study dwelt on this strength to 
illustrate how words and statements facilitate the production of preferred meanings and their 
interpretation (cf. Foucault, 1972).  
 
When applied to policies, texts, words and phrases, critical discourse analysis facilitated the 
examination of how themes as signifiers, are employed to pursue certain meanings in policies 
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(Fairclough, 1995). This study considers discourse as represented by texts and spoken 
communication and explores the ways in which discourse is shaped by social practices (Hajer, 
1995). Breaking down the concepts into easily observable units was important for two reasons. 
Firstly, to reveal the uncontaminated reality of the villagers’ lifestyles and secondly, to 
understand elements that constitute the discursively constructed poverty by the NGOs 
(Foucault, 2003). Subjecting definition of the poverty problem in the MDGs framework to 
critical discourse analysis was not only limited to investigating the role of power in influencing 
choices and decisions but it also sought the villagers’ views on the subject of poverty and well-
being.  
 
With findings of the critical discourse analysis on the poverty problem definition finalised and 
made apparent, it was possible to identify the possibility of re-theorizing poverty and well-
being from either an alternative view point or from the villagers’ perspectives. By using this 
methodology, the study was able to explore the link between power, narratives, positions and 
identity formations regarding social practices. It aided analysis in Chapter 6, to examine how 
the collocation of words in the documents enables the reinforcement of policy positions which 
become frames of reference for thinking and practices.  
 
For a critical analysis of how communication for development is used to implement the MDGs, 
I drew from Foucault (2003) who offers advice on how to interpret policies and statements as 
a form of decoding meanings that convey a preferred worldview by power to influence preferred 
behaviour patterns and practices. The first level effect of such meanings of statements is to 
create psychological schematic structures which manifest into practices, actions, choices, 
judgements, self-regulation and self-governance leading to a particular identity – an object of 
discourse (Foucault, 1972). For example, the UN Communication for Development is very clear 
on its model and intentions. Firstly, it is a top-down model with overriding themes of 
transferring knowledge, building capacities and transforming communities assumed to be 
underdeveloped. These themes are repeated several times, sometimes in different words and 
phrases, devices used to reinforce the preferred worldview on poverty, privileging such 
positions into a dominant body of knowledge while silencing that of the villagers. With this 
discursive identity established, through communication as a socialising agent, it was evident 
that the villagers and the governments became discursive objects ordained into a new social 
order. As a result, the discourse that creates the object becomes part of the frames of and 
practices through which it is managed and governed (ibid, 1972). 
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In using the qualitative methods of critical discourse analysis, I took advantage of their ability 
to ground analysis on a wide range of disciplines including literary studies, cultural studies and 
social sciences. These approaches were important in enabling analysis, specifically 
understanding socially constructed human practices. While critical discourse analysis has 
historically demonstrated its ability to be a stand-alone method, in order to ensure the policy 
positions in the documents under study are engaged with practices on the ground, this study 
adopted a combination of data analysis methods to provide a credible and comprehensive 
explanation on participation, empowerment and poverty reduction in these countries.  
 
To examine the role of communication in influencing participation within the framework of the 
MDGs, this study relied on the role of discourse in identity construction and how such identity 
is ascribed roles and responsibilities. To establish how the discursive identity plays out in the 
MDGs, this study made use of three critical lenses – the contextual discourse, the poverty 
discourse and finally how these two lenses construct identity and allocation of roles. Contextual 
discourse allowed analysis of the policy spaces as arenas of discourse formation – the discourse 
from which interests assume the function of ideas – while the poverty discourse enabled 
examination of how interests influence the poverty problem definitions and solutions (van Dijk, 
1985).  According to Albert Einstein (1917), how a phenomenon is formulated into a problem, 
influences how it is solved. The goal here is not to look at poverty from a problem solving 
perspective but rather to examine how the MDG discourse identifies a certain way of lifestyle 
as a poverty problem upon which it prescribes solutions. Findings from the critical discourse 
analysis demonstrate that the MDGs present a certain form of poverty as a global problem. This 
is in fact an act of priority setting which justifies certain responses to certain actors and how the 
villager in Malawi and Zambia thinks and talks about the imposed poverty as a social concern. 
The third lens brought the MDG discourse and narratives into life by identifying how discourse 
allocates roles and responsibilities, which in turn define social identities and discursive 
participation through communication. The study views communication for development as a 
reinforcement and transmission of behaviours that sustain the identity constructed by the 
dominant discourse, notwithstanding the notion that individuals as members of the villages are 
heterogenic. In other words, the ways in which Malawians and Zambians are identified within 
the MDGs discourse ascribes their roles, which in turn characterise their participation and also 
have an effect on their social position. Breaking down the MDG framework into narratives, 
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actors and roles was useful in revealing the hidden message behind the knowledge, intentions, 
agency and interests.   
 
5.6 Narrative analysis  
In order to make sense of the data gathered from qualitative interviews and focus groups, I used 
narrative analysis as one of the data interpretation methods (Reissman, 2008; 1994). According 
to Reissman (2008), narrative analysis is a study of stories or accounts of lived lives often of 
individuals, groups, societies, and cultures. The method allowed the researcher to listen, take 
notes and to observe non-verbal signs (cf. Connelly and Clandinin, 2000). In choosing this as a 
method, I drew from Connelly and Clandinin (1990) who argue that humans are storytelling 
organisms who, individually (interviews) and collectively (focus groups), lead storied lives 
enabling the researcher to listen and analyse the stories. This is where the subject of well-being, 
participation and the use of traditional media, become part of the reason to understand the 
relationship between conventional development knowledge and what prevails in the villages in 
Malawi and Zambia. From that perspective, the study documented narratives from the villagers 
on their cultural and historical background in relation to their ways of life. Investigations and 
data collection to explain the lives of individual villages, the collection of individuals’ stories 
of their experiences, and meaning of those experiences and then understanding them was made 
possible through narration (Elbaz, 1991). It enabled the researcher to draw conclusions on the 
relationships not only between respondents and texts (development policy), but also between 
the MDGs policy positions and social reality in the villages (Franzosi, 1998). 
 
In the context of this study, narrative analysis took an individual or a group as its object of 
analysis to investigate the story from their different perspectives. The stories from the villagers 
in Malawi and Zambia were about their past lived experiences and were told in a chronology 
of sequences, with common properties situated within the same discourse.  While there is no 
consensus on the relevance of chronology of events and stories, Young (1987) argues that for 
consequential sequencing one event causes another in the narrative, although the events may 
not always be chronological (Reissman, 1987). Regardless, the most important aspect of 
narrative analysis is that the discourse contexts in which events are configured are in one 
temporary unit (focus groups) but within a plot. The MDG poverty reduction projects were 
viewed as plots in a story in this regard. Bruner (1987) identifies two types of cognition: 
paradigmatic, which operates by acknowledging elements as part of a category; and narrative, 
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which operates by combining different elements into a story within a plot. The respondents in 
their respective countries designated the category, while development projects formed the 
narrative. Narrative-type inquiry facilitated the gathering of events as its data and used narrative 
analytic procedures to produce explanatory stories (ibid).  
 
5.7 Positionality and self-reflexivity 
In undertaking this study, the researcher was cognisant of issues to do with positionality and 
reflexivity. This awareness helped the researcher to manage marginalization, prejudice and 
differences in data representation and interpretation (cf. Nagar, 2002). The researcher 
understood reflexivity as the awareness and assessment of his involuntary contribution and 
influence on the research and the findings. As an individual, the researcher is also positioned 
by his present and past engagements with the UN system and other development organisations 
he may hold a view over (Chiseri-Strater, 2006). In addition, the researcher’s orientation can 
also be influenced by gender, race, nationality and his interaction with the above institutions, 
which may influence his views on things (Keller, 1985). The researcher was aware that these 
influences tend to be revealed or concealed during the conception of a research problem, 
objectives, methodology, theory construction, and methodological understanding, through the 
creation of the narrative voice and overall writing of the research study.  
 
The researcher is a Zimbabwean citizen, a country which shares a lot of historical and cultural 
background with Malawi and Zambia and having worked in the field of humanitarian aid and 
development for nearly two decades, covering these two countries among others, an attempt 
was made to conduct this study under negotiated spaces and practices of reflexivity, critical to 
positionality. The researcher approached this study, especially data collection with full 
awareness that he occupied a privileged position by virtue of being an employee of the UN 
system and being an outsider academic for the villagers, which may have drawn demarcations 
between the researcher and the villagers (Chavez, 1978). My awareness of these helped 
navigate what Chavez describes as the insider bias which might have influenced my view of 
different knowledge and culture (Ibid, p. 475).   
 
The researcher followed the advice of Chavez (1978) to manage the outsider perspective which 
enabled an objective analysis of the accounts provided by the villagers, but the insiders’ 
perspective, mainly the researcher’s prior knowledge of Malawi and Zambia helped to deepen 
insights about poverty reduction and implementation of several projects. During the 
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researcher’s previous engagement with other organisations in Malawi and Zambia, he had been 
involved in numerous poverty reduction project activities, a situation which inspired him to 
undertake this study, largely to question several approaches, but mainly participation. 
Therefore, the insider, who would otherwise project bias, is fundamental in achieving a detailed 
understanding of poverty issues in the two countries (Chavez, 2008). In addition, being a 
member of staff for UN systems at the time of finalising this study, exposed the researcher to 
the ways in which the organisation carries out its business, including the different policy spaces, 
planning processes, plus first-hand information on how the UN system functions. This echoes 
Chiseri-Strater (2006) who argues that being reflexive about one’s positionality is not to ‘self-
indulge’ but to reveal the researcher’s involvement in knowledge production. In the case of this 
study, the researcher considers his positionality as a benefit, because he is a specialist in the 
area of media and communication, and thus has the advantage of basic knowledge. This makes 
the researcher somewhat of an authority in the area (Banks, 1998: 8). Therefore, the researcher’s 
positionality or subjectivity cannot be viewed in the context of bias but as an advantage that 
comes with a combination of experience and the depth of knowledge of the subject matter, 
which is a crucial form of repositioning. 
 
5.8 Conclusion 
This study combined qualitative methods of data collection and analysis to examine both the 
global policy texts and the global governance contexts framing communication and the MDGs. 
Therefore, the research structure, including data collection and processing, were designed to 
meet the objectives of this study. Applying these methods to analyse poverty, communication 
and participation within the context of actor-interests and power relationships, is important in 
determining the framing of the concepts under study and how these through communication 
translate into practice. The next chapter presents the findings of document analysis. 
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SECTION III: DATA PRESENTATION AND ANALYSIS 
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Chapter Six: Framing poverty, the actors and participation 
 6.1 Introduction 
This chapter presents findings of document analysis of the UN Communication for 
Development strategy, the MDG resolution, the national MDGs plans of Malawi and Zambia 
for the period 2011 to 2015 and PRSP. Reference is also made to Malawi and Zambia national 
plans from 2000 to 2010 to deepen the analysis. This chapter examines the global governance 
context in which the UN Communication for Development and the MDGs are conceptualised, 
formulated and adopted. It also seeks to examine the discourses and narratives that frame the 
poverty reduction agenda in these documents, largely because they are attached to the MDGs –
international development policies formulated, adopted and implemented within the global 
governance arena of the UN system.    
 
Before examining the main themes which are promoted in these documents, including critically 
analysing how the discourses embedded in them frame poverty and its solutions, this chapter 
begins by setting the scene through a policy-space-actor analysis by Brock et al. (2004). This 
is in order to unpack the global policy architecture and processes giving rise to the UN 
Communication for Development strategy and the MDGs. As stated in Chapter 5, policy spaces 
are moments in which interventions provide opportunities to reconfigure the relationship 
between actors and policies. The policy space analysis method therefore provides the lenses to 
magnify the policy infrastructure by breaking it down into easily observable elements (Brock 
et al., 2004). The objective is to identify which actors have or do not have access to particular 
policy spaces and to examine their discursive contribution to the MDGs formulation. This is 
significant in light of Brock et al.’s, observation that policy actors “hold opinion and interest” 
(2004:9); that policy spaces are arenas of discourse production and that policies are ideas 
representing actors’ interests.   
 
The third section is an analysis of the discursive implications of MDGs narratives on Malawian 
and Zambian national policies, looking at how they are transformed into practice.  The chapter 
concludes by arguing that the poverty reduction agenda which is the same as the social 
transformation agenda in the UN Communication for Development strategy and MDGs, is 
actually a strategy of co-opting developing nations into one world order, perpetually displacing 
communities from their local knowledge and ways of life.  
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6.2 MDGs formulation: the actors and the global spaces 
Since the adoption of the MDGs as a global development framework, participation has been the 
benchmark for assessing efficiency in reducing poverty, most specifically in developing 
countries (e.g. Malawi and Zambia). According to the UNSG’s report (2010), achieving the 
goal of halving the number of people living on less than a dollar a day by 2015, requires 
strengthening participation through effective implementation of the UN communication 
strategy. This thinking is also reinforced in the World Bank and IMF’s PRSP, which prioritises 
three themes – ownership, empowerment, and participation as enablers of poverty reduction. In 
both the MDGs and PRSP, participation is framed in various ways but mainly as involving the 
poor in making decisions that concern them. In this process, communication is considered vital 
(UN, 2010).  
 
Despite the fact that participation faces definitional vagueness, this study uses the concept to 
refer to means, moments and opportunities available to Malawians and Zambians to exercise 
agency in deciding their lives and pursuing their wellbeing at all levels (cf. Cohen and Uphoff 
1980). In its presentation of findings, this study will not limit analysis of participation to policy 
implementation activities alone, but will also investigate policy formulation processes as well. 
The first point to highlight is that the MDG framework is a product of global governance, 
adopted and endorsed in an open and legislative space (Brock et al., (2004; Heclo, 1978) at the 
UN General Assembly in 2000 where all member states were assumed to be equal participants. 
The MDGs framework derives its international legitimacy from having been unanimously 
adopted by all UN system member states, including Malawi and Zambia, through a process 
described as consensus. Underlying the participatory narrative in this process are two key 
assumptions. Firstly, that the adoption by all member states signifies participation and secondly 
that heads of states are representatives of their citizens thereby subsuming individual 
participation.  
 
This study proceeds to identify key actors and how their interests manifest in ideas making up 
the MDGs discourse as well as how they translate into social and behaviour change through the 
UN Communication for Development strategy. Chapter 2 gave a historical account of the 
MDGs, and the focus here is the theorisation of spaces and processes. Early stages of the MDGs 
formulation process as documented by Hulme (2007), illustrate how the goals transitioned from 
the International Development Targets (IDTs) after their conception by the Utstein group, a 
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“closed space” comprising a group of female European ministers. The interests of this group, 
formed in the 1990s but formally established in 1998, are illustrated in its aim of correcting the 
political conditions influencing the flow of aid (DAC, 1996) and in reinvigorating the 
development aid. This is in order to attract donors frustrated by the backlash on multinational 
corporations, stemming from developing countries that suffered the effects of SAPs. Given the 
composition of the Utstein group and their participants, the objectives of their mission could 
therefore not be characterised as neutral, nor was it intended to address poverty. The first 
objective speaks to Western countries’ foreign aid policies in relation to their home-country’s 
political and capital interests in those developing countries revolting after the effects of SAPs. 
On the other hand, improving aid efficiency by reinvigorating the waning donor confidence 
justified a new poverty reduction global policy purportedly to restore confidence among donors 
by wooing developing countries into the fold. It can be concluded that the ultimate goal of the 
Utstein group was to reconcile and mediate between donors and the unhappy developing 
countries which had suffered the effects of SAPs through a new global policy.    
 
These observations make it instructive to elaborate the implications of the access challenges 
imposed by these interests on Malawi and Zambia. Firstly, as a group only made up of female 
European Ministers, I consider the Utstein group to be a political and closed interest policy 
space (cf. Heclo, 1978 in Fischer, 2001). In the case of the MDGs, the group allotted itself the 
responsibility of authoring a global blueprint in seclusion, marginalising countries such as 
Malawi and Zambia whose poverty it supposedly sought to address (cf. Brock et al., 2004). The 
non-neutrality of the group operating in the closed-shop policy discussions is betrayed by their 
status as politically elected and appointed politicians in their countries. These actors represented 
the economic and political interests of constituencies in their home countries, thereby making 
the initial phase of the MDGs formulation political. The content of their ideas compromised the 
agenda of reducing poverty as discussed earlier, the goal was never to address poverty but to 
bring back the development industry to the international finance institutions.   
 
The second stage of the MDG formulation is a mixture of policy spaces from the technical level 
closed policy spaces before the draft blue print was presented to the UN system as open and 
legislative space. The MDGs changed hands for further refinement, to the Development 
Assistance Committee (DAC) in the late 1990s (cf. Hulme, 2009; 2010 & OECD, 2006). 
Operating as a technical organisation, the DAC fits with the criteria of a neutral and technical 
space even though it operates in a closed-shop group. The neutrality of the DAC is 
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compromised by the fact that it reports to a supranational organisation, the Organization for 
Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), whose membership holds economic and 
political interests around the world, including developing countries. On that basis, the 
researcher concluded that though the DAC acts as a neutral face of the poverty reduction 
agenda, its neutrality is compromised by the economic and political interests of the Utstein 
group whose members are also part of the OECD (which is hegemonic). The technical and 
scientific character of the DAC creates an impression of neutrality of knowledge which enabled 
the MDGs to be seen as a new approach to addressing poverty (cf. Leysens, 2008; Cox, 1983). 
In drawing this conclusion, the researcher derives from the OECD’s mission statement that it 
serves as a “venue and voice” to pursue economic and political interests of the European Union 
members (who in this case double as donors targeted by the Utstein group), a major stakeholder 
in the OECD 33F34 (cf. Cox, 1981). Handing over of the IDT by the Utstein group to the DAC may 
therefore be in line with the group’s objective of reconfiguring the global aid industry in order 
to attract donor interest by assuring the “private sector” an open market and a conducive 
operating environment within developing countries. These narratives will be discussed in detail 
later in this chapter.  
 
A similar pattern was observed when the OECD/DAC and the World Bank/IMF processes 
converged in 1996 culminating in Shaping the 21st Century: The Contribution of Development 
Cooperation Report (1996) outlining development targets that formed the core of the MDGs. 
The process, again, assumed a hybrid of closed and open technical spaces creating an 
impression of a neutral pseudo-public policy space. The World Bank and IMF as membership 
institutions, theoretically assume the open democratic policy spaces to member states, but also 
as an affiliate to the UN system. Technical “working committees drawn from a range of UN 
bodies”34F35 led the drafting of the We the Peoples: The Role of the United Nations in the 21st 
Century (2001) report process. Where the UN system was supposed to act as an open public 
policy space for its member states and facilitate dialogue in identifying national and global 
poverty priorities, it instead “privatised” its spaces and ceded the formulation process to 
                                                 
34 During the formulation of the MDGs, the OECD was largely controlled by the European Union (EU) but it is 
historically known to promote the USA neoliberal policies such as the Marshall Plan, spreading these ideas in East 
European countries after the Second World War (DAC, 2006). Framing of poverty reduction, in such a context, 
can be read in the context of the EU’s mandate of advancing and safeguarding the economic and political interests 
of its member states and not Malawi, Zambia and other developing countries. [http://europa.eu/about-
eu/index_en.htm] 
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technical experts who were linked to the IMF and World Bank. They produced a global blue 
print that promotes participation, while paradoxically excluding developing countries (Brock et 
al., 2004; Fischer, 2001). Malloch-Brown35F36, the former head of UNDP for example, describes 
the MDGs as a nuclear fission, a negotiated mixture of varied and competing narratives which 
involve the human-rights based approach and human development models. He also added that 
the MDGs have accommodated the World Bank pro-market structural adjustment strategy; and 
the target-setting mind-set of rich donors in the DAC of the OECD. This therefore, makes the 
MDGs a “cooked up [discourse] by experts in a backroom – or basement”36F37. These policy 
positions put together do not point to a discourse that prioritised poverty reduction but rather, 
one that promoted western ideas. Ultimately, neoliberalism was the biggest winner as decision-
making was dominated by its actors while fencing Malawi and Zambia out of all the important 
policy spaces, save the adoption of the actual policies over which they had little or no control.  
 
The UN Communication for Development strategy followed a similar closed space pattern with 
participants drawn from the United Nations Secretariat, specialised UN agencies, UN 
programmes and Funds, the World Bank and OECD/DAC, as well as academics, practitioners 
and other experts in the field of Communication for Development. The dominant policy spaces 
denied access to developing countries both physically and epistemologically, except for the last 
moment of adoption. What is deduced from this analysis is that the pre-programmed UN system 
policy space structure constrains developing countries from accessing relevant policy spaces, 
which makes these countries passive receivers instead of producers of discourses. Each of the 
policy spaces discussed above represents interests and those of their political constituencies (cf. 
Brock et al., 2004). The outcome of such a hierarchical ‘privatised’ policy structure leads to an 
imposition of discourses on Malawians and Zambians through the process of endorsement of 
the MDGs and the subsequent alignment of nation plans to them. Given that these discourses 
are conveyed from the top to the bottom, local level decision-making is undermined or confined. 
Weiss (1986) and Baker (1996) have postulated that policy-making at the local level is not a 
once-and-for-all activity but an ongoing process as people adjust to their local realities. In the 
next section, I discuss how interests are enmeshed with power, highlighting the ways in which 
this serves to frame and control knowledge.  
                                                 
36 The Guardian newspaper, 16 November, 2012 (Mark Malloch-Brown: developing the MDGs was a 
bit like nuclear fission) 
37 The Guardian newspaper, 16 November, 2012 (Mark Malloch-Brown: developing the MDGs was a 
bit like nuclear fission) 
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6.3 The knowledge parameters 
The discussion so far has illustrated that policy spaces are arenas for discourse production.  It 
has also demonstrated how interests conspire with power to impose ideas, thus conditioning 
practices and behaviour (cf. Leysens, 2008). In this section, I discuss how powerful interests 
impose preferred modes of knowledge and how that knowledge constrains alternative ideas.  As 
a starting point, the knowledge resulting from the texts under study constructs a notion of a 
global collective when viewing poverty and its possible solutions. However, it can be noted that 
by doing so, it is discursively imposing thinking parameters on what ideas are acceptable or 
not. Firstly, the MDGs framework is born out of a context of pre-defined knowledge tools, 
which set these parameters through frames of thought. These frames of thought, which come as 
tools, are a composite set of concepts, formulas and explanations, which prescribe how poverty 
should be understood and addressed. In my analysis, I consider knowledge parameters to be 
information that attempts to define poverty and its solutions (cf. Brock, et al., 2004). From the 
documents under study, I will focus on four knowledge categories: 1) the eight goals (setting 
the agenda); 2) the economic income as a measure of poverty (the indicator); 3) the logical 
framework (the process), and 4) PRSP (the enabler).     
 
The eight goals are a constellation of several assumptions regarding the poverty problem, which 
in the case of the MDGs, set out a global agenda on priorities of how to address it on behalf of 
developing countries including the two countries which are the focus of this study (cf. Entman, 
1993). As noted earlier, Malawi and Zambia were not involved in the formation of the MDG 
idea, even though they were part of member states who adopted the MDGs at the UN General 
Assembly. The notion of adoption needs to be understood within the context of power relations. 
By being member states, Malawi and Zambia succumb to and cede their decision-making 
powers to the UN system. Secondly, as explained in Gordenker and Weiss (1996), the UN 
system possesses global governmental power and exercises authority over its member states, 
especially on matters of global importance such as poverty. Thirdly, Chapter 3 illustrated how 
the UN system has been hijacked by capital interests since the rise of neoliberalism in the late 
1980s. The net effect of these, is that Malawi and Zambia and other developing countries have 
limited or no choice in formulating policies relevant to their local context as they are forced to 
align with global policy positions. By adopting the MDGs, Malawi and Zambia agreed to 
comply with the requirement of the MDGs and the conditions mentioned above.  
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The second category of knowledge frame is $1.25 a day as a benchmark for assessing poverty 
against which countries measure their poverty reduction efforts. Collocating income and 
poverty prohibits alternative dimensions of understanding poverty and wellbeing in different 
cultural contexts. In Chapter 3, it was noted that the dollar-a-day indicator of poverty is both 
archaic and is not generalizable to the current and different contexts. Chapter 7 explains this 
indicator of poverty from its historical origins in the 19th century labour relations discussions 
context which is not applicable to different contexts such as Malawi and Zambia, most 
specifically in the villages under study.  
 
The logical framework is the third knowledge frame. This is a tool adapted from USAID37F38 by 
the World Bank and IMF during a period when neoliberalism gained momentum in the mid-
1990s. While the logical framework assumes a neutral and scientific character, it was a tool 
invented to correct the political conditions influencing the flow of aid. In essence, it hides the 
neoliberal agenda inherent in it. What the logical framework does as a scientific tool is prescribe 
on behalf of donors, how poverty should be quantitatively addressed, and constraining 
participation because of pre-set goals in a pre-designed template. Participation from the view 
of the logical framework is the operationalisation of institutional goals, and not anymore the 
realisation of local realities. In a context where the logical framework is used, it draws from 
several laboratory-like epistemic assumptions, in a linear cause-effect model presuming that 
this scenario will lead to predictable results. The aim of the project officer charged with running 
such projects is to ensure that the behaviour and activities of those targeted by development 
projects are adjusted in line with the development goals. It is thus fair to infer that the logical 
framework works as a poverty reduction script in which individuals act according to prescribed 
roles and neglects those ideas that have sustained villagers’ lives over the years. By bringing 
individuals into the logical framework project goals, the tools are actually indirectly coercing 
individuals to dump their lives for that introduced by the project activities.  The logical 
framework is thus exercising agency. 
 
The researcher also considers the PRSP as the fourth set of knowledge frame because it lays 
out developing countries’ macroeconomic, structural and social policies and programmes over 
                                                 
38 The Logical Framework is a goal-oriented tool developed for the U.S. Agency for International Development 
(USAID). It has been adopted by donors and NGOs, for purposes of designing, monitoring and evaluating 
international development projects. 
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a period of time on how poverty must be reduced through inducement of external funding 
(PRSP Sourcebook, 2001). The PRSP imposes an obligation to conform to policy positions as 
a condition for accessing aid funding (cf. Entman, 1993), while determining the way in which 
poverty must be reduced and collocated within the narrative of locally-driven participatory 
approaches (cf. Driscoll and Evans, 2005; Piron and Norton, 2004). The PRSP places so much 
emphasis on participation to the extent that the participation concept used or referenced in 
Malawi and Zambia national plans mirrors the PRSP.  It dangles the funding carrot that any 
country in need of debt relief under the HIPC initiative needs to comply with PRSP conditions, 
but specifically through a broad-based participatory approach according to its prescription. In 
addition, it sets the discursive parameters on which concepts such as broad-based national 
participation are supposed to be operationalized. The next section presents findings of the 
critical discourse analysis of the key themes emerging from the documents under study with 
particular focus on poverty definition, participation and communication for development.   
 
6.4 Poverty, definitions and solutions: a critical discourse analysis  
The researcher approached the MDG framework as a text, which contains discourses. It largely 
dictates a particular understanding of poverty. This text consists of words and phrases, which 
convey ideas within a particular political context, from which the meanings of poverty are 
derived (cf. Tuchman, 1978). As will be illustrated later in this section, words and phrases 
surrender their definitional meanings to contextual meanings thereby advancing the interests of 
dominant actors in a particular context. Following on earlier discussions, I argue in this section 
that the MDG texts convey the political and economic positions of dominant actors. Knowledge 
arising from such a confluence of interests has implications on the way individuals construct 
meanings from the implications (cf. Chomsky, 2002; 1988). The schematic structures represent 
ideologies combining beliefs, norms and goals of poverty. Hajer (1995), Foucault (2003) and 
Fairclough (1989) provide a basis for this theorisation suggesting that meaning formation is an 
outcome of power and discourse production which provides “specific form of ideas, concepts, 
and categorisations that are produced, reproduced, and transformed to give meaning to physical 
and social relations” (Hajer, 1995, p. 44). In undertaking this analysis, the researcher also 
reflected, through a historical discourse analysis, on the International Development Strategy 
(IDS) (1970) to deepen the understanding of how the MDG resolution came to frame poverty. 
While narrative variation exists, the two documents remain conceptually similar.   
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a) Poverty as lack of economic income 
In the MDG text, poverty is signified by lack of economic income – a dollar a day 38F39 - required 
to sustain a certain way of life (MDGs, para. 19). This is the main narrative that has been 
historically advanced by the UN system in its commitment to reduce “the proportion of the 
world’s people whose income is less than one dollar a day (ibid)”. By adopting the MDGs 
resolution, Malawi, Zambia and other countries have thus agreed to facilitate “productive 
employment and decent work for all”39F40 as a means of increasing income. This is translated as 
poverty reduction in the MDGs. Terms and phrases such as “income”, “poverty reduction”, 
“economic growth” and “private sector” converge to form logical storylines, which together 
form a discourse that both defines a problem and prescribes a solution. These storylines are 
coordinated and collaborated through each of these words and phrases to establish actions and 
ascribe actors to each storyline directly or indirectly. For instance, poverty is a hyponym for 
lack of economic income while poverty reduction is synonymous with economic growth. 
Sequencing of these concepts through semantic relations paves way for interests to exert their 
influence on how poverty is understood (cf. Fairclough, 1989).  By promoting economic income 
as an ideological foundation for understanding poverty in developing countries, the MDGs texts 
contradict their own narratives, especially the UN system’s commitment to the diversity of 
societies and the equality of its member states.  
 
A similar conceptualisation of poverty is found in the PRSP where it is described as “an 
unacceptable deprivation in human well-being” with the word “deprivation” linked to and 
signifying people’s economic inability to “secure the goods and services to meet basic material 
needs” (PRSP Sourcebook, 2001, p.2). These narratives deliberately neglect the importance of 
assessing individual’s capacity to improve their own well-being. This is perhaps, in the PRSPS’ 
view of poverty, not the responsibility of such individuals to address their poverty. Be that as it 
may, this causal narrative subtly lays out a logical order of how poverty is caused, suggesting 
that the solution is not locally available hence the need for creating a “conducive environment” 
                                                 
39 The dollar a day as an indicator of poverty backdates to the European industrialisation era of the 19th and 20th 
century in London and New York respectively often used to determine minimum wages (Booth, 1887; Rowntre, 
1920). Booth (1887) and Rowntre (1920) defined a poverty line by approximating monetary requirements for 
nutritionally adequate food requirements including other needs such as clothing and shelter for labourers during 
the period of industrialisation on the assumption that everyone then depended on employment income or 
government welfare.  
40 See http://www.un.org/millenniumgoals/poverty.shtml [Accessed on 28/07/2014] 
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(MDG, para, 12) “for private sector-led economic growth” (MDG, para 20). These narratives 
collaborate to form a relationship of dependence, with the MDG operating as a textual device, 
reconciling several of these narratives into one new discourse.  
 
This linear sequencing of concepts enables power to use language to present economic growth 
as central to meeting the MDGs40F41. In addition, within this collusion of power and language, 
economic income and growth blur the spaces for Malawians and Zambians to  define their own 
well-being (cf. Wodak and Meyer, 2009) while securing and obscuring the central role of the 
private sector as the sole actors needed to reduce poverty. Para 30 of the MDGs resolution 
illustrates this when it indicates that developing states must give “greater opportunities to the 
private sector ... [which] will contribute to the realization of the [development] goals...”.   
 
b) Poverty as an outcome of comparison 
The second construction of poverty refers to economic income, and compares African to 
Western lifestyles to form a narrative that discursively positions economic income as the 
referent “truth” of how poverty must be understood.  For example, in the IDS, poverty is 
signified by the phrase, “the level of living of countless millions of people in the developing 
part of the world [which] is still pitifully low” (IDS, para. 3). The word “low” has two 
connotations; first, a comparison to Western lifestyle and second, the dollar-a-day as baseline. 
On top of that, the language presents poverty as an absolute rather than a relative condition.  
 
In such an intricate context, poverty becomes an outcome of social and economic construction 
and not a reflection of local realities in Malawi and Zambia. For example, this model simply 
implies that Malawi and Zambia are poor since they live on less than a dollar a day. The dollar-
a-day discursively represents the socially constructed “truth” of measuring well-being (cf. 
Foucault, 2003; van Dijk, 1998a; Fairclough, 1993). It can thus be inferred that, if economic 
growth had not occurred in Western countries, then what is defined as poverty in Malawi and 
Zambia would not have occurred, thereby creating a narrative thread which suggests that 
Malawians and Zambians are poor because the West is rich.    
 
With the poverty of millions of people left in the hands of the Western private sector-led 
economic growth (MDG resolution para, 20, 30; IDS, para. 3), resemblance, representation and 
                                                 
41Primary schooling, Reducing maternal, Reducing child mortality, Halting and reversing the spread of HIV/AIDS and malaria, 
and others 
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comparison combine to discursively construct a poverty identity of “others” such as Malawi, 
Zambia and other developing countries. By positioning the discourse of western lifestyle as a 
referent for Malawi and Zambia, the MDG discourses reproduce a hierarchy of social relations 
by suppressing these countries’ ability to define their own development. Cox (1987) wrote 
extensively about how hegemony operates through identity construction. Such an identity 
subordinates and impoverishes Malawians and Zambians because of comparison while 
simultaneously imposing a burden on them to catch up with the West. This facilitates the 
hegemony of neoliberalism. Local knowledge on well-being is displaced thereby denying 
Malawians and Zambians the opportunity to know anything outside of what is prescribed. 
Ironically, this is another occasion in which these countries are called upon to lead their own 
development (cf. PRSP, 2001; Rosenau, 1999). 
 
Two key implications of this discourse are that global identities cannot develop in a sequence, 
simply because the developing identities cannot be matched with the developed because of their 
different contextual backgrounds. The MDGs text demonstrates how different narratives can 
co-exist in the form of a hybrid discourse even though the neoliberal discourse presides over 
others. This accommodative discourse struggles to establish the collectiveness needed to co-opt 
the developing countries, as the discourse seeks to promote and preserve a global identity which 
can be transformed at the whim of capital’s interests (van Dijk 2001). The western lifestyle 
remains the prototype, which calls into question the notion that through actor representation, 
policy narratives can construct developing societies’ identities. What is clear is that the MDGs 
were written from the position of power, where the authors were trying to construct or re-
construct hegemony. 
 
6.5 Participatory development 
This section examines how actors and discursive contexts are drawn out in the MDG discourse.  
I consider in this section, that those whose roles or identities are defined or represented in the 
MDGs’ storylines within the poverty reduction discourse are actors. I rely on van Leeuwen 
(1996) who extensively explores the discursive representation of social actors as acquired from 
descriptions and linguistic constructions. I start from the UN Human Development Report (UN 
HDR, 2010) which revitalises the people-centred participatory development models of the 
1980s to achieve the MDGs targets. Integration of communication for development to 
strengthen community engagement and dialogue arises from the same report (2010: 116). In 
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this section, I present how the MDG resolution captures the notion of participation of the state, 
government, individuals, villagers and the private sector from the narrative in the MDGs.  
 
The MDG framework proposes several, sometimes contradictory forms of participation which 
are both discursively allocated and implicitly prescribed, while setting out the context from 
which roles of those different actors emerge from different storylines.  Earlier discussions 
revealed how the MDG discourse establishes storylines into a sequence of a cause-effect 
relationship, with each narrative thread suggesting the roles of each particular actor. I consider 
in this study, these actions to mean roles which signify participation. Drawing from the MDG 
text, “participation” is positioned within a broader global arena, where member states interact 
with the UN system, and where states are assumed to be in dialogue with their citizens. Earlier 
discussions have illustrated dialogic relations and polemical tensions between global and local 
discourses, especially where globalisation is textually collocated with the global economy 
(MDG, para, 5). For instance, where local problems are supposed to be matched with local 
capabilities in Malawi and Zambia, the MDG framework discourses evasively opt to generalise 
poverty in order to universalise its reduction. The same text mediates in a persuasive and yet 
coercive manner demanding “other” countries to be part of the global “we”, as the first form of 
participation.  
 
The word “we” which represents a new discourse in line with the global discourse and shift in 
development approach from the IDP (1970) appears 49 times in the 32 paragraphs of the MDG 
resolution. The “we” discourse is used to convey a sense of equality, collectiveness, shared 
responsibility, coalition building and universality of thought (cf. Wodak, & Meyer, 2009; 
Waisbord in Hemer and Tufte, 2005), and to hide the power imbalances in a context that 
presumes equality of member states in the UN system. This discourse contradicts the MDG 
paragraph 11 which states that “we will spare no effort to free our fellow men, women and 
children from the abject and dehumanizing conditions of extreme poverty, to which more than 
a billion of them are currently subjected” (MDG para. 11). Power relations determine the way 
that the MDG resolution deploys linguistic devices at state level in establishing a universal 
entity within the hegemonic majority, concurrently constructing its members as appalling, while 
seeking to pressure them to adopt the ways proposed in the MDG discourse. The co-location of 
poverty reduction as a right (para, 11), when linked to non-compliance (para, 9) criminalises 
the right to be different (cf. Cox, 1987) and subsequently undermines the right to self-
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determination (para, 4). The next discussion focuses on three main actors whose roles are 
prominent in the MDGs.  
 
a) The state government and the facilitation role  
Developing states, in this case Malawi and Zambia are my first category of actors whose duty 
of care for their citizens is well defined in the MDGs. Their main role is to create a conducive 
environment for economic growth (MDG, para, 12) by reforming governance policies to ensure 
“an open, equitable, rule-based, predictable and non-discriminatory multilateral trading and 
financial system” (MDGs para, 13). Critical in this analysis is how participation is configured 
by the MDG discourse. Its focus is no longer on what states must do but why they must do what 
needs to be done for development to happen. Of particular interest is the way power is hiding 
behind the “we” discourse while emphasising the open market and creating the conditions for 
a conducive environment for the private sector-led economic growth. The primary focus is not 
on what the states must do to improve the conditions of their people. Three hidden and yet 
critical ways in which power is deciding the role of the state are evident, especially where 
discourse seeks to weaken the state and submit it to the whims of the private sector, purportedly 
to develop their people. Already, developing countries are presented as recipients of global 
orders and beneficiaries of private sector-led growth.   
 
Firstly, the behaviour of Malawian and Zambian governments as member states is governed by 
the UN system, inherently constraining their independent agency. Secondly, compliance to 
demands to create a conducive environment is set as a pre-condition for accessing international 
aid and, thirdly, these two combined are necessary for states to achieve economic growth. 
Compliance to the above constitutes part of the “special measures [which developing countries 
must adopt] to address the challenges of poverty eradication and sustainable development 
including [...] improved market access [and] enhanced Official Development Assistance and 
increased flows of Foreign Direct Investment, as well as transfers of technology” (MDG, para 
28). Of what use is this aid to these governments, especially if their role is limited to facilitating 
a conducive environment for the private sector? In the absence of a narrative that defines their 
role differently, the only logical conclusion is that such funding is provided to facilitate the 
open market and to keep developing countries subservient and indebted to the international 
finance institution. Configuring the role of governments in such a way leaves them with limited 
access to resources and incapable of meeting the needs of their empowered citizens through 
private sector donor-funded civil society who hold them accountable for service delivery.  
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b) The citizen and the vulnerable identity 
My second category of participants are individuals who are part of the social actors but are 
translated through the MDGs text into global citizens. The concept of participation in the MDGs 
is largely built around the citizens or individuals as actors whose poverty should be addressed 
and need to “participate”’ to improve their well-being. The HDR proposes that human 
development is about people exercising their “individual choice and to participate in, shape and 
benefit from processes at the household, community and national levels— to be empowered” 
(2010: 2).  This builds from the HDR (1990) which emphasised that development is about 
freedom, both human choice (opportunity freedoms) and a participatory process (process 
freedoms).  
 
To assess if the proposed participatory development model leads to improved well-being, I 
draw from Confucius’ 41F42 popular quote: “…if what is said is not what is meant, then what must 
be done remains undone”. Analysis proceeds by focusing on three factors – first, the 
performative and semantic effect of words and phrases surrounding the “people”; secondly, 
how discourse constructs identity of “the people” and their role; and finally, how these establish 
power relations between “the global arena” and “the people” is extensively discussed in Cox, 
(1987).  Assessing how the MDG framework constructs the identity of people is vital here.  The 
MDGs text establishes the identity of an incapable citizenry. For example, the word “people” 
is mentioned 13 times, ten of which create an identity of vulnerability – a powerless people – 
in desperate need of the global “we” to access “greater opportunities” offered by the private 
sector (para, 30) to enable them to determine their well-being. This identity does not signify a 
lack of local needs by citizens of developing countries such as Malawi and Zambia but an 
imposition of socially constructed shortages through a socially constructed identity. The 
following extracts illustrate how the people are described in the MDG resolution.  
 
Global leaders are sparing “no effort to free … peoples” (para, 8) from poverty, “halve the 
world’s people whose income is below a dollar a day… who suffer from hunger” … and ... 
“unable to reach or to afford safe drinking water” (para, 10). “[G]lobal leaders have a duty” 
(para, 2) to “fight for all the people of the world” (para, 29) and globalization is “a positive 
                                                 
42 The Chinese philosopher whose ideas and sayings were collected after his death and became the basis of a 
philosophical doctrine known a Confucianism (circa 551-478 BC). 
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force for all the world’s people” (para, 5) to be best assured their “right” to development (para, 
6).   
 
These words and phrases characterise the ‘people’ through linguistic devices in the service of 
power, to impose a social hierarchy of subordination and domination. Individuals are translated 
into a global collective, making it easy to manage their poverty, while constraining their ability 
to see their realities from their own standpoint (cf. Scott, 1998). In that fashion, language is 
uniting different discourses in the same text and context. For example, the vulnerability identity 
relates to lack of capacity (MDG, para, 28) for self-development and to use locally available 
resources. It is also a discursive tool prohibiting individuals and communities in Malawi and 
Zambia from being part of the private sector economic growth and therefore incapable of 
utilising locally available resources.  This means that the goal of capacity building is not about 
making the people part of the private sector’s economic growth but rather linked to the dialogic 
processes of interfacing with the institutions of development while holding their governments 
accountable. The MDG resolutions are both mediating and rationalising social power 
imbalances by “representing and constructing a society” of unequal relations of power (Wodak, 
1996, p.18). They are playing the ideational role of negotiating realities through texts by 
creating a worldview which is constituted and constituting itself at the same time. A single and 
universal way of addressing poverty is made possible once the “people” are discursively 
constructed as a vulnerable and homogenous group – thereby enabling conditions which frame 
the course of action. Such framing creates conditions that hold the dominant discourse in the 
MDGs together on the assumption that people are helpless in the absence of globally supported 
intervention. A similar construction of the vulnerable “people” and how it is used to justify 
social transformation as part of the empowerment agenda will be addressed later in this chapter. 
 
Diminishing individual agency is not the only consequence, but the new vulnerable identity of 
the people may result in a loss of local knowledge, autonomy of thought and confidence among 
Malawians and Zambians at the expense of the dominant thought system in the MDGs thereby 
creating a dependent individual. As the “original identity” acquires a “new” discursively 
imposed one, possibilities of altering the mind-set are high, especially one that ceases to see the 
importance of utilising locally available resources and capabilities to meet their individual 
needs.  
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c) The private sector – the miracle maker 
The role of the private sector in stimulating economic growth as a panacea to poverty is 
elaborated on in this chapter. While so far the most dominant actor in the poverty reduction 
discourse in the MDGs is the private sector, it is not foregrounded in the text. It is only 
mentioned twice where it is collocated with the narrative of economic growth and civil society 
partnership, with the text preferring to focus on the process of and not the actors on economic 
growth. They are however, the major beneficiaries in the MDGs resolution. Most of these 
benefits have been discussed in earlier sections of this chapter. For example, in the MDG 
resolution, member states are compelled to ensure “greater opportunities to the private sector… 
to contribute to the realization of … goals” (para, 30) and it is further indicated that they are the 
only credible partner for civil society and other development institutions in “pursuit of 
development and poverty eradication” (para, 20). These narratives foreground the private sector 
as central to economic growth and as the sole actor. Everyone else’s participation is couched 
under the civil society organisations which are also discursively linked to partnerships with the 
private sector. The private sector is conceived of as both a stimulator of growth and the funder 
of civil society’s participatory development.  
  
The MDG text’s silence on the role of the private sector in the whole document is of particular 
interest. The role of the private sector can only be explained within the storylines that construct 
the MDGs discourse. The silence by the MDGs on the role of the private sector casts them as 
invisible, innocent, uninterested and not members of the global “we” while constructing a 
developing world incapable of addressing poverty without the private sector. In short, the 
developing world is constructed as dependent on the private sector to address poverty. Both 
poverty reduction and globalisation are presented as dependent variables of the private sector 
discourse. In my analysis of discursive context, Fairclough’s (1995, 2003) views were useful in 
examining how texts derive meanings from the contexts of their discursive production and 
dissemination within a particular political order. Language is used as a textual device to 
influence policy directions and practice at national level by prescribing who does what within 
the domain of discourse production and who occupies the position to send or receive texts.  
 
How the MDG discourse prioritises poverty reduction and lays out the storylines of how it 
should be addressed without directly mentioning and allocating the private sector as the lead 
actor, illustrates a curious discursive paradox. The private sector is dependent on governments 
creating a conducive environment and yet the same government depends on the private sector 
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for development. The MDGs resolution text relies on the communicative discourse to allocate 
roles without necessarily mentioning the actor but instead, builds on the shared understanding 
of the context.  Understanding the role of power in configuring social relations is revealed when 
discourse is broken into these elements and storylines. In this context, that is one way of 
exposing the active role of the private sector whose identity is not specified but plotted behind 
narratives and texts (cf. van Dijk, 1993). Breaking down these storylines enabled a detailed 
analysis and examination of the actors’ roles drawn from a context which shapes the 
representation of social actors, including discursive and social practices and formations. 
According to  van Dijk, (1993) it is through storylines that roles define actors and therefore the 
private sector need not be necessarily mentioned in order for them to be seen to be active in 
constructing, reproducing and articulating a discourse. What is important to note is the repeated 
interdependence between poverty reduction and economic growth. In the next section, I discuss 
the social transformation agenda, presented as a precursor to addressing poverty through the 
UN Communication for Development strategy.  
 
6.6 Communication for development: global transformation agenda 
Before discussing the third theme - communication for development - a summary of the above 
discussion will provide a vital platform for deeper analysis. The factors, processes, actors and 
spaces that gave rise to the MDGs constitute discourse production and therefore a message 
package. Earlier discussions showed that neoliberal interests influenced the MDGs despite 
having passed through several policy spaces such as the Utstein group, World Bank, IMF and 
the UN system. The interests behind the MDG resolution are evident in the discourse. I consider 
the convergence of the MDG discourse with communication for development to be setting an 
agenda whose goal is not necessarily to fast-track poverty reduction but to co-opt developing 
countries into the neoliberal fold.  
 
Despite lack of consensus on the effectiveness of media messages to change behaviour, there 
remains hope that communication as socialising agent can transform society (cf. Blummer and 
Katz, 1974; Fiske, 1987; McQuail, 1983, 2010). Buoyed by some success stories in “disease 
prevention, protection of ecosystems, good governance activities and improved agricultural 
practices,” (The 10th UN Inter-Agency Round Table on Communication for Development 2007, 
p.4) the UN system justifies the integration of Communication for Development strategy as an 
implementation tool to achieve the MDGs by calling on “effective use of mass and community-
based communication” (ibid). In this section, I take a look at three approaches proposed in the 
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UN communication for development to be used in MDGs, exploring how words and phrases 
frame and justify certain functions of communication for development.  
 
a) To speak and to be heard is to develop 
The first approach is modelled around the democratic participatory theory of Habermas (1989) 
which predicates participation as “speaking” and “being heard”. It assumes that when people 
are capable of being spoken to and when they are heard, it reinforces other aspects of their 
freedom and their ability to be involved in society. The media and communication are 
positioned as central agents in facilitating dialogue between “the people” and institutions 
responsible for addressing poverty, but is also used as a tool to transmit knowledge (The 10th 
UN Inter-Agency Round Table on Communication for Development 2007, p.15). The 
knowledge transmission model will receive further attention later in this section, but it is vital 
to highlight that phrases such as “speaking” and “being heard” set a scenario of power relations 
where the speaker signifies an empowered people to engage with institutions. While “the 
people” and the institutions are expected to equally collaborate in addressing poverty, they are 
in this model not equals because, as portrayed, one is in a position of authority, while the other 
is a beneficiary of services from institutions.     
  
This conceptualisation of communication has laboured, albeit unsuccessfully, to present 
development institutions as passive listeners and active implementers of the wishes of the 
supposedly “empowered” speaking people as its point of departure. In doing so, it allocates the 
duty to address poverty solemnly to development institutions under the guise of responding to 
the wishes of the people. However, this approach is betrayed by a restrictive and disempowering 
environment arising from the power relations – one which limits participation to speaking to 
institutions, rather than seeking to foreground dialogic communication within the context of 
differing diversities and pluralities of well-beings in Malawi and Zambia (cf. MacBride et al., 
1980). In earlier discussions on identity, this study explained that when an identity is created as 
incapable, individuals with such identities cease to see opportunities around them as 
possibilities to improve their lives. Everything around them acquires value through the presence 
of institutions or the private sector. This because the poverty problem is limited to democratic 
participation in planning and decision-making only confined within institutions (cf. Servaes, 
2006), to which the strategy suggests the “increased prevalence of communication media and 
the democratic” mechanisms (ibid).  
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b) A dialogue in inequality 
The second approach emerging from the UN Communication for development strategy is an 
attempt to embrace Freire’s (1970) model of dialogue where knowledge sharing is assumed to 
be between equals. The point of departure is to understand that the definition of well-being is a 
process by the people in dialogue with their local contexts. Freire proposes participation within 
a context of self-development of the local community, while acknowledging that society can 
depend on others for scarce resources, both in form and in degree and in a context where there 
is no centre or periphery but a mutual inter-relationship and interdependency. However, from 
what can be observed from the UN Communication strategy, poverty reduction is aligned to 
behaviour and social change (pp.13,16, 20) nuanced by using prefixes and suffixes such as 
“access”, “exchange”, “inclusive”, “sharing”, “open and non-exclusive”, “participate in the 
global knowledge economy”, and “build knowledge societies”.  These words and phrases 
recapitulate more than they convey. They define social positions according to who needs to be 
empowered by being included and given knowledge which should enable them to overcome 
their poverty. In their assumed neutrality, these words mask power imbalances in which the 
diffusion model is used (cf. Rogers, 1983) by presenting a scenario of equality and impartiality 
where everyone leads in defining their well-being. By presenting development knowledge as 
central to participatory poverty reduction, the discourse is justifying the use of communication 
to transfer knowledge to alter behaviour and practices of those perceived to be in poverty (p.13 
– 41). Again, poverty becomes a problem of lack of knowledge. Knowledge and power combine 
to assume the same currency necessary for the “voiceless poor”, who are implicitly signified as 
knowledge-less and hence cannot address their poverty if they cannot engage in public debate 
with their governments on decisions that affect them.  
 
c) Disempowering by empowering 
The third approach arising from the UN Communication for Development strategy is linked to 
empowerment whose central theme is the broader social transformation agenda discussed 
earlier. The convergence of the above two positions resonates with the main MDGs discourse 
which suggests that the inclusion of the excluded social groups is the only way out of poverty. 
The link between knowledge, communication and power as a process where “ideas change 
minds” is summarized by Vandemoortele (2004, p.2) in his postulation that the convergence of 
ideas with universal power leads to a universal identity.  The use of ideas to change minds 
resonates with the MDGs (para 25) which call for global intervention “to strengthen the capacity  
... to help Africa build up its capacity to tackle” poverty (MDG, para, 28). From a theoretical 
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perspective, this narrative places the UN system in an agency dilemma, one in which it speaks 
to Malawi, Zambia and developing countries as a global authority and the other in which it is 
supposed to be listening to member states as its citizens.  However, the category of Malawi and 
Zambia as member states implies a low position of influence within the UN system. 
 
The UN positions itself as an “agentive self-constructor” (Bamberg et al, 2010; p.6) with the 
power to instruct member states to “to take special measures to eradicate poverty and [achieve] 
sustainable development in Africa” (MDG, para 28). The narrative of developing countries 
being at the forefront of “shaping their development… and the lives they value” (UNDP, 2010; 
p.6) achieving the “nationally owned development strategies” is contradicted by its link to the 
support by “international development partners” (UN MDG report, 2010, p.3). Social 
transformation which is signified as unsustainable “patterns of production and consumption” in 
the MDGs (para, 10) is used to justify the need for national “policy coherence” to the MDGs in 
order “to achieve a fully coordinated approach to the problems of development” (para, 30). 
 
In the next section, I expand on the global social transformation analysis of the UN 
Communication for Development strategy and the MDGs. The analysis is largely informed by 
neo-Gramscian scholars such as Cox (1981, 1983, 1987), and Robinson (2005) who discuss 
social power in relation to social change within the framework of a nation-state relationship. 
The focus of analysis here is how the power of the MDGs discourse has influenced Malawi and 
Zambia’s national planning policies (cf. Gordenker and Weiss, 1996; Rosenau (1997a).  I use 
the national “policy coherence” to MDGs as the point of departure as it arises from the UN 
Secretary General’s report (2010) and as part of strengthening communication for development 
to expedite and localise the MDGs. While the UN Communication for Development strategy is 
not directly referenced in both plans, there is a significant usage of the participatory phrases 
such as “community involvement”, “empowerment”, and “participation.” For example, in both 
five-year national plans for 2011 to 2015 for Malawi and Zambia, the word participation 
appears 134 times and 29 times respectively.  
  
  6.7.1 Localising the MDGs in Malawi 
Malawi launched its Growth and Development Strategy II (MGDS) in 2011 laying out its 
development course under “economic growth” model which set the tone for wealth creation as 
a key ingredient to achieving the MDGs, food self-sufficiency (p.18), reducing poverty (p.ii) 
and transforming Malawi to a manufacturing and exporting economy (ibid).  The localisation 
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of the MDGs, except in Goal 8, in the context of the national plan, is one of its priorities. The 
use of the media and communication strategies reflected are under theme 4: Infrastructure 
development (MGDS). The MGDs aptly capture the discursive convergence of poverty 
reduction and the participatory model by deploying words, language and texts allowing for the 
operationalisation of these at national level.  
 
The use of media is captured under two models. First, the diffusion model (cf. Rogers, 1962) 
where the media is assigned to ensure “that the population has access to timely and relevant 
information” and second, to the participatory model (Freire, 1970) where the role of the media 
is to increase “popular participation of the citizens in development, governance and democratic 
processes” (ibid, p.153) through a variety of social change media (ibid, p.154).  As shall be 
demonstrated in Chapter 7, the views of the Malawians are not taken into account, because the 
objective is to make them passive receivers of knowledge who act on what has been diffused to 
them. This is despite the fact that in its national plan, the Malawian government has made a 
commitment to strengthen the regulatory framework to facilitate the free flow of information 
on topical issues and decision-making for everyone.  
 
Dominant storylines in the MGDS single out economic growth and democratic participation as 
central to reducing poverty by clearly identifying the private sector as a key player because 
without “growth, it will be impossible to deliver … the vision of creating wealth and 
employment for all the people of Malawi” (MGDS, 2011, p.13). The national plan goes further 
to state that poverty reduction requires action on multiple fronts including “maximizing the 
contribution to economic growth through the potential growth sectors, … putting in place an 
enabling environment for private sector led growth … and empowering rural communities to 
be part of economic activities” (p.18).  The capabilities of ordinary Malawians are side-lined in 
favour of the government creating a “conducive environment for the private sector to stimulate 
economic growth” (xviii). The participatory narrative is reconstructed by the texts on 
empowerment to create an image of Malawians playing a leading role in their wellbeing. In 
fact, they too must take interest in advocating for economic growth in order to be empowered. 
The use of the enunciation discourse in this context distinguishes what is said and the act of 
saying it, with the texts organising the act of addressing the poverty problem.  
 
The discourse of economic growth imposes compliance on Malawians concerning policy 
reforms to create a conducive environment purportedly to deliver development. Individual 
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differences among Malawians are summoned and ushered into a global identity under the 
discourse of social cohesion. The MDG (para 2 and 30) articulates these discourses together by 
using words which combine different categories of discourse into a compelling and inspiratory 
semantic relation. “We recognize that, in addition to our separate responsibilities to our 
individual societies, we have a collective responsibility to ... the most vulnerable...” (para.2) 
and therefore must “give greater opportunities to the private sector ... to contribute to the 
realization of [MDG] and programmes” (para.30). In the case of Malawi’s national plan, 
possibilities of participation are limited only to employment opportunities offered by the private 
sector-led economic growth. The inequalities imposed by these narratives are neglected at the 
expense of facilitating a free and open market system to create opportunities for multinational 
corporations (see Chomsky 2000; Foucault, 1992).  
 
Development indicators in Malawi however, contradict the prominence given to the economic 
growth proposal. For example, Malawi improved its national food security42F43, reduced 
malnutrition and achieved 50 per cent reduction in the prevalence of HIV in the absence of a 
vibrant private sector industry (Country programme document for Malawi, 2011). These 
achievements are acknowledged in MGDs as partly due to the role played by the media and 
communication in promoting the appropriate farming methods, behaviour change targeting HIV 
and AIDS and promoting inter-communal marketing for farm produce as part of the success 
story. An overview of the media landscaped in Malawi and its role in development is offered 
in Chapter 8. The disconnection between what the MDGs have prescribed and the realities in 
the village in Malawi illustrates how the power of discourses swayed Malawi’s local and 
national priorities to address the neoliberal interests rather than empower the population to 
control their own development processes (cf. Cox, 1987). The need for promoting the factors 
that influenced these success stories is obscured by the pressure to comply with the dominant 
discourse.  
 
This dissonance is severally repeated in the MGDs (2011). For instance, more than 80 per cent 
of Malawi’s population is said to depend directly on natural resources for livelihood. Above 80 
                                                 
43 During Bingu Wa Mutharika’s first term in office, he introduced the Greenbelt project which saw Malawi 
exporting and to donating food to its neighbouring countries in Southern Africa by 2009 in a short period of time. 
(http://www.fao.org/fileadmin/templates/wsfs/Summit/Statements_PDF/Monday_16_PM/02_Malawi_Speech16
1109.pdf. Accessed on 13 September 2015) 
 
 
144 
 
per cent of them live in rural areas, while 95 per cent are involved in subsistence agriculture. 
Instead of taking these factors into consideration and as baseline for understanding their well-
being, the national plan opts to allocate the previously locally-driven agriculture sector which 
was behind the successful production mid-2000s, and hand it over to foreign private sector-led 
economic growth actors. This is done under the assumption that to transform 80 per cent of 
Malawian population into “workforce, [would] contribute to over 80 per cent of foreign 
exchange earnings” (ibid, p.18).  The rest of the population is turned into prospective labour, 
because as the plan suggests, “the private sector is [the only] engine for growth and wealth 
creation” (p.28) and a source of “foreign exchange earnings” (ibid, p.18).   
 
6.7.2 Interpreting the MDGs in Zambia 
Like Malawi, Zambia launched its Sixth National Development Plan (SNDP) 2011–2015, a 
successor to the Fifth National Development Plan (FNDP), under the theme, “sustained 
economic growth and poverty reduction” towards becoming “a prosperous middle-income 
nation by 2030”. Within the same framework, stated in its Vision 2030, the Zambian 
government makes a commitment to improve “economic infrastructure and investing in human 
development” (p.1). The SNDP builds on the gains of the FNDP 2006-2009 when economic 
growth is said to have improved43F44.  Media and communication in achieving the SNDP is linked 
to the diversification of opportunities, framed as opening up new income-generating activities 
whose role is to disseminate information on socio-economic development, and also to stimulate 
participation. A detailed overview of the Zambian landscape and the role of media in 
development is offered in Chapter 8. However, the goal of the private sector, apart from 
economic growth, is to create employment which is required to reduce poverty.  
 
Just like in Malawi, creating an enabling environment is positioned as central to supporting 
“private sector growth and ensuring that the country has good infrastructure, a supportive 
macroeconomic environment and skilled human resource” (ibid).  Participation is framed 
severally in different policy narratives. First, it is defined through the Broad-Based Wealth and 
Job Creation through Citizenry Participation and Technological Advancement policy 
document. This is an appendage to the 2011- 2015 plan, aiming to create wealth and reduce 
poverty. In some section of the same document, participation is framed as citizen involvement 
                                                 
44 Averaged 6.1 per cent per annum compared to 4.8 per cent during the Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP)/Transitional 
National Development Plan (TNDP) period.  
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in civil society, NGOs, and the private sector. In other sections, participation refers to human 
resources development as labour supply to the private sector, and does not look at local capacity 
of people to reduce their own poverty within the context of locally available opportunities. The 
views on participation and wellbeing are influenced by how the MDGs define poverty and its 
proposed solutions. The same view is communicated to Zambians encouraging them to imagine 
their own well-being from the same perspective, so that in playing their participatory 
democratic role of holding the government accountable, they use the same view on poverty as 
a frame of reference. The conjunction of different textual devices sustains hegemony by 
concealing the presence of power and domination while providing coherence in imagining 
development.  
 
In several passages, the Zambia national plan refers to the disparities that emerged during the 
period of economic growth in the 1990s, a period when poverty was believed to have deepened 
among many Zambians. The Zambian government draws from this experience to caution in its 
plan that prioritising multi-national private sector-led economic growth at the expense of local 
empowerment is risky. During the SAP period, Zambia suffered heavy capital flight 44F45 as 
multinational companies exported most of their earnings to their home countries. Zambia was 
among the countries that were unhappy with the international finance institutions because of 
their experience with SAPs. The multinational companies had, as part of the SAP, promised to 
use their earnings for local investment in exchange for favourable conducive conditions such 
as tax exemptions, cheap labour and several other concessions (cf. The Forum Syd report Bring 
the Billions Back, 2011). After multinational corporations reaped huge profits, they reneged on 
their promise while continuing to insist on policy reform for the country to qualify for further 
meagre financial aid, leading to a de facto cycle of aid and debt (cf. Claessens and Naude, 
1993).  Capital flight hugely outstripped aid to Zambia.  
 
The economic growth recorded during that period did not lead to poverty reduction but rather, 
left millions of Zambians in a worse off situation. Even with the benefit of this hindsight, the 
Zambian plan has not drawn lessons from this experience to foster a people-driven approach. 
Instead, it has given in to neoliberal pressures to create a conducive environment for the private 
sector in place of creating opportunities for a locally driven development approach. The 
inconsistency between economic growth and poverty reduction is blamed on the concentration 
                                                 
45 During SAP capital flight was estimated to be between 140% and 150% of Zambia’s Gross Domestic Product, resulting in 
Zambia becoming among the Highly Indebted Poor Countries in the world. 
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of private-sector-led growth in urban areas and its inability to create sufficient employment. 
That being the case, the plan argues that, “if the country continues on such a trajectory, it will 
not advance the development objectives identified in the Vision 2030 as well as progress 
towards meeting the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) objective of halving the 1990 
levels of poverty by 2015” (p.20).  
 
The SNDP acknowledges that Zambia is “endowed with vast and diverse natural resources that 
form the basis for economic activity” (SNDP, 2011-2015, p.10). These include “fertile land, 
wildlife, forest, minerals, natural heritage and wetlands” (ibid). The value of these resources is 
not linked to the national poverty reduction agenda but to foreign exchange earnings, considered 
a primary requirement for national development. How discourse constructs subordinate 
identities and how such identities cease to see value in locally available resources and 
opportunities but instead focus on demanding services from development institutions, was 
discussed earlier.  Such discussions demonstrated that instead of these subordinate identities 
applying their productive energies towards available opportunities to achieve their well-being, 
they tend to rely on institutions for their well-being. “Effective and efficient management of 
these natural resources can … contribute to … foreign exchange earnings and employment 
creation” (ibid, p.10). The absence of foreign interests in the available natural resources means 
that they are of no value to Zambians. By extension, these resources derive their value from 
demand by the multinational corporations and not by Zambians’ desire to utilise them to meet 
their needs. This contradicts the assertion that Zambia is “a nation with capacity to promote and 
provide sustainable security against constant or periodic critical levels of deprivation and 
extreme vulnerability by 2030” (ibid) through empowering “low capacity households and 
provid[ing] social assistance to incapacitated households and support to vulnerable people to 
live decent lives” (ibid, p.30).  
 
Empowerment is not aligned to access and utilisation of locally available resources but its 
ability to respond to social problems, and social transformation is linked to improving skills to 
service the labour needs of the private sector. The discourse positions the private sector at the 
helm of economic growth, assumed to create benefit for all. This narrative construction chimes 
with the push to empower the poor by increasing their income as an “effective approach in 
addressing their plight … than the often unsustainable subsidy programmes that tend to destroy 
the very financial and human resource bases that are expected to facilitate positive growth 
through productive investment” (ibid).   
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6.8 Conclusion 
This chapter has attempted to answer the sub-questions of this study by critically analysing the 
global governance context in which the MDGs as an international development policy are 
formulated, adopted and implemented. It has also elaborated on how the MDGs and UN 
Communication for Development strategy were conceptualised, the narratives and discourses 
that frame them and their implications for Malawi and Zambia’s national poverty reduction 
strategies.  
 
The discourses underpinning the MDGs and the UN Communication for Development strategy 
betray the participatory approach proposed in the UNSG’s report (2010) as they largely deliver 
a neoliberal agenda through a diffusion model to co-opt different societies into the global 
village. Starting from the global to the national level, the MDGs and related national plans 
demonstrate semantic coherence of policy directions. Texts, in the form of words and language, 
are crucial in establishing a poverty reduction discursive context within which actors derive 
their roles, while creating a false sense of participation which contradicts social difference. This 
paradox is illustrated in the three main approaches to communication which are conspicuous in 
promoting a mixture of participatory approaches – the democratic participation, the diffusion 
and the social transformation model. This study has further expanded on the discussions that 
texts are linked to historical ideologies and that both discourse and contexts influence linguistic 
devices in promoting narratives and story lines. The critical discourse analysis of the MDGs 
has demonstrated that their text and contexts are products of power and interests which together 
configure what, why and how identities of developing countries are at play. Problematic in these 
models is that they are operating from a global discourse established elsewhere. The 
“beneficiaries” such as Malawi and Zambia consequently become vulnerable to the whims of 
neoliberal interests that control the UN system. 
 
This poverty discourse arising from such constructions comprises the lenses through which 
Malawians and Zambians are viewed as lacking capacity. This is the narrative that has been 
used to justify external intervention to build capacity in the form of social and behaviour 
change. The private sector is portrayed as not just the source of this capacity, but as the only 
actor capable of utilising available opportunities and resources in Malawi and Zambia to 
stimulate growth needed to ensure participation. The relationship between these two positions 
does not add up. The use of communication in this context in fact weakens local capabilities, 
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including altering their mind-set and displacing the self-confidence of Malawians and 
Zambians. In presenting economic growth as the single means to achieve poverty reduction in 
Malawi and Zambia, the assumption is that only the private sector, largely western 
multinational companies, can actively lead the global poverty reduction agenda, thus making 
everyone else a follower.  
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Chapter Seven: Participation, spaces and power 
7.1 Introduction 
This chapter complements Chapter 6, providing an empirical practical application analysis of 
participatory approaches in policy formulation and implementation spaces in Malawi and 
Zambia, all as part of the MDGs and PRSPs requirements. It partly seeks to examine the 
implications of the UN Communication for Development strategy on participatory approaches 
to poverty reduction practice in the two villages, including analysing how the villagers 
understand participation within their context. The first part is a critical analysis of the complex 
patterns of policy formulation spaces in Malawi and Zambia. This includes examining how they 
are discursively constructed. The second part of the chapter magnifies the different dimensions 
of power and knowledge, including how these play out in spaces and processes available for 
citizen participation from village to national level. The objective is to assess the level of 
influence by different actors, from the stage when citizens’ views are collected, to the final 
national stages where decisions are made. As a working assumption, this chapter considers 
public policy spaces and processes, firstly as open to citizen participation and secondly as 
arenas of discourse production informing policy narratives. Drawing on the responses from 
different respondents, the chapter argues that available public policy formulation spaces in 
Malawia and Zambia are drained of their decision-making power by the presence of external 
knowledge, power and rules which govern how the spaces operate. The government’s ability to 
empower its citizens to influence national decision is also diminished.  
7.2 Background and context 
 
a) Malawi 
Malawi, with an estimated population of nearly 16 million people, according to the World Bank 
(2014), is located in southeast Africa and borders Zambia to the northwest, Tanzania to the 
north-east, and Mozambique to the east, south and west. Like most Southern African countries, 
Malawi fell under British colonial rule in 1891, and then changed hands to the Federation of 
Rhodesia and Nyasaland in 1953. In 1964, it became independent under the presidency of 
Kamuzu Banda’s single party regime for three decades. In 1964 Malawi became a member of 
the United Nations (UNSC Resolution 195, 1964) and the then Organisation of African Unity 
(now Africa Union) the same year.  In 1971, Banda declared himself ‘President for Life’ (Heyn, 
2013). With the rise of neoliberalism in the late 1980s in the West, civil society organizations 
funded by western donors and the UN system took centre stage in Malawi exposing the 
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autocratic leadership of Banda’s regime leading to his downfall in 1992, which paved the way 
for a participatory process of developing a new democratic constitution in 1994. His downfall 
was orchestrated by an amalgam of global forces and partly triggered by the rise of 
neoliberalism in the late 1980s. Malawi only faced its first serious demonstration on 17 July 
2011. As Heyn (2013) notes, before then, Banda’s repressive regime earned praised from 
Western countries and finance institutions for instilling discipline and loyalty in his government 
to the global institutions. The World Bank and IMF used Malawi as an example of fiscal and 
monetary responsibility. All these developments fits into Lukes’ (1974) theorisation of power 
and its ability to influence behaviour and their parameters.  In the context of Malawi, it was 
evident how neoliberalism, through the UN system as a global governance structure, approved, 
reviewed and rejected behaviour patterns of what should be sovereign countries. As Edwards 
(2014) notes, with the rise of neoliberalism, Banda’s leadership became a barrier to the new 
ideology under which states and markets began to be seen as essential elements to achieving 
capital interests. Freedom of society became paramount, civil society, operating under the 
global neoliberal hegemony, became a relevant driver of change towards achieving the desired 
conducive environment to maximise profits. Harnessing of the power of citizens became a 
crucial ingredient under the ideology of participatory democracy, to push for policy reforms 
needed to achieve economic growth (Edwards, 2014). After the 1994 elections, Malawi adopted 
constitutional democracy, under the neoliberal ideology. Power shifted from Banda’s Malawi 
Congress Party to the new President, Bakili Muluzi’s United Democratic Front Party who ruled 
the country from 1994 until 2004. With the new form of global ideology predominating, Malawi 
politically began to open up, and has thus far held elections every five years. Mr. Muluzi was 
succeeded by Bingu wa Mutharika who was in turn succeeded by Joyce Banda, following his 
death in April 2012. In the 2014 elections, the incumbent, Joyce Banda lost to current President 
Peter Mutharika, the brother to late Bingu wa Mutharika.  Malawi, post-1994, has operated on 
a participatory democratic and multi-party government system. The three main branches of the 
government include an elected executive, an elected legislative and the judiciary. The executive 
includes an elected president who oversees the management of government affairs (Kayuni and 
Cloete, 2006).  According to these authors, in theory and on paper, the country has a system to 
support citizen participation and representation from the grassroots, districts and regions up to 
the central government (cf. also Hussein, 2003).  
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b) Zambia 
Zambia is a Southern African country, which borders the Democratic Republic of the Congo to 
the north, Tanzania to the north-east, Malawi to the east, Botswana, Mozambique, Namibia and 
Zimbabwe to the south, and Angola to the west. Zambia shares cultural and historical 
similarities with Malawi. It, like Malawi, was colonized by the British in 1890 and attained 
independence in 1964 before joining the United Nations and the Africa Union that same year.  
Kenneth Kaunda became the first President of Zambia in 1964 until 1991. In 1972, just a year 
after Malawi’s Banda declared himself ‘President for life’, Zambia became a single party-state 
under the motto ‘One Zambia, One Nation’ until 1991. The fight for democracy in Zambia 
started much earlier than in Malawi, with civil society organisations mobilizing against the 
Kaunda regime as early as the 1970s (Maitra, 2011). Consequently, what has emerged in 
Zambia as civil society today is a history of authoritarian regimes from the colonial era, to the 
post-independence one-party rule. The rise of neoliberalism during the late 1980s and early 
1990s meant that civil society organisations enjoyed more financial backing from western 
donors and the UN system who were pursuing economic policy reforms through mass 
movement of organizations and individuals. By February 1990, civil society organisations 
gathered momentum, led by two trade unionists advocating for a referendum on the one-party 
state. It must be noted that because western donors were funding civil society organisations 
including the two trade unions, they were viewed with suspicion by the government leadership, 
who accused the civil society of undermining its sovereignty and destabilizing the government. 
During the Kaunda period, there was a policy of devolution of power to local authorities, which 
never materialized as it was tampered with by political considerations. It has though, remained 
on the agenda of all governments, including the current one (Simutanyi, 2013).  
 
Parliament convincingly voted, on 30 November 1990, for a constitutional amendment, which 
led to the introduction of multi-party system. Following the election victory of 31 October 1991, 
the Movement for Multi-Party Democracy, a labour backed movement, led by Frederick 
Chiluba came into power. Chiluba, who was a social democrat, subsequently took over power 
and ushered in a new phase of participatory democracy, social-economic growth and 
government decentralization echoing the tenets of neoliberalism (van Donge in Wiseman, 
1995). Levy Mwanawasa succeeded him, from January 2002 until his death in August 2008. 
Rupiah Banda took over in acting capacity until 2008, then as an elected President until 2011 
when he lost elections to Patriotic Front party leader Michael Sata. Sata  died in October 2014, 
paving way for Guy Scott to serve as interim president until the January 2015 elections won by 
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the current President, Edgar Lungu. Despite having served briefly, Guy Scott became the first 
white President in a post-independent African country.  
 
The democratisation process in Zambia takes the form of a presidential representative and 
democratic republic, with the President of the republic acting as both head of state and head of 
government in a pluriform multi-party system. The government has executive power, with the 
legislative power bestowed on both the government and parliament. Since the ouster of Kenneth 
Kaunda in 1991, the role of civil society organisations has continued to grow (Fiedler-Conradi, 
2003). One of the major examples of civil society participation was in the formulation of the 
PRSP, which is believed to be an outcome of input from a cross-section of actors.  While the 
country embraces a participatory approach in its national business, planning has remained 
focused on the allocation of national economic resources. The unfolding democratic governance 
system in Zambia has largely relied on the civil society organisations such as the trade unions, 
NGOs, social movements, churches, the media and others. These engage with different arms of 
the government, from ministries, members of parliament and the parliament, cabinet and 
government structures at all levels on various policy issues, including poverty reduction.  
However, the effectiveness of democratic participation is undermined by the existence of a dual 
system of local government. The elected local council serves the political interests of its parties, 
while the local (regional and provincial) administration reports directly to its parent ministries 
in Lusaka (Simutanyi, 2013).  
 
7.3 Multi-layered national policy structures  
To assess possibilities of participation in different levels of policy making processes for 
villagers in Kamaila, Zambia and Mwandama, Malawi, this study draws, as stated earlier, from 
the policy space analysis methodological approach. This follows Brock et al. (2004) who 
postulates that each policy space is an opportunity to assess participatory possibilities, discourse 
formation and decision-making power across different decision-making levels. Discourses 
arising from or influencing policy spaces introduce changes or sustain a certain mode of 
thinking and behaviour and these shape courses of action. It is the same discourse that informs 
the role of communication for development in fostering participatory development (cf. Cleaver 
in Cooke and Kothari, 2001). Here, I present findings of the policy spaces analysis and 
significance of such to the formulation and implementation of national plans.  
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As a theoretical baseline, this chapter considers every policy or decision-making space as 
shaped by power. Spaces refer to any situations, opportunity or platform where policies or plans 
are deliberated, and where decisions are made or decision-making processes occur (Brock et 
al., 2004). Thus the term entails the broader spectrum of the policy hierarchy from the 
individual, as single entity and as part of a social group, through to different structures and 
levels of national governance. Except for the media, each respondent in this study interacted 
with or belonged to a policy space, notwithstanding their varying degrees of influence.  Data 
for this analysis was collected from the Ministries of Planning, Millennium Project in Malawi 
and Kamaila water project in Zambia (hereafter referred to as NGOs), the UN system, the media 
and the Kamaila and Mwandama Villagers in Zambia and Malawi respectively.  
 
7.3.1 Participation within structural context 
As mentioned above, Malawi and Zambia are half a century old. Notwithstanding some 
challenges, both countries claim to be participatory democratic states, often characterised by 
holding elections at the end of each five-year term. The participatory ideology runs across the 
national planning processes. In Malawi, the process occurs in three administrative stages of the 
national, regional and district level. Much of the government interaction with more than 16 
million of its citizens is presumed to occur in 28 districts in the three regions – Central, Northern 
and Southern. An appointed governor heads each regional office, with districts led by 
commissioners (Heyn, 2013). Mwandama Village falls under the Zomba district in the Southern 
region of Malawi. Each of these administrative layers, in theory, represents spaces for citizen 
participation in policy formulation and implementation. These administrative layers implement 
the central government policies. Malawi’s unicameral national assembly, made up of 194 seats 
is another important political space, enabling citizens to dialogue with their members of 
parliament on policy matters.  Parliament, as a legislative policy space, is constitutionally 
empowered to approve and endorse key national decisions (Edwards, 2014). District 
commissioners and regional governors are charged with implementing government policies. In 
theory, Malawi has the minimum infrastructure required to meet the participatory requirements 
of the PRSP and the MDGs. 
 
Unlike Malawi, Zambia is divided into ten provinces which are subdivided into 103 districts. 
Districts interface with the nearly 15 million people in the country. Kamaila Village lies in 
Chibombo District, within the Central province, 50 kilometres from Lusaka, the capital city of 
Zambia. The legislative, executive and judicial branches of government are located in Lusaka. 
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The provinces are led by an appointed Provincial Minister who is also a Member of Parliament, 
with each district led by a district commissioner charged with implementing national policies 
at grassroots on behalf of the central government (Marcia, 1988).   
 
Local authorities in both countries are presumed to connect the central government with the 
grassroots. Because of their proximity to the people, they are better placed to collect, reflect 
and represent grassroots voices in a typical Habermasian public sphere for the villagers to be 
heard and to influence national decisions. The Habermasian model has been criticised by Cox 
(1983) for limiting decision-making to institutional structures, which in turn constrain well-
being to problem-solving models. True to Cox’s concerns with Habermasian thinking, these 
layers of government in Malawi and Zambia set up channels of communication and command 
from top-bottom, and from the bottom to top, with the top having the final say on national 
decisions. At each level of the layers and spaces, there is a hierarchy of positions and authority, 
which represent the lines of command. It is only at village level where such lines are blurred 
with local government authorities subsuming the traditional administration systems led by 
chiefs, headmen and village heads. This is an interesting space, because it dove-tails into 
national policies, but it also enjoys its own epistemological and cultural autonomy, hence 
allowing a different version of participation. More on this is discussed later in this chapter.  
 
Over the past half a century, Malawi and Zambia have faced leadership and governance issues 
to which their poverty is generally attributed (cf. UNDP Poverty Report, 2000). The tenure of 
President Kamuzu Banda is described as a dictatorship responsible for impoverishing millions 
of Malawians, while Zambia suffered an economic downturn during President Kenneth 
Kaunda’s last years in office. In both cases, poverty is linked to a lack of democratic 
participatory space, bad economic policies and poor governance. Since then, Malawi and 
Zambia have made some crucial policy adjustments in line with the global community to gain 
access to credit lines needed to address their poverty. Part of these efforts include aligning their 
national plans to the PRSP and the MDGs. Ministries of planning45F46 attested that, since the 
adoption of the MDGs in 2000, their governments had complied with the UN system’s planning 
requirements, including embracing the PRSP participatory model. From these ministries’ points 
of view, compliance with the PRSP has two objectives, addressing two types of audiences. First, 
                                                 
46 Ministries of planning in Malawi and Zambia are charged with the responsibilities of formulating development 
policies aimed at achieving economic growth and reduce poverty. In Malawi, it is called the Ministry of Finance, 
Economic Planning and Development, while in Zambia it is the Ministry of Finance and National Planning. 
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it is a sign of good governance in the eyes of the global community, despite it being not relevant 
to the contexts of these countries. Second, compliance is a conduit to access donor funds and 
incentive to lure private sector investment which is considered in the PRSP as vital to poverty 
reduction.   
 
At the time of collecting data, both Malawi and Zambia governments expressed satisfaction at 
having aligned their national plans with “what needs to be done to reduce poverty”, (interview 
conducted on 29 April 2015) including ensuring that every layer of governance facilitated 
democratic participation by a cross-section of actors at different levels, as well as ensuring 
national priorities were communicated back to the grassroots for informed participation in 
project implementation. Some of these actors included NGOs, private sector and grassroots. 
The process of collecting views and disseminating national priorities was seen as dialogic 
participation. Satisfaction was measured by the presence of structures at all levels from national, 
regional, district to village level, thus conforming to global norms. Governments in both 
countries used this as evidence to demonstrate commitment to the democratic participatory 
model. The Ministry of planning in Zambia for instance, indicated that the government had 
“strengthened its provincial, district, ward and village commitment to ensure easy 
communication and transmission of development ideas between the government and the 
people” (email interview 29 April 2015). 
 
The existence of a wide array of participatory spaces can be deceiving as the actual planning 
process takes place in three layers – the district, regional and national spaces. These are 
responsible for arranging the planning process according to the PRSP themes of collective and 
national ownership, inclusive and integrated plans. Like most successful ideologies, these 
themes do more than convey collectiveness and local ownership of plans. They coerce every 
actor to be part of this glorified process (Althusser, 1971) and which must be taken as a given 
(Cox, 1976). The discourse in the PRSP works through these themes to convey a sense of 
togetherness within spaces assumed to allow equal participation for everyone and one 
bestowing decision-making powers. It also portrays governments as capable of leading the 
planning processes in addition to emotionalising poverty (cf. Brown, 2003). These themes, 
together stigmatise difference by summoning all actors to commit to a process that enables them 
to act to alleviate poverty. Not being part of these processes is considered one of the reasons 
people are suffering. Realities in Malawi and Zambia reveal some contradictions to the sense 
of equality portrayed by the PRSP, most specifically with the planning process taking a top-
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down model within the same context where governments are assumed to lead national planning 
processes (cf. Cornwall and Brock, 2005). Interviews with governments revealed numerous 
interpretations of the concept of ‘taking the lead’. For Malawi, participation meant locally-
driven planning processes which however must, at all costs, comply with a pre-set results-
oriented logical framework in the PRSP (cf. OECD, 2006). In Zambia though, it meant a 
national plan that was collectively decided by stakeholders in the country. The notion of 
stakeholder will be discussed later in this chapter.  
 
Attempts to portray a bottom-up approach within this top-down model are betrayed by a 
national planning process which is initiated and managed from central government level down 
to the grassroots. During interviews, none of the governments indicated that villagers could 
initiate the process up to central government level, implicitly suggesting that decision-making 
that obtained at village level was either not recognised as important or had no room in the 
existing policy spaces yet it was what represented individuals and the villagers as a collective 
in their local contexts (cf. Jenning, 2000). Such contradictions ruled out possibilities of an 
empowered villager who could effectively lead their own life and influence national decisions 
because national planning processes in Malawi and Zambia were centralised. 
 
 NGOs working in Kamaila and Mwandama followed a similar pattern. Their goals and 
objectives of plans were developed from their head offices both nationally and abroad. They 
were only sent to the villages to fill in the forms with what is perceived to be the villagers’ 
views, making them appear as community-led. Village consultation by project officers was used 
to secure consensus and entice the villagers to commit to being part of the project activities. 
The bottom-up model has its discursive role here, but it was subordinate to an agenda that 
promoted the opposite order or model. In both countries, the role of the bottom-up model was 
limited to facilitating the flow of villagers’ views towards NGO head office, instead of 
establishing ways of understanding the local realities in the villages as a basis for response, and 
their participation in a grounded model. Application of the bottom-up is mainly for political 
correctness, rather than an honest response to poverty according to local needs. In a way, the 
PRSP discourse finds itself in a paradox, where it seeks to empower the same villagers which 
it acknowledges as empowered to take the lead in their lives. For instance, the fact that 
structures and spaces in which the bottom-up occurs are controlled by the centre is not 
acknowledged or highlighted as contradictory and problematic.  
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The dominant top-down model in both governments and NGOs in Malawi and Zambia was 
weakened by a lack of coordinated policy processes at each level and varied interests among 
each group of actors. For example, on the one hand, the NGOs ran different processes, 
individually, and parallel to those of the local governments in pursuit of their interests. On the 
other, the private sector had a completely different process catering for the interests of its private 
sector constituencies 46F47 and did not see reason to dialogue with the grassroots. The three streams 
of policy formulation confluenced at national level in the national consultative forums, the 
dynamics of which will be addressed later. What needs to be noted here is that these policy 
spaces, which served to facilitate the villagers’ participation by contributing their local 
perspectives, were either limited, remote from the policy spaces where decisions were made, or 
were inundated by interests of other policy streams holding decision-making powers. 
Paradoxically, the PRSP neglects these power imbalances, preferring to portray the entire 
process as part of its broad-based consensual stakeholder engagement, leading to national 
ownership of plans and policies. Critical theory scholars such as Cox (1981) view this troubling 
co-option of the subaltern into a centralised system, in this case, where the villagers’ 
participation was limited to expressing views without guarantee of those views influencing 
decisions.  
 
Both Ministries of planning confirmed that national priorities were decided and finalised at 
national level and largely determined by available resources and funders, a situation which 
further compromised the bottom-up model and ran the risk of simplifying an otherwise complex 
pattern of spaces, actors and power from the village, middle-level, and up to the national level. 
It also throws into disarray the widely-held theorisation by scholars such as Chambers (1997), 
Habermas (1989) and others that to be included is to be empowered to participate and reduce 
poverty. Whereas it can be the basis of involvement, findings from both countries suggest 
participation in institutional structures and poverty activities created a wrong impression of 
inclusiveness which was in contrast to realities in the villages. Existing capabilities and 
opportunities in the villages were not acknowledged as a foundation for understanding and 
addressing poverty. In a context where poverty is understood from one external perspective, its 
                                                 
47 The private sector in Zambia mainly consists of mining, farming, manufacturing, energy, telecommunication, 
tourism and small-scale business. In Malawi, the private sector is mainly comprised of agriculture, manufacturing, 
construction, and wholesale and retail trade.  In each of these countries each sector is represented by an interest 
group such as farmer’s union, business forum, or mining associations, which together with others, form of the 
national consultative forums.  
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knowledge also becomes centralised. For example, by including the excluded villagers in 
project activities, NGO projects create the impression that power operates in a neutral model 
when the reality is that such projects usher individuals into their structures of control, thereby 
disempowering individuals (cf. Fraser, 1992). Chapter 6 noted that being a member state comes 
with ceding power to the UN system as global authority. Contradictions between how 
empowerment is implied in the PRSP and MDGs versus where power lies in reality, challenge 
the notion of sovereignty of states and their ability to take the lead in national issues, given that 
Malawi and Zambia’s national planning was clearly scheduled along and dictated by the UN 
system.  
 
Diminished power on the part of the Malawi and Zambia governments might seem to be an 
outcome of voluntary occasion when states join the UN system, purportedly at their own choice. 
However, whether a state is a member or not, the global norms imposed by the UN system do 
not provide room for these choices. Donor funds and private sector investment were cited earlier 
as the main driver of compliance to these norms and priorities to national plans. Added to that, 
the fear of sanction for non-compliance was palpable in Malawi and Zambia, that is, if they 
chose to divert from the global norms, the consequences were cited as frightfully catastrophic. 
Thus, centralisation of funding in the hands of a few and its critical role as a key determinant 
in the discourse of poverty alleviation aided the nullification of alternative ideas to the extent 
of threatening national sovereignty. The main actors on poverty reduction are socially 
constructed as the only solution to reduce poverty, when in fact, this is another discourse that 
creates and perpetuates socio-economic inequalities and imbalances. For example, in Malawi, 
the Ministry of Planning cited an example where a donor who had funding for HIV and AIDS 
programmes instructed the government to adjust its national plan and ensure all poverty 
reduction projects fell under the HIV and AIDS programme in order to access the available 
funding. Funding sustains the erroneous ideology that it is linked to alleviating poverty. In 
reality, it is a form of social control relying on social facets such as knowledge and capacity to 
define vulnerabilities and justify the intervention of neoliberal ideas.   
 
In addition, the autonomy of both Malawi and Zambia as sovereign states and the villagers as 
individuals was reduced by monetization and internationalization of lifestyles especially when 
analysed from Cox’s (1981, 1987) argument that effective participation must derive from the 
government’s and the villagers’ ability to govern their lifestyles by making rational, informed 
and un-coerced decisions to fulfil their aspirations. The Coxian Critical Theory, somewhat 
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concurs with Foucault in viewing the purported inclusion of the villagers into projects as a 
smoke-screen and failure or unwillingness to view villagers’ lives as a self-constituting living 
project. There was consensus among all respondents, except for the villagers, that poverty is 
caused by lack of autonomy due to their deficit in decision-making power, which culminates in 
inequality, denial of choices and opportunities and exclusion of individuals from decision-
making processes. 
 
As part of addressing these shortfalls, governments and NGOs prioritised empowerment, 
inclusion and participation which were glorified as the most effective way of addressing 
poverty. Incontrovertibly, the top-down model drives the capacity building agenda to empower 
the disempowered by transferring knowledge and development projects to them. Three 
knowledge transfer streams were observed. The first one was a government-led process where 
views were collected from and disseminated to the villagers. In this case, the government acted 
as a channel of information. The second was the supervisory role of the UN system to 
governments which included providing financial support and technical expertise to the 
ministries of planning to align national plans to global norms. And the third stream included 
donors, NGOs, private sector and civil society organisations and others. As will be discussed 
later, these policy positions are contradicted by the villagers because the perceived lack of 
autonomy had not taken into account local power dynamics and neglected the primary fact that 
the villagers too exercise agency. They are not passive participants in their lives. Most of the 
assessments, as noted by the villagers, were cursory, with the majority being done through 
village meetings, inter-personal and mass media, consultations and community planning 
sessions. These platforms, on the surface, served as open spaces for discussions and decision-
making – in short, a free market of ideas. The sub-text however, revealed such platforms to be 
where NGO goals were presented and villagers taught how to implement them, at least 
according to Mwandama Villagers. Such platforms were controlled, moderated and facilitated 
by project officers. Interaction was described, most ironically, by a project officer as “dialogue” 
because the villagers’ function was to be “neutral and only there to listen” (face to face 
interview on 2 May 2015). Consultation was discursively used to portray the process as villager-
driven to which villagers had to consent and commit.  
 
At national level, the PRSP participatory framework is also a decisive tool that determines how 
resources needed to implement governments’ programmes are to be allocated.  A national 
poverty reduction plan that meets all the PRSP requirements secures donor funding and attracts 
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foreign private sector investment. For example, Zambia received debt relief for being “on track” 
by adhering to similar World Bank and IMF prescriptions, while Malawi continued to receive 
donor funding for the same reasons. However, in both cases, allocation of funds to projects was 
also decided by the donors who determined priorities. The power of money was deciding 
priorities and preventing the grassroots from influencing such decisions. The manifestation of 
money and its links to interests, typifies the cunning nature of neoliberalism in pursuit of a 
universalized lifestyle. For example, in Malawi, the national consultation forum, a platform that 
decided national planning priorities, was organized by the UN system on behalf of the 
government, and in Zambia it was hosted by the government but funded by donors or the private 
sector. These actors held interests and the concurrency of their generosity towards the 
consultative forum pointed to a deliberate agenda to preserve their interests.   
 
7.4 Local spaces, external knowledge and rules 
The discussion above unpacked the intricacies of a participatory model within different policy 
formulation spaces in Malawi and Zambia. It highlighted the contradictions between what was 
said by the different respondents and what actually subsisted. For instance, bottom-up was in 
practice top-down and villagers’ views, as in the Habermasian (1989) public sphere model, 
were not part of decision-making and they did not have meaningful access to decision-making 
spaces. Yet “deliberations” of this sort were couched as consensus and its net effect was the 
homogenisation of citizens and their poverty through well designed hegemony. Difference or 
alternative ideas were either stigmatised or discounted, with the villagers losing their power and 
beginning to rely on NGOs. Governments, too, lost their power to donors and the UN system, 
curtailing their ability to empower their citizens.  
 
In the following section, I zoom into how knowledge, power and rules control the cross-section 
of policy spaces ranging from open, legislative, public and NGO, from village level to central 
government. We noted earlier that when villagers’ views were collected and fed into the goals 
and objectives of national or NGO plans, the ideas transmitted back to the villagers were 
presumed to represent the villagers’ development needs. This characterises what are commonly 
described as community-owned or driven projects. Indeed, the paradox between the village-led 
plans highlights a theoretical confusion arising from merging a top-down with a horizontal 
model of fostering participation. The assumption drawn here was that through their views, the 
villagers could only be more effective when their views are taken and refined by NGOs through 
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their project officers to change their behaviour in order to alleviate their poverty. Thus, in the 
absence of the listening NGO project officers, the same villagers were unable to generate and 
communicate the same ideas among themselves on how to address their problems. The net 
effect of such discursive context was the establishment of an imaginary democratic space where 
participation was seen as occurring organically, without being induced by an ideology.  
 
The presence of multiple spaces within the government structures, NGOs and civil society in 
Malawi and Zambia epitomises the above but also appeals to and legitimizes the democratic 
participatory approach to poverty reduction. Such legitimisation is deliberately established to 
mobilise individuals while creating a sense of openness from which consensus is derived and 
used to neutralize the presence of power and interests in different policy spaces. It is in Foucault 
(1977) where the notion of consensus is linked to the generalisation and homogenisation of the 
subaltern such as Malawian and Zambian citizens, and the channel through which global 
knowledge and power are exerted and reinforced in a continuum. For example, Malawi 
national’s budget has been 40 to 70 per cent donor funded over the past decade (Ware, 2014, 
p.117), and Zambia has succumbed to the whims of the donors after debt relief by World Bank 
and IMF.  
 
The link between consensus and participation is problematic, especially in a context where the 
dominant hegemony is the source of the problem. Chapter 6 discussed the collocation of the 
notion of consensus and the ‘We’ discourse. A similar scenario plays out where the ‘We’ 
discourse is a rallying point to position the UN system, donors and private sector as the only 
credible voices and effective actors on matters related to poverty reduction. These global actors 
are speaking subjects occupying a position of power which sustains social imbalances and 
subjects and converts villagers into listening objects. For instance, the participatory model the 
UN system advocates does not seek to understand the villagers’ way of life as a basis for 
intervention, but rather prefers a co-option model which, as discussed earlier, constrains their 
ability to autonomously exercise their agency. Findings from the two villages, also revealed a 
close link between knowledge, power and capital interests hidden behind the ‘We’ discourse.   
 
In this study, the footprint of external knowledge and rules was found to be present and 
dominant in the hierarchy of all public policy spaces (including village committees, regional 
governments, parliament and the national executive). All these policy spaces, even though 
nationally constituted by local laws, were largely governed by western knowledge, rules and 
162 
 
norms. As discussed earlier in this chapter, Malawi and Zambia adopted “constitutional 
democracies” upon which the notion of democratic participation is founded. However, these 
are borrowed concepts from the West for which both countries still rely on western 
consultancies for their effective implementation and interpretation. Interviews with government 
representatives demonstrated that both Malawi and Zambia still depend on western funding 
which brings with it, its own knowledge in the course of implementing projects through the 
participatory democratic processes. The most important aspect to highlight here is that the 
constitutional democracy model these two countries adopted suffers similar limitations as the 
Habermasian (1989) public sphere theory where participation is limited to citizen dialogue with 
governance structures and not the practical utilisation of available resources and opportunities.  
 
While the participatory democracy model speaks of the rights of citizens as a basic unit of 
society, the interests of the grassroots, especially the villagers are constrained by the centralised 
focus on the private sector to secure economic growth. Once the economic growth model 
assumes centre stage within global priorities, it follows that national priorities which must 
mirror the global, also neglect or even violate the participatory spaces for the grassroots in the 
interests of pursuing economic growth. Neoliberalism is known for securing the interests of the 
multinational corporations rather than of citizens of the developing countries (Cox, 1981). 
Discrimination of the views of the grassroots on the basis of lacking economic power is not 
highlighted but hidden behind the narratives of capacity building and social movements. It was 
noted in Chapter 6, how Zambia sacrificed its own assessment of development priorities over 
the concern to comply with PRSP and some of the World Bank and IMF prescriptions to secure 
economic growth.  
 
It is vital to highlight here that the adoption of constitutional democracies in Malawi and 
Zambia, as stated before, occurred at the same time as the proliferation of the NGOs and civil 
society in Southern Africa and that of neoliberalism in the late 1990s. The liberal democracy 
governance model, now promoted through the UN system, is rooted in neoliberalism, which 
was a response to the need to reinvigorate changes in the global market economy by promoting 
free market and managerial efficiency (Osborbone and Gaebler, 1992).  While both 
neoliberalism and civil society rose from the west with the goal of limiting government 
involvement in private sector activities, some authors such as Osborbone and Gaebler (1992) 
have argued that the global recession of the 1980s and the crisis of governance in Africa 
justified the support for civil society to push the neoliberal agenda in Sub-Saharan Africa. For 
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example, the World Bank report of 1989 argues that the poverty problem in Africa is due to 
lack of governance, hence the need for governance reforms by financially and politically 
empowering civil society in Southern Africa as the countervailing power to their governments.  
However, a closer analysis indicates a lack of relationship between neoliberalism, civil society 
and poverty reduction. In fact, there is yet a country to develop through aid and reforms. Instead, 
neoliberalism has successfully prioritised economic efficiency over democracy by using civil 
society under the guise of participatory democracy to check on underperforming or rather non-
complying governments.  
 
The UN system has embraced the neoliberal values and champions the advancement of 
economic growth led by western multinational corporations as the only panacea to poverty 
reduction. This supervision of developing states, including Malawi and Zambia, by the UN 
system, has consequences on the extent to which national and local policy-makers, including 
the villagers, can effectively participate and influence decisions. For example, the Malawi 
Constitution (1995) gives power to civil society organisations47F48 more than government 
ministries and structures because it was born out of civil society advocacy (James, 2005). 
Citizen participation is subsumed under the civil society umbrella as prescribed by the PRSP 
and yet the civil society organisations48F49 in Malawi survive on donor funding. In Zambia, civil 
society is increasingly active on issues related to governance, democracy, human rights and the 
rule of law and was instrumental during the drafting of the current draft constitution (Abdi, et 
al, 2010). Their active involvement in political issues stems from what they perceive to be 
inequality and poverty and their work is driven by major donors’ funding policies (Fiedler-
Corradi, 2003).  
 
Where local spaces are occupied by external knowledge and where their governing principles 
are outsourced, achieving a locally-driven and participatory poverty reduction planning 
becomes an impossible venture unless the villagers’ freedom can be guaranteed and secured to 
enable them to self-determine (cf. Strange, 1988). The presence of external knowledge and 
power in what should be local spaces for decision-making, has the net effect of diminishing 
                                                 
48 Prior to 1994, Malawi did not have a significant civil society. However, the Catholic Church is credited for spearheading 
efforts to expose the ills of President Banda’s regime in a pastoral letter, in 1992. That formed the beginning of serious civil 
society organisations and led to the development of a participatory process of developing a new Constitution, guaranteeing the 
basic rights of all Malawians, including multi-party elections in 1994. (James,2005) 
49 Civil society includes, among others, non-governmental organisations (NGOs), professional associations, community-based 
organisations (CBOs), philanthropic and religious organisations and both society’s élite and ordinary individuals. 
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Malawi and Zambia governments’ ability to empower their citizens to self-determine. This is 
because, spaces available to citizens (such as governments, parliaments and the executives), are 
drained of their decision-making power as they are reduced to facilitating the planning process 
and adoption of external ideas. Governments too, take the less assuming role of arranging 
planning processes, thereby severely diminishing their power and sovereign role.  
  
In a situation where the governments of Malawi and Zambia who, according to the UN system 
have a responsibility to empower their citizens are also weakened, the villagers’ views, which 
are solicited at the early stages of the planning process, are rendered less or not influential to 
the national priorities. This is not for their lack of relevance but rather lack of political and 
financial power to back them in the mainstream. For example, due to the global attention 
brought by the MVPs, Malawi is among the 50 countries selected to undertake inclusive 
consultations leading to the Post 2015 Development Agenda – a new global policy framework 
to succeed the MDGs. According to the UN system, by having gone through several 
participatory and consultation processes, it is assumed that voices of ordinary people in the 
villages have influenced the global planning policy space for Post- 2015 Sustainable 
Development Goals. There are also some examples cited by the governments, NGOs and the 
villagers to illustrate and justify these forms of dialogic participation between the villagers and 
the government even though realities show that donors who financed the projects, remain 
influential to the outcome.  
 
The connection between power, actor interests and national priorities converges in the national 
consultation forum. Consultative forums are important policy and planning spaces in Malawi 
and Zambia. They form a confluence of all policy streams and hold decision-making powers 
on national priorities, notwithstanding that they are not statutory in nature. Consultative forums 
and the actors who occupy them wield more power than parliament and the executive. The 
concept of consultative forum is an offshoot of the UN system and the PRSP policy 
recommendation to establish a national broad-based planning platform to purportedly represent 
the interests of all stakeholders. Governments, as explained before, are rendered less powerful, 
despite being considered an equal stakeholder, just like the private sector, civil society, donors 
and the NGOs.  
 
Nonetheless, both  governments in this study boasted well organised consultative forums whose 
function was to “refine the views collected from all stakeholders at all stages in deciding 
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national priorities” (email interview on 29 April 2015) according to one respondent from the 
Ministry of Planning in Zambia. Since these were organised by the government, I viewed them 
in this study as public and open policy spaces. However, the realities from both countries were 
rather conflicting. Actors who occupied consultation forums assumed a different label, that of 
stakeholders because they exercised agency and exerted influence on priorities. According to 
the ministries, a stakeholder is an actor who wields power, represents a constituency of other 
actors and holds interests ranging from ideas, funding for the projects and economic interests. 
Whereas a participant and stakeholder may seem the same, in reality these terms represent 
different levels of power to influence. A participant can be anyone from a villager to one who 
decides on priorities and commits resources to ideas. On the other hand, a stakeholder, who 
often represents a foreign or private sector constituency, possesses the power to influence 
decisions.  
 
Ministries of planning attested that stakeholders exercised agency both on their interests and 
those of the country. The word ‘stake’ is used to refer to interests from which power to exercise 
agency is derived. Stakeholders come in two categories – economic growth and social actors. 
Growth actors in Zambia included the private sector, charged with economic growth for which 
the government owed a conducive economic environment to address poverty. On the other 
hand, social actors included donors, development and humanitarian agencies, and civil society 
actors who were catered for through various legislative provisions (mainly human rights) to 
preserve their operational space. Within such a discursive context of the consultative forum, the 
villagers’ views disappear from the table as discussions are dominated by the growth and social 
actors both of whom are foreigners even though the ministries of planning insisted that the 
villagers’ views were subsumed in government submissions, civil society and the NGOs. 
Despite their insistence, they were unable to give examples in their national plans of 
contributions by the grassroots. 
 
Once again, the power of money is observed to conspire with ideas in local and national policy 
spaces at the expense of villagers. The presence of several policy spaces in Malawi and Zambia 
count for nothing if such spaces are pre-occupied by stakeholders’ interests. Ultimately, what 
was presented from the consultative forum to parliament for approval and endorsement by the 
executive was not a reflection of the villagers’ interests but those of the stakeholders. Even if 
the Kamaila and the Mwandama Villagers were to climb up to the top of the planning ladder, 
the structure is incapable of empowering them because the villagers are not the primary target 
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for influencing such decisions. The UN system confirmed its epistemological supervisory role 
on Malawi and Zambia regarding national planning and the ministries of planning corroborated 
this by highlighting how it was a requirement for them to adhere to the UN system’s planning 
schedule. This scenario was apparent in Zambia. Their national planning process was dictated 
by the United Nations Development Framework (UNDAF), a strategic programme framework 
that lays out the collective response to national development priorities after every five years, 
and ensures alignment of national plans to the MDGs framework. The UNDAF mirrors the 
PRSP principles of national ownership, inclusiveness, involvement of specialized and non-
resident agencies, national partners, and mutual accountability for development results. Within 
the UNDAF framework, the capacity development and results-based management are presented 
as key drivers of transformation. Transformation here represents change from a situation seen 
as poverty to one seen as development, therefore change is the main determinant. The 
implications of these knowledge frames are discussed in Chapter 6. However, it is also vital to 
highlight once again, that the power of money enables the reproduction of a discourse and the 
cognitive process that manufactures consent, judging by how proud the Zambian government 
was of how its Sixth National Development Plan (SNDP) 2011–2015 effectively aligned with 
the MDGs without addressing the notion of a people-driven national plan.  
 
The discussion above has demonstrated two important factors. Firstly, that availability of 
participatory policy spaces does not always imply the ability of citizens to influence policies. 
Secondly, that external political and financial power controlled nationally and locally available 
spaces in Malawi and Zambia. I deduce from these two factors that different modes of 
participation such as expression of views and consultations are just mere smokescreens that 
conceal the neoliberal agenda that hides behind poverty reduction. External power and 
knowledge have subtly usurped the sovereignty of Malawi and Zambia governmental spaces. 
Brock et al. (2004) have highlighted that power and knowledge can remotely exercise agency 
in local spaces through conditionalities that impose rules and knowledge at the service of 
dominant interests. Narratives about community-driven planning, villager-owned plans, 
evidence-based planning, village empowerment, participatory approach to development 
planning, including the dominant bottom-up approach are caught up in the service of dominant 
ideas of the elites. The current conditions of available participatory policy spaces in Malawi 
and Zambia are therefore deeply flawed and encapsulate unsustainable assumptions about the 
level of influence the government and the villagers have on national and local policies.  
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7.5 Participation: A tale of two worlds 
Participation is a central feature at both national level planning and project implementation 
since the MDGs were adopted in the year 2000. Inspired by the desire to reduce what is 
perceived as human suffering, Malawi and Zambia joined the world in the fight against poverty. 
Although there is a global convergence of efforts to address global poverty, this chapter has 
revealed that the global worldview of poverty and that of the villagers are worlds apart. One 
worldview is propagated by the development institutions, while the other, the villagers’, has 
remained unexplored and therefore not understood. With these differences, the UN system and 
its MDGs continue to promote the global mode of lifestyles neglecting that each set of a group 
of people has its own ways of viewing lifestyles. The two worlds remain apart from even though 
they co-exist because Malawi and Zambia are members of the global consensus and 
commitment reached in New York when adopting the MDGs.  It was  noted earlier how global 
commitment comes with the saturation of local and national policy spaces with external 
knowledge and rules, and at village level by externally-funded project activities as part of the 
capacity building drive.  
 
The link between the development projects, material supply and interests, especially in 
Mwandama Village, has been extensively covered, echoing Cox’s argument in Leysens, (2008, 
p.3) that hegemony is established by a combination of “ideas, institutions and material 
capabilities” to foster transformation towards a certain social order in the villages through 
consensus and coercion. For instance, consultation by the NGOs as a form of participation was 
used to legitimize consensus and village ownership of project plans to which each individual 
was indirectly coerced to participate as a matter of public good. But both were cosmetically 
designed to legitimise the narratives of ‘giving people a voice’ as they sought to co-opt the 
villagers into the NGOs’ project activities. Discussions with NGOs highlighted how poverty 
reduction plans that were assumed to be community-driven were sent back to the villagers as 
reflecting their voices, at the same time, prescribing the NGOs’ courses of participatory actions 
to achieve goals. Dressed up as innocent and neutral charities, these NGOs were found to be 
fronting power and hegemonic interests, concurrently preventing the villagers from exploring 
their identities and capabilities.  
 
By creating opportunities and spaces for villagers to express their views on project activities, 
the NGOs and government were using that as evidence of participation, even though it 
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undermined the same views by excluding the local capabilities of villagers to utilise available 
opportunities. Views on lifestyles cannot be limited to the spoken words but a whole way of 
life of a people. Power exposes the villagers, through communication, to adopt and adjust to 
the neoliberal intentions articulated via the MDGs and NGO project activities. The UN 
communication strategy, as shall be illustrated in the next chapter, aims to infuse neoliberal 
ideas into local practices in order to convert the villagers into consumers of its culture, 
regardless of its unsustainability and inconsistence with local context. For development 
institutions, poverty reduction is a laboratory-like, time-bound budgeted project cycle. For the 
villagers, however, well-being is an inductive process characterised by lived-experiences and 
its evaluation, capabilities and self-worthiness and decision-making comprise an organically 
ongoing process influenced by individual aspirations, reactions and context.  
 
Similarly, the disparities highlighted earlier stand between the power of communication to 
influence social participation in the villages, largely because the communication messages seek 
to re-create a new identity of the villagers from the conventional development discourse, 
without giving due consideration to the historical and cultural factors that shape their current 
identities. Redefining identities via communication by adjusting the villagers’ social cognitions 
is described by Cleaver in Cooke and Kothari (2001) as a tyranny that regulates the villagers’ 
relationship with the NGOs and governments, the outcome of which subsumes the individual 
villager’s capacities and characteristics into a homogeneous NGO-induced identity.  
 
Responses from both villages suggest that the effects of communication messages were largely 
limited to raising awareness on issues related to poverty, but did not influence behaviour.  
Individuals in Kamaila Village, for example, were clear that their mode of life-style and how 
they performed it was shaped by their historical and current context from which they drew their 
social relevance, thus contradicting the capacity building narrative in the MDGs. These 
attributes were enacted at both individual and village level, including how they maintained a 
dual identity. Of these two identities, the first is fixed, giving permanence to the social identity, 
with the fluid and functional identity enabling flexibility to cope and adjust to new situations. 
In the context of Kamaila, the fixed identity facilitated participation in the NGO projects, with 
the fluid identity remaining grounded in the villagers’ traditional and cultural ways of life. In 
fact, local culture remained a key referent in the way they interpreted their lifestyle. Their silent 
resistance was evidenced by the existence of parallel community structures – ones that engaged 
with the NGO on development projects and another which was charged with the traditional and 
169 
 
spiritual administration of the village.  Each of these held and exercised different levels of 
power and influence. In Kamaila Village for instance, the community comprised of a mixed 
group of different profiles of villagers, interfaced with the NGO but had limited or no decision-
making powers. Before decisions were made, the community group consulted with the 
traditional community leadership who approved or rejected ideas. Villagers participated in the 
NGO projects at the instruction of their community leadership, instead of the benefits of the 
projects.  Once the village leadership endorsed an idea, the community group then allocated 
duties to villagers on behalf of the villager leadership and not the NGO. 
 
There are several reasons why the villagers chose to adapt the dual system of administration. 
These two structures enabled them to live ‘double’ lives and enact the two identities – one for 
the NGOs’ project activities and another to maintain their own lifestyles. According to their 
responses, they considered the NGO as a visiting entity whose projects did not require full time 
attention. For example: 
We have seen so many NGOs come and go and therefore we consider NGOs as visitors 
who come and go. Sometimes, when NGOs come to introduce their projects, we get 
involved for the sake of making them and their project officers happy (FGD, Villager in 
Kamaila on 2 May April 2015)  
 
They confessed that in some instances, they dramatized involvement, participation and signs of 
empowerment, to appease the NGOs and donors without really changing how they perceived 
their lives. Being part of a project did not always imply belief and commitment to it. The main 
reason for this was that, as one informant commented,  
Some NGOs came and tried to change our ways of life and some requested us to dump 
some of our traditional practices which we find useful to our lives and those NGOs 
disappeared once funding dried up (FGD, Villager in Kamaila on 2 May 2015) 
 
Secondly, there had always been fear of the outsiders who were suspected of having bad 
intentions to either change the villagers’ ways of life or to displace them from their current 
location. Therefore, staying away somewhat empowered the village leadership to deny any form 
of consultation by the NGO, in case decisions go against their wishes. In a way, they were 
practicing empowerment as the ability of individual villagers to exercise who they wanted to 
be without being constrained or defined by others (Freire, 1970).  
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In addition, there was an attempt to keep the village free of external cultural contamination. 
This point calls for further analysis, especially on the social intricacies of how identities are 
ascribed, acquired and maintained vis-à-vis social communication and its relationship with 
external discourses such as the MDGs. Within development projects in Kamaila and 
Mwandama Villages, communication was positioned to achieve identity transformation in order 
for villagers to participate in project activities. Chapter 6 offered a detailed analysis of the 
counterfactual construction of the poverty identity.  
 
The existence of parallel structures raises a curious question about the degree to which the 
media messages have an influence on decisions and behaviour change. As noted in Kamaila 
Village, the effect of media messages was limited to raising awareness on project ideas. Even 
where personal communication was involved, the villagers needed to consult in their own 
spaces before decisions were made.  The position of the Kamaila Villager conforms to Freire’s 
(1978) postulation that in order for empowered participation to be achieved reasonably, a 
communicative interaction must be dialogic, balanced and not bullying. It must be in a context 
where each individual enjoys the ability to be different and such cannot exist in a context where 
consensus on lifestyle is obligatory. It is the same view projected in Habermas (1984, p.392) 
who conceives of an environment where each member of the village has an equal opportunity 
“to participate, to criticize, to express personal aims and attitudes, and to perform these acts 
without regard to power or ideology.” It was clear in Kamaila Village, that individual and 
village identities were habitually operationalized to preserve identities while consciously 
accommodating an external poverty identity. This demonstrates that villagers were both locally 
empowered, conscious of themselves and their aspiration unaided by external influence. 
 
Focusing on identities to understand participation is vital in this context. Firstly, at village level, 
it was noted that identities were closely linked to how each villager viewed their lifestyle and 
its practical operationalization as theorised in Goffman (1969). For example, village farmers in 
Mwandama viewed their world in terms of crop farming and animal husbandry, while 
drummers in Kamaila Village planned their lives based on available opportunities to play 
drums. Secondly and linked to the above, identity construction ascribes the participatory 
function in achieving such a way of life. However, we learn from Cox (1979) that identity is 
the characterization of the self, which in itself is an effect of participatory performance. To 
establish their identities, individual villagers, in the absence of NGO projects were able to 
express their identities verbally and in practice through certain characteristics such as their day-
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to-day roles including their traditional roles. In Mwandama Village, for example, a farm 
labourer in the MVP project during the day was also a drummer in their own time and wished 
to be known more by what they did during their own time than what they were forced to do 
during the day in project activities. The point to be emphasized here is that although both were 
forms of participation, one was an expression of being part of an NGO project and the other, 
action characterized by commitment and personal choice in fulfilling a self-identity. Given a 
choice, the villagers would rather choose the former than the latter because the latter is forced 
and former represents the choice of what they wanted to be.  
  
Lived-experiences and a myriad of other traditional modes of knowledge sources were cited by 
both villagers. Several forms of cultural practices play the role of producing and reproducing 
local discourses, including the transfer of traditional knowledge from one generation to another 
in a process that facilitates identity construction and reconstruction, to replicate their parents’ 
or ancestors’ cultural values. Though identities, especially in Kamaila Village, had shifted from 
those of older generations over time, the villagers severally referenced their connection to their 
ancestors and spiritual mediums. There was a strong belief that their identities and how they 
were operationalised were partly inherited from their ancestors. Their sense of traditional 
identity had remained somewhat intact and fixed because, “life is lived to fulfil the wishes of 
ancestors by retaining and maintaining the family or clan identity” (FGD, Kamaila Village, 2 
May 2015). 
 
The above view was further confirmed in Kamaila Village, especially how villagers had resisted 
pressure to be co-opted by conventional development.  
 
Due to short-term nature of projects, we find it relevant to maintain our culture, while 
at the same time ensuring that we are part of development projects in our area (FGD, 
Kamaila Village, 2 May 2015). 
 
However, their present lifestyles showed a mixture of both traditional and modern day life styles 
in their attempt to maintain collective and individual differences in pursuing self-worth and 
individual pride. This concept is explained in Foucault (1995). The social position of the 
villagers in relation to the NGOs’ mode of lifestyle, stood in contrast to other types of identities 
such as traditional and other social affiliations. Similarly in Mwandama Village, it was noted 
that identities were partly produced from local cultural contexts but dialogically disseminated 
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through various traditional forms – from folktales, traditional ceremonies, initiations and inter-
personal communication between children and their parents, close relatives, including 
community elders. Assessing these claims against realities, we can only draw on the 
assumptions that when the villagers were exposed to another mode of life, they assumed a new 
functional identity, but had not necessarily altered their identity.  
 
From the Kamaila villgers’ response it can be inferred that participation was ideally an outcome 
of voluntary consciousness to one’s aspirations and a response realities. It is the combination 
of their aspirations and response to the realities which then constitute individual identity and 
shape their behaviour adjusting to their needs and their context. Individuals are their centres 
and spaces and not centred by externally or institutionally constructed spaces or ideas. In the 
process they enable their own agency, organically (Burkey, 1993).  In this view, participation 
is the exercise of the individuals’ capabilities and capacities in meeting their needs and 
aspirations.  
 
The limited effects of communication messages on participation however, cannot be 
generalised, as it can be inferred from both villages that their identities had shifted with 
changing contexts. To understand why participation is not a commitment, it was noted that the 
villagers’ way of viewing life, albeit varying in degrees, was a complex combination of 
traditional and NGO orientation, but traditional forms of transmission are predominantly part 
of the psychodynamic processes where knowledge is inter-generationally transferred to humans 
from birth as they form their identities. In Kamaila, it was noted that identity construction was 
an ongoing process which began at birth, through to adulthood. Traditional forms of social 
orientation are at the centre stage in inculcating an individual and a communal identity, both of 
which are grounded on shared cultural values system (cf. Giddens, 1984).  Constructing an 
identity and deconstructing or changing behaviour, is thus not a short or five-term project-based 
communication for development venture as stated in the MDGs and other project activities.  
 
Mwandama offers a different scenario. Due to the massive capital investment in the project 
activities and the use of communication by the MVP project, the villagers there had adopted 
modern farming methods which had led to deforestation as the villagers cleared land for 
farming, triggering soil erosion in the process. This factor, combined with an erratic rainfall 
pattern and privatisation of water sources by commercial farmers meant that the newly adopted 
way of life had become unsustainable and therefore rendered the villagers incapable of 
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depending on their traditional ways of life, resulting in high vulnerabilities such as food 
shortages. The MVP justified its relevance and introduction of the farming project based on 
food shortages. As this chapter has demonstrated elsewhere, identity is the main source of pride, 
power and knowledge. Yet in the Mwandama Village, identity had been turned into the target 
of communication for social change, to transform it into a preferred being that behaved in line 
with the expectations of the MDGs. Participation by the villagers became the projection of this 
new way of life from which the individual villagers conveyed and performed tasks in project 
activities, with a strong belief that this way of life was the only way to a better life.  
 
As highlighted in Chapter 2, the Mwandama project, which is divided into two five-year phases 
employed a broad package of activities which included farming inputs, school construction, 
HIV prevention, donor funding, infra-structure development and others, with the goal of 
breaking the poverty cycle, consequently mapping the way forward for sustainable 
development. Prior to and during the Millennium Project, the villagers provided employment 
for $0.50 to the surrounding commercial tobacco farmers, who were linked to the private sector 
in Malawi and abroad. The project was built on several assumptions, the first being that the 
people of Mwandama were poor and food insecure because they were unable to produce enough 
cereal to sustain their consumption needs, despite cereal never being part of their staple food. 
Lack of these newly-introduced cereals or the low harvest thereof signified poverty and not 
their capabilities or available opportunities. The NGO in Mwandama Village thus credited itself 
with increasing the average maize yield five-fold, from 0.8 to 4.5 tons per hectare, which 
resulted in a surplus and a contract to supply maize to an international organisation, thus earning 
its members more than $50, 000 in 2010 for the entire village. A co-relationship of narratives 
is sequenced to form a discourse, where increased production is linked to increased economic 
income, which is attracting other economic services such as banking facilities for the villagers 
to save their earnings, as well as a telecommunications system.  For the Mwandama Villagers, 
these factors have configured their lives, even though not completely. For instance, lack of food 
due to erratic rains, is used to justify the MVP in which villagers must participate to avert 
hunger.  
 
7.6 Conclusion 
Unlike Chapter 6, this chapter has drawn from views of various respondents in Malawi and 
Zambia and some theoretical frameworks highlighting how the notion of participation within 
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policy spaces and project activities were either stifled or controlled by the presence of power. 
External power and knowledge dominated policy spaces available to Malawians and Zambians 
from village up to national level. Behind these are capital interests pursuing the neoliberal 
agenda. The role of communication for development, contrary to the calls by the UNSG to 
empower citizens to participate, had the opposite effect of weakening the villagers and co-
opting them into the streams of neoliberal power. Traditional tools of communication which 
had been part of the villagers’ cultural ecosystem had been heavily institutionalised and taken 
away from the grassroots.  
 
The convergence of interests, power and knowledge, sustained the neoliberal discourse partly 
by attempting to marginalize, stigmatize and exclude the villagers’ ways of life, seen as 
unwanted and therefore barriers to development. This proved to be a means by which hegemony 
was placing the villagers into the perpetual fear of a constructed poverty and ushering them into 
the preferred way of life (Foucault, 1995). Fear was induced through communication to re-
orient the villagers into dumping their own culture and adopting the neoliberal culture despite 
the fact that it was not sustainable within their local context as both the knowledge and material 
requirements were external. These observations in this chapter, reinforce the widely held view 
that developing societies are under an information hegemony siege from the western countries 
(UNESCO, 1980). Although this may be true, it is not adequate to explain poverty in African 
countries, given Foucault’s (2003) assertion that power is everywhere. As this chapter observed, 
the villagers were not passive receivers of media messages. This scenario is echoed by Cox 
(1996; p.377) who sees opportunities of transforming power “relations both within and among 
nations in the direction of greater social equity.” Kamaila Villagers illustrated the strength of 
subaltern power, even under a dominant discourse, despite the lack of direct co-relation between 
communication, participation and behaviour change, even when awareness was high. This 
proved that it is the symbiotic relationship between identity, behaviours and the context that are 
more at play in deciding participation than media effects.  The next chapter presents the findings 
on the extent to which communication for development had been used in the two villages under 
study.  
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Chapter Eight: Knowledge and Communication for Development 
 
8.1 Introduction 
What emerges from Chapter 6 and 7 so far is that the flow of knowledge is skewed from the 
centre to the periphery – from the knowledgeable West to the unknowledgeable, 
underdeveloped South. In providing the historical accounts of the MDGs, Chapter 6 observed 
and concluded that the knowledge and ideas that frame both the MDGs and the UN 
Communication for Strategy are influenced by western ideas, most specifically aimed at 
changing the minds of the South, without the appetite to explore existing knowledge and ways 
of life of villagers. On one hand, Chapter 7 demonstrated that the discourses and narratives that 
frame these policy documents transcend actor interests and also bring ideas, knowledge and 
norms that structure the operation of local policies, including undermining the individual 
villagers’ ability to make decisions relevant to their local context. This construction of policy 
spaces shapes how participation, exchange of ideas and communication for development are 
interpreted at policy formulation and implementation levels.  
 
This chapter continues with the same line of inquiry of examining the implications of the UN 
Communication for Development strategy on participation in the villages vis-à-vis how the 
villagers derived and perceived their participation in addressing their problems.  It has three 
objectives. The first is to argue that the Kamaila and Mwandama Villages exist in a specific 
social context, shaped by both local and national communicative and knowledge ecologies from 
which they derive their view of life (cf. Altheide, 1995).  The second objective is to highlight 
that the villagers in Kamaila and Mwandama, contrary to the widely held view that they are 
poor due to lack of knowledge, are not unthinking as they possess valuable knowledge from 
their local context and lived experiences. Thirdly, and building on the two objectives, is a 
critical look at the extent to which the UN Communication for Development strategy is used to 
implement the MDG-related projects. Findings in this chapter demonstrate that, firstly, there 
are two sets of poverty knowledge, namely the village and the conventional knowledge. 
Secondly, that communication for development in MDG project-related activities has used both 
modern and local modes of social communication to privilege conventional development 
knowledge over local knowledge. In concluding, this chapter argues that portraying poverty in 
the villages as a consequence of a certain type of knowledge, the UN system through the MDGs 
is complicit with neoliberalism whose aim is to absorb the local into the global.  But as Chapter 
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7 has demonstrated already, local knowledge is stronger because of its grounding in local 
culture and context.  
 
8.2 Communicative ecologies of the villages 
Before addressing the extent to which communication for development was used in the Kamaila 
and Mwandama Villages to implement MDG project activities, it is imperative to take a closer 
look at the communicative ecologies of these two villages. This is necessary in order to establish 
an understanding of the villagers themselves and how they saw themselves (cf. Altheide, 1995). 
According to Tacchi, Slater and Hearn (2003), a communicative ecology is a particular social 
system comprising many, but different people, social communicative activities and social 
relationships. In its traditional use and in this study, the communicative ecology approach is 
relevant to understanding the villagers within their social context and forms of media as well 
as communication tools available to them (cf. Foth, 2003). Slater and Hearn (2003) and Foth 
(2003) define communicative ecologies in terms of three layers – technological (radio, 
television, ICTs), social (community meetings, informal networks, institutions) and discursive 
(themes or content of both mediated and unmediated communication). 
 
While this approach is relevant to this study, I choose to provide a critical look at the 
communication ecologies in the different strata in which these manifest. In taking this approach, 
my baseline assumption is that prior to making contact with the outside world which consists 
of the NGO project activities, the villagers in Mwandama and Kamaila had other ways or factors 
shaping how they viewed themselves. They were not blank slates but a people with a thriving 
social ecology. Thus, communication for development must not be concerned with the 
effectiveness of message delivery in fostering the desired participation, but rather, seek to 
establish and understand local views on poverty as a starting point. During focus group 
discussions in Kamaila and Mwandama, the villagers commented that their identities and 
worldview were derived from and grounded in their history. Common forms of media and social 
communication tools used in these villages can be categorised into five groups.     
 
8.2.1 Internal communicative ecologies 
The first category of communicative ecologies in both Kamaila and Mwandama is at inter-
personal level, where communication is characterised by direct, face-to-face dialogue, often 
between and among families and people of different age groups, classes and genders. The 
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villagers’ social system can be characterised as an outcome of a shared value system, using 
traditionally constructed cultural signifiers to make sense of their lives (cf. Katz and Rice, 
2002). These shared values and the villagers’ ability to use shared cultural signifiers such as a 
common language, in both cases the Chewa language, enabled them to interact as their primary 
means of social communication, thus confirming Katz and Aakhus’s (2002) postulation on 
social communication. Instances of such social communication included the way fathers in 
Kamaila taught their sons to carve wood or how aunties and uncles taught teenagers how to be 
adults as they prepared to undergo initiation49F50 in Mwandama Village. These sessions were 
either pre-planned or ad hoc. 
  
The second category is the family level, in most cases the extended family, where the elderly 
used folklore, didactic traditional riddles (similar to quizzes), songs and dance to transfer family 
values and traditional knowledge to the young generation. These sessions, in most cases carried 
out in the evening or at night after the day’s work, were led by grandparents in transmitting 
knowledge to their grandchildren. These also included interpreting the meanings of natural 
phenomena. For instance, in Kamaila Village, an overabundance of natural fruit signified 
possibilities of a drought, thus families are required to harvest and dry the fruit for storage and 
for future use. In Mwandama Village, the interpretation differed but animals, creatures and 
vegetation were highlighted as vital indicators of climatic forecast. This is because, as stated in 
sections of this study, riverine and forestry ecosystems were the main drivers of their livelihood 
system.  
 
The third category is the traditional media and village communicative systems. These include 
traditional village gatherings common in both villages. They were either organised by the 
village heads, requested by the spiritual media or other ceremonies. The format of these 
platforms differed. In most cases, proceedings were led by the village leadership, who occupy 
traditional positions to interpret spiritual messages (policies) to the villagers. The process of 
communication was top-down, from either the spiritual media via village leaders, as in Katz 
and Lazarsfeld’s (1955) two-step, to the villagers segmented by song, drums, dance and 
sermons. Each of these has an important role in imparting knowledge, reinforcing old values 
and disseminating new messages. Therefore, culture in the villages was dynamic, but driven by 
local communication ecologies.  
                                                 
50 Though not any more common in the Mwandama Village, girls used to undergo chinamwali, a traditional girl initiation 
process. 
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These first three categories are internal communicative ecologies, which are major parts of the 
cultural production and reproduction system in these villages. Each category has a different 
audience and content. The knowledge transfer at each stage gives the audience a heterogeneous 
identity at individual, family and village level. They are interwoven by shared cultural values, 
which in turn make the villages different from others, even though they belong to the same 
nation in a geographical format, and not cultural tradition (cf. Tacchi, Slater and Hearn, 2003; 
Seton-Watson (1977). The forms of discourse that emerge out of these are discussed later in 
this chapter,  but what is vital to highlight here is that this shared cultural ecosystem is part of 
the villagers’ ways to self-organize and take action through communicative processes on issues 
of mutual interest such as well-being, livelihood, entertainment and others. The main defining 
factor in these villages was not the physical place or their geographical location. Villagers’ 
identities were defined by shared cultural traditions and sociological conditions which 
Anderson (2006) describes as imagined communities. 
 
8.2.2 External communicative ecologies 
The other two categories are external communicative ecologies. The first is a communicative 
system whose discourse is conveyed by NGOs. It is the same discourse which makes the 
villagers – through how their poverty is assessed by the global policies – to be viewed as poor 
within an imagined global village. The concept of imagined communities is described in 
Anderson (2006) as culturally shared values. According to Allison (2007), the nation-state or 
global village, are powerful metaphors, empowering the NGOs to apply a universal knowledge 
on poverty through various forms of communication. Thus, the poverty, which the NGOs seek 
to address, arises from the imagined poverty. The role of the NGO in defining poverty on behalf 
of the grassroots is discussed extensively in this study.  
 
Conventional mass media, as the fifth category is an important player in the communicative 
ecologies of Malawi and Zambia in general, and at village level in particular. This especially 
relates to radio because of its ability to overcome literacy and language barriers. While media 
freedom and access to information have been largely determined by who is in power, the 
democratization of Malawi has seen the rise of several radio stations including state, private 
and community-owned broadcasters and print outlets across parts of the country. The most 
accessible media, with the most reach remains radio, as literacy in English remains low. The 
Daily Times and The Nation are the only two daily newspapers in Malawi. Both are in English 
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and privately owned. Five50F51 privately owned weeklies were in circulation at the time of 
conducting this study. The growth of newspapers was constrained by viability problems, low 
literacy rates and distribution challenges (Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, 2012). There was only one 
national television station and three religious television stations, which had very small reach. 
 
Unlike print and television, radio continued to be the most popular means of transmitting and 
accessing information in Malawi because of its wide reach and availability in local languages. 
By June 2013, there were at least 34 radio stations operational in Malawi, 14 of which were 
community radio stations, eight privately owned and commercial in content51F52. This was a 
significant improvement, considering that Malawi did not have any private radio stations in 
1998. The Malawi Broadcasting Corporation’s (MBC) Radio 1 and 2, were owned by the state 
and had the capacity to reach 95 per cent of the country if all transmitters and equipment were 
working (ibid). The government of Malawi and numerous NGOs relied on state-owned MBC 
Radio 1 whose content targeted rural communities such as the Mwandama Villagers on 
development issues such as poverty, agriculture, education, and health among other matters. 
Chanco Radio Station, attached to the Chancellor University in Zomba, covered the district and 
its peripheries, including the Mwandama Village. Due to these radio stations’ proximity to the 
Millennium Project offices and the village, they were able to collect information (in the form 
of interviews) from the project officers and the villagers for broadcast. This formed part of 
participatory communication techniques that supported agricultural efforts using local 
languages and voices to communicate directly with the villagers.  
 
Despite a diminishing media space, several information sources existed in Zambia, including 
print, radio and television, and growing internet and mobile phone platforms (Friedrich-Ebert-
Stiftung, 2013). There were four major daily newspapers in Zambia, which included The Times 
of Zambia, the Daily Mail, (both government-owned), the Post and the Daily Nation (both 
privately owned). The government also ran the Zambia News and Information Services agency 
(ZANIS). These papers published in English and their distribution was limited to urban centres, 
not reaching villages such as Kamaila despite its proximity to Lusaka city. Occasionally, 
however, old newspapers found their way to the village through visitors or NGO staff.  There 
were also six national weeklies, two of which were state-owned (Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, 
                                                 
51 The Business Times (English), Malawi News and Weekend Nation (both in English and Chichewa) the 
fortnightly Fuko Nation (Chichewa and Tumbuka), The Weekend Nation (English). 
52 http://www.osisa.org/other/malawi/malawi-media-landscape (accessed on 9 September 2015) 
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2013). Compared to Malawi, Zambia had made some strides in opening up space for television. 
In addition to the two state-owned Zambia National Broadcasting Corporation (ZNBC) 
television stations (ZNBC 1 and ZNBC 2), there were other privately owned stations such as 
Muvi TV, North West TV, TBN, Prime TV, and Copperbelt TV.  Television viewership was 
limited by transmission challenges and limited television-set ownership as only an estimated 
45 percent of Zambian families owned a television set (Ibid). 
 
According to the Africa Media Barometer report for 2013, an estimated 60 radio stations were 
operating in Zambia, reaching every corner of the country. Of these, only three national stations 
were state-owned with the rest being private and community radio stations. Radio is the most 
accessible medium, with an estimated 87 percent of families in the country owning at least a 
radio receiver. Rural radio coverage accounts for 84 percent. At least 16 community radio 
stations were available in Zambia, covering specific geographical locations (Friedrich-Ebert-
Stiftung, 2013). Most radio stations had embraced technology and social media to significantly 
improve their reach. Mobile phones, aided by solar energy, had also increased radio 
listenership. The government-owned broadcaster, the ZNBC ran three radio stations. ZNBC 
Radio 2 and 4 broadcast in English while Radio 1 which was multi-lingual focused more on 
developmental issues using different tools such as drama, comedy and songs. This was the radio 
station the Kamaila Villagers highlighted as their source of information on the MDGs and other 
developmental issues.  
 
The goal of setting out these communicative ecologies is to situate the assumption that the ideas 
and messages emerging from them somewhat shape the characteristics of the individual 
villagers in line with both local realities and the global village’s imagined commune norms. 
They create power relations, worldviews and courses of action. While there is no consensus on 
media effects on behaviour change, there is yet to be more focus on how different types of 
communicative ecologies project individual behaviour in relation to being a member of a group 
or imagined community. Such studies would take away the burden on media effects by 
providing insights into the communicative ecology of different categories.  
 
8.3 Understanding poverty from the village knowledge ecology 
This section focuses on how and why villagers became aware of their own ways of life. To 
respond to these questions, this study draws from theories of knowing (cf. Longhofer, 
Winchester and Baiocchi, (2012), informed by Foucault’s (1991) ideas on knowledge and its 
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omnipresence. The goal is to establish if the external knowledge provided by the NGOs and the 
media on poverty, was the only relevant form of such knowledge. Also highlighted in this 
section, is the contrast between local and global knowledge, setting the scene for explaining 
why the notion of poverty is evasive unless local views are understood and appreciated.  
 
Connelly and Clandinin’s (1990) methodology approach enables this study to apply interpretive 
inquiry from the villagers’ narration of their lived-lives in order to unpack factors that shaped 
or have shaped the ways of lives outside the NGO projects in Kamaila and Mwandama. 
Narrative inquiry was relevant to capture local wisdom. It is an approach to understanding 
identity construction by placing the villagers in a position of power as the speaking subject, 
storytelling and autonomous entities. As a starting assumption, the villagers have led storied 
lives. In the same vein, the stories characterize the history and experiences of the villagers in 
relation to their ways of life. This enables a juxtaposition of their lived lives against that of the 
MDGs project activities. Thus, I use narrative as both a phenomenon and a method of inquiry. 
The next section presents findings of the narrative analysis from the villagers.       
  
8.3.1 The Kamaila Village 
According to the people of Kamaila, the village started in 1963 and had since grown to over 
4,000 people, spanning almost four kilometres long. The village started from a group of 
charcoal burners who traded with surrounding commercial farmers and farm workers. As 
commercial farming activity diminished, the villagers diversified their means of livelihood. 
Livelihood, poverty or wellbeing in Kamaila Village was characterised by different dimensions 
remote from that promoted by the MDGs. Self-worth emerged as one of the key factors defining 
their view of life and well-being, where each individual villager evaluated their worth in relation 
to their capabilities, available opportunities and aspirations.  
 
What makes us happy is our ability to do what we aspire, to meet our daily needs and 
achieving our long term goals. For a young man growing up in the village, they need to 
be known beyond just their names or those of their families by what value they add to 
themselves and the village…, a young man who goes to town and bring sugar is equally 
acceptable as one who goes to hunt or who beats the drums during ceremonies. They 
are all important differently (FGD, Villager in Kamaila Village on 2 May 2015). 
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The link between the concept of self-worth and power is captured by Foucault (1980, p.30) who 
describes it as a manifestation of power when it “reaches into the very grain of individuals, 
touches their bodies and inserts itself into their actions and attitudes, their discourses, learning 
processes and everyday lives.”  
 
The villagers’ responses to how they understood their lives suggests that the Kamaila Villagers 
derived their knowledge of well-being from the individual villager’s own value to oneself 
before being part of the village. This confirm Foucault’s idea (2003) that the same power from 
which knowledge is derived decides the ‘truth’. Here we see that the notion of truth on well-
being is not limited to the manifestation of social collective but rather, individual judgement 
based on their assessment of life against their benchmark of self-worth. This perspective 
discounts the notion in the UN Communication strategy that when knowledge is transmitted to 
the villagers, it changes their minds and regulates their behaviour. The approach here should be 
to explore and promote existing potential than change people. In addition, the way well-being 
is conceived, indicates a relocation of power from structures of governance to an individual’s 
aspirations on achieving self-worth. Therefore, the effect of the power wielded in the NGOs 
knowledge, transmitted through different communication channels and tools, is reduced, unless 
it speaks to the contextual factors that determine the individual’s aspired self-worth (cf. 
Foucault 1977). Attempts by individual villagers to maintain and retain individual autonomy 
echoes Freire’s (1970) referencing of the non-formal activity occurring outside the dominant 
domain as a form of cultural action. In the case of Kamaila Village, it was noted that the cultural 
action occurred in their traditional, individual and community spaces, outside the NGO and 
government structures. Here we see a curious scenario where the individual, by being able to 
make decisions and choices, becomes an empowered actor in their own policy space to make 
decisions and choices, unconstrained by institutional pre-set norms. But the same individual is 
also part of other village spaces whose role is complementary to others. Aspiring to achieve 
self-worth was the vehicle by which individuals coped and resisted the social contradictions of 
the NGO discourse which threatened to subordinate them. 
 
The second factor that came out of the interviews with the villagers in Kamaila was that self-
worth is not an outcome of comparison as in Luke (1974) and Abrahamson, (2004) or ‘othering’ 
as in Miller (2008) but a construction of each individual’s unique value. These social attributes 
had constructed the different individual’s social identities in relation to their different 
environmental and cultural contexts in the village. The way villagers enacted their identities is 
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considered in this study as a form of locally informed and driven participation which defined 
each individual villagers’ social status in their social order. In addition, these attributes gave 
them gratification and value in the lives they cherished. Skill sets that arose from these and 
other modes of participation were unsurprisingly not taken into account by the NGOs’ water 
project because its goals were linked to those of the UN MDGs and backed donor interests and 
not of those of the villagers. Some of the individual activities highlighted during the discussions 
included gardening, farming, hunting, weaving, carving, playing drums and other musical 
instruments at traditional ceremonies, singing, constructing and thatching houses and trading in 
charcoal. 
  
The third factor is that self-worth was referenced severally, including the skills mentioned 
above. For example, if an individual villager were talented in playing certain musical 
instruments relevant to the traditional ways of life, it would earn them both respect, social status 
and a living, and therefore a source of gratification and contentment. Responses from the 
Kamaila Villagers suggested a strong link between gratification and well-being. Unlike with 
the MDGs, gratification and well-being did not derive their meanings only from the presence 
of material resources or funding, but locally available resources and capabilities. In fact poverty, 
in the villagers’ view, was when they were displaced from their cultural and epistemological 
context, including out of their available resources and capabilities which largely shaped their 
ability to achieve self-worth. For example, playing traditional instrument was linked to several 
modes of gratification such as appeasing the ancestors, social appreciation, income earning, and 
promoting a dialogic transfer of knowledge.  
 
The fourth factor that emerged from the responses in Kamaila Village is that gratification and 
well-being form the symbiotic cultural ecosystem of their lifestyle largely shaped by their lived 
experience and self-worth. Foucault’s postulation of power perhaps pertains to this level of 
individual autonomy, which in the case of the Kamaila Villagers operated as part of social and 
individual relations to their contexts, factors which together shaped behaviour. It was the same 
individual autonomy which facilitated the reproduction of the villagers’ identities and culture 
through coping with and adjusting to changes (cf. Foucault 1977). Several theories of 
participation, especially that of Chambers (1997), have advocated using power as a course of 
empowering the poor, but that has resulted in diminishing the  power of the excluded as well as 
stigmatising the same individual should they seek to remain autonomous. Through the NGO 
project, power insidiously attempted to regulate and re-channel the villagers’ capabilities into 
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a certain mode of production and consumption. A key question arises on why skills found in 
Kamaila Village, big money earners in the western world, were only used by the NGO for social 
change to achieve their goals instead of converting them into high profit-making ventures.   
 
8.3.2 The Mwandama Village 
The Mwandama Village, located in the southern region of Malawi’s Zomba district, has become 
a recent laboratory for testing external development ideas (cf. Chapter 2). The villagers too had 
either become willing customers or just opted to be converted objects of laboratory testing. 
When asked about the history of their own ways of living, they were quick to divert the 
discussion to demonstrate how knowledgeable they were about poverty, the importance of the 
NGO projects in their lives and the meaning of the MDGs. It took a lot of effort to convince 
them that knowing their history was also an important part of this study. It was later established 
that they used every opportunity to convince every visitor to the project site of the need to 
continue funding the project.   
 
However, their narrations of their history and cultural practices revealed that part of what 
remained of their lifestyles was drawn from their past and ancestors, most specifically, on how 
decision-making was based on each individual’s ability to comprehend their local complexities. 
Contrary to what is proposed in the MDGs, the spaces where decisions were made at both 
individual and village level were influenced by personal factors and priorities. Narrative 
accounts provided by the villagers suggested that the people of Mwandama were, even though 
now mixed due to migration to the area, largely of Yao52F53 tribal origins who had occupied the 
land since the 19the century. They are descendants of traders who plied trade between the inland 
tribes and the Arabs on the east coast. They have remained a fragmented group along kinship 
but under the same traditional chieftainship since the beginning of the 20th century. Their 
livelihoods and lifestyles were shaped by their proximity to the Lake Chilwa basin, where 
villages have historically practiced fishing and a riverine livelihood system. In addition, the 
Miombo woodlands have until recently, been part of their other major source of livelihoods53F54.  
 
                                                 
53 The Yao people are one of the major Bantu ethnic and linguistic groups, largely occupying the southern part of the Lake 
Malawi. (Mitchell, J. C.,1971) 
54 Miombo woodlands were the source of their basic needs such as shelter, tools and free fuel. Small forest animals, birds, 
insects, fruits, tubers, medicines and fodder for livestock were among the by-products that were harvested from the woodlands.  
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A long time ago, we used to survive on fishing for both family consumption and trading 
with other tribes. During times of drought, our forefathers traded fish with cereals from 
other areas. Fish were dried, stored and sold” (FGD, Villager in Mwandana, 28 April).  
 
Responses from the villagers suggest that colonisation introduced cash trade, and the villagers 
started earning money from selling fish, firewood, charcoal, poles, thatch and fruits. This is 
corroborated by Sheldon (2013) who states that during the colonial period, indigenous people 
lost power and economic autonomy with the arrival of cash crops, farming and villagers’ 
exclusion from economic activities. 
  
One of the villagers commented, “During the same days, our ancestors traded sorghum from 
Mozambique areas.” (FGD, Mwandama Village 28 April 2015). Maize farming, such as the 
one under the MVP, was a new concept introduced after colonialism and had largely altered 
both the environment and livelihood culture. The villagers were forced to clear the woodlands 
to pave way for farming activities as part of embracing a new way of life. Even though 
dependence on the woodlands had changed over time, it remained one of the main sources of 
subsistence livelihood, especially its ability to retain healthy water catchments for Lake Chilwa 
while reducing soil erosion, an important factor in farming (cf. Mvula, P. et al., 2014).       
 
Colonisation and modernisation have also meant a loss of access to natural resources, ownership 
of land and water resources as they were commercialised by foreign farmers (Sheldon, 2013). 
Villagers were pushed to the fringes of water sources and fertile land and their only involvement 
was limited to providing labour to the farmers. At the time of data gathering for this study, they 
partly relied on markets for consumption as they had abandoned their non-monetary traditional 
ways and sources of livelihood. One villager complained that even though they were also 
farmers under the MVP project, they were not allowed to use the nearby water source owned 
by a local commercial farmer because it had been privatised. Overall, riverine and forestry were 
the main sources of livelihood for the Mwandama Villagers (cf. Mvula, P. et al., 2014).   
   
Cox’s (1981) argument that neoliberal ideas carry with them interest and have a target audience 
resonates with life in Mwandama Village. To understand the relationship between the 
Mwandama Village and the Millennium project, Giddens’ (1984) sociological view on the 
complex relationship between human agency and social structures becomes handy. Giddens 
examines the institutionalization of power relations, especially that which arises from external 
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structures but impacts social action on local culture in producing and reproducing hegemony 
and sustaining inequality. While the Millennium Village project is seen from both humanitarian 
and poverty reduction angles, as a project affiliated to different national and global structures, 
it represents invisible power. Giddens (1984) is by no means discounting the existence of power 
and structures; he views participation as a self-reproducing phenomenon which is an outcome 
of recursion. This is acknowledging that the Mwandama Villagers did not come into existence 
because of the presence of the MVP but had persistently re-created their way of life by 
expressing themselves individually and collectively.  
 
Notwithstanding these contradictions, the MVP, heralded as a typical operationalization of the 
MDGs, represents the global status quo which caters, in this case, for the interests of the 
commercial farmers, the suppliers of agricultural inputs and those who purchase the harvests, 
with the villagers being part of the processing system. We learn from the above that the 
Mwandama Villagers, before colonization and modernization, possessed their own power 
which derived from their local realities and cultural context and these determined their 
lifestyles. The prevailing order in Mwandama contradicted and undermined this historical 
configuration as the source of rules had shifted to the hands of the surrounding commercial 
farmers, the NGO operating in the area, and somewhat weakly, the government. These rules 
were not only designed to control and manage the now privately owned natural resources but 
were also used to suppress both the alternative order and pre-existing ways of lifestyles of the 
Mwandama people (cf. Neufeld, 1995). While I acknowledge that culture by nature is dynamic 
and so is lifestyle, I argue that this historical context, if not contained by external impositions 
of new ways of life, should therefore be the baseline for understanding and responding to 
poverty in Mwandama Village.  
 
The power of the Millennium Project Alliance over the villagers placed it in control to serve 
the interests of varied actors. Cox (1983) describes this social re-organisation within the context 
of hegemony, and how it thrives on social ordering in which the NGO in Mwandama, in this 
instance, was acting as the provider of material and knowledge, and villagers reduced to passive 
receivers of both. With this social order in place, the villagers became less empowered but 
dependently acquired access to the NGO spaces where they could express their views. This is 
not to suggest, however, that achievement of autonomy or participation is an outcome of, or a 
credible basis for changing behaviours. Notwithstanding, the wealth of history of capacities and 
capabilities, explained earlier, was discarded as the  MVP proceeded to build a discourse based 
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on farming,  justified by a purported lack of food, due to drought, erratic rains, lack of 
knowledge and technology. This ignored the fact that the current mode of farming was in the 
first place not the villagers’ source of livelihood and that the current situation was a deliberate 
ploy to give prominence to the NGO’s ideas.   
 
The new way of life introduced into the village by the MVP gradually replaced the villagers’ 
local lifestyle in the name of poverty reduction through a constant supply of ideas that sustained 
neoliberalism. Western ideas were deployed to control the villagers’ minds through indirect 
coercion which when analysed from a social transformation theory that dominates the UN 
Communicating for Development strategy suggests persuasion predicated on fear of either 
sanction or suffering on the part of the villagers (cf. van Dijk, 1987). The function of 
communication for development, especially how it exercises power becomes critical in 
understanding how privileging neoliberal domination is not only limiting possibilities for 
empowerment but also dis-empowers the villagers by ignoring and annihilating local 
knowledge and local modes of lifestyle. As noted in some sections of this chapter, the objective 
of communication in promoting participation in the NGO projects was firstly to reduce the 
social distance by bringing the villagers closer to NGO projects. In addition, the aim was to 
subject them to a linear process where the villagers shift from the perceived state of under-
development to development through observable social and economic development indicators 
defined by the NGOs (cf. Servaes and Malikhao, 2004). It is against this rise of neoliberal 
hegemony that Freire's (1970) ideas on critical literacy and the emancipatory discussion become 
handy. Freire conceived of democratic participation, dialogical approach and a cultural circle 
emerging from a discourse context that allows for critical analysis as passage to empowerment 
and participation in decisions that affect individuals and the grassroots. The starting point for 
his proposal is a context pre-configured by an uncontaminated historical background and a 
cultural circle from which a local vision is constructed. This constructed vision is internally 
conceived by villagers both individually and collectively, and characterized by equal dialogue, 
participation and a critical understanding of both the inner world, and outside world in which 
the process of progress occurs.  
 
Freire’s (1970) ideas are pertinent given that the poverty being addressed by the NGO in 
Mwandama was not informed by the realities of the villagers but constructed by the discourse 
of conventional development. Inputs and knowledge were both outsourced and their availability 
was dependent on external funding and global factors. While arguing that the poverty reduction 
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model in the MDG is controlled by neoliberal interests may appear conspiratorial, we note, for 
example, that the World Disaster Report (2011) cautions that, “the last half of the 20th century 
saw an ever-increasing economic concentration of power among the providers of agro-chem-
icals, machinery, seed and other inputs to farmers…. Today, four or five grain traders control 
most of the grain moving around the world” (IFRC54F55, 2011. p.29). Similarly, the seed sector in 
Malawi is controlled by multinational seed companies linked to the four or five mentioned 
above (ISSD, 2012)55F56.  Local seed varieties and other local farming inputs are no longer in use 
as a result.  
Traditionally, we used to store and recycle seed for the next planting season. After every 
harvest we would select the best seed for use the next planting season. We learnt from 
our forefathers how to store seed and create manure for the next season. But with the 
arrival of western seed, we all have been forced to dump our traditional methods of 
producing and storing seed. This means that every season we need to have cash to buy 
new seed or wait for NGOs to give us seed (FGD, Mwandama headman, 28 April 2015).  
 
The village headman’s concern with the imminent end of funding was testimony to the above 
but also exemplified how unsustainable external projects that are not grounded on local 
capacities can be.  
 
Again, the power of money proved to be a deciding factor on poverty reduction priorities and 
their implementation. Adopting such priorities come at the cost of ceding power to those who 
fund the projects, thus exposing the Mwandama Villagers to the whims of commercial actors’ 
profit making interests. These actors, who form part of the private sector network, control the 
funding system, the supply of inputs, and the marketing of the produce. This construction of 
narratives into a poverty reduction discourse follows similar actor segmentation. The donor 
provides the funding; the NGO implements the idea whose inputs are sourced from the private 
sector, part of whom are the buyers of the output. Both the villagers and the government are 
reduced to bystanders or passive beneficiaries in the vicious cycle of capital interests. The 
connection between charity and economic interests, especially on food production, was 
discussed earlier in this chapter. This is by no means reducing the relevance of materialism in 
uplifting the lives of the people of Mwandama, but it amplifies Cox’s (1983) argument that 
capital interests embedded within MDGs ideas have the net effect of corrupting and weakening 
                                                 
55 International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent societies 
56 ISSD Briefing Note – September 2012: Malawi Seed Sector Assessment 
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the Mwandama Villagers (cf. Leysens, 2008). One example is how the villagers had lost access 
to their natural resources and had also been absorbed into ideological machinery that made them 
perpetually rely on NGO project activities. Without taking into account the relevance of local 
capabilities as a basis for understanding poverty, the MDGs’ veracity is highly questionable 
especially in an environment where the presence of its project activities deepened 
vulnerabilities and widened inequalities.  
 
8.4 Communication for development 
Communication between individual villagers and the NGOs, including the governments, is not 
just a matter of employing the media to promote dialogue on eradicating poverty, but to promote 
ideas. The model adopted by the NGOs in the two villages of this study, is that of transmitting 
ideas based on Rogers’ (1962) top-down diffusion model purportedly to enlightening the 
unenlightened villagers. While there was a wide range of communication strategies used in the 
two villages from face-to-face, traditional and interpersonal media, mass media, village 
meetings and social mobilisation tools in both villages to convey development messages and to 
encourage participation, involvement and behaviour change, I will only focus on those that I 
found to be commonly used in these villages. For example, there were a lot of printed materials 
used or distributed even though there were concerns that due to varying literacy levels in these 
villages, their effectiveness was limited. As a result, the NGOs preferred the inter-personal and 
edutainment approach. It must also be emphasised that NGOs see the function of 
communication as two-fold, i.e., to collect views for planning and to transmit ideas. These 
together combine into project communication activities as part of conveying ‘what the people 
have said’ even though it is evident that ideas being transmitted promote goals that have been 
set elsewhere. The next section discusses findings on the extent to which the UN 
Communication for Development strategy had been applied in the villages to promote the MDG 
poverty reduction projects.  
 
This study refers to communication for development as any form of communication processes, 
techniques and media that facilitate transmission or exchange of ideas between and among 
different actors. Therefore, the study views communication as a process of diffusing, acquiring, 
exchanging and disseminating ideas. The UNSG’s recommendation, which is the rationale of 
this study, insinuates that the effect of communication transcends transmission of ideas to 
include their practical operationalisation. We can draw from the UNSG’s line of thinking, that 
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knowledge is thus seen as the basis of decision-making, human action and social 
transformation. It is thus not the process of transmitting, but the ideas being transmitted taking 
into account Cox’s (1979, 1980) caution on the link between knowledge and interests. However, 
as this study will reveal, the theorisation in the UNSG’s recommendations oversimplifies the 
power of knowledge, because whereas knowledge can be seen as the power over things, its 
communication is not always a basis of action. Not all knowledge leads to action, nor is it 
always agenda-based. Participation, too, was elusive, ranging from benefitting from project 
activities, sitting in meetings, expressing views, involvement of the villagers in decision-
making and activities aimed at improving their lives. The underlying assumption in these 
interpretations is that when the villagers were part of project activities or their own activities, 
their lives would improve.  
 
Notwithstanding the above arguments, views from the media, NGOs and the governments 
reveal a significant investment and a strong belief in communication as a useful tool in creating 
awareness on development projects. Communication is seen as a means to lure or directly force 
the villagers into some form of engagement with NGOs and national authorities and to mobilize 
them to get involved in project activities. Traditional and modern forms of media converged to 
summon the villagers in Kamaila and Mwandama to be part of development projects. The use 
of communication tools by both the NGOs and the media, hinges on two aspects. First, to 
persuade the villages to participate and adopt new ways of life and second, to instil fear of 
sanctions or suffering that may arise as a result of not partaking in the proposed lifestyle (cf. 
van Dijk, 1987). Under this arrangement, the notion of consensus deliberately blurs the presence 
of coercive power and ideology, by using community consultation and involvement to create 
an impression of locally-owned project plans to which the villagers must commit. In a similar 
vein, the project plans are used as sources of ideas and knowledge, which inform 
communication strategies under the guise that they are villagers’ ideas and the NGOs are doing 
them a favour by transferring their knowledge back to the villagers.  
 
8.4.1 Communication, culture and social transformation 
Contrary to general practice where communication for development is characterised by 
billboards and printed material, the most preferred media in the two village were inter-personal 
and group communications. Traditional occasions have always been special moments to share 
knowledge and exchange ideas in both villages. They are characterised by traditional dances, 
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depending on who has requested them. In Mwandama, because of its link to the MVP project 
framework, the Millennium Promise NGO-initiated events tended to be a mixture of local and 
outsourced performances. But those by the villagers were often done at the request of the village 
spirit mediums or the headmen at funerals, rites of passage initiations, and the appointment of 
new community leadership. In Kamaila, traditional ceremonies carried different weights of 
importance depending on who had requested them. Where traditional leadership requested 
them, they were linked to the traditional and spiritual ceremonies, often to reproduce and 
reinforce vital elements of cultural order and to provide fixed reference points as part of 
villagers’ cultural reproduction. Each villager bore a different identity, but they were also united 
by shared cultural values from which they claimed their ‘original identities’, contrasting them 
with those introduced by modernisation.  
 
Social communication had historically existed to serve intra-communal dialogue to enrich 
villagers’ lives, and its function had not been limited to a tool of cultural change but a vital tool 
of cultural dynamism and evolution. In each of the communication activities mentioned by the 
villagers, they were clear about the goals they sought to achieve, but largely to facilitate intra-
dialogue and raise awareness among fellow villagers regarding their situation and 
responsibilities. This was contrary to how communication was suggested by the UNSG and 
how it had been used in the two villages. For the NGOs, media and the government, the 
communication for development was largely focused on changing minds and behaviour and not 
enriching what already existed. This is not an attempt to underestimate or neglect the presence 
of local power dynamics and their relevance to the role of communication within the villages’ 
traditional set up by focusing only on the NGOs, donor, UN system, and neoliberal power on 
the villages (cf. Berger, 1985). It was noted earlier that the villagers’ power was located within 
their traditional structure, cultural domain and spiritual realms. Within that domain, it can be 
deduced that the function of communication at that level was to convey messages and to sustain 
local discourse production and reproduction, while facilitating the pursuance of their 
aspirations.  
 
The prevailing dissonances on the way communication for development is used by the NGOs 
and how it is understood by villagers mirrors the knowledge disparities discussed earlier in this 
chapter. There is specific reason for the NGO to adopt these methods apart from literacy 
exercise. Infusing external knowledge into local channels is seen as an effective method of 
transmission as it enlists all social gate keeper to rally behind the messages. In the case of the 
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MDGs, communication was used to fast-track NGO projects, ignoring the fact that 
communication was part of the villagers’ cultural ecosystem. The media and the NGOs 
severally referenced tapping into local culture in order to influence the desired change and as 
an effective means to fast-track development. Village elders and their spiritual media, were thus 
replaced as sources of knowledge and points of reference by project officers and the NGOs. 
The use of communication in such a context was no longer for the villagers’ cultural good but 
for NGO’s interests. The latter becomes the only voice of reason and the source of “truth”, 
which relying on and manipulating the villagers’ traditional communication tools to achieve its 
goal of eradicating the villagers’ cultural practices to achieve poverty reduction (cf. Fraser, 
1992).  
 
Mass media and inter-personal communication are the most commonly used channels to spread 
NGO ideas and encourage villagers to be part of their project activities (cf. Servaes and 
Malikhao, 2004). The villagers are the target audience for an agenda change, in a classical 
Lasswell (1948) model of ‘Who says What through Which channel to Whom with What effect’. 
For example, the content of communication messages such as radio programmes, inter-personal 
communication activities, including traditional media placed huge emphasis on the benefits of 
being part of development projects – in a way marketing the MDGs ideas, at the same time, 
downplaying the existing modes of village lifestyles.  The use of local drama in both radio 
programming and live performance in Kamaila Village, for instance, drew from externally 
developed scripts, which promoted the NGO’s water project as the trigger to achieving the 
MDGs, as well as to eradicate diseases. Similarly, drama performances which had been used 
by the villagers for their entertainment and pedagogical value to maintain certain cultural 
practices and behaviours were incorporated to advance the NGO’s goals. The traditionally 
didactic possibilities in drama were being exploited, not for the villagers’ purposes, from which 
theatre for development drew its relevance. Use of traditional media by the NGO in Kamaila 
Village was influenced by the recognition of the power of influence in traditional media on the 
villagers.   
 
For the villagers, and due to their strong belief in their traditional system, any message that 
comes via a traditional medium carries a lot of weight. These messages are transmitted or 
exchanged via several traditional media such as songs, ceremonies, dance drums, drama and 
others, which were historically used for pedagogical purposes. These specifically target the 
young generation as part of preserving their cultural values. Apart from the spiritual attachment, 
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one of the reasons cited by the villagers is that they learnt better through a combination of 
artistic representations, graphical texts, audio and visual aids, familiar to their cultural context. 
But ancestors were their main point of reference. It was on account of the villagers’ strong 
attachment to their traditional systems of communication that NGOs and radio stations had 
adopted the use of songs, dance, folktale and other traditional forms which captured and 
appealed to the villagers’ mental schema. The NGO in Kamaila confirmed that traditional media 
had been effective as a tool for addressing some of the development problems such as a cholera 
outbreak, but cautioned that the same could not be said of social transformation when it came 
to the modern mass media which did not often appeal to local realities. In addition, the NGO 
also harnessed the power of traditional leadership to relay messages to the villagers, as it 
recognised the power and influence of village leadership in a similar way as espoused in Katz 
and Lazarsfeld’s (1955) two-step theory. We can infer that communication can influence 
choices on which decisions for adopting new behaviours and practices can be made. But 
communication alone is not enough to change behaviours and practices because behaviours are 
constituted broadly by context.  
 
In Mwandama, the villagers also spoke of traditional media as being part of their socialisation 
agents where story lines were infused into performances, traditional dances, and drama to 
convey ideas and knowledge to villagers. The use of traditional and conventional media by the 
NGO in the Mwandama Village resonated with observations in Chapter 6 and in Fairclough 
(1989) where the discourses that make up the MDG are broken down into sequenced scenes 
with each story line addressing or communicating different parts of the poverty problem and 
the solution. Each scene or story line presents a part of the poverty problem in a way that 
collocates with the prescribed way of addressing it. This was evident in projects where the 
NGOs sought high uptake of village participation. For example, one of the songs recited by the 
focus group in Mwandama Village consisted of verses that highlighted a problem, its cause and 
the solution. The underlying key message was that the villagers were hungry because they had 
not participated in the MVP agriculture projects; they were sick because they lacked borehole 
water and proper hygiene practices, or they died because they did not have access to primary 
healthcare facilities, therefore making the MVP the only solution.    
 
As demonstrated earlier, hunger and suffering were not exclusively and directly linked to 
farming projects in the Mwandama area. Earlier discussions have shown the diversity of the 
livelihood systems in the two villages with some of them not linked to farming at all. Cox’s 
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(1980) argument that ideology, politics and knowledge are linked is vindicated, especially the 
erasure of local knowledge by preferring the ideas imposed by the NGO, said to represent global 
ways of life. In the case of Mwandama where the villagers’ lifestyle was historically not linked 
to farming, hegemony had used maize as a signifier of food to impose mental control and 
dependence, with communication playing a central role in cultural re-orientation. Tying the 
Mwandama Villagers to maize production had discarded other alternative food types. 
 
Placing the poverty reduction concept in sequences of cause-effect logical relation through the 
semantic relations between poverty and participation paved way for the NGO ideas to introduce 
discursive lenses through which the villagers looked at both their lives and their poverty (cf. 
Fairclough, 1989; Cox, 1980). In that sense, the MDG discourse and communication connived 
to impose a social change order which carried within it an ideology.  The NGO’s application of 
traditional modes of communication manipulated traditional tools that appealed to the villages’ 
cultural schemas (cf. Chomsky, 2002; Luke, 1974). This was done by presenting a problem 
through instilling fear of poverty in villagers’ minds and leaving them no option but to rally 
behind the NGO projects as the only solution. The high maize yields in the MVP were an 
essential discursive tool used to prove the NGO’s case and tool of mediation between the village 
and NGO knowledge which was presented as indispensable. Roloff and Berger (1982) have 
written about how some discourses rely on scientific explanations to privilege their ideas over 
others. As mentioned earlier, historical narratives from the villagers in Mwandama suggest that 
both farming and maize were never part of their source of livelihood system. 
 
Folktales emerged as another communication tool hijacked by the NGOs and the MBC Radio 
1 station in Malawi with the goal of changing the villagers’ behaviour and practices. 
Storytelling, story lines and drama scenes were part of the semantic tools infused into the local 
traditional media to positively present the NGO’s ideas as better than the traditional ones.  This 
included what was commonly described in Mwandama Village as ‘using local voices’ to convey 
messages and ‘transform communities’. A respondent made reference to an example of when a 
villager was requested to give testimonies during NGO-organized community meetings, on how 
their lives had changed since the development project’s introduction, similar to the classical 
Katz and Lazarsfelds’ two-step flow, and top-down re-incarnation of Rogers’ diffusion model 
(1995). Such testimonies are not as neutral given that they are scripted ‘behind the scenes’ to 
tell a story that addresses specific issues, ‘from a personal experience’. Story lines in this model 
were framed to respond to the MDGs by applying a ‘before and after’ narrative from which 
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negative conclusions about local practices could be made. The underlying message was that if 
the villagers had not divested themselves of their traditional ways of life, they would not have 
changed for the better.   
 
A lot was borrowed from folk tales, which according to the villagers, had been part of how they 
had traditionally passed on knowledge, wisdom and moulded behaviour from one generation to 
another. Like the western cartoon genre, in both villages, some of the folktale story lines relied 
on animal characters and their cultural symbolic meanings to convey messages. In the NGO 
projects, the preferred ideas were embedded within the story lines and themes and positioned 
favourably through use of animal characters borrowed from village lore. The commonly told 
stories involved the hare and the baboon, with the hare representing the ideal and the wise and 
the baboon representing the primitive, lazy and stupid and therefore a danger to the community. 
Even if one was satisfied with their life outside project activities, they were still pressured to be 
part of the project activities to avoid social stigmatisation that came with being associated with 
the baboon character. Once again, Miller’s (2008) discussion on ‘othering’ becomes relevant 
where the village, as transpired in this study, was placed in a state of dilemma or fear to adopt 
the “irrelevant” lifestyle, and the fear of not wanting to be left behind and be stigmatised. 
 
According to the hare and baboon story, the hare also assumes the responsibility of rescuing 
the baboon whenever it is in trouble. Invariably, those outside project activities were portrayed 
as weak and therefore in need of rescue by those in the projects. When adapted to the project 
activities, lore became part of the symbolic power of the NGO discourse where the MDGs 
facilitated textual reproduction legitimization. In the folklore stories used in these villages or 
theatre plays, the hare character represented those who were quick to adopt new ideas and to 
participate in project activities that were assumed to lead to benefit. The baboon however, was 
stigmatised and represented those who would regret not having adopted the project’s ideas at 
the inception of the project activities. Stigmatization was also a tool used to replace existing 
lifestyles and to introduce a new lone which represented the ideal. Contaminating the existing 
modes of local communication with NGO ideas could potentially alter the villagers’ judgement 
of life, behaviour and practice, in a situation where understanding the villagers’ lifestyle should 
have been paramount in complementing it. This is closely linked to the key messaging in the 
song mentioned earlier, where villagers who did not participate in projects (metaphorically 
identified with the baboon character) became associated with several negative connotations 
such as slow thinking, thieves in other people’s farms and pariahs in society. The Mwandama 
196 
 
Village headman was popular for chasing away from the village, people who did not participate 
in the development projects.  
 
In both villages, the people demonstrated a high level of awareness of the MDGs, the definition 
of poverty and how it should be addressed, essentially reciting what was in the MDGs. All this 
was thanks to the NGOs and radio stations’ programing which invested a lot in social education 
and mobilization. Increased awareness was considered an indicator for assessing success and 
was co-located with project involvement as part of a social change that would lead to reduced 
poverty. Knowledge acquired through radio stations, posters, meetings and theatre 
performance, including directly from the NGOs was seen as necessary to influence change in 
attitude or behaviour and therefore production and well-being. Although these narratives 
portrayed the villagers as consumers of institutional knowledge, they were not as passive as 
presented.  
 
The next section discusses how knowledge interfaces with participation. It is not seeking to 
define what participation is, but rather to understand how the villagers reacted to both 
conventional development and their local discourses.  In other words, it seeks to examine how 
the villagers operationalized knowledge from their traditional understanding of way of life and 
that transmitted by the media and development institutions.  The researcher draws from Cox’s 
(1987) critical analysis on the relationship between ideas and participation, especially when the 
focus is on identifying alternatives outside the structures of power. The next section builds from 
the above discussion where the power of communication lies in the cultural domain of the 
villagers. It also draws from the persuasive or coercive power of different forms of 
communication used, particularly those which connected with the villagers’ cultural belief 
systems, to compel the villagers to adopt new ideas and to participate in NGO projects.  
 
8.5 Progress versus poverty reduction 
The fifteen year-period of the MDG ended in September 2015, paving way for the new 
framework called Sustainable Development Goals 56F57 to run until 2030. The time of collecting 
data would have presented a good opportunity to assess progress on the MDG in the two 
countries but the results were evasive. Responses from the governments, the UN system and 
the NGOs did not give tangible results, save to say, systems and processes to reduce poverty 
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had been put in place. The focus was no longer on reducing poverty but ensuring availability 
of systems. Before addressing the question on the extent to which communication for 
development contributed to progress in implementing the MDGs, it is imperative to point out 
that the understanding of poverty between development institutions and the villagers in Kamaila 
and Mwandama revealed curious disparities as well as elements that have perpetually been 
neglected by development practitioners. For instance, claims of responding to the villagers’ 
needs by development institutions were betrayed by their strict adherence to the same poverty 
definition by the World Bank, IMF and what has been extensively discussed in Chapter 6. 
 
The starting point in assessing progress is to understand the type of poverty on which 
development institutions are evaluated is the one discursively constructed by them and to meet 
the influential actors’ interests. It is on the same account that all institutional actors such as the 
governments, the UN system, NGOs and the media claim significant success or ‘are on track’ 
in addressing that form of poverty, which is at variance with realities in the villages. At national 
level, progress assessment is no longer against the MDG tangible targets as the focus has shifted 
to processes and systems than the tangible outputs of reducing the number of people who are 
living in poverty. For example, alignment of national plans to the MDGs and the new 
Sustainable Development Goals, reaching out to people and raising awareness on development 
issues and the post MDG-2015 consultations over the past few years have been highlighted as 
having increased participation in setting up the global development agenda. Reaching out to 
people, raising awareness and increased participation have emerged as among the main 
indicators of progress. It is paradoxical that the poverty phenomenon which is quantitatively 
defined has its assessment evaluated by such qualitative indicators.  
 
In Kamaila Village, where the Water for Kids NGOs worked on a community-driven water 
project to improve access to clean water for 4,000 people and installing banks of water taps for 
the 700 school children and standpipes within 5 minutes’ walk of the village houses, the 
availability of clean and adequate water supply by the NGO was considered a trigger to village-
driven projects. The Water for Kids project placed communities at the centre of its project 
planning and implementation, where they provided material resources for the communities to 
construct and maintain the water sources. While the initial project was a response to a diarrhoea 
outbreak in 2002, believed to have been caused by poor hygiene and unprotected water sources, 
over time, the project became linked to broader goals of addressing poverty, increased food 
production, general hygiene, reducing distances travelled by women and girls to water points, 
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hence reducing the time used for water drawing. According to Water for Kids, increased 
economic activity was presumed to result from availability of water as “access to water means 
more food can be grown, better health means health care costs are reduced, avoiding the need 
to carry water over long distances means more time is available,” according to the project 
officer (face to face interview conducted on 2 May 2015). The time saved could then be used 
for other livelihood activities, which in turn could lead to poverty reduction. The radio stations 
too, claimed credit for their middle-role of transmitting simplified knowledge on development, 
raising awareness on health, sanitation, human rights and modern methods of farming, 
including giving a voice to the communities.  
 
In Malawi, increased awareness had become an indicator as it was thought to have triggered 
policy review and adjustment, including resource mobilization to support programmes aimed 
at supporting the MDGs projects. In Mwandama Village, there was a combination of indicators 
including processes, systems and quantitative MDG outputs. For example, the NGO there 
claimed increased maize production, improved access to clean drinking water, reduced 
malnutrition and prevalence of HIV & AIDS, without elaboring on the number of people whose 
poverty has been reduced. The Mwandama Villagers expressed their satisfaction at having been 
continuously consulted. Again, this is another measure of success used by the NGO to portray 
their project plans as locally conceived. Sutton’s (1999) postulation bear affinities with the 
above in his description of how the NGO’s discourse had positioned itself as the centre of the 
truth and how it exercised power to adjust narratives to suit its agenda.  
 
We noted earlier how the villagers in Mwandama had become more vulnerable to the whims of 
external ideas, leaving them worried about the imminent end of the project. They had been 
converted into consumers and objects of an externally funded and locally unsustainable lifestyle 
(cf. Leysens, 2008). This was true in Mwandama Village, where once the villager’s views were 
collected by the NGO, they were branded and copyrighted, leading to the loss of ownership of 
local knowledge by the villagers. On the other hand, the Kamaila Villagers, who had been able 
to somewhat take leadership and ownership of their projects, were less vulnerable to donor 
interests.  
 
These varying perspectives on progress and poverty, in some way, are symptomatic of the 
existence of two worlds and ways of life.  The use of communication by NGOs to shift villagers 
from their own ways of life to the one prescribed by the NGOs, is enough justification to 
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acknowledge the importance of recognising the villagers’ ways of life.  Unlike development 
institutions, it is inconceivable to assume that the villagers were empty slates who were 
unknowing of their ways of life. Cohen’s (1994) argument that institutionalised development 
knowledge is not the only credible one, paves the way to explore both villagers’ knowledge and 
the existence of alternatives.  
  
8.6 Conclusion 
This chapter has discussed the communicative ecologies in Malawi and Zambia but most 
specifically, in the villages and how these shaped the way the villagers came to see themselves.  
Findings in this chapter illustrate that the villagers were not unknowing of their situation or 
blank slates but possessed knowledge on their way of life which was not taken into account in 
the domain of conventional development. The chapter also offered a brief overview of the 
media landscape in both countries, including highlighting radio stations accessible to the 
villages under study. While not exhaustive, the discussion on the extent to which 
communication was used in Kamaila and Mwandama was insightful in revealing how power 
and hegemony can hijack local cultural tools of communication as a channel to impose its ideas 
on the villagers. The researcher draws from Chapter 7 and findings in this chapter to conclude 
that despite the presence of power in the ideas and use of traditional forms of message 
transmission, communication for development faces serious limitations in fostering behaviour 
change and participation. By making this argument, the researcher is not suggesting a re-
evaluation of communication in the current state of poverty reduction discourse, but is rather 
advocating for a robust approach that acknowledges that within those villages, something is 
happening as a foundation for building an effective response to sustainable well-being. The next 
chapter provides a reflection on the findings in Chapter 6, 7 and 8. It attempts to provide ways 
of situating communication to achieve empowerment and participation in the debate on well-
being and poverty. 
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Chapter Nine: A discussion and reflections 
 9.1 Introduction 
In this chapter, the researcher reflects on the findings in Chapter 6, 7 and 8 on the main themes 
of communication, participation and development. I expand on the themes of poverty 
construction, participation and the role of communication in defining these concepts. The 
discussion in this chapter is a follow up on how poverty is constructed by the discourse framing 
the MDGs and implications on identity construction and practices, particularly linked to 
communication in the selected villages in Malawi and Zambia. 
 
In this chapter, the researcher starts with the findings in Chapter 6, which illustrated how 
neoliberal interests shape the global poverty reduction agenda. The researcher built on Chapter 
7, demonstrating how the discourses arising from such agendas congested national and local 
spaces for participation in Malawi and Zambia. Chapter 8 showed that the neoliberal dominance 
transcends policy spaces congestion as it is infused into cultural streams of social orientation 
such as communication for development. This is done in an attempt to reconfigure the 
behaviour patterns and co-opt states and individuals viewed as poor, into the neoliberal mode 
of production and consumption. In analysing these findings, the researcher concluded that any 
approach to re-invent ideas on poverty reduction is bound to fail in the same way as other 
historical development models did, unless local human activity is predicated at the forefront of 
ontology. In such a context, participation would be an outcome of cultural and local aspiration, 
where communication is not burdened by the task of transmitting centralised ideas, but rather, 
facilitating dialogic flow and exchange of ideas at local level. From this conclusion, the 
researcher attempts to explore the possibilities of reconfiguring communication and citizen’s 
well-being outside the realms of the existing global policy narratives and discourses.   
 
9.2 Reflections on poverty, neoliberalism and global governance 
In Chapter 1, this study promised to re-read of the role of communication for development in 
relation to poverty reduction participatory approaches. Findings in Chapter 6, 7 and 8 revealed 
how the discourse of conventional development is a barrier to alternative ideas. Western and 
neoliberal discourses continue to dominate the various definitions of poverty and its solutions 
in terms of policy processes, spaces and ideas. The words “participation” and “communication” 
when located in this intricate domain of neoliberal interests are fraught with numerous 
meanings that diminish their definitional meanings. A historical discourse analysis in Chapter 
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6 showed that the current poverty definition has remained fixated in the 19th century discourses 
and narrative of labour relations (cf. Booth, 1887; Rowntre, 1901; 1918) and is thus irrelevant 
to the 21st century, and not applicable to the different contexts as demonstrated in the villages 
in Malawi and Zambia.  
 
The dollar-a-day indicator of poverty is also problematic as it centralizes and homogenises 
lifestyle by linking it to prescriptions of neoliberalism such as increased economic income, 
production and modes of consumption. This is despite the fact that conventional development 
discourse has incessantly failed to provide a quantifiable and credible connection between high 
economic growth and poverty reduction. This narrative discordance is evident in Malawian and 
Zambian national plans, where the link between economic growth and well-being of these 
countries’ populations is not only evasive but also far-fetched and to a point,  an act of faith. It 
was noted that both poverty and inequalities deepened in Zambia after the government provided 
a “conducive environment” to foreign growth actors in the late 1990s. Multinational companies, 
under the SAP policy, were given an unfair advantage over their local counterparts, with a view 
to boost the local economy. Emphasis on absolute rather than relative poverty overrides the 
importance of viewing different realities and dimensions that inform poverty assessments in 
different contexts. Neglecting these factors is one of the reasons for unwarranted pressure on 
Malawians and Zambians to comply with the UN system’s terms and norms. Even so, the value 
of a dollar cannot be extrapolated to every context in the world. Findings from Chapter 6, 7 and 
8 together with the absence of a credible explanation on the relationship between growth and 
poverty, make the researcher conclude that the MDGs are using communication and 
participation as a spin-off to propagate and promote neoliberalism. 
 
In considering the above conclusion, especially its goal of increasing production, maximising 
profits and measuring consumption according to a prescribed lifestyle, the researcher also 
concludes that neoliberalism, which rose in the late 1990s has used the poverty discourse 
through the MDGs to weaken developing states by making them and their people consumers of 
western culture. The domination of neoliberalism is aided by the convergence of western capital 
interests, operating through global and national governmental structures to pressurise the 
governments and villagers in Malawi into adopting their global discourse and norms. However, 
the villagers, especially in Zambia, demonstrated social power by not succumbing to the whims 
of these pressures and had maintained their local identities, different from what was prescribed 
by development projects. By doing so, the Kamaila Villagers had not only shown the lack of 
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relevance of the 19th and 20th century dollar-a-day indicator of poverty, but had demonstrated 
that there was another wealth of knowledge on how well-being could be defined. 
 
In Chapter 6, the researcher observed that the discourse underlying the MDGs conveys a sense 
of equality and collectiveness, and political power is presented as if it has no influence on the 
discourse. Such discourses construct, through the UN system, a universal identity of states and 
their citizens, in which global governance agencies such as the World Bank, IMF and other UN 
agencies can speak on behalf of everyone on matters of poverty and yet propose solutions that 
have an incontrovertible effect of constraining alternative views on poverty and participation. 
Drawing from Foucault (1972), the MDGs discourse thus enables the UN system to speak to its 
member states, while indirectly speaking on behalf of neoliberalism by concurrently imposing 
a global worldview on poverty. In Chapter 7, the Mwandama Villagers expressed an 
unsustainable desire to adopt the new life introduced by the Millennium village project instead 
of reverting to their traditional ways of life. Traditional means of production, despite their 
suitability, feasibility and relevance to the villagers’ local contexts continued to be threatened 
by the NGO which had deliberately embraced local means of communication to convince the 
villagers to abandon their traditional way of life in exchange for what was imposed by the NGO, 
and which had proven to be locally unsustainable.  
 
The coalescence of the two discourses of the NGOs and the villagers’ created discursive conflict 
in which participation was constrained by governmental norms. How communication and 
participation depart from their definitional meanings to derive new functional meanings is an 
important area for further discussion. Chapter 6 provided insights into how each of the available 
policy spaces was influenced by an actors’ or their constituency’s interests. These interests in 
turn influenced a shift in the meanings of the word “participation” in relation to poverty 
reduction. The same Chapter 6 did this by examining the discourse context from which texts in 
the policy documents under study are produced, and from which the words ‘participation’ and 
‘communication’ derive a new operational meaning. In Chapter 7, it was noted that the new 
operational meanings were blurring and constraining the definitional meaning of these words. 
The researcher views this as a linguistic device, common in the collective discourse of the 
MDGs, meant to conceal the presence of power as well as neutralise the social relationship and 
imbalances imposed between the member states, the UN system, citizens and their 
governments.   
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Two types of participation closely linked to strategic communication were observed in Chapters 
6, 7 and 8. First and commonly used is the do-it-yourself model, where knowledge and skills 
are diffused from institutions as centres of knowledge (NGOs, CBOs 57F58, local and national 
governments) to individuals who are assumed to be lacking knowledge needed to change their 
behaviour as part of efforts to increase their productive capacities. This approach has been 
commonly used in disease prevention and farming. The second type is the democratic 
participatory approach modelled around the Habermasian (1976) public sphere and Rogers’ 
(1983) diffusion for social change model, where communication and participation are central 
enablers of poverty reduction. This type however, limits participation to state-citizen 
entitlements or NGO-beneficiary project activities and does not foster the productive utilization 
of locally available opportunities as part of pursuing local aspirations. Participation is reduced 
to expressing views and claiming rights and services from the governments. It was explained 
earlier that these governments are weakened by allocation of growth activities to the private 
sector, the transfer of decision-making power to the UN system as well as the pressure from the 
civil society to comply with global norms and further burdened by demands to create conducive 
environment for multinational private sector investment.   
 
Whatever form of participation, communication conveys a model that is configured by social 
imbalances. This is illustrated by the focus on the perceived benefits of participation. The role 
of communication is to ensure dialogue between institutions and individuals and not a 
conversation among and between individuals and their local realities. In spite of both villages 
in Malawi and Zambia indicating that the presence of traditional modes of knowledge transfer 
from one generation to another as a means of knowing, conventional development modes of 
knowledge transfer remained the most preferred.  Chapters 6 and 7 illustrated how stimulating 
individual capabilities in Malawi and Zambia was not prioritized but rather constrained by the 
preoccupation to ensure compliance with global norms.  
 
In addition, the policy spaces in which participation by states or citizens is supposed to occur 
are the same arenas where external knowledge and norms rob these actors of their ability to 
empower their citizens and where individuals lose their power to self-determine. For example, 
villagers in Mwandama noted that pursuing their traditional knowledge and skills would make 
them lose the benefits from the MDG-related projects. Since the NGO in Mwandama Village 
                                                 
58 Community-based Organisations. 
205 
 
was linked to the UN system, what should have been a global space was usurping local spaces 
by assuming the central reference space in its pursuit to convert the villagers into some form of 
global identity. When participation is configured that way, the neoliberal discourse is able to 
perpetuate conditions that allow member states and villagers to be discursively recycled into its 
hegemonic order.  It was noted that the processes governing policy debates in the UN system 
are controlled by interest-driven rules arising from the closed spaces before they are presented 
into global governance policy spaces. As a result, democratic participation is constrained by 
pre-determined agendas, a scenario which questions the rationale for governments in Malawi 
and Zambia to effectively influence global policies. This includes their ability to independently 
develop, unhindered by the global pressure, the most effective development policies in line with 
the needs of their people. The researcher draws this observation in light of the pressure exerted 
by civil society, inciting citizens against their governments to demand certain services in a 
context where resources to sustain such services are not available. This is unless government 
borrows from international finance institutions, deliberately neglecting the importance of 
citizens’ productive capacities. As an approach, it is not only flawed and problematic, but is 
also a neoliberal way of advancing its interests by pitting citizens in conflict with their under-
resourced governments, forcing them to borrow from the World Bank and IMF and thus to 
comply with global policies.  
 
The fact that neoliberalism sets citizens in conflict with their governments is not surprising as 
the UN system has historically advanced similar interests on behalf of the West. This has 
historically constrained developing states’ ability to take the lead in addressing poverty 
concerns in their countries. The rise of neoliberalism in the late 1990s to the centre of global 
governance continues to shape conditions that hold this ideology intact, including how 
participation is proposed in the MDGs as an outcome of communication, neglecting power 
relations. Historical coincidences on how the industrial revolution, the post-African 
independence and SAP eras were followed by grand global poverty reduction policies were 
discussed in Chapter 3. In each of these, weaker social groups were summoned into a collective 
agenda, addressing what has been discursively described as a global problem requiring 
collective solutions by a system known to demand compliance than delivering on results. 
   
What should be public policy spaces have assumed a closed private space character, most 
specifically where the MDGs are formulated. The discourse and narratives arising are 
consuming and converting the individual identity into an economic growth discourse, via 
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communication as a socialising agent. Whereas poverty is presented as apolitical but technical, 
so does communication in transmitting ideas as neutral in a context where the UN system, 
driven by capital interests, assumes a public and neutral policy space. The public policy space 
character which promises possibilities of plurality of views is constrained by interests. It was 
noted that when the public policy space is connected with a private and powerful space, 
democratic participation becomes problematic.  
 
Theorising a new mode of communication for development in order to salvage participation 
outside the parameters of conventional development thus requires stepping outside the 
parameters of conventional development. That is achievable by establishing a discourse context 
that recognizes the existence of both power and knowledge at individual and local level (cf. 
Mosse in Cooke and Kothari, 2001). Kamaila Village, and to a considerable extent, Mwandama 
Village, provide credible evidence from which to build this premise. Given the interconnections 
between individual identities, power and discourse contexts especially in Mwandama where 
villagers had been converted by the NGO, disentangling these identities can be constrained by 
hegemonic discourse. Securing a participatory approach outside the dominant discourse (Mosse 
in Cooke and Kothari, 2001) is significant as it first discounts Chambers’ (1997) counterbalance 
of power (theory of empowered participation). Mosse (2001) argues that reversing hierarchies 
of institutionalized power through dialogue alone is inadequate to foster a participatory model 
outside the parameters of the dominant discourse. Pursuing that line of inquiry is tantamount to 
recycling the individual back into the neoliberal control thus sustaining the dominant hegemony 
(cf. Cooke and Kothari, 2001). How hegemony permeates through the UN system and its 
agencies and how it holds forth and captivates the mind-sets of the underdeveloped is discussed 
in Chapter 3 (cf. Rodney (1981). The proposition the researcher is putting across in this chapter 
derives from the same discussions in Chapter 3, which argued that the discursively weakened 
minds allow the prevalence of hegemony, enabling the prescription of western capacity-
building activities. The way in which discourses have held the oppressed mind-set hostage 
together, incapacitating its ability to utilize locally available resources and opportunities is 
extensively discussed in Chapter 6.  
 
9.3 Reflections on participatory communication 
In this section, the researcher augments the above analysis by further addressing two critical 
issues. Firstly, in this section the researcher approaches the notion of poverty or wellbeing as 
partly a problem of the mind-set and not material inadequacy (cf. Gordenker and Weiss, 1996). 
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Secondly, he argues that the impact of communication on behaviour and practices depends on 
several factors, including the power behind the ideas being transmitted to the individuals and 
not necessarily the medium of transmission as suggested in many media theories. The 
researcher argues that the relationship between discourse and communication as a social agent, 
as explained in Eliot (1948) and Rodney (1981,) constrains or facilitates society’s ability to 
control its value system and to define its wellbeing. In making this proposition, I have drawn 
from observations in Chapter 6, specifically on how ideas operate through texts and language 
to manifest into policy positions. I also draw from Chapter 7 on how policy documents, 
particularly the MDGs, allocate roles and translate action into behaviour and practices at 
different levels. With this premise in mind, the researcher considers both communication and 
participation to be easily re-theorized in two ways. First, is to prioritise knowledge creation on 
well-being before assigning participatory communication to transmit pre-defined knowledge. 
The second is an inversion of the first, but not as a direct counter to hegemonic ideas. It is one 
that places human activity at the forefront of ontology in which communication facilitates the 
dialogic flow and exchange of ideas.  These approaches are discussed in detail in the next 
section.  
 
i. Rehashing the past to present 
This section discusses the first option and challenges of redefining or identifying alternative 
poverty reduction knowledge ahead of participation, and how it is tantamount to recycling 
conventional development modernization models. Redefining knowledge on poverty has 
perpetually led to the loss of autonomy for developing countries and resulted in their co-option 
into the discourse of the global collective. By identity, the researcher refers to the individual’s 
mental content and readiness to perform certain tasks applying a mind-set that is scripted by the 
discourse of historical context to make social meaning. Individual identities are constituted by 
traits, characteristics, attributes and values which define an individual’s ways of being (Fearon 
et al., 1999). 
 
The first challenge arising from creating new or alternative knowledge of poverty reduction is 
that it occurs within laboratory-like institutionalized policy spaces which have historically been 
prone to political and capital interests of those who either control or fund the spaces (cf. 
Cox1981). Positioning communication to convey such knowledge is the same as imposing pre-
set discourses to individuals, thus making them passive receivers of knowledge. This approach 
historically views the poor as unthinking and blank-minded. As they gain knowledge 
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transferred into their culture, their capabilities weaken in the process because a new and external 
worldview on well-being has been imposed on them (cf. Waisbord, 2000). Waisbord (2000) is 
among the few authors to emphasise that the process of decision-making, is an everyday 
occasion at the individual level and by institutionalizing it, the process constrains that ability 
and autonomy of individuals to define and establish themselves outside the confines of 
institutional project goals. Effective participatory approaches must thus pursue well-being that 
combines local decision-making and capacities in line with local needs (cf. Jenning, 2000). 
 
The extent to which communication for development was used in Kamaila and Mwandama 
Villages exemplifies how prioritisation of institutionalised knowledge neglects and undermines 
local epistemologies. For example, traditional mass media such as theatre and music had been 
converted into tools to convey conventional development ideas to change villagers’ behaviour 
instead of viewing them as part of the local culture. This ultimately creates identity confusion 
or a suspended identity in which the base identity finds itself in a space of indecision under 
pressure to shift towards a discursively constructed poverty identity, one which is not grounded 
in local culture. It was clear in both villages, but most specifically in Mwandama, that 
individuals’ identities were caught between the pressure to be modern and the desire to remain 
traditional. The desire to be modern did not arise from necessity but due to the stigma associated 
with not being part of project activities. Villagers intended to maintain their cultural identities 
within their traditional systems of thought. For example, lifestyles in both villages had been 
altered and re-organised to suit the prevailing order, while their minds, judging by their 
response, still made reference to their traditions.  
 
Discourses from the PSRP and MVP have evidently re-organized systems and practices of 
lifestyles and structures of governance at village level. Contentment was defined by money and 
income even where these were not necessary. Creativity was no longer an expression of ones’ 
expertise but confined and linked to economic activities. In both villages, communities said that 
traditional affluence was determined by factors such as skills, self-worth, gratification and 
others which enabled them to self-fulfil within their environment. Ways of life were not based 
on comparison, but on the ability of everyone having unfettered equal opportunities and access 
to available resources that enabled them to convert zero into something through their effort, 
craftsmanship and other productive skills (cf. Kotler, Armstrong, Brown and Adam, 2004).  
Findings from both villages showed that knowledge to utilize available resources had never 
been in short supply, and had been passed on from one generation to another through traditional 
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methods, with skills either perfected by one generation or acquired externally. Their 
understanding of development was how they perceive their roles, contentment and self-worth. 
With individual’s traditionally ascribed roles, self-worth and development represents 
gratification.  
 
The difference between how well-being was defined by the villagers and how it was perceived 
by the NGOs demonstrates how the concept of poverty is a social construction by external 
agents who occupy or represent interests that are situated within powerful social spaces that 
influence individual villagers’ personal lives. By being linked to the UN system, situated in the 
Unites States of America and speaking the global language on development, the MVP 
influenced the villagers’ ability to engage among themselves and authorities. Therefore in this 
case, possession of power by the MVP determined how social realities, including poverty, were 
designed to enable the production and reproduction of hegemonic relations.  
 
It emerged from this study that traditional lifestyles were being abandoned, lampooned as part 
of the cultural barrier that needed to be changed through communication for development. 
Devaluation of these local attributes was not only de-equalizing but also dispossessing the 
villagers of their epistemology, capabilities and identity and therefore power, in exchange of 
what they did not have and may never have. Thus, the villagers were robbed of their ability to 
be in charge of their well-being as it was taken over by the NGOs. At village level, in both 
Malawi and Zambia, the study observed that needs varied, and it was learnt that villagers and 
their social and environmental contexts were neither homogenous nor static social entities, even 
though the MDG preferred to lock them in a static 15 year-project. The dialogue between the 
global and local meant that the discourse of development, unless unsettled, would always 
remain deep-seated in the same ideological context. Extricating autonomous participation is 
therefore not achievable in isolation of the implication of such discourses on the mind-set to 
self-determine (cf. Rodney’s 1981). Rodney has stated that Africans are discursively blinded 
from appreciating their capabilities and the value of locally available resources by the colonial 
discourse. Therefore, addressing poverty is about reconfiguring the mind-set towards self-
determination.  
 
The symbiotic relationship between culture and the mind-set needs to be highlighted and 
acknowledged to avoid viewing one as the effect of the other. In other words, how Malawians 
and Zambians understood their social position in relation to the proposed lifestyles by the 
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MDGs determined their identity in relation to their capability and ability to define their well-
being. The discourse created a loyal identity that, at the onset relinquished its own power and 
knowledge in exchange for the “global”. This is disturbing considering that identity is important 
for judgement, decision-making and behaviour and it also ascribes roles (cf. Leary and 
Tangney, 2003). When identity is involuntarily altered, shifted or lost, self-confidence 
diminishes. The epistemological dependence on the west, shown in both countries, illustrates 
how conventional development disempowers UN system member states, especially where 
Malawi and Zambia spent a considerable amount of resources and time on hiring neo-liberal 
intellectuals to draft their constitutions and national plans, precisely to ensure compliance with 
World Bank and IMF requirements rather than ensuring relevance to local realities (cf. PRSP, 
1999).  
 
ii. Reflections on knowledge and empowerment  
This section discusses the second option, an inversion, but not a counter to the above. The 
proposition being advanced is that communication and participation must be placed ahead of 
creating new knowledge on poverty reduction in attempts to understand the well-being of a 
society. The link between knowledge and participatory efficiency has been explored by a 
number of authors (cf.Chambers, 1997; Cooke and Kothari, 2001) but its effectiveness remains 
a matter for further debate as it is yet to be empirically confirmed. Where knowledge and 
participation is discussed, it is yet to go beyond the theoretical assumptions that derive from the 
persuasion and diffusion models. In other words, very little exists on the link between the two. 
The concept of knowledge is discussed by Nueman (1986) in terms of how individuals feel that 
they are capable of influencing decisions in their lives, linking participation to three reasons, 
namely to protect social and cultural values, secondly a concern with other members of the 
community and third, as a function of acquisition of resources within a community network.  
 
The role of communication in these categories varies in relation to available development 
knowledge, efficiency and participation. The discussion in this chapter has noted that the 
theorisation of knowledge in conventional development occurs in spaces of power before it is 
transferred to those assumed to be unknowing poor individuals. This section proposes a premise 
where dialogic communication occurs within a local context with the objective of revitalising 
what is seen in the eyes of conventional development as the subordinate mind-set and to 
stimulate an empowered identity within its local setting. The proposal diverts from Chambers’ 
(1997) emphasis on involvement in projects or the state-citizen dialogue that has been criticised 
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for recycling individuals within the same institutions of control (cf. Green, 2008; Hulme, 2007; 
Cox, 1987; Leysens, 2008).  
  
Communication remains a crucial socialising agent in promoting local dialogue and cultural 
processes that together converge into a local form of wellbeing. The researcher draws 
inspiration from the period of intellectualism that spawned western industrialization in the 17th 
and 18th Centuries and the Lunar Society of Birmingham (McLuna, 1964) to exemplify how 
the media and knowledge inspired change and instigated individuals’ capabilities to extricate 
themselves from dominant discourse. The media was productive while unhindered by external 
and capital constraints. Key to this proposal is placing local human activity as the ontology of 
well-being which grows organically, through a recursive communicative agency and the local 
accumulation of power (cf. Cohen, 1994).  
 
The researcher builds on Sen’s (1982, 1999) capabilities approach which theorizes villagers 
such as those in Malawi and Zambia as capable of exploiting locally and externally available 
opportunities unaided (cf. Foucault, 1980). This makes understanding village life and its social 
complexities crucial in situating villagers’ perception of life in general and wellbeing in 
particular. Acknowledging that these capabilities are conditioned by their local contexts, most 
importantly in relation to how they meet their aspirations, drawing from available knowledge 
and resources is the second step (cf. Sen, 1982; Cox, 1987). In both steps, the function of 
communication is to pursue these capabilities to establish new and autonomous identities based 
on a new mind-set that can act confidently dialogically (cf. Freire, 1986). In searching for an 
appropriate positioning of communication, this study turns to how knowledge functions in 
different forms in establishing and stabilizing the mind-set.  
 
9.4 Reformulating and re-positioning communication for development 
How ideas embedded in the texts under study construct identities is considered in this study as 
justifying the need to reposition communication. Revitalizing the oppressed identity requires 
re-allocation of power to that identity (empowerment) with a view to enhancing self-
determination among the villagers in Malawi and Zambia. This section unpacks the relationship 
between different forms of knowledge frames and how communication has been or can be 
linked to them. In exploring the symbiosis between these two concepts, the researcher is guided 
by how Cox (1997) theorized the relationship between capital’s interests and ideas and its 
consequences on communication and practices. The discussion unavoidably turns to debate on 
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human behaviour, especially media effects and reception theories (cf. Hall, 1982; Gerbner, 
1983; Levy and Gurevitch, 1993), particularly the postulation that media messages have limited 
impact on behaviour.  
 
Even though Cox (1987) might not have highlighted the link between ideas and material 
interests in the field of media studies, the theorisation of the message-receiver in media studies 
is insightful. Despite lack of consensus on the impact of ideas in the field of media studies, Said 
(1979) and Foucault (1972) have expounded extensively on how discourses shape 
representation. Behaviour scientists such as Darnton (2008) and Jackson (2005) and social 
marketing theorists such as Kotler and Lee (2008) also consider behaviour as partly an outcome 
of communicative social orientation. It was evident in the villages that ideas transmitted to 
villagers through various forms of media created a certain level of awareness and did not 
necessarily adjust behaviour. This is a view that is emphasized in Hogg and Abrahams (1988), 
Oakes, Haslam and Turner (1994) and Turner (1984). Despite such disjuncture, it follows that 
if discourse can construct a poverty identity, communication can also contribute to the 
reconstruction of a new identity, but doing so requires an understanding of the different 
knowledge frames. 
 
Formulating a new way of using communication for development would thus require emphasis 
on the role and power of knowledge than media channels. To achieve this, the researcher draws 
from several authors such as Foucault (2002), Said (1979), Leysens (2008) and Chomsky (2002; 
1988) who have categorized knowledge into three frames – the propositional, functional, and 
social identity knowledge. Knowledge frames, in this context, refer to how thoughts are shaped, 
organized and stabilized. Knowledge frames are not to be confused with Chomsky’s (2002) 
schemas that are limited only to patterns of thought. How communication is used in the two 
villages can be mapped along two of these three knowledge frames. For example, the functional 
knowledge frames resonate with the transfer of knowledge to build the villagers’ capacity and 
to change behaviour with the objective of enhancing functional skills and increase production 
(cf. Waisbord, 2000). The farming projects in Mwandama Millennium Village and the water 
project in Kamaila exemplify a pre-occupation with enhancing functional knowledge by placing 
emphasis on efficiency, that is to say, on ‘how to’ effectively implement  certain activities.  
 
However, as noted in focus group discussions, these two sets of knowledge frames had short 
term gains and were not sustainable in the absence of continuous external support. Although 
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both villages can report some form of improvements in their living conditions, none of them 
were confident of self–sustaining if the NGO projects departed. On one hand, at national and 
global policy level, the propositional knowledge frame is modelled on the capacity building and 
social change agenda where technical and intellectual knowledge, including basic operational 
norms, are outsourced from the western countries, as well as how the reasoning towards poverty 
is conducted. A critical analysis of tools that constitute propositional knowledge frames and 
their implications on Malawi and Zambia (cf. Shannon & Weaver, 1949) is extensively offered 
in Chapter 6.  
 
This study argues that one of the reasons conventional development projects that used 
communication in line with these two knowledge frames have not been successful and 
sustainable is because they lacked or neglected the third knowledge frame – the social identity 
knowledge frame which is the basis of all other knowledge frames and identities because it 
offers stability that is grounded on local epistemology. In making this proposition, the 
researcher draws from Tajfel and Turner (1979) who have theorised the social identity 
knowledge frame as a psychological basis in explaining the ways that social positions are 
acquired or ascribed. These authors contend that social position, arising from social 
phenomenon such as poverty discourses, conditions an individual’s self-consciousness and 
identity in relation to other groups. Such conditioning becomes the knowledge base from which 
roles of their identities are assigned and ascribed and where the identities are positioned in 
relation to others (Hogg and Vaughan, 2002). In the absence of this knowledge frame, no matter 
how much of the functional and propositional knowledge is transferred to individual villagers, 
the researcher argues that they remain short of power to self-determine as they perpetually lack 
confidence. We see this in Mwandama Village project and ten other MVPs that recorded 
successes in the first phase of the MVP between 2006 and 200958F59, where they enjoyed sustained 
external experts and funding support. However, once that support started reducing, so did the 
achievements. Villagers in Mwandama expressed concern that once funding and support 
stopped at the end of the MDGs phase, their living conditions were likely to deteriorate again.  
 
It follows, therefore that for Malawi, Zambia and other developing societies to achieve the 
required empowerment, they need to reposition communication to secure self-determination 
and social identity confidence. The researcher builds on Tajfel et al.’s (1971) view that 
                                                 
59 http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=39914#.VQ3RWMscTIU 
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individuals as constituted in the present are actually outcomes of historical priori, which 
foregrounds their thoughts and reasoning.  How colonialism and the current MDGs projects 
have affected the mind-sets of the villagers in Malawi and Zambia (cf. Rodney, 1981) and how 
conventional discourse seeks to convert individuals to objects of dominant power (Foucault, 
2002) was discussed earlier. Inferentially, anyone born in Malawi, Zambia or born in any other 
developing country is thus ascribed the poverty identity which is loyal to the dominant ideology. 
Poverty is, thus, a condition of relative powerlessness where individuals lose control of 
important aspects of their lives. Malawian and Zambian villagers who are seen as experiencing 
poverty, are poor on the grounds of their discursively constructed social identities which hinder 
their ability to claim and control resources and opportunities available to them. It is an outcome 
of inequalities and unequal power relationships that are deeply ingrained within institutions and 
policies (cf. Green, 2008).  
 
Countries that have recently been able to come out of poverty are those that have retained and 
maintained their social and cultural identity, rooted in their historical background and 
nationalism. The social identity knowledge frame acts as a baseline for feeling a sense of 
belonging, responsibility and nationalism, as part of self-conceptualization and actualization at 
all social levels.  In this context, the social identity retains both its individual autonomy and a 
group identity in a shared culture.  The self is defined in terms of both an individual and one 
belonging to a social group but as an autonomous entity.  The self-esteem associated with the 
social identity is known to underlie capabilities needed to approach the complexities of well-
being with confidence to effectively meet aspirations (cf. Brewer, 2003). Recent examples 
include countries such as China, Korea, Taiwan, Vietnam and other Asian countries’ fast 
growing economies that have drawn from the same theoretical base and illustrated the important 
role of mind-set and identities. Although none of these countries have meaningful natural 
resources when compared to most African countries, their state of economies grew 
exponentially from imported raw materials and a national ideological mind set which draws 
from strong social identity knowledge frame. On the contrary, despite their abundant natural 
resources, most African countries survive on trading raw materials and labour or opening up to 
foreign investors because of the lack of confidence and what is described in Rodney (1981) as 
a damaged mind-set. This is the basis for this study’s proposal: that if communication has to 
play a role in achieving self-determination and self-consciousness as a means to escape the 
oppressive identity, it must be positioned to address the social identity knowledge frame. The 
researcher is aware that such transformation is characterized by both completeness and 
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incompleteness where the current identity acquires an absolute self-consciousness but with an 
insatiable mind to acquire functional and propositional knowledge locally and externally on its 
own terms. However, this is not new as it was noted in Chapter 7 that the villagers too opted to 
assume dual identities; one for the NGO project and the other to hang on to their culture. The 
fixed identity signifies an empowered identity while the incomplete, which is also the flexible 
identity, acquires knowledge to sustain the absolute. The individuals’ idea of self is a significant 
indicator as it encompasses their ambitions that direct their internal and external social 
interactions in relation to the world.  
 
The objective of focusing on the social identity knowledge frame is not to unsettle the dominant 
neoliberal hegemony, but to re-establish an individual who assumes a self-conscious identity 
that is modelled by a local or national discursive context outside the dominant hegemonic order 
(Cohen, 1994). Self-consciousness, in this regard, goes together with critical pedagogy as a 
baseline for an emancipatory process out of which the individuals not only read their ‘word’ 
but also their ‘world’ (Freire and Macedo, 1987). Once such an individual is positioned in the 
self-conscious identity, it organically acquires its own power required to make relevant 
decisions about its own well-being, including outsourcing material and epistemological 
resources.  
 
In re-positioning the new identity within its own sphere of power, and not focusing on its 
relationship with the hegemony of conventional development, it is not to suggest a delinking 
with the global village, but to facilitate its presence within the global arena as an autonomous 
entity. Therefore, focusing on the individual is by no means losing sight of the bigger social 
and national picture, a picture that becomes the basis for a new locally constructed hegemony. 
The researcher takes note of Hall’s (1996) view that hegemony at any level operates through 
discursively constructed identities produced within specific sites of discursive formations and 
practices that lead to a collective identity. The Asian economic success story especially Japan 
and South Korea, provides evidence of the importance of an independent government which 
can make policies independent of global governance pressures, promoted through individual, 
family and community creativity to instigate potential (Green, 2008; Moyo, 2009). Lessons 
from these Asian examples demonstrate not only the power of individual but also collective 
capabilities, which is a form of participation and prowess of an independent mind-set to 
individually or collectively be more effective in determining their own wellbeing, increasing 
their productivity, and determining their courses of action to achieve.  
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9.5 Re-constructing the social identity 
This study argues that establishing individual autonomy outside the dominant discourse is not 
the end but provides a platform for defining or re-defining a new form of well-being. Drawing 
from the above analysis, and from those in previous chapters, it is clear that poverty in the 
MDGs is discursively constructed by dominant powers and interests and not by local realities. 
Addressing socially constructed poverty is therefore not about the notions of equality and 
wealth redistribution. Cox (1997) highlights how power swallows alternative ideas into 
neoliberal discourses. In this study, the researcher draws from Freire’s (1973) three levels of 
consciousness necessary to achieve autonomous participation where communication for 
development is positioned to foster diverse well-beings. Freire considers the intransitive stage 
of communication intervention in line with what the Kamaila Villagers noted – individuals are 
satisfied with their self-worth, including what they possess within themselves and their 
environment as fundamental to the way they view their lifestyles. Social change is an organic 
occurrence.  The relationship between what exists in Malawian and Zambian villages under 
study and what is ascribed to individuals as part of their past and present capabilities is the basis 
for establishing a co-relationship between the two variables. Chapter 7 highlighted the existence 
of certain aspects of life, which historically function independent of external aid.   
 
The semi-transitive consciousness is the second stage proposed by Freire (1994), where 
communication facilitates individual self-awareness and one’s aspirations, and is not limited to 
addressing problems. This was evident in Kamaila Village where villagers claimed awareness 
of their aspirations outside the NGO goals. This study builds from the assumption that villagers 
in Malawi and Zambia hold intra-communal and inter-generational dialogue, as part of both 
pedagogy and ontology that is not contaminated by external impositions. This is linked to the 
third stage – the critical transitivity in which individuals such as the villagers in Malawi and 
Zambia are capable of relating to their situation and use their newly acquired power to decide 
aspirations unhindered by external discursive impediments. The social identity knowledge, in 
this context, is derived from these intra social conversations, reflecting on what one knows 
about oneself and the unknown which incites the desire to transform and change for the better 
(cf. Kessing-Styles, 2003).  
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Discussions with the villages in Kamaila and Mwandama suggested that the process of 
decision-making was located in two parallel processes. The first set of space was designed 
specifically for interaction with NGOs with clearly defined reporting lines. The alternative was 
that the villagers had their own spaces reserved for traditional discussions that addressed locally 
pertinent issues in which the latter had more influence than the former. The traditional spaces 
assumed a different hierarchy whose membership and leadership followed traditional 
structures. The traditional structures existed to mediate dialogue, exchange of knowledge and 
handling various views on issues raised in the village. In fact, in both countries, villagers had 
more influence and were more respected than government and NGOs. This was largely because 
the village community included traditional leadership that mediated between the people and 
their culture, interpreting and implement messages from the spirit mediums. These were seen 
as custodians of culture and sources of social direction. Exchange of ideas among villagers was 
thought to generate a sense of belonging, ownership and had liberating effects which bound 
them together. Understanding the traditional policy spaces is relevant in order to assess the 
importance attached to them by the villagers in Kamaila and Mwandama.  
 
This leads to two key questions: first, can the proposed re-positioning of communication for 
development occur naturally without being instigated by some form of power and interests? 
Second, having established the above theoretical base, is it still relevant to lay the blame of 
Malawian and Zambian poverty on colonialism and the psychological damage it caused on the 
minds of their people? The Asian examples given in this chapter, respond to the first question 
especially where communication relates to fostering a new mind-set among citizens. While 
African poverty cannot be explained in isolation of the historical factors creating it, it is equally 
fair to argue that Malawi and Zambia must take the responsibility to re-define their well-being. 
The notion of states taking the lead in addressing their poverty must be located within the 
objective of revitalizing the social identity knowledge frame, in a similar fashion to the way 
African countries successfully won independence over colonialism. 
  
9.6 Hope for Communication for Development in Africa 
Chapter 3 drew from Mda (1993) and Scrampickal (2006) to highlight how social 
communication and the traditional media have been part of the African cultural production. 
They were also instrumental in liberating, uniting, preserving, and arbitrating social interests in 
toppling colonial regimes. Revolutionary movements, for instance, relied a lot on traditional 
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media to mobilise the masses to fight and sacrifice their lives for self-determination and 
independence (Rodney, 1981). Rodney (1981), while not a media scholar himself, called for 
revolution against western domination, which in part, invokes the use of mass media to inspire 
emancipation and re-orientation of the oppressed mind-set. The key lesson to be drawn from 
the use of theatre and other forms of traditional media during the struggle for independence is 
that its goals were linked to that liberation, independence and self-determination, but most 
importantly through indigenous knowledge and values which made the fight for freedom 
voluntary participation to those who felt oppressed.  
 
We can draw from the above and the findings in this thesis that the fear of lacking self-
determination inspires more vigour than the fear of being poor.  This is an affirmation that 
people in Africa, have at some point of their lives sacrificed their lives to defend or redeem 
their identities. It is thus fundamental to think of communication for development societies from 
their culture by placing them at the forefront of their communication and intervention activities 
(Mda, 1993).  Mda is not alone in calling for a link between communication and freedom as a 
starting point. Iorapuu (2008) also notes that people’s freedom, its enhancement and a sense of 
self-determination are the root of their ability to progress beyond just economic growth to 
include other aspects of their well-being (cf. Sen, 2000). What these authors tell us is that well-
being does not begin with material attributes but people’s ability and freedom to 
communicatively interact among themselves and with their environment to get the best out of 
both. They place the role of communication as part of the cultural process of raising self-
consciousness, engagement and participation in areas related to their aspirations within their 
environment. In that regard, these authors are positive that communication has a vital role to 
play in creating a form of participation needed to secure freedom to self-determine one’s well-
being.  Participation is no longer a matter of exclusion or inclusion in projects, but rather an 
outcome of endogenous cultural aspirations linked to self-determination, where communication 
plays the inspirational role to invoke creative capabilities of the people, their worldview and 
culture.  
 
The notion of recursive social action linked with self-determination as discussed in Giddens 
(1984), was partly evident in Kamaila Village, where the local traditional structures served to 
facilitate locally-driven response to needs. These structures also function to control and regulate 
behaviour in the process producing and reproducing social structures. Well-being becomes a 
means and an end, but most specifically a result of social practices ordered across space and 
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time (Giddens, 1984), individually or collectively repeated, thus reproducing the conditions that 
facilitate the form of participation needed to meet needs. The village then creates, acquires or 
reproduces knowledge needed to address local needs through reflexivity of individual 
behaviour or social transformation as the villagers continue to reflect, assess and adjust to the 
new contexts or achievements. The continuous generation or acquisition of knowledge 
organically enables and recreates or sustains social ordering and reorganization (Giddens, 
1984). However, what is vital to highlight in Kamaila Village, for example, is that the ability 
by individual villages to make choices and decisions show their agency, though it may be 
limited. Giddens (1984) concurs with Foucault (2003), that, knowledge and power are crucial 
in determining the direction of how villagers implement social action as agents. Archer (1995) 
has taken Giddens’ view further by arguing that structures or spaces in which individual 
villagers’ behaviour or social transformation is administered are produced and reproduced by 
the villagers’ ability to exercise agency through their actions and choices. From this 
theorization, spaces or structures are centres of both defining self-worth and meaning and arenas 
to express aspirations and courses of action, informed by the villagers’ lived-life and realities 
(Penderis, 2012). Dislocating the villagers from their spaces, undermines their power, 
knowledge and identities. 
 
Therefore the choice to seek self-determination is a matter of both personal and collective 
decision.  In such a case, when communication is used to inspire a locally-driven well-being, 
those considered to be poor cease to be an audience or message receivers. They become authors 
of their well-being, deciders of their fate and protagonists of their participatory actions. The 
case of the liberation struggle highlights this phenomenon where Africans no longer needed to 
delegate the liberation cause to others but allocated that responsibility to themselves and 
changed the course of their situation by assuming full responsibility for their liberation. Despite 
the fact that modern media then was under colonial management, traditional media proved a 
powerful tool which played a vital role in transmitting ideas through songs and dances, theatre 
and ritual dramas to mobilize individuals towards the liberation agenda. Such a social 
transformative process needs to be under the premise of sovereignty and autonomy. This kind 
of scenario obtains in Asian countries, particularly those that have managed to maintain their 
national or cultural identities in pursuit of achieving improved ways of life. However, what is 
missing in the fast growing media in Africa in general, and Malawi and Zambia in particular, 
are those independent ideas to spur a similar movement, given that the policy spaces and the 
dominant discourses on well-being are heavily and ideologically induced. The alignment of 
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national plans to global policies is an example of how neoliberal power is unwilling to allow 
freedom to self-determine as that would be tantamount to overturning its dominance (cf. Cox, 
1987). Breaking down the typology of global policy making gave testimony to how social 
relations and economic production are imposed and laid the foundation for understanding how 
capital’s interests reinforce certain production patterns, including the erosion of the autonomy 
of individuals, villagers and governments in Malawi and Zambia. These intricate relationships 
which converge in conventional discourse have made it impossible to squeeze in 
communication to achieve real empowerment.  
 
9.7 Conclusion 
The discussion in this chapter points to a discourse that safeguards neoliberal interests by 
bringing everyone under its control. Such a discourse predominates the MDGs more than its 
goal of addressing poverty. While the co-location of communication for development to address 
poverty reduction can be considered a precursor to participation, such participation recycles 
individuals into an institutionalised system of control. It was also noted that despite both 
participatory development and neoliberalism’s conceptualisation of equality, for as long as the  
villagers in Malawi and Zambia were marginalised and reduced to beneficiaries of development 
projects, they would not be self-empowered. That makes development a matter of endogenous 
power than an external donation by those who seek to cling to power by pretending that they 
can transfer part of it to the un-powered.  
 
This chapter also illustrated that despite communication having been co-opted into the 
neoliberal agenda, there are possibilities to re-position it to reformulate the discursively 
constructed poverty identity.  The approach proposed in this chapter takes into account that 
once communication revitalises the social identity knowledge frame, it is possible for 
individuals to start appreciating and utilising available resources and opportunities in realizing 
their aspirations.  Achieving this is thus an act of power, but one that is located within the 
individual’s social context. The next chapter provides the concluding discussion of the study.  
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Chapter Ten: A concluding discussion 
10.1 Introduction 
The goal of this study was to explore the extent to which communication for development was 
used to implement the MDGs projects in two villages in Malawi and Zambia respectively. The 
three chapters on findings have adequately answered the research questions set out in Chapter 
1. Research on the two thematic areas of study – poverty reduction and communication for 
development – has largely focused on the discourse and narratives that frame these concepts 
and their influence on well-being and participatory development. The purpose of this chapter is 
to conclude this study.  
 
The critical discourse analysis methodology and Cox’s (1987) critical approach enabled the 
study to unpack the MDGs discourse and their implications for policies and practices in Malawi 
and Zambia. The narrative analysis placed the dominant discourses on poverty in conversation 
with the villagers’ perception of poverty in general. Applying these methodologies enabled the 
researcher to confront questions on global governance, hegemony, communication and 
participatory theories in which international development policies are formulated, adopted and 
implemented, including how the MDGs were conceptualized. It also unpacked the narratives 
and discourses that frame the MDG and the UN Communication for Development Strategy and 
their implications for policies and the development practice in Malawi and Zambia. Findings 
on the intricacies in international policy formulation and implementation enabled the researcher 
to suggest a reformulation of communication for development.  
 
While the UN system prioritizes participatory development as a crucial enabler to reducing 
poverty, available research has yet to provide credible evidence on how participation in 
development projects can sustainably transform people’s lives. As this study concludes, the 
villages in Malawi and Zambia bear testimony that the villagers’ operationalisation of their 
individual and collective goals was influenced by their cultural and environmental contexts, of 
which social communication was part. It is on this premise that this study has concluded that 
the link between communication for development, participation and poverty reduction, is 
elusive, dramatized, and an act of faith as described in Cooke and Kothari (2001). By using 
Kamaila and Mwandama Villages as part of the units of analysis, the researcher was able to 
unpack some of the challenges and tensions associated with numerous theoretical assumptions 
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on integrating a top-down poverty-reduction model with horizontal communication and 
participation approaches. The ability of villagers to maintain double identity on their 
participatory role of being part of the NGO project, while running their normal lives outside the 
confines of the NGO project is one of the examples.   
  
10.2 Global and local perception of well-being 
Through the critical approach and the critical methodologies highlighted above, the researcher 
unpacked the global governance context in which the MDGs were formulated, adopted and 
implemented, as part of the first goal of this study. The researcher also illustrated how decision-
making power is centralized in the hands of global governance institutions such as the UN 
system, World Bank and IMF, who control on behalf of capital interests, the global discourses 
and narratives on poverty and the form of participation prescribed to overcome it. The UN 
system as a global governance institution occupies international centre stage making it an arena 
for major theoretical tensions. According to the UN system Charter, it brings all its member 
states together to address global problems because they require global solutions (cf. Deutsch, 
1953). This is despite the fact that member states and their various grassroots have not been 
consulted or understood before intervention programmes are initiated. In undertaking the global 
policy mandate, the UN system does that as a government authority mandated by the same 
member states to oversee and seek solutions to problems (Haas, 1958, 1961). However, as 
observed in this study, despite claims of equality of member states in the UN Charter, its policy 
positions and norms continue to be influenced by Western member states.  
 
In this study, the researcher argued that the power of western countries is not limited to 
influencing culture, but also material and financial power. It is the ideas of those who hold the 
power of money which influence global decision-making processes and prioritisation of global 
agendas. In Chapter 6, the researcher demonstrated that the UN system still has a long way to 
go before it can be an empowered global governance institution that has weaned itself of 
depending on western financial support and ideological bondage. It will need to take into 
account that the principle of respect for diversity is not congruent with the market-oriented 
neoliberal ideas. As long as funding occupies central role in deciding lifestyle in the global 
discourse of poverty reduction, the UN system will continue to be driven by economic growth 
interests as a means to end poverty.  The flow of knowledge and global policies will remain 
skewed against the rest of the world, within a global establishment where equality and respect 
for diversity are some of the key values of the UN system. How the group of western ministers 
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conceived the MDGs idea exemplifies how these ideas hide interests, before they are snuck into 
the UN General Assembly for adoption.  
 
Based on the above, the researcher cautioned that a similar scenario may have been repeated in 
the Sustainable Development Goals launched in September 2015 because of a tendency to build 
policies on pre-existing policy documents. These make participatory approaches difficult even 
though they are already impossible to implement within the UN system. For example, in 2014, 
ahead of the World Humanitarian Summit 59F60 to be held in 2016 in Istanbul, Turkey, the UNSG 
launched a consultation process from the grassroots to the high level to set the agenda to address 
future humanitarian challenges. This process has demonstrated that it is possible to involve 
different actors and sectors in the global policy formulation process largely because the field of 
humanitarian work is not epistemologically ring-fenced by several contentious interests and 
knowledge frames such as the PRSP, the logical framework, and the dollar-a-day indicator of 
poverty, all of which carry the goal of promoting neoliberalism. 
  
In making the above caution, the researcher considered that the way the current development 
ideas are framed is closely linked to funding which is connected to capital interests. These 
interests in turn seek to maximise profits by controlling the minds and resources of the 
developing societies via their constructed poverty. Consequently, the existence and acceptance 
of alternative views on poverty in the UN system becomes an impossible venture. Allowing or 
empowering the villagers to pursue their views on poverty would unsettle the neoliberal agenda. 
This is one reason all the policy spaces in Malawi and Zambia are heavily dominated by external 
power and knowledge. Thus, whatever remains of the participatory space in the global 
government is nothing but both platonic and insignificant.  
 
The researcher also demonstrated that ideas dominating debate at the global level and passed 
onto member states are by far inconsistent with what obtains at village level. Because global 
thinking on poverty is marinated by the conventional way of looking at poverty and the world, 
the discourses and narratives in the global ideas on poverty, makes us look at the villagers’ 
lifestyles as strange, different and therefore poor. Thus, the response to such poverty arising 
from these theoretical lenses of neoliberalism is no longer about equality or empowerment but 
an agenda of resemblance of culture. I also highlighted that the practice of collecting data 
                                                 
60 https://www.worldhumanitariansummit.org/whs_about (Accessed on 4 September 2015). 
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purportedly to understand the villagers’ lifestyles is always linked or designed to fulfilling 
NGOs’ pre-set goals and objectives which also draw their definitions of poverty from the global 
governance perspectives. Short-term surveys and assessments dominated poverty reduction 
practice in Mwandama and Kamaila Villages as part of creating rapport with the beneficiaries 
of projects. In many cases, it was described as participation, consultation or involvement of 
beneficiaries of projects. This raises questions on the possibilities of adopting grounded theories 
on poverty in subaltern groups within the broader domain of global governance theories.  
 
The researcher learnt that these villagers were knowledgeable about their lives which informed 
their world view. Such views cannot be ignored in exchange for a western lifestyle. Debate on 
both participation and the role of communication for development needs to focus on the 
subaltern groups such as the two villages than seek to improve message transmission efficiency 
of development models that have a documented history of failure. Further studies need to 
explore the gap that lies in the disparities between the global and local discourses and this is 
not to encourage another development from below model (cf. Makhoul, 1999). One lesson 
drawn from the Kamaila Village is that development is not a matter of climbing the ladder of 
progress as pursued by different development models such as the development from below or 
up. Neither is it about structures and diffusions as in modernization models, but is an organic 
process that arises from individual and communal aspirations.   
 
As noted in Chapter 6, 7 and 8, the researcher argues that structuring poverty reduction policies 
is tantamount to repositioning the economic growth model as the main driver of poverty 
definition with private sector funding being the only facilitator of its reduction. With the 
collocation of these narratives of poverty as a problem, income as a solution and economic 
growth as the enabler, the neoliberal discourse is allowed to thrive over other views and remain 
unchallenged. The researcher highlighted this in Chapter 7 and how the power of capital 
interests has co-opted ideas on poverty to diminish the ability of global and national 
governments to make appropriate decisions relevant to their contexts. The chapter also 
highlighted how citizen participation is discursively configured and limited to expressing 
views, securing jobs and other economic growth fringe benefits. Allowing economic growth to 
be the deciding factor means that addressing the form of poverty it ascribes is at the whim of 
those who control it in order to exploit local resources with the private sector hand, while 
providing funding for projects using their donor hand. Chapter 6 highlighted how Zambia 
suffered as a result of the same model.  
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From findings in Chapter 7 and 8, the researcher was able to categorise village life in the two 
countries in two ways – the local (traditional) and the global (modern). At village level and 
from their traditional perspective, a number of variables such as self-worth, gratification and 
ability to meet aspirations defined well-being. MDGs derive from a modernistic discourse and 
assess the villagers’ poverty based on indicators that do not necessarily derive from or apply to 
them. This erroneous assessment proceeds to put pressure on them to adjust their lifestyles from 
what they have been used to, following what neoliberalism is prescribing to them. For those 
without access to measurable economic income, even though they are content with their lives, 
they are placed under pressure to be part of the modern lifestyle. The economic income of the 
villages has implications on how they are viewed by authorities in countries where access to 
services is linked to economic conditions of the area. 
 
10.3 Understanding development 
One of the goals of this study was an assessment and analysis of the narratives and discourses 
that frame the MDG and the UN Communication for Development Strategy. The researcher 
identified, in Chapter 6, the narratives and discourses that underline poverty reduction 
knowledge in shaping its positions in the MDG framework and its implications on practice in 
the villages.  The researcher also established that western and capital interests’ knowledge 
dominates how poverty and ways of life must be understood which in fact stigmatises and 
discriminates local narratives on the same. This study found that the villagers in Malawi and 
Zambia were considered poor based on a constructed poverty than their lived experiences.  
 
Based on the findings in Chapter 6, the researcher proposes that it is high time the global 
community redefined the concept of poverty because its dollar-a-day labour relations indicator 
is both archaic and irrelevant to the present world and to different contexts. It was explained in 
Chapter 3 that the main deciding indicator of poverty has been dominant since it was pioneered 
by Booth (1887) and refined by Rowntre in 1920. That indicator only makes sense in western 
economies, where labour wages are calculated based on measurable production earnings and 
general cost of living, variables that do not apply to the villages in Malawi and Zambia. 
Indicators of contentment highlighted by the village such as self-worth, gratification and ability 
to meet aspirations, are not quantifiable and yet resources to meet them are readily available 
within their local environment. These disparities are noted in Chapter 7. However, that both 
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communication for development and poverty reduction, in their various models, have been part 
of the global agenda since the 1940s and yet the villagers remain unconverted, calls for 
rethinking on the relationship between communication and development.  
 
The UN system needs to reinvigorate its position that “human beings must respect one other, in 
all their diversity of belief, culture and language. Differences within and between societies 
should be neither feared nor repressed, but cherished as a precious asset of humanity” (MDG, 
para 6).  If villagers can attest achieving contentment along the lines of the indicators noted 
above through roles defined from their cultural and environmental context, then participation 
must be perceived from the same perspective. The responses by the Kamaila Villagers to the 
NGO project are another reason highlighting the need to revisit the current development 
thinking. It was noted that the role of each individual was defined by their local aspirations 
within a specific context.  They were also cognisant of the need to protect their space while 
ensuring they were part of the NGO project activities. From the villagers’ views, there were 
two types of development, their development and that by the NGOs. The point that needs to be 
raised here is how villagers remained closer to local than NGOs’ knowledge. Access to local 
free knowledge and natural resources gave each villager an equal opportunity to explore their 
potential, even though they felt, especially in Mwandama, that modernisation and colonisation 
had robbed them of their access to natural resources. Without taking into account how different 
communities perceive their well-being, the researcher concludes that development, in its current 
theorisation, is an extension of ideologically induced western capital interests. In addition, these 
interests seek to use poverty to pave way for fulfilling their profit motives as they enjoy free 
reign under the guise of providing opportunities to address poverty.  
 
10.4 Communication and behaviour change 
The researcher was able to highlight the extent to which the UN communication for 
development strategy was implemented in Malawi and Zambia and its implications in Kamaila 
and Mwandama Villages. Starting with a discourse analysis, this study has shown that the UN 
Communication for Development strategy is preoccupied with transferring knowledge from the 
centre to the periphery on the assumption that villagers, whose lifestyles are not like those of 
the west, are poor and need knowledge. The application of the strategy resembled Rogers’ 
(1962) diffusion model and is anchored within the MDG narrative of capacity building by 
transferring knowledge and resources to the villagers in Kamaila and Mwandama even when 
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there was no tangible historical evidence to sustain this approach. However, it was noted that 
social communication has always been an integral component of the villagers’ cultural 
ecosystem, responsible for local discourse production, exchange of knowledge, maintaining 
traditional practices and sustaining certain notions of community identity. The researcher also 
noted that it is through social communication that the villagers regenerated themselves and their 
identities by reproducing their culture. Not surprisingly, the NGOs operating in Kamaila and 
Mwandama had adopted the villagers’ traditional mode of social communication to propagate 
their neoliberal ideology on poverty and the way it should be eradicated. In Mwandama Village, 
for instance, there was evidence of the villagers dramatizing the adoption of new ways of life 
because of increased awareness. However, it was not clear whether their being part of the 
project was an attraction to the benefits or a belief that that was the right way of life.   
 
Kamaila Village was a stark contrast to Mwandama in that increased awareness had not 
translated into significant changes in behaviour. Villagers’ behaviour was largely influenced by 
their aspirations and local context than external NGO influence. They had remained more 
inclined towards their traditional ways of life than those of conventional development. Thus, it 
was ideas within their tradition that had a much larger influence on their behaviour and their 
reading of their context in relation to their world. In making this conclusion, the researcher 
challenges several assumptions in the field of media studies, especially on the power of media 
to change society. In the same vein, the researcher is questioning whether media studies 
scholarship must concern itself with analysing channels and messages instead of the power that 
drives them. In addition, pursuing that line of academic inquiry, would face challenges unless 
the villagers’ local context in which they receive such messages is understood first. Within that 
span of discussion, the main question this study raises is: why were the Mwandama Villagers 
more receptive to development ideas, while the Kamaila Villagers retained their lifestyle, 
despite pressure on them to adopt the same ideas? Could the difference be in the power of ideas 
or the magnitude of the problems faced? If the latter is true, then fear of suffering becomes 
another factor to take into account when analysing media effects. Perhaps, it explains why 
communication has been effective in responding to disease outbreaks than other areas.  
Alternatively, was maintaining a local identity more important to the Kamaila Villagers than 
the benefits brought by the NGO? Moreover, why was it the opposite in Mwandama Village? 
It was noted that in Kamaila, it was the symbiotic relationship between identity, behaviours and 
the context that was more at play in deciding participation than media effects.  By media effects, 
this study is referring to radio and other external and institutional forms of communication. As 
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it was noted in Chapter 8, the villagers in Kamaila had high respect for their own traditional 
channels of communication, of the link to their spiritual and ancestral reference points. 
 
10.5 Understanding participation 
The fourth goal of this study sought to critically examine the implications of the implementation 
of the UN Communication for Development strategy of MDG related project activities on 
participatory models. The researcher used the UNSG’s recommendation that to fast-track 
poverty reduction, communication is necessary to steer community participation, as the entry 
point to this study. In the process of analysing the assumed cause-effect relationship between 
communication, behaviour and practices, he interrogated different sets of theories such as 
hegemony, knowledge, power, and ideology. The researcher also used theories of media effects 
and participatory development to engage with the topic of this study. Through these theories 
and qualitative methodologies, he was able to demystify the widely held view that knowledge 
and communication lead to participation and therefore poverty reduction.  
 
It was also noted that communication might not have a direct impact on participation, behaviour 
or practices even though there may be remote and indirect influence on each other. How the 
villagers performed their roles within their local context highlights the operationalisation of 
their lives according to how they viewed it. The characterisation of their participation is directly 
linked to how they perceived contentment, from which they derived their locally set goals and 
ambitions. Hence, lack of progress on the MDGs as acknowledged in the UNSG’s report 
(2010), which justifies strengthening communication for development is not necessarily lack of 
participation or localisation and involvement in MDG-related projects. Involvement in the 
context of the projects means that villagers renounced their own locally sustainable lifestyles 
to partake in externally funded project-oriented lives. In Mwandama, for instance, for project 
officers, participation meant involvement in project activities, while for villagers participation 
had two meanings. First, participation was part of how they lived their daily lives and 
participation meant being part of an NGO project. The difference lies in that the first is 
voluntary and endogenic, while the second is coerced directly or indirectly by the perceived 
threat of hunger and poverty or the fear of losing the benefits from the NGOs. As Cohen (1985) 
opines, couching participation in such a context is an insidious form of inclusionary control that 
ensures easy management of those considered poor, while excluding them from real economic 
and political issues. While the goal of participation is to uncover local knowledge, communities 
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that have been excluded, marginalized or disqualified by conventional development discourse 
become more controlled and subjects of the socially constructed definitions of poverty.  In 
drawing this conclusion, the researcher raises concerns, especially considering that despite 
some challenges, the villagers’ local ways of life were more sustainable than those externally 
funded. Future studies on participation for development need to pay attention to the importance 
of understanding the two different types of participation and examine why the village 
participation is more sustainable than the NGO participation even though the latter wields more 
economic and political power than the former. This is necessary to inform thinking on 
participation and poverty reduction as it was difficult to deduce if the villagers believed in or 
bought into participating in project activities by the NGOs. Only the Kamaila Villagers 
confirmed that in some cases, their participation in projects was only to impress NGOs and the 
project officers, because they viewed projects as part-time and passing, hence did not need to 
give them full-time attention.  
 
10.6 Implications of poverty reduction discourse 
A critical discourse analysis in Chapter 6 yielded insights on how power constructs the poverty 
problem before it summons the UN system’s member states to rally behind its ideas. These 
implications go beyond imposition of ideas via the global governance arena to include how 
member states are coerced to comply by aligning their national plans with the global policy 
positions. In the case of Malawi and Zambia, compliance meant that their national and local 
policy spaces were occupied by foreign knowledge and governed by external rules, resulting in 
the loss of power by the governments. Once governments lose their power to make decisions, 
it becomes impossible for the same government to empower its own people. In addition, in that 
context, participation is framed according to the whims of those who control the discourses and 
narratives, no longer those who are viewed as poor and underprivileged.  The sovereignty of 
states and the ability to live alternative lifestyles is diminished.  
 
As highlighted in various chapters in this study, neoliberalism is at the centre of the poverty 
reduction discourse at all levels. This is notwithstanding that this discourse did not speak to the 
local realities in the villages in Malawi and Zambia. The narrative analysis methodology was 
instrumental in complementing the critical discourse analysis but most importantly, 
demonstrating that modernization models and neoliberal discourse were only successful in 
achieving their goal of pushing through their agenda of profit making and not addressing 
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poverty. Zambia for instance, after several years of SAPs, found its people poorer than before 
and yet the economic dashboard looked viable.  
 
Unless local knowledge on well-being, including the grounding of communication within the 
same local knowledge, is viewed as part of local, national and global policies, the researcher 
concludes that the current poverty reduction framework as it is in the MDGs is nothing but a 
myth that is serving the interests of neoliberalism. As observed in this study, inclusion in formal 
project activities and structures of governance displaces people from their cultural economies. 
In addition, traditional communities are not traditional from their view but to an external world 
that assesses communities through neoliberal lenses. Thus, what has been referred to as 
traditional in this study is to the villagers their current way of life.  They are a dynamic and 
different group who do not passively wait for external intervention to address their local 
problems. They are not unthinking. 
 
Villagers have their own means of communication which they have historically applied to 
acquire knowledge. The researcher demonstrated that the transfer of knowledge using whatever 
technology does not naturally lead to behaviour change. The villagers’ local forms of 
knowledge, which define their well-being even though they are not acknowledged by the 
NGOs, are more sustainable and adaptable. Grounding of the local practices in the 
conceptualization of well-being makes it different from what dominates development theory. 
The strength of local well-being lies in its grounding on local context and the flexibility to 
maintain individual and communal heterogeneity, making it more adaptable and adjustable to 
new scenarios while maintaining ties with social networks for purposes of social cohesion. It is 
on this account that the researcher was able to propose a reformulation of communication for 
development as an important corrective approach to what is encapsulated in the UNSG’s 
recommendation on the implementation of the MDG-related projects. Understanding of local 
well-being and how it is organically constructed, with a focus on the individuals before they 
are members of the community, is the platform from which the role of communication must be 
derived. Therefore, consultation with the villagers or collecting their views may not be adequate 
to understand their lifestyles.  
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10.7 Challenges of communication for development 
The first challenge communication for development faces today is its inability to be a 
standalone theoretical discipline unattached to other fields of study. When we consider Freire’s 
(1994) view on dialogic communication, social communication remains a crucial socialising 
agent. It therefore remains the duty of the leadership of states, communities and individuals to 
play their role in decision-making and driving locally relevant policy-making processes. While 
within the UN system, Communication for Development strategy in the MDGs is configured to 
ensure inclusion, it was observed that the very act of inclusion reinforces control over states 
and individuals and creates an exclusion from their own local context, as they became part of 
economic growth (Cohen, 1985). The use of communication for development to alter behaviour 
as a way of bringing the excluded into poverty reduction projects, is thus reinforcing control of 
those seen as poor. 
 
Among the key challenges facing communication for development in Africa is that most of the 
literature is written from western perspectives. There is still very little literature that looks at 
communication for development from a non-western perspective. Secondly, communication for 
development as a field of study has not been able to detach itself from facilitating institutional 
ideas in the field of development studies, health and human rights. It is noted in Chapter 3 that 
lack of funding continues to inhibit academic studies on communication. This is to the extent 
that most of the recent literature on communication for development is either commissioned by 
donors or NGOs to improve project efficiency, largely to integrate diffusion models into project 
goals (cf. Mefalopulos, 2003, 2006, 2008; Servaes and Malikhao, 2006; Waisbord, 2000); 
Hemer; Tufte, 2005). This consequently makes it difficult to disentangle participation that is 
delivered by this model of communication for development from conventional development, 
especially when we consider the pressure from the civil society organisations who demand 
states to comply with global norms. Chapter 6 highlights the difficulties in pursuing goals 
relevant to local realities as they are largely constrained by global norms, social and cultural 
practices and structures that mainly safeguard economic interests. The Communication for 
Development Working Group is simply a technical group comprised of employees of different 
UN agencies and a few NGOs who wield little political power, and yet are in a position to set 
a global policy agenda. In addition, very few, if any, academic institutions offer training on 
Communication for Development in Africa.  
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One of the barriers facing communication for development research in its role of promoting 
participatory development is its over-reliance on the assumption that poverty is addressed when 
there is balance of power and equitable distribution of wealth. Such an illusion has occupied 
central stage in the UN system since its formation. It has only served to strengthen an otherwise 
theoretically and practically weak claim, that those who wield little power have limited or no 
opportunities to achieve their wellbeing, because they are excluded from key governmental 
decision-making processes, and that their knowledge is considered insignificant. Addressing 
poverty through communication for development as a result, has oscillated between knowledge 
and power transfer, while neglecting the importance of understanding local realities as a starting 
point. The notions of behaviour, social change or inclusion at whatever level, are still significant 
exercises of external power whose function implies some form of control over groups and 
individuals (Kothari in Cooke and Kothari, 2001). As noted in earlier chapters, radio 
programming on poverty reduction in Africa has largely depended on western donor funding, 
compromising its ability to be objective, independent and autonomous. For example, both radio 
stations interviewed during data collection for this study indicated that their poverty reduction 
radio programming was either funded or provided by donors and NGOs. Radio stations that 
should be promoting different views of issues related to well-being are handed over to donors 
and NGOs.  
 
One of the key recommendations from this study is that addressing poverty in Africa should 
not be left in the hands of the global policies, but must be initiated from the grassroots. In 
making this recommendation, the researcher draws inspiration from the rise of China since 
1979, when the country chose to transform its communist ideology. Under the communist 
ideology, the Chinese government promoted the values of a classless society and common 
ownership of the means of production.  However, between the 1980s and 1990s, family-based 
business models started emerging out of what were thought to be cooperatives in the field of 
agriculture. As James Kynge, (2006) writes, communities secretly subdivided the land allocated 
to a community cooperative into family plots. And each family made a decision of what they 
wanted to plant and how they wanted to use their land. Illegal as it was against the constitution, 
this marked the birth of the family-based business model which during the time comprised 
85.4% of the private sector in that country, making China one of the fastest growing economies 
in the world 60F61.  While the government was aware of these developments as illegal and inimical 
                                                 
61 http://china.org.cn [Accessed on 19 October 2014] 
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to government policy, they allowed them to proceed as they economically contributed to 
individual, family and national development. Today, family businesses contribute significantly 
to China’s economy and have freed more than half a billion of its population out of poverty (p. 
14-15). In this context, communication goes beyond just communicating. It becomes an 
instrument that facilitates the reconstruction of realities and opportunities for different 
stakeholders. The researcher takes from Mefalopulos (2006) who posits that participation 
resides in the multiplicity of realities which need to be considered instead of ignored or 
corrected by imposing ‘proper’ perspectives. The assumption that there is only one correct 
reality is a major barrier to development (Anyaegbunam, et al., 1998). 
 
10.8 Contribution to media studies  
In this study, the researcher has touched on the contentious questions on media effects, most 
specifically assessing the link between communication and participation. Communication is 
understood in this study as channels that enable the transmission and exchange of ideas within 
a particular setting. In whatever ways communication is understood, what was revealed in 
Chapter 8 is that it is the power behind the message that makes it more powerful than the 
channels that convey it. Several media scholars have made loose arguments that media 
messages can effectively alter behaviour when conveyed in the right context and space (cf. 
McQuail 2010; Livingstone 1996; McDonald 2004).  
 
The current practice of communication for development has lagged behind especially in its 
analysis of media-effects (cf. McQuail 1983). The theoretical position encapsulated from the 
UNSG’s call for integration of communication into the MDG-related projects mirrors that of 
Lasswell’s classical model of communication of ‘Who says What to Whom in Which channel 
and to What effect’ (Lasswell, 1948). However, behaviour scientists and social marketing 
theorists may have a different take on this debate, especially when considering how the 
Mwandama Villagers have adopted the MVP projects. In addition, it is not clear whether they 
are part of the project activities because they are communicatively convinced or due to the 
perceived benefits of the project.  
 
Regardless, Katz’s (1980) discussion of communications theory, especially his  postulation that 
media studies is tied between active and passive audiences, though weak, gives a useful 
grounding  for understanding how individuals consume messages in different contexts. In 
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Kamaila Village, the researcher concludes that mass media such as the radio station had little 
or no effect, but local ideas through their local media forms impacted behaviour. Chapter 7 and 
8 elaborated on this and it was noted that villagers viewed national radio stations as foreign to 
them. Again, the emphasis in Kamaila was on attachment with ancestry, spiritualism and 
traditional authority, which together, formed the broader idea of villagers’ culture. Drawing 
from the above arguments, the researcher proposes that local culture and how it is 
operationalised must be the ontology where communication for development occupies the role 
of facilitating the exchange and transmission of knowledge with the agenda of promoting 
progress and not change. In discussions on ontology, the researcher borrowed from different 
knowledge frames in which the social identity knowledge is identified as an entry point for 
positioning communication for development. In making this proposition, the researcher takes 
the view that communication is an inherent part of the cultural ecosystem from which 
individuals derive their behaviour.   
 
10.9 Areas for further research 
The three areas discussed in this study still need further research. First, the notion of poverty or 
well-being needs to be addressed and understood from local perspectives and through local 
lenses before conclusions are drawn. Doing so is not a matter of basic assessment or surveys 
but rather, through comprehensive academic research. Second, regarding the notion of 
participation in achieving local well-being, it may be useful to conduct further research on how 
individuals in village settings action their well-being and aspirations, including how these and 
local contexts configure human behaviour within the context of communicative ecologies. In 
the field of sociology, there is significant literature on how environmental and social context 
shape behaviour (Gidden, 1984; Haralambos and Holborn, 2008) but there remains little or no 
research on how different modes of local social communication can form part of 
communication for development at grassroots level. Another area of study is how 
communication for development can be implemented outside international development policy, 
taking into account progress made in the field of post-development studies. That would mark 
the beginning of a policy shift on communication for development, towards revitalizing 
subaltern groups to reclaim their social power and rely on their knowledge to meet local needs. 
There is need for further critical studies on global poverty reduction policies such as the MDGs, 
as they tend to be taken for granted and regarded as given, holy and therefore left uncriticised. 
So far, there has been very little literature critically looking at the MDGs and their implications 
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on culture, production and consumption. Due to lack of studies questioning the relevance of 
global policies, the UN system has proceeded to conceive the Sustainable Development Goals 
to succeed the MGDs in a similar fashion and under the same discourses and narratives.  
 
Chapter 8 raised a pertinent question on the relationship between media effects and behaviour 
as well as between policy ideas versus practices. Further research in the area will benefit the 
field of media and policy studies. The numerous reviews and critiques of media effect theories 
have evaded the point that the power of messages lies in ideas that are being transmitted and 
the power of the actor behind them which calls for analysis of the embedded intentions in ideas 
being transmitted. The power of the media messages, or lack thereof, is determined by several 
factors, including the political power behind the messages. 
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Appendices 
 
Appendix 1: List of interviews 
 
Malawi 
Dr. Rodwell S. Mzonde, Ministry of Finance and Planning, Government of Malawi, 28 May 2015 (email 
interview) 
Patrick Kamwendo, UNDP Malawi, 25 May 2015 (email interview) 
Dr. Andrew T. Daudi, Millennium Promise Alliance, Malawi, 28 April (face to face interview) 
Mr. Joseph Chibwe, Millennium Promise Alliance Malawi, 28 April (face to face interview) 
Mr. Mzati Nkolosa: Development Broadcasting Unit, Malawi Broadcasting Corporation, 19 June 2015 
(email interview) 
Mwandama Villagers 28-29 April (face to face and focus group interviews) 
 
Zambia 
Ms. Rekha Shrestha, UNDP Communication Specialist, Zambia, 10 June 2015 (email interview) 
Ms. S Banda. Ministry of Finance and National Planning, Zambia, 28 May 2015 (email interview) 
Mr. Edmund Chilanzi Mulwanda, Water for Kids 1 May 2015 (face to face interview) 
Radio one, Zambia Broadcasting Corporation, 28 May 2015 (email interview) 
Kamaila Villagers 1-3 April 2015 (face to face and focus group interviews) 
 
Appendix 2: Interview Questions 
 
Interview Questions 
1.1 Questions for United Nations Resident Coordinators in Malawi and 
Zambia 
Question 1:  Describing development/Poverty reduction 
 How does the UN system in this country describe poverty and development?  
 What are the key factors that influence this description of these two concepts?  
Question 2: Planning process 
 Can you describe the poverty reduction planning process by the UN system and how it 
compliments Government poverty reduction plan? 
 To what extent does the UN policy formulation process ensure participation of member states 
in terms of accessing policy and planning spaces? 
 To what extent does national and local knowledge from this country influence the UN system’s 
thinking on global poverty reduction planning? Can you give examples where possible?  
Question 3: Understating participation 
 To what extent is both the UN system and Government processes in this country inclusive and 
participatory?   
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 What is the UN system’s understanding of participation?  
 What extent are views of individuals and communities taken into account? 
 What is your assessment of this form of participation? 
Question 4:  Linking communication with participation 
 The UN system adopted a Communication for Development Strategy in 2007 which is aimed at 
promoting community participation in implementing the MDGs.  Can you describe how the UN 
expects communication to promote participation?  
 What communication for development methodologies, approaches and programmes have been 
used to ensure communication promotes participation? 
Question 5: Assessment of progress 
 Since both the MDGs and UN communication for development have been in place, what is your 
assessment of the progress thus far? 
 As the MDGs period comes to an end this year, what is the post MDGs plan?  
 If there is a new framework, to what extent is the UN system going to ensure or has ensured 
participation of member states, especially developing countries, in developing the new 
framework?  
 In your view what are the opportunities and challenges faced by developing member states in 
participating in the formulation and implementation of the UN global poverty reduction plans 
and their own national plans? 
1.2 Questions for the Governments (Permanent Secretaries in the Ministries 
of Finance and national development planning) 
Question 1:  Understanding poverty reduction/development 
 How does the government describe poverty and development? What influences the description 
of these two concepts?   
 How does the government think development should be achieved? 
Question 2: The planning process 
 Can you describe the poverty reduction planning process by the government?  
 How does the government planning process relate with the goals of the UN system? 
 Does your government participate in global planning process? Can you please explain? 
 Give you elaborate on the relationship between the government and the UN system? 
Question 3: Understanding influences 
 To what extent do government processes collaborate with those of the UN system and how are 
the processes participatory?   
 What is the government’s understanding of participation? 
 How do local priorities shape national planning? If it does, how is it done? 
 How do global priorities influence national planning? Can you explain? 
Question 4:  Understanding of communication and participation 
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 The UN system adopted a Communication for Development Strategy in 2007 which is 
aimed at promoting community participation in implementing the MDGs. Can you 
describe how the government has integrated communication strategies to promote 
participation?  
 Which communication for development methodologies, approaches and programmes 
have been used to ensure communication promotes participation? 
 Do you think communication can play an important role in transforming society? Can 
you please explain?  
Question 5: Progress assessment 
 Since both the MDGs and UN communication for development have been in place, what 
is your assessment of the progress thus far?  
 As the MDGs period comes to an end this year, what is your government’s post MDGs 
plan? If there is any, can you describe how it took or takes the views of individuals and 
communities into account?   
 
1.3 Questions for Development agencies/NGOs (Millennium Promise Project 
in Mwandama Village, Malawi and Water for Kids in Kamaila, Zambia) 
 
Question 1:  Understanding poverty/development 
 How does your organisation describe poverty and development?  
 What are the key factors that influence this description of these two concepts?  
Question 2: The planning and participation 
 Can you describe the poverty reduction planning process by your organisation?  
 To what extent does your planning process collaborate with or compliment that of the 
UN system and the government and how the processes are participatory?   
 How does your NGO participate in the UN system’s planning process?  
 How do you assess project participation? 
 What is your organisation’s understanding of participation? 
Question 3:  Understanding communication and participation 
 The UN system adopted a Communication for Development Strategy in 2007 which is 
aimed at promoting community participation in implementing the MDGs.  Can you 
describe how your organisation has integrated communication strategies to promote 
participation?  
 Which communication for development methodologies, approaches and programmes 
have been used to ensure communication promotes participation? 
 Do you think communication is an important in influencing participation? Can you 
please explain? 
Question 5: Progress assessments 
 Since you have integrated communication and participation in your programming, what is your 
assessment of the progress thus far?   
 Can you attribute progress or lack of it, to participation/communication? Explain. 
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 As the MDGs period comes to an end this year, what is your NGO’s post MDGs plan? If there 
is any, can you describe how it takes the views of individuals and communities into account and 
hot it links with the UN and national development priorities?   
 In your view what are the opportunities and challenges faced by individuals and communities 
in accessing project planning processes, including your NGO’s, and participating in the 
formulation and implementation of poverty reduction plans? 
 
1.4 Questions for Radio stations (Zambia Nation Broadcasting Corporation 
-Radio and Malawi Broadcasting Corporation- Radio 1) 
 
Question 1:  Understanding poverty/development 
 How does your radio station describe poverty and development?  
 What are the key factors that influence this description of these two concepts?  
Question 2: Radio programmes 
 What development/ poverty reduction radio programmes do you run on radio station?   
 Can you describe the objectives of those radio programmes?  
Question 3: Media and development projects 
 To what extent is your programming promoting participation or participatory? 
 How does the programming collaborate with the UN/NGO/Government projects?  
 What is your radio station’s understanding of participatory development? 
Question 4:  Media and participation 
 The UN system adopted a Communication for Development Strategy in 2007 which is aimed at 
promoting community participation in implementing the MDGs.  Can you describe how your 
radio station has complimented these efforts to promote participation?  
 Do you think radio is a powerful tool to reduce poverty in your country?  
 What media methodologies, approaches and programmes have been used to ensure that radio 
programming promotes participation and poverty reduction? 
Question 5: Progress assessment 
 Since you included development radio programming, what is your assessment of the progress 
thus far? 
 Can you attribute progress or lack of it, to your programming? Give examples. 
 
1.5 Questions for the communities/focus groups in Mwandama and Kamaila 
Villages 
Question 1:  Understanding poverty/development 
 What is your understanding of poverty or development?  
 What are the factors that inform this description?   
 How was wellbeing described traditionally/historically?  
 How do people in this village survive?  
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Question 2: Development projects and local well-being 
 What development/ poverty reduction projects exist in this village?  
 Can you describe the objectives of the development projects?  
 How do these differ or compliment your daily life needs? 
Question 3: Understanding community participation 
 Do you understand the MDGs, when they were adopted and their content? 
 Can you describe how they were formulated? 
 To what extent do you think the MDG development projects in your area are participatory?  
 What is your understanding of participation in development projects?  
 How would describe participation in the absence of development projects? 
 Can you describe how you would survive in a situation where there are no development 
projects?  
 What activities do you undertake to achieve this? 
Question 4: Factors influencing lifestyle  
 What factors influence your lifestyle most? 
Question 5:  Media and behaviour relationship 
 Do you have access to media and which media do you access? 
 What are the media-related development projects you have been exposed to and what has been 
their influence on behaviour and practices in this village?  
 How do you describe the influence of traditional media on the behaviour and practices of the 
communities in the villages?  
 What is the significance of these to supporting local/traditional well-being of the people in this 
village? 
Question 6: Progress assessment 
 Since different media approaches have been used in this village, what is your assessment of the 
situation so far?   
 Can you attribute progress or lack of it, to the media? Give examples. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
